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Special Issue on
NATO and European Security

with articles by

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
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Special Issue on NATO and European Security

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Reflections on the Quarter

The Atlantic Alliance: Retrospect and Prospect

SINCE retrospective scenarios can be made even more selective than futuristic ones, the ifs of history are far more intriguing and immeasurably less ambiguous than that mixed bag of tricks, real history. Since NATO has never been put to the test of war, it is easy to argue that the threat of war never existed. In theory, especially in vulgarized Hegelian theory, it is possible to assert that what has not happened in history could not have happened anyway.

In the last resort, the ethical justification and practical usefulness of NATO stand and fall with the West's perception of the Soviet threat to Europe. If the West, after World War II, perceived that threat correctly, then the decision to create NATO flowed logically from historical objective reality. But no one has yet been able to understand objective historical reality fully, and a degree of uncertainty remains. This uncertainty has gnawed at the vitals of NATO ever since its inception. During the first decade of NATO's existence, its members could live with it, and they relied on the original model rather than speculating on alternative security schemes. Of late, uncertainty about Soviet purpose has been growing mightily, and revisionism is now threatening to overwhelm the orthodoxies of the alliance.

Foreign policy making, like any other rational activity, proceeds by simplification. If it did not, rational decisions could not be made. In democratic societies, the problem of how to present this process to the average citizen, presumed to be knowledgeable but not knowledgeable enough to do without professional expertise, is fraught with many technical difficulties and moral dilemmas. The tendency, in the present age of public-relations technology, is for all large organizations, national and international, to develop their particular mythologies. It is these mythologies, rather than the record of performance, that vest the organization with legitimacy—and help to sell the product. In certain cases, for example that of the United Nations, the gap between myths and metaphors on the one hand and operational realities on the other hand is perilously wide.

The gap between myth and substance is far narrower in NATO. Even so it was natural that the participating governments should endow NATO with reductionist myths. One of these was the ever-present danger of an all-out military attack against Western Europe—the Soviet tanks filling their radiators with water from the Loire and the Tiber. True, this specter of a Soviet attack, like most myths, was rooted in the haunting memory of historical transactions. In World War II, the Soviets displayed the traditional Russian propensity for the use of crude manpower. In France and Italy the Communist Party rode the tide of anti-fascist, anti-collaborationist sentiment and widespread economic distress. In communist parlance, the revolutionary situation seemed "ripe."

Who can now prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that Stalin, particularly after his 1948 squeeze on Berlin, could have resisted the temptation to exploit Europe's military vacuum had NATO not begun to fill it? Or prove that Stalin was unlikely to stake the "sure thing," i.e., control of East-Central Europe, on an all-European gamble? Although massive Western war aid, enormous war booty and plentiful slave labor had sped the recovery of the Soviet Union, the Soviets had not yet been able to re-equip their hard-used military forces, and the battered Soviet economy could hardly have sustained the logistics of a large-scale offensive. But such an offensive might not have been needed against a largely disarmed Western Europe. Perhaps, because of the American atomic monopoly, the Soviets deemed the odds too heavily weighted against them. Yet, undoubtedly, the specter of the Red Army sweeping over Europe strengthened popular support for NATO.

It is just possible that Western statesmen did not contrive this and other myths about Soviet purpose in order to rouse their peoples' sense of urgency. Apparently the Western governments themselves had only the foggiest notion of communist conflict techniques, and hence of Soviet strategy. Certainly, what is past is prologue: NATO is rooted in conflict situations which, despite significant variations, have shaped the enduring pattern of West-East confrontation to this day.

NATO was created in the wake of the Greek civil war and the Czechoslovak coup d'état of 1948. These events belong to the Strategy of the Indirect Approach category. They set the standard for communist subversion, directed and supported (as in the case of Czechoslovakia) from nearby Soviet control posts, or (as in the case of Greece) from an allied communist state, Yugoslavia. Soviet operations against West Berlin and in Cuba are classic examples of the Strategy of the Indirect Approach which, from the outset, should have been a primary concern of NATO. Scanning the presently available evidence, one cannot now argue convincingly that the Western governments ever grasped the complex interaction between insurgent forces operating locally and Soviet-supplied matériel, between formal diplomacy and political warfare, between the uses of low-level violence and strategic blackmail. It is not clear that they understand the "system" even today.

As now can be seen, NATO has suffered grievously from its success—and from this success being taken for granted. It has suffered even more from that lack of sophistication which reduces the public discourse of Western statecraft to hardened platitudes. The masses of the Western peoples cannot be blamed for ignoring the real threats to the Atlantic Alliance and, hence, its real usefulness. Myths have taken the place of sober explanations. Since the political leaders are content to live with myths, and since no one is more myth-receptive than the West's opinion-making elite, only the logic of events now speaks for NATO. Unfortunately, the logic of events speaks with a small voice, and the cacophony of pseudo-events is apt to drown it out.

As the striking power of the Strategic Air Command shifted from bombers to missiles, the mission of the American nuclear deterrent became to forestall a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States. But only within the political and strategic environment created by NATO can the American deterrent be said to have contained the expansion of Soviet power in Europe. Insofar as NATO has thwarted the Strategy of the Indirect Approach and has prevented the release of tensions within the communist bloc into foreign conquest, NATO has helped to cause the disintegrative process that has loosened the Soviet grip on the satellite states and weakened the hold of individual communist regimes on their respective peoples. Again, we are forced back upon the perilous terrain of conjecture. The progress of industrialization and organization and the conflict of generations, unaided by external pressures, might have set in motion those changes in communist Europe that have slackened the dogmatic zeal of communism and thus "relaxed tensions." Yet, it is not recommended to read history out of context. The real and putative changes in the communist world have occurred within an international environment of which NATO was a part. Indeed, in the perception of communist leaders, it was a major part.

II

From the outset, a rationale of NATO was the expectation that the pooled power of the West could induce the Soviets to accede to a European settlement conducive to individual freedom and world peace. Thus, NATO was conceived as a stage in international evolution, not as an end in itself. Semantic novelties do not necessarily give us a clearer understanding of the real world as it is and as it has been for a long time. The idea of NATO as a bargaining instrument is not novel, though the words for it might be. NATO was designed to open "bridges" toward the East. In the beginning it was thought that the bridging arc had to rest upon two equally stable platforms, namely, a powerful united West and a stable East likely to be powerful, but also (so it was hoped) prepared to restore the civil liberties and national freedoms which as a result of World War II had been ground down by Soviet power. In the more distant future, Western statesmen could then perceive the prospect of profound political and social changes in the Soviet Union itself: the Soviet people, wearied by the exactions and contradictions of communism, would enter the community of free peoples.

Were these assumptions and contingent expectations altogether unreasonable? Of course they were not. In the wake of de-Stalinization, political and social change swept the East. Cracks opened in the once monolithic empire. The fundamental assumptions stood the test of time: the Atlantic Alliance created a framework of security within which the West achieved unprecedented levels of widely distributed prosperity, and this fact has done more to expose the fallacies of communist doctrine and to weaken the authority of communist rulers than any other. Whatever else NATO did or did not accomplish, it provided the psychological *ambiance* of European economic recovery.

By restoring the balance of power in Europe, NATO laid the basis for negotiation leading toward a European settlement. The overreaching issue of such a settlement is now, as it has been during the last twenty years, the unification of Germany. A European settlement to this day eludes the West. Ever since the early 1960's, U.S. diplomacy has sought to bypass this and related political issues and to bridge the chasm of the Cold War by arms control agreements, bilaterally negotiated with the Soviet Union. The wisdom and efficacy of this approach stand or fall on one assumption: that the political issues which gave rise to the East-West confrontation can be healed or at least painted over by agreements which reduce the danger of war between the two superpowers.

The massive impact of the United States on the cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance suggests more than a casual relationship between the vicissitudes of alliance solidarity and the fundamental change in priorities of U.S. foreign policy. It would have been surprising if NATO could have survived unaltered the United States' change of preferences. Without prejudicing the case for this change, it is legitimate to question here a view widely held, i.e., that Western Europe's perception of the decrease in the Soviet threat has weakened the cohesiveness of the alliance. An alternative hypothesis needs to be tested: the relaxation of Western Europe's posture in NATO is a function of American perceptions and policy preferences.

In foreign policy, timing is of the essence. A strong and cohesive Atlantic Alliance might well have served as the diplomatic means—"the bridge"—for reaching a European settlement. Once that settlement had been achieved, NATO qua a military alliance could have been dissolved, and America and Europe, if they were so minded, could have moved toward other forms of cooperation. It is, however, difficult to see how the disintegration of NATO, in anticipation of a settlement yet to be concluded, will strengthen the bargaining power of the West. Viewed from this perspective, U.S. foreign policy is tantamount to a gamble: the loosening up of the communist bloc is expected to compensate for the disintegration of NATO. Even if events were moving in this direction, this extrapolation leads us far away from the conception of NATO as a functioning military alliance or "crisis manager"—so far, indeed, that what is left of NATO is unlikely to find its way back home.

Not the least stake of this gamble on the mutuality of dissolution is the future of Germany. NATO created the framework for the integration of the German Federal Republic into the community of Western Europe. West Germany has progressed from membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union to membership in the European Economic Community. The analogy of NATO as a lever of change in the East holds for West Germany as well. We do not know how Germany would have fared in the hypothetical NATO-less world; we do know that the political and economic development of the Federal Republic unfolded within an international environment of which NATO formed the core. The importance of NATO to West Germany has been reciprocated by the importance of West Germany to NATO. The awareness of this community in fate has been an indispensable element in the evolution of a democratic Germany. If it were only for this consideration (and not for others such as the strategic geography of Europe), the dissolution of NATO would be fraught with incalculable consequences. No one knows what a neutralized, demilitarized Germany, united or divided, would be like. There is no dearth of scenarios such as the Rapacki Plan and its many variations.

In recent years the Warsaw Pact countries have set forth other "European security" proposals. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, meeting in Budapest on March 17, called for a "European conference to consider questions of European security and peaceful cooperation." The idea of a European security system, Soviet style, has been unveiled, with slight modifications, at various times. No doubt, there are all kinds of people in Europe—young, middle-aged, old — who have found the idea an appealing one. Certainly, a European security system that would issue from a settlement of the major political problems created by the advance of Soviet power to Central and Southeastern Europe would lie not only in Europe's but also in our own best interest.

During the last twenty-five years, the Soviets have held on to their positions in Europe, gained by conquest. The Western powers, led by the United States, have provided those defense arrangements on which, during these years, the balance of power in Europe has come to rest. In this sense, a European security system exists now and has existed ever since the founding of NATO. Neither the United States nor its European allies has tried to upset this balance of power to the detriment of Soviet security interests. Insofar as the withdrawal of France from NATO has tended to disturb the balance, the net result has favored the Soviets.

The increase in Soviet conventional capabilities, most of which are deployed against the West, appears to have further tipped the European power balance in favor of the USSR. In Europe, most strategic analysts are agreed that the forward deployment of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia not only compensates for the alleged unreliability of the Czechoslovak forces (which were never armed with nuclear weapons), but, together with the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine of intervention, increases Soviet political-military pressure upon Western Europe, notably the German Federal Republic.

These developments do not seem to have improved the climate in which negotiations about a European security system, such as that suggested by the Soviets and their allies, could be carried on. Certainly, the Soviets could furnish solid proof of their earnest interest in a European security system by returning to the *status quo ante,* i.e., the balance of forces existing in, let us say, April 1968. Finally, the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean has tended to destabilize the informal system which, for over twenty years, has signified European security.

The negotiation of a meaningful European security system will take many years. Even to begin this immense and laborious task will be impossible unless a real psychological détente precedes it. Of late, Soviet activities have generated new psychological tensions. The least the Soviets can be expected to do, if they seriously desire such negotiations, is to cleanse the atmosphere of the fallout from their menacing initiatives.

III

Alliances consisting of more than two members confront two related problems, namely, those of size and motion—how large the membership of the alliance should be, and how the alliance should proceed toward its goal.

Too small a coalition might not be strong enough to accomplish its purpose and might suffer defeat; too large a coalition might be unwieldy and riven by factional differences. In theory, it is possible to define the "optimality" of an alliance; in practice, the leaders of an alliance are apt to bid for all likely adherents, and alliances, once they have been put together, develop a bandwagon effect: some of the states that did not join when the alliance was formed or when it was still weak now "want in," either to share in the gains of the alliance or to divert from themselves the retribution the founding members might mete out to the latecomer, the trimmer, or simply the weak.

Alliances are formed for a specific purpose: to upset the status quo, or to maintain it by deterring the likely aggressor or defeating him in war. Sooner or later this aim is either accomplished or defeated, depriving the alliance of its *raison d'être*—unless other common concerns have taken the place of the original objective. Even while the ostensible purpose of the alliance still enlists the pledged collaborative efforts of the members, more or less subtle changes in the allies' perceptions of that common purpose impinge upon the behavior of the alliance: its "personality" changes—and the attrition of time and other variables alters the purpose itself. No matter how constant its purpose, an alliance must adapt itself to changes in the international environment of which its members, as well as nations that are not its members, are parts.

Not that everything in the international environment changes as significantly or as quickly as some revolutionary doctrines will have it. A good many things do not. The inertia of the international system is much greater than historical pragmatism allows. Alliances that have existed for a long time and were intended to be permanent, have always reached a critical threshold: on this side of it lies stagnation and ultimately dissolution; beyond it lies another evolutionary stage—the creation of a new unitary institution. In brief, alliances among sovereign nations either disintegrate or grow into federations, closer unions. The choice is between moving forward or backward, and not between either of these alternatives and standing still.

The Atlantic Alliance has not crossed the critical threshold: the standing military treaty organization has not developed into a political union. To the contrary, its *political* cohesiveness has diminished, and its military establishment has deteriorated apace. In no other country has the case for international collaboration and all kinds of "integration" found more forceful and persuasive spokesmen than in the United States. European integration has been an explicit desideratum of U.S. foreign policy; so has been general and complete disarmament, a measure inconceivable without the allocation of powers now vested in national sovereignty to the United Nations. Yet the systemic revolution of our times is pregnant with new political formulations. The future fortunes of the Atlantic Alliance—dissolution or evolution—will determine the shape of the new world order.

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NATO IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE 1970'S

by Morton A. Kaplan

SINCE we can only surmise what the international system of the 1970's will be like, we cannot say with confidence what place NATO will occupy in it. For policy purposes, projections extending through the next several years are less hazardous but also less significant.

The world in 1970 or 1971 is not likely to differ greatly from the world of 1969. If the policies of the Nixon Administration are shaped by the expectation that the world will not radically change after 1972, however, it risks adopting military and diplomatic postures that will be grossly inadequate for the problems of the mid-1970's. The long lead time for the development of weapons systems or for the institutionalization of structural changes in international instruments invalidates the expectation that postures adopted for foreseeable problems will be adequate to the surprises almost sure to confront us. On the other hand, the surprises may be so diverse in nature that policies adapted to any particular segment of the possible range could be even more inadequate than policies based on the expectation that things will continue as they are.

Are we then led into a cul-de-sac from which there is no exit? Or can we take prudential measures that will optimize the flexibility of succeeding administrations? Perhaps no firm answer can be given to such questions. However, we shall be in a better position to respond if we examine briefly the reasons for the formation of NATO; the changes in the international system that have compounded NATO's difficulties; the structural features of the international system that are not likely to change greatly over the next five to ten years, and the range of surprising developments that might either enhance our security prospects or confront us with a threatening crisis.

I

NATO was both a cause and a consequence of developing international bipolarity. The institutional reforms NATO undertook during the Korean War established an American ground presence in Europe that, during a period when the Soviet nuclear arsenal was small and ineffective, constituted a tripwire for our nuclear force. The members of NATO were bound together by long-term interests in a way that protected them against the organizational and military capabilities of the Soviet bloc. It was NATO and not the United States that assumed the chief responsibility for guarding the world against the outbreak of major war in Europe. NATO protected the individual nations of Western Europe against the divide-and-conquer tactics that Josef Stalin utilized in his treatment of the satellites and of party and government factions in the Soviet Union.

The reasons for the weakening of NATO are several. The perception of an imminent Soviet military attack against Western Europe diminished as the Cold War receded. Eventually, most Western interpreters of Soviet foreign policy came to believe that such fears had always been nourished by misconceptions about Soviet goals in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The nations of Western Europe recovered economically from the war and, in most cases, went forward to new and unprecedented prosperity. As a consequence, their dependence upon the United States declined, and their irritation over American dominance in NATO correspondingly increased. The peculiar but definite perceptions of the world and of the nation-state held by General de Gaulle further weakened NATO. The incomplete but effective military rupture of France from NATO made the conventional defense of Western Europe more difficult. As NATO became increasingly dependent on the U.S. nuclear deterrent the unreliability of this safeguard came to the fore.

Although the United States officially insisted upon the reliability of its nuclear protection of Europe, its attempts to delineate the differences between a deterrence posture and a war-fighting posture seemed to many Europeans to call into question American willingness to use nuclear weapons. Moreover, Europeans were aware that a prolonged crisis in Europe would provide the United States with the opportunity to consider in vivid detail the vulnerability of American cities to nuclear weapons. If the equities of the crisis were not absolutely clear—and they were not likely to be if the Soviet Union developed the crisis intelligently—the United States would, in all likelihood, exert pressure on the most threatened European nation to make concessions contrary to its interests.

The alliance-splitting potential of a crisis would operate even more gravely against European members of NATO which were not at the center of the controversy. Such countries, lacking the second-strike nuclear capabilities of the United States, would be subject to greater pressure than the United States and would be more prone to press for concessions, or to leave NATO at the height of a crisis. It is no accident that West Germany, which would probably absorb the initial blow of any Soviet move in Western Europe, has been the Western ally most willing to coordinate its policies with the United States. Although the artificial division of Germany also plays a role in its alliance with the United States, West Germany, unless it makes a deal with the Soviet Union, is the West European nation least able to divorce itself from crisis in the heart of the continent.

The failure of the United States to provide either a joint-NATO nuclear force or a European nuclear force—either of which would minimize the alliance-splitting potential of a Soviet-inspired crisis or nuclear blackmail—is one of the major causes of the crisis in NATO. The search of the United States for détente with the Soviet Union is another. There are few, if any, accommodations with the Soviet Union that the United States is capable of making that would not threaten some existing West European interest. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is a specific case in point.

It may appear paradoxical to some that West Europeans, who were disturbed by the reputed American Cold War psychology and who demanded changes in the American perspective, are now frightened by the change in perspective they appeared to ask for. Apart from inconsistencies in human personalities, motivations and reasonings, the answer to this seeming paradox is not particularly difficult. As long as the Cold War continued, many Europeans feared that American differences with the Soviet Union might thrust Western Europe into the maelstrom of nuclear conflict. They were fearful that what they regarded as American intransigence would provoke war. As the United States began to accommodate its objectives to those of the Soviet Union, they began to perceive another and a larger danger: the compromise of their interests that might result from détente. They now discount the possibility of war and see as increased the possibility of a settlement at their expense.

Other concerns influenced their reactions to American war-fighting strategies. Deterrence in the view of many Europeans avoided war. They did not like to ask what would happen if war actually occurred. War-fighting strategies raised the specter of actual war—a war that would be fought on their territories. Discussion of tactical nuclear war, an enterprise that is quite dubious in my opinion, further enhanced these perceptions.

A similar explanation may be given for their misperception of the problem of ballistic missile defense. Although BMD increases the likelihood that the United States would actually live up to its commitments in Western Europe by reducing the Soviet threat to the continental United States, it brings home to West Europeans the possibility of an actual nuclear war—one in which the United States would have some protection and in which they would not.

II

What are the structural features of the international situation most directly relevant to NATO that are not likely to change surprisingly in the next five to ten years? Only the United States and the Soviet Union will possess major stable nuclear forces. Only the United States and the Soviet Union will possess second-strike capabilities, although the introduction of MIRV (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles) might raise the possibility that one or the other superpower might gain a credible first-strike capability. BMD installations in the United States and the Soviet Union might deprive those West European nations which possess unstable nuclear forces of posing even the threat of a penetration capability against the Soviet Union or the United States.

It is likely that Great Britain and France will continue to deploy unstable and provocative nuclear forces. By the end of the 1970's West Germany may have an unstable nuclear force. Developments in ASW (anti-submarine warfare) and in orbital weapons may further increase the first-strike potential of the United States or the Soviet Union.

Increasing prosperity in the developed nations may reduce the incentive for external adventure. Improvements in logistics, large increases in world trading combines, and increased economic interdependence among all developed nations, and between the United States and the Soviet bloc, will create a disincentive for external adventure.

The Soviet Union will retain an authoritarian regime. Decision-making will be centralized in a small body of men who in turn will be dependent only upon a technocratic class that will be relatively uninterested in acquiring political power and that will be less shocked by Soviet external adventure than were the emerging humanistic and technological groupings of the mid-1950's.

These last two considerations are not contradictory, although they lead to inconsistent consequences. Economic interdependence reflects a characteristic of economy and technology in a world that is becoming smaller. The attitudes of particular elites toward particular kinds of actions reflect the development of a social consciousness within a particular milieu that creates certain kinds of rewards and incentives. Thus the difference between Soviet intellectual reactions to Czechoslovakia in 1968 and to Hungary in 1956 is striking. Part of the difference may result from dissimilarities between generations and the increasing accommodation of the intellectual class to the post-Stalinist regime. Part of it may lie in the fact that Hungary was the first case of such intervention and thus was much more shocking than the second occasion to the susceptibilities of certain kinds of Marxists. Perhaps this last factor should not be placed among the structural features, for, should the Soviet Union fail in Czechoslovakia, there may be another reshaping of attitudes toward such events.

III

We will now briefly consider the wide range of possible surprises the next decade might bring and then sketch the possible relevance of these for NATO. We will finally adumbrate a few of the measures that might improve the operations of NATO in the existing world and in the expected world of the 1970's and that might be adaptable to some of the consequences of the surprising, although not entirely unexpected, worlds.

Consider a world in which the Soviet pressure on China is successful, in which tight Soviet control over Rumania is restored, and in which Yugoslavia is occupied or otherwise brought back within the confines of the Soviet bloc. Despite the prosperity prevailing in Western Europe, this world would have a much more frightening aspect for Western Europe than did the situation after the close of the Second World War or even at the height of bipolarity. A conventional defense of Western Europe would not seem feasible. The credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee would be subject to serious doubts. Moreover, it is unlikely that Soviet pressure, under the sponsorship of a younger and more confident leadership, would be used in ways that would confront the United States with a situation clearly justifying the use of its nuclear deterrent. The Russians could be expected to employ the processes of "chemical dissolution" so powerfully applied by Adolf Hitler against the Czechoslovak Republic in 1938. Local communist parties would be used as fronts to create incidents giving rise to plausible grounds for Soviet intervention. Threats would be employed that would not be fully explicit. Members of NATO, other than the one directly threatened, would be reassured of Soviet good intentions toward them. Only if the members of NATO were bound indissolubly or if the threatened member had a credible deterrent of its own would the prospects for organizational survival and the successful blunting of Soviet demands be reasonably high.

Consider a world in which China and the Soviet Union are reconciled after the death of Mao and Lin Piao. In this world it is likely that the pressures against Japan and India would be increased, thus diverting American attention from Europe. By maintaining a passive policy against Western Europe, the Soviet Union could play upon the fears of West European nations that, in the Orient, the United States might drag them into adventures contrary to their security interests. Moreover, despite the absence of Soviet threats or overt pressures, the existence of a unified communist bloc would be likely to stir in Europe fears of a military nature stemming from entanglements with the United States and doubts concerning the long-term viability of democratic systems. The temptation to move in a socialist direction and to multiply entanglements with the Soviet bloc would increase. In this case, the prospects for NATO would be high only if Europe had an independent military capability. Thus a European nuclear force or developments leading to the beginnings of an Atlantic Union would minimize, but far from eliminate, the dangerous consequences of this particular surprise.

Consider a world in which the Russians decide to settle accounts with the Chinese. They bomb the Chinese nuclear installations and allow volunteer groups to invade Mongolia and Sinkiang in support of dissident nationalist forces in those areas. In this circumstance, a number of requirements would confront American policymakers. The United States ought not to be so tightly bound to NATO that any action it takes elsewhere in the world would appear to involve its allies. Unless Washington loosened the integration of NATO, there might be enormous and perhaps successful pressures from our allies to halt American activities in the Asian theater. Given the demonstrated Russian willingness to take extreme measures, the United States might deem it a prudent move to place its fleet between Taiwan and the mainland and thus prevent the Nationalists from intervening counterproductively, inasmuch as they have little or no remaining support on the mainland. Whether the United States would wish to send supplies to the Communist Chinese government or to act in a manner that severely limited Russian objectives would depend upon the circumstances. If we were too eager, our aid might be accepted but at the cost of great suspicion. Yet the opportunities for intervention which could produce a more favorable world environment for the United States would probably be present. If any important faction of the Chinese Communist Party or military decided to cast its lot with the Russians, then a much more threatening situation would arise for the United States; it would increase the incentives for direct intervention, but limit the opportunities.

Consider a world in which there is a left-wing socialist revolution in Japan and in which Southeast Asia goes communist. Even if the communist nations remain disunited, the establishment of what would appear to be a "wave of the future" would increase the pressures against Western Europe enormously. The more closely Western Europe was integrated in NATO and aligned with the United States, the more secure American security interests would be.

Consider a world in which one of several events occurs. There is a revolt in East Germany that arouses sympathy in, and possibly intervention by, West Germany. Alternatively, in an effort to build consensus behind a shaky East German government, there is an East German invasion of either Poland or West Germany. A revolt in East Germany that appears to invite West German responses would engender great pressure from France, Britain and the small members of NATO to prevent Bonn's intervention or, alternatively, to loosen the bonds of NATO. Measures that maintained centralized control of NATO military forces would, in this case, reduce the centrifugal forces of the alliance. In the case of an East German invasion of West Germany, such centralized measures would increase the likelihood of the cohesion of the alliance in resisting the invasion. In the case of an East German invasion of Poland, German integration in NATO and, more particularly, in a united Europe would diminish the chances that nationalistic pressures could force West Germany to support the East German move and thus threaten the stability of the existing Bonn regime and of its alignment with the West.

Consider a world in which the West Germans regard a solution for the problem of German reunification out of the question as long as they maintain cordial relations with the West. In this world the Germans would feel betrayed by both the French and the Americans. They might feel discriminated against because they lacked nuclear weapons, although in other respects they would have great power status. In an effort to resolve their problems and to demonstrate their independence as a great power, the West Germans make a deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of East Germany. In this world, France is likely to return to NATO. However, the rational grounds for conventional defense, weak though they may previously have been, are now despairingly inadequate. Nuclear defense or deterrence must be relied upon, but this is likely to work only if the plan for its use approaches automaticity. Thus it is likely that the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons must be spelled out and vetoes removed from the hands of political leaders.

Consider a world in which France, alarmed by German resurgence, makes an alliance with the Soviet Union. A ground defense for the remaining NATO nations would hardly be feasible, and a collective nuclear defense might be difficult to implement. The existence of a stable independent nuclear deterrent in German hands might in this case be the only plausible alternative for U.S. policy.

Consider a world in which there is a major revolutionary upheaval in Latin America. American attention would naturally shift to the south. If NATO had not yet become a more viable instrument, armed with procedures for consultation and integrated militarily, it might easily be allowed in these circumstances to wither away, thus opening up Europe to Soviet pressures. In all likelihood, the existence of a European nuclear force would serve to protect important American security interests. If NATO remained intact, the existence of such a force would enable the Europeans to assume an increasingly important role in it while the

United States turned its attention to the Western Hemisphere. Given such a force, NATO might remain viable even in the absence of forceful American leadership.

Consider a world in which a minor nation uses a nuclear weapon against another minor nation. Although this occurrence need not directly involve either the Soviet Union or the United States, it would constitute a precedent threatening to both. Yet unilateral intervention by either might appear dangerous to both. In such a world, there would be major incentives for the United States and the Soviet Union to establish a condominium, at least with respect to the nuclear weapons issue and probably with respect to quarrels that grew so intense that a danger of nuclear escalation arose. If such a condominium were instituted, it would *introduce severe strains between the United States and its Western* allies—unless NATO were so organized that various consultative measures could reduce the fears of the West European nations that important interests of theirs would be sacrificed to the requirements of the American-Soviet détente. It would probably be important in this circumstance to exclude Europe from the condominium and to support the creation of a European nuclear system.

Consider a world in which China becomes a substantial nuclear power, and Japan and West Germany acquire nuclear weapons. These weapons systems are likely to be unstable. The Soviet Union would probably be deterred from overt military action and its power of blackmail would be greatly reduced, even though the nuclear weapons systems were not enormously effective against the defenses of the Soviet Union. In this world, NATO would not be important, although its absence might lead to political instability. The possibility of provocation in such a world is reasonably high. The Eurasian land mass would constitute a zone of extreme danger. It is most unlikely that the United States would desire to be bound to it by stringent security treaties. One way to avoid this contingency would be to have previously prepared the way for a European nuclear system or for viable national nuclear forces through the transfer of know-how or perhaps through the actual transfer of weapons.

Consider a world in which the Czechoslovak invasion of 1968 was a last gasp by the Soviet hardliners. Increasingly, Soviet domestic policy is moderated and Soviet controls over the bloc are lifted. Although a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals still seems a figment of the imagination, the prospects for favorable political developments would be eased by a loosening of the bonds between the United States and Europe. The greater the extent to which Europe could transfer its attention from West to East, the greater the likelihood that developments of this type would strengthen American security. If there were, in addition, a democratic revolution or nationality uprisings in the Soviet Union, the quick dissolution of NATO might enhance favorable prospects.

IV

It is obvious that we cannot protect ourselves against all the contingencies considered above by the same measures—at least not equally effectively. In some cases, NATO becomes a liability for American security and interests. Nonetheless, certain minimal requirements common to most of the surprising worlds stand out. It seems that NATO cannot remain viable either in existing circumstances or in our "most surprising worlds" unless its decision-making machinery becomes more consultative and less dominated by the United States. Although the United States should not permit NATO to be in a position to circumscribe American actions over the entire globe, it must find some way to insulate the consequences of these extra-European actions from the European sphere. A more or less united Europe facing the United States within NATO as a relative equal would both increase European bargaining power in a desirable fashion and facilitate distinctions of spheres of activity, thus to some extent insulating Europe from the consequences of American actions elsewhere in the world. This means that Europe would not be expected to come to the aid of the United States in such cases, a reasonable price to pay to secure the compensating advantages.

Possession of an independent nuclear capability by a united Europe would permit a degree of disengagement between U.S. strategic forces and NATO strategic forces. Although the insulation of the two forces from each other would not be automatic and complete, the distinction could legitimately be made. It may well be in the interest of an enemy of the United States to recognize the distinction and to observe it. Thus, the involvement of the United States in Asia would not automatically invoke the involvement of the West Europeans. This would decrease European fears of America's extra-European ventures. Although Europeans would still be likely to pressure the United States to disengage itself from Asia, these pressures would be greatly diminished by Europe's possession of an independent nuclear force and by the strength resulting from unity.

Even in the absence of West European unity, a European nuclear force with appropriate control machinery would have many of the same desirable advantages. If the European nuclear force were programmed in advance for use either if the Russians first used nuclear weapons or if they invaded Western Europe and failed to withdraw within a stated period of time, then the demands for a political veto on use of the force would be diminished. This doctrine of nuclear control would be further improved if it were linked to the doctrine of limited strategic retaliation. The establishment of relatively autonomous command and control procedures not subject to veto before crisis would diminish the blackmail capabilities of an enemy state. The European nuclear force, used under these two circumstances, would appear to be adequate to meet most of the various contingencies posed earlier. For the United States, the existence of such a force would reduce the nuclear risks of involvement in the alliance. But it would eliminate neither the risks nor the rationale for American membership.

If a European nuclear force should be infeasible for political reasons, then one possible alternative would be to aid West European nations to acquire national nuclear systems with second-strike capabilities and adequate command and control systems. Although such a solution would satisfy fewer of the contingencies considered, it would be responsive to a number of them. It would reduce the dangers of American involvement in the NATO system that would result from the acquisition by West European nations of unstable and provocative nuclear systems. Stable independent national nuclear systems would probably deter the Soviet Union—even if, later, NATO were to be loosened or dissolved.

If this alternative is politically infeasible, then a last fallback position might rest on American development of a capacity that would permit the transfer of nuclear weapons to a threatened ally at the inception of a crisis. Polaris-type submarines may prove to be the only satisfactory way to achieve a quick transfer capacity; the effectiveness of such a capacity would depend on the prior training of crews from the relevant nations. None of these measures would be inconsistent with the dissolution of NATO in those cases in which the communist bloc breaks up and the internal Soviet system "mellows." However, the acquisition of independent national nuclear systems would transfer to Western Europe the capabilities that would be useful in deterring the Kremlin if further "surprises" revived a Soviet threat to Europe.

In the absence of appropriate European nuclear capabilities, it is likely that increased consultative arrangements for the West Europeans, as proposed by some, would serve primarily as a brake upon U.S. actions elsewhere in the world. Moreover, in the absence of a unified Europe, such increased power for the European allies of the United States would probably inhibit rather than enhance military support for a threatened member of the alliance. Thus, there is some reason to believe that West Germany would be exposed rather than protected by a decrease in American dominance within the alliance; this, in addition to other factors, might tend to move the West Germans toward a deal with the Soviet Union.

In political organizations political power and military weakness only rarely constitute desirable coordinate attributes. NATO is unlikely to be an exception to this rule. Reforms of NATO that increase consultation and collective control instead of strengthening the organization may bring to a focus conflicts of interest and different perceptions of the situation. Such reforms are more likely to enhance the complexity of organizational charts than the activities of the alliance.

NATO is far gone on the road to extinction. Yet unified American direction and military policy still preserve some organizational potential. The defects of American dominance give rise to the tribulations of the alliance, but it is far from clear that coordinate control will remedy NATO's ills in the absence of coordinate military capabilities. If it is true that under present circumstances—as contrasted with those of the immediate postwar period—NATO requires political as well as military goals, it still does not follow that political goals can be implemented in advance of the solution of the security problem.

A joint-NATO nuclear system would enhance the unity of the organization at the expense of the ability of the United States to act in Asia. A European nuclear force attenuates the relationship between the United States and Europe, but it enhances the prospects for a viable European response while increasing the potential of the United States for extra-European intervention. The dependence of Europe upon American know-how and transfer capabilities provides a rationale for NATO and leaves open the prospect of large areas of mutual political interest not directly involving a war in Europe. Independent national nuclear forces greatly increase the risk of the fragmentation of NATO. However, they also decrease the likelihood of military pressure and therefore diminish the prospect of crises that would accelerate the centrifugal tendencies in the alliance. Thus, this prospect permits, although it does not facilitate, the development of joint political goals.

A quick transfer capacity is perhaps the least promising but the politically most feasible of the alternatives. Furthermore, the knowledge that such a quick transfer capacity exists diminishes the likelihood of a deliberate escalation of a crisis by an enemy state. In addition to the deterrence provided by the American SAC, the actual transfer of nuclear weapons to a West European state will be undesirable from the standpoint of that enemy state. Thus, *there will be an effort to avoid triggering the transfer. This, in* turn, is likely to damp political crises and preserve the prospect that NATO members will be able to attain common political goals.

A failure to find even a "jerry-built" solution to NATO's security problems is hardly likely to facilitate the attainment of joint political goals. At the same time, an increase in consultation and joint control in the absence of appropriate military measures is likely to be counterproductive.

NATIONALISM AND INTEGRATION: NATO IN THE PERSPECTIVES OF 1949 AND 1969

by Hans Kohn

THERE are quickly changing tides in human history. In the years between 1945 and 1949 a "new world" appeared, and demanded new attitudes. Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Volga, had been destroyed physically and morally. Only two nations of nineteenth-century Europe, Britain and Russia, had preserved their power status, both thanks to their unexpectedly heroic resistance to German aggression over years of anxiety and suffering. Soon it became clear, however, that Britain no longer possessed the broad bases needed in the new technological age for the power position she had maintained for two hundred years. During this time she had promoted, slowly and empirically, as is the English way, the basic preconditions for human freedom, peace on a global scale, and the growth of trade and industry. The nineteenth century, the only one in the long and painful history of mankind in which moderation, limitation of power and humanitarian considerations grew to prevail, was the century of the British middle class, to which, in historical perspective, we pay our respect—as we do to the last decade of the Austrian monarchy.

The British Empire is now irrevocably gone. The Soviet Union, a product of World War I, was offered by German aggression in World War II not only the possibility of westward expansion, but also, partly because of American and British help, the means of advancing its technological and scientific *savoir-faire* and improving its organization. Thus in the Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals the Soviet Union (which not only Hitler wished to destroy once and for all) emerged in 1945 as the one victor.

The by far stronger victor emerging from World War II, however, was the United States, whose territory had remained untouched by the war, whose technological productivity had reached undreamt-of heights, and whose victory over Japanese aggression assured her hegemony in the Western Pacific. The Japanese had underestimated the human and industrial potentialities of the United States as the Germans had underestimated those of the

Soviet Union. Both victors were shaken out of their pre-World War II isolation and faced not only each other, but a great number of new nations, mostly weak and inexperienced, which gained their independence at the end of the war. In the decade beginning in 1947, Britain granted independence to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. At the end of the decade she granted independence to Ghana, and in an astonishingly short time the colonial empires in northern and central Africa disappeared. In the same year (1957), Sputnik was put into an earth orbit, opening a new electronic stage in the twentieth-century industrial-scientific revolution—the conquest of outer space.

The situation after 1945 offered some parallels to that after 1918. The newly gained independence of central and central-eastern European countries after World War I was more than matched after 1945 by the newly gained or asserted independence of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America (the latter covering the whole spectrum from Cuban communism to the Peruvian military junta). World War I had started primarily, as Bethmann Hollweg foresaw in 1913, as a "racist" struggle between the Germans and their Magyar allies on the one hand, and the Slavs or Pan-Slavs led by Russia on the other. The Germans wished to control the whole area between the Baltic and the Aegean seas, and almost reached this goal in the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest (1917). The Russians wished to "liberate" the Slavic peoples then living under Austro-Hungarian rule, occupy Constantinople—a wish granted them by their Western allies, Britain and France, in the secret treaties of 1915—and open the road to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The strange outcome of World War I was that neither the Germans nor the Russians achieved their objectives. Unexpectedly both were defeated to the profit of the western and southern Slavs, the Rumanians, and the Finno-Baltic peoples. But the victorious democracies and their creation, the League of Nations, were unable to understand the problems arising from the changed complexion of Middle Europe or to provide the united leadership needed to assure security and peace. The weak and inexperienced new European nations quarreled among themselves. Hardly "liberated," they began to oppress their "own" minorities. Instead of uniting, they regarded each other with suspicion and envy. Meanwhile the two defeated colossi, Germany and Russia, regained their strength. Democracy, barely existing outside its old home in northwestern and northern Europe, gave way to fascism, the great historical phenomenon of Europe between the wars.

The result was the breakdown of the Europe-centered League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II, and this time two non-European powers, Japan and the United States, played an infinitely greater part among the belligerents. The outcome of 1945 seems more lasting than that of 1919. The struggle between Germans and Russians for hegemony in central and eastern Europe seemed in 1945 as definitely decided in favor of the Russians as the struggle for hegemony in the Western Pacific did in favor of the United States. The presence of the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which had been absent from the League of Nations in the 1920's, promised greater staying power to the United Nations. The new organization was no longer Europe-centered. Characteristically, it was established in San Francisco, on the Pacific coast. Its seat is in New York City and the fact that it is represented by a Buddhist Burmese as its Secretary General attests to its universal character. The world of 1945 appeared quite different from that of 1919, yet there were important similarities, the most notable being the quick breakdown of the victorious alliance following both wars. New possibilities of war appeared on the horizon in the late 1940's.

The nations of Western Europe were the dispossessed victims of World War II. The real strength and the potential weaknesses of the Soviet Union, the one spectacular victor in Europe, were poorly known. The Soviet leadership carried on the secretive character of the former Russian empire, maintaining a closed society to a degree unknown in modern times. Communism, the official creed, appeared to be a unified worldwide ideological conspiracy, as the Roman Catholicism of the Counter Reformation appeared to Protestant countries such as Elizabethan or Cromwellian England.

The fear of Russia was nothing new. After 1815, Western Europe had feared expansionism from the East. Mysterious imperial Russia was accused of a desire to create a world monarchy with Petersburg and Constantinople as its centers—a victorious counterpart to Napoleon's legendary Western World Empire with Paris and Rome the two historic capitals. Under the much more complex and now global perspectives of the late 1940's, Western Europe came to realize that in order to regain its lost strength and power it would have to forge unity above its age-old national boundaries and accept the protective umbrella and hegemonial guidance of the United States as the only remaining great power of the Western world. The overthrow of the semi-democratic regime in Czechoslovakia by its communist political partners, the acquisition of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union, the takeover of the vast, war-destroyed and corrupt Chinese empire by the Chinese communists who had built up their army and government since the late 1920's, the mysterious despotism behind the impregnable walls of the Kremlin practiced by an aging master who showed signs of megalomaniac deterioration, the overemphasis on the rigidity and exclusivity of communist doctrine—all these elements, together with the feeling of their own weakness, brought the West European nations to Washington, to conclude in April 1949 the treaty instituting the North Atlantic Alliance.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a system of integrated military cooperation functioning even in peacetime under a common command led by the United States, has for twenty years fulfilled its primary task. Soviet power did not expand westward, and under the NATO umbrella Western Europe recovered. But world conditions have changed in the intervening years.

II

NATO in 1949 was felt to be something new, something different from former military alliances. Many saw it as the first step toward further integration, toward closer economic and cultural cooperation among the common heirs of the modern tradition of individual liberty and limited government. This trend toward lessening the emphasis on national sovereignty, perhaps considered even as a device for strengthening the foundation of democratic liberties against the ever-present danger of military or ideological dictatorship, was at that time part of a general worldwide movement. The unity of Europe, the unity of a newly constituted Africa, the Afro-Asian solidarity of the Bandung Conference (1955), the creation of smaller regional conglomerations like the Arab Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), the Central American and Caribbean republics, the former British-ruled East African territories, the Benelux countries—all these associative conceptions were hopes of the 1950's. At the threshold of the 1970's they seem farther away than before, and here again post-

1919 and post-1949 developments are similar. A narrow nationalism, with overemphasis on traditions and claims arising from the past, has been threatening the realization of the generous hopes of the immediate postwar period. National frontiers have hardened practically everywhere, and considerations of national pride and of real or alleged national security have taken precedence over considerations of personal liberty, social emancipation and human equality. Europe and NATO do not remain untouched by this resurgence of nationalism.

European political integration, to be brought about by the lowering of national barriers, was proclaimed in November 1948 as the goal of a European movement, the leaders of which met in The Hague. Twenty years later, in November 1968, prominent European political leaders met at the same place to discuss how the vanishing hopes of European integration could best be revived. The President of the European Movement, Professor Walter Hallstein, declared in his opening speech: "If a voice of Europe can still be heard, it is a voice of extreme weakness which we hear. We are here to change this situation." Nothing, however, was changed. The good intentions remained purely verbal. Ten democratic European nations were represented. France was absent. Three months later, the Franco-British struggle over the publication of President de Gaulle's interview with the British Ambassador marked perhaps the lowest point reached in the sixty-five-year-old entente cordiale between these countries which has been the backbone of an incipient West European integration for common defense and the preservation of democratic liberties.

There still exist remnants of the hopes of the late 1940's in the Council of Europe, a broadly based organization, and the Western European Union, a forerunner of NATO, but neither has made any progress toward European unification. The European Economic Communities, established by the Treaty of Rome in 1956, have achieved a high degree of economic cooperation, but the number of their members is limited by the French desire to use the EEC as a basis for hegemonial efforts in Europe. The road to political integration, even of this "little" Europe of the Six, seems blocked. There is today no European voice, but many European voices, and they do not talk in agreement, but more and more in sharp disagreement. American leadership under President Kennedy had hopes that North America and a united Western Europe might achieve an equal partnership across the

North Atlantic. President Nixon recognized in February 1969 that any U.S. attempt to promote European unity was counterproductive. The United States faced having to abandon its claim to leadership in NATO, not to a united Europe, but to the full sovereignty of each NATO member, Canada included. Thus the nationalism of President de Gaulle prevailed over the great design of President Kennedy as national independence, in the full sense of the term, prevailed over interdependence.

This development was part of a general trend of the 1960's; everywhere hope of integration vanished and resurgent nationalism intensified. Nationalism proved stronger than any ideology. NATO had started as a focus of democracy. In 1968 one of its members, Greece, was turned into a military fascist dictatorship. Some of NATO's members were on cooperative terms with a similar dictatorship in Spain which in the course of its evolution seemed, in February 1969, to harden its political and social structure instead of liberalizing it.

Nationalism proved equally, and perhaps to a higher degree, to be a disintegrating factor in the communist camp. By 1969 there was no longer one communist camp, but many such camps, openly quarreling with each other. The events of March 2, 1969, when in defense of the "sacred soil of the Motherland" (a small and often submerged island in the Far Eastern frontier river Ussuri, between the USSR and China) dozens of Russians and Chinese were killed, made the long-existing Chinese-Soviet conflict manifest even to those who still proclaimed the prevalence of common ideology over nationalist passions. Small Albania had since 1962 attacked the Soviet Union in the rudest terms, rejected all cooperation with Moscow and expressed its solidarity with the far-off Chinese giant. Each communist state stressed, at the close of the 1960's, its national sovereignty as its chief concern. The President of revisionist communist Yugoslavia, Tito, and the President of orthodox or semi-Stalinist communist Rumania, Ceausescu, met at the beginning of February 1969. They agreed on one point, that national independence and full sovereignty is the basic principle of their regimes.

Even in the most faithful of the Soviet Union's European allies, Bulgaria, the "new nationalism bulged large" in the congress of Bulgarian writers held in Sofia at the end of May 1968. "Today," Communist Party Leader Premier Todor Zhivkov told the writers, "this national spirit is naturally emerging with the great cause of the Bulgarian Communist Party." Poetess Dora Gabe called for "the unity of past and present," and writer Stefan Dichev dwelt on the historic novel "which by unveiling the past, must stimulate patriotism." Professor Pavel Matev, president of the committee for art and culture, proclaimed that

> an art work is valuable to mankind [!] when it is a national [not a class!] product. The poetry of each nation must have a national character and should not resemble the poetry of other nations. . . . Mankind is not composed of individuals . . . but of individual nations [not of international classes], each with its own psychology, soul [!] and class structure, which are created and determined by historic conditions.

This may be true, but it sounds more familiar in the writings of early German romantic nationalists than in the discourses of international class-conscious communists.

On June 4, 1968, the Bulgarian Communist Party organ published excerpts from a letter by Zhivkov to the painter, Tsanko Lavrinov, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. Zhivkov praised the painter's "original creative art activity, which continues to develop successfully the tradition of known and unknown old Bulgarian mentors, part of our national art treasure," and compared it to a "song exalting the beauties and grandiose past of our fatherland."[1]

The fundamental controversy between the Czechoslovak people, especially the intellectuals and artists, and the Soviet Union, which led to the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces on August 21, 1968, was not so much a question of ideological difference, but of Czechoslovakia's insistence on national sovereignty and the resurrection of the national past as a guide for its cultural and political life, and its rejection of the Soviet Union's claim to leadership of the communist movement as a whole. Revisionist Czechoslovakia found herself as opposed to any Russian superpower claims as were less revisionist Yugoslavia and the orthodox, Stalinist parties of China and Albania that never ceased to accuse the Soviet leadership (which appeared to some Czechs or Yugoslavs as neo-Stalinist) of being ultra-revisionist, traitors to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. As the 1970's approached, the supposedly monolithic structure of communism revealed its complexities and contradictions. A communist "world conference," sought by Moscow to restore the movement's unity, has been repeatedly postponed. The driving force behind this disintegration was nationalism.

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[1] See *East Europe* (New York), July 1968, p. 437.

III

But it was not only nationalism that was at work. Unexpectedly the late 1950's revealed themselves as a period unfavorable to authoritarian orthodoxy. A similar unrest made itself suddenly felt in the Roman Catholic Church, that *rocher de bronze* which continued most successfully the pre-Enlightenment intellectual and the pre-French Revolution social-political attitudes of an elitist inequality, of unquestioning obedience, of Catholicism's undisputable claim to being the only true road to salvation. In the Council of Trent and in the long reign of Pope Pius IX the Church declared its hostility to civil and intellectual liberty and withdrew into a protective ghetto of self-preservation in the midst of a more and more secularized and liberalized world. Similarly Leninism stressed, in opposition to most West European socialist movements, the return to a pre-Enlightenment authoritarian dogmatism and a closed society as the sole guide to salvation. The famous twenty-one points proclaimed at the second congress of Lenin's "Third International" as binding on all communist parties were a radical challenge to the pluralist, open, late-nineteenth-century society of growing tolerance. In different terms, those of social science instead of theology, Moscow claimed to be the new Rome, heir of the second rather than of the first Rome. Its Byzantine heritage reached its climax in the later years of Stalin's regime, radiating from the labyrinthian caesaropapist Kremlin an arrogant assumption of infallible leadership.

Nikita Khrushchev, a man of bright intelligence but little culture, tried to open up communist Russian society and thought. His "secret" speech at the Soviet Party Congress of February 1956 broke with Stalinist Byzantinism. In his own way of living, on his many unprecedented travels outside the communist world, Khrushchev appeared as a human being, husband, father, and father-in-law, with some common sense and not devoid of humor. He even went to Belgrade, then the capital of the only revisionist or independent form of communism, and confirmed Tito's and Yugoslavia's right to travel their "own" road toward communism. Soon he became in the eyes of "Stalinist" China and Albania the chief representative of feared and hated revisionism and thereby the chief enemy. The new trend subjected the former communist bloc to great strains. As a result, Khrushchev was removed and his successors tried to re-establish communist unity and Soviet leadership. So far their efforts have not been successful. Communism enters the 1970's in a deep crisis which in 1949 few people foresaw.

A similar break with the past was attempted by Pope John XXIII, who ascended the papal throne in 1958 and proved himself the greatest personality of the half-decade. During his reign he gave to one of the most rigid surviving institutions a new turn and a new vital relevance for the whole of mankind. As Gandhi became a rallying hope for the 1930's, so John XXIII became one for the 1950's. Both represented the strength of moral and spiritual forces which have no armed "divisions" at their disposal.

The Second Vaticanum expressed the spirit of John XXIII. In contradiction to the two preceding church councils, those of Trent and of the First Vaticanum, it opened the Church to the world, proclaimed the validity of civil and intellectual liberty, emphasized the rights of God's people rather than their strict subordination to the rule of the elitist hierarchy. John's successor, Pope Paul VI, found himself having to safeguard the doctrinal unity of the Church and the supreme authority of the papacy in the midst of the intellectual and organizational unrest and quest caused by John's "liberalism." Paul worked to maintain and at the same time strictly to guide and limit the fundamental reforms of his predecessor. But the unrest in the Catholic world can be as little quenched as that in the communist world. In both formerly monolithic organizations a struggle goes on between "liberal" and "orthodox" trends.

What *Le Monde* wrote regarding the Church and the contested papal encyclical, *Humanae vitae,* may be applied, *mutatis mutandis* or perhaps *si licet comparare,* to the present stage of communist society, too.

> Dans l'Église Catholique, comme dans toute société, il existe un parti de l'ordre et un parti du mouvement, et il est salutaire que se manifeste entre eux un certain tiraillment, la sclérose et le conservatisme n'étant pas de moindres périls que l'anarchie. Mais, s'agissant d'une religion, il existe une limite qui ne peut être franchie sans en altérer la nature même.[2]

In March 1969 the Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français organized a week of discussion under the title "Chercher la vérité." It was not part of the dialogue that is now going on between Catholics and non-Catholics in many parts of Europe, but a dialogue among Catholics. The president of the Centre pointed out that the crisis today is a universal one, that it questions all faiths and ideologies, all traditional relationships and ways of life which still seemed intact in 1919 and even in 1949. All the speakers stressed the universality of the crisis and the interdependence of all its various manifestations in the new quest for truth, self-awareness and identity.

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[2] Editorial in *Le Monde* (Paris), February 19, 1969. See also Louis Bouyer, *La Decomposition du Catholicisme* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1969).

The student unrest of the last two years has not only stirred to an unprecedented depth the students, including high school students, in Spain and Poland, in Japan, Mexico, and among Afro-Americans, but perhaps even more the youth in France, Italy and West Germany. In these three countries academic life had, for all practical purposes, come to a standstill at the beginning of 1969. Only in the most democratic countries, where Reformation and Enlightenment have thoroughly modernized society—in Britain and Scandinavia, for example—has the crisis disorganizing the moral and intellectual academic life led to rather minor eruptions.

IV

Still, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is less affected by the intellectual crisis of the late 1960's than the more orthodox, authoritarian and dogmatic societies. After all, NATO was founded not only as a military alliance but as the core of a community based upon the modern concepts of pluralism, individual liberty and tolerance. Openness, both toward different ways of life or systems of thought and toward other forms of organization—an openness in space and mind, and the rejection of exclusivity—has, at least in principle, characterized modern North Atlantic civilization. This gave it its great strength, its adaptability to changing (and today rapidly and universally changing) conditions, its resilience.

Fascism was a revolution against modern society, developing out of surviving pre-modern attitudes. Its roots were in the first decade of the twentieth century, the same period which gave birth to Leninism.[3] It took the great thirty years' civil war (1914-1945) within what had been Western society in the nineteenth century to defeat the fascist revolution. In spite of their poverty and diminution of power, none of the victorious or defeated nations of modern Western Europe and North America succumbed to subversion by Leninism or neo-fascism. The ruling power structure in Portugal or Greece can hardly be seen as part of modern Europe. In these cases the victory or survival of fascism was due not to its own strength but to the support given it, out of an exaggerated fear of communism, by certain democratic groups or the military forces. A similar phenomenon characterized the development in many Ibero-American nations. In a world of breathtaking scientific, political and social changes, therefore, North Atlantic democracy can be seen, as a whole, not as a rock of immobility but as one changing, even against much domestic resistance, in unison with the universal tides or winds of change. A Conservative prime minister of Britain stressed in the 1960's this need of adaptation to the winds of change, as did another British Conservative leader in his novels in the 1840's and his policy in the 1860's.

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[3] See Hans Kohn, "A Turning Point," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* April 1969.

In 1957 the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, together with the Collège d'Europe, called an international conference to Bruges, Belgium. The conferees foresaw the danger of overemphasizing the military aspects of NATO and pleaded for re-emphasis on its common intellectual, political and social roots, established in the pluralistic, civilian, tolerant age of the Enlightenment. These values of the Enlightenment represented Britain's and France's greatest contribution to the universal treasure house of human values and formed the basis for the birth of the United States as a nation. "The North Atlantic Community is based upon the will to defend certain common spiritual and moral values," one of the speakers at the conference for a North Atlantic Community declared, emphasizing at the same time its character of an intellectually open society in dialogue with other communities, the communists, the churches, the so-called Third World. I say so-called because there is not one Third World, as the Bandung Conference assumed, not one community of nonaligned nations, but many "worlds," many communities, learning painfully and slowly (we are only twenty years beyond 1949) the difficult art of living more or less at peace with each other and within each community grouping.[4]

The main obstacle to learning this difficult art today is nationalism. The late 1960's have witnessed the growing strength of nationalism even within the Atlantic Community. It is on the one hand, especially in politically and socially backward countries, a force of integration, as it was on the whole in eighteenth-century Europe; on the other, it is now in the advanced countries primarily a force of disintegration. It is nationalism that has so far prevented, and will probably prevent in the early 1970's, an integration of the European or of an Atlantic Community. The newly strengthened prosperity of the European countries and the growth of Canada will cause a reorganization of NATO, lessening the hegemonial leadership of the United States and acknowledging the equality of the members in a continuing defensive partnership. President Nixon's visit to Europe at the end of February 1969 was successful mainly because he seemed to accept the necessity of this change on the part of the United States.

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[4] See Hans Kohn, "The Atlantic Community and the World," in his *Reflections on Modern History* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 303 ff.

It should not be overlooked that some of the troubling nationalist issues of the immediate post-1945 period have been or are being solved. The fate of the port city of Trieste threatened to become a focus of continuing tension between Italian and Yugoslav nationalism. Yet the problem was solved in such a manner that there has been no frontier unrest between the capitalist and the neighboring communist nation for many years. Greater difficulties have prolonged the conflict (marred by much violence) over German South Tyrol between two capitalist and Catholic nations, Italy and Austria. But continuing negotiations may remove the tensions there in the early 1970's. The election on March 5, 1969 of Gustav Heinemann, one of Germany's few prominent Christian and democratic nonconformists, as Federal President over his arch-conservative and nationalist opponent, may be of only symbolic value, but the joining of the Liberals with the Social Democrats against the votes of the Christian Democrats and the openly neo-fascist National Democrats makes the Federal Republic a safer component of the West and perhaps carries promise for a new type of leadership there.

In other ways, however, nationalism at the beginning of the 1970's not only impedes the integration of Europe but threatens the disintegration of European nations, of Canada, and in the case of the Afro-Americans even the fundamental pluralistic integrationist character of the United States. The demands for Scottish and Welsh independence, for the dissolution of the United Kingdom, have grown to unprecedented proportions. On the other hand, more national economic and geographic consideration has improved the relationship between England and the Republic of Ireland to a degree unforeseen in the emotional upheavals of the 1920's;[5] and the autonomous government of Ulster under Prime Minister O'Neill had worked hard toward defeating the more bigoted sections of the Protestant and Catholic populations.

In the United Kingdom nationalist separatism does not, of course, coincide with a movement for civil liberties as it does among Catalonian and Basque nationalists in Spain. Full democratic liberties and parliamentary rule are as secure in Scotland and Wales as they are in England. The nationalists in Wales and Scotland demand not civil liberties but independence, or at least far-reaching home rule, which would maintain only tenuous federal relationships with England. In Wales the Free Wales Army, following the example of the Irish Republican Army, believes in violence to achieve its goal, whereas the National Patriotic Front rejects violence. At the annual meeting of the Plaid Cymru in September 1968 "pointless vandalism" was condemned and the extremists were described as "barbarians leaving a scar on the soul of Wales." A careful National Plan was adopted to create an infrastructure for the economic development of Wales after independence. To the planned investiture of Prince Charles as Prince of Wales the party showed complete indifference. The war in Viet Nam, on the other hand, was condemned, apart from the "horror of the war itself," because the Vietnamese people "were fighting essentially the same struggle as Wales, to be freed from an alien government." The large majority of Welsh and Scottish nationalists are opposed to violence and expect to achieve their goal through parliamentary methods. For the first time, in 1968, Scotland elected a representative of the nationalist movement as a member of the British House of Commons.

All these seem beginnings on a very small scale, but the student of nationalism knows that, given favorable circumstances, nationalist movements can rapidly gain great strength if they are supported by activist devotion. There is in the British tradition, in which after all the Scottish and Welsh peoples have lived, little inclination to violence, yet in the last five years various "free armies," of which the Welsh is the most important one, have taken form in the United Kingdom. At the beginning of 1969 they were cooperating within an international Celtic army, which also includes the Irish Republican Army and the Front de Libération de la Bretagne.

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[5] See the article, "England und Irland," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* December 12, 1968.

Even in Cornwall a few members of the Mebyon Kernow ("Sons of Cornwall") speak of turning to violence.[6] Some of the Breton leaders live in Ireland, among them the painter and sculptor Yann Goulet, who has been accused of negotiating with the German occupation army in World War II about autonomy for Brittany. Much was written in French newspapers about the Breton nationalist movement on the occasion of President de Gaulle's visit to Brittany at the end of January 1969. Among the members of the Breton National Liberation Front arrested by the French police there were several Catholic priests, who helped to organize the bombing of buildings of the "occupation" forces. More than one million people still speak the Breton language and feel a strong loyalty to ancient customs and the white and black flag of their formerly independent country.

The Breton nationalists in the majority are not separatists. They demand a free Brittany in a French federation and favor a France within a federated Europe. They all recall that in the summer of 1967 President de Gaulle, while in Canada, demanded a free Quebec, apparently being unaware that the French-speaking people in Quebec conduct all their education in French, control the French-speaking radio and television, and enjoy a far-reaching autonomy—all national liberties denied to the Breton people in France. De Gaulle's offer of a vague regionalism may have had its advantages as a plan to counter the evils of an overcentralized France, but it offers no satisfaction to Breton aspirations.[7]

Since de Gaulle made public his support for an independent Quebec in the summer of 1967, international attention has been drawn to the separatist movement in the French-speaking Canadian province. In October 1968 it organized itself as a political party for the next election. It hopes then to establish a sovereign Quebec, with French as the only official language, albeit maintaining monetary and customs union with Canada. As with similar movements in Britain and France, the outline of future developments remains uncertain. The new party is a coalition; its leader, René Levesque, represents the urban intelligentsia, while his associate leader, Gilles Gregoire, has his support among the arch-conservative and strictly Catholic population of the countryside. The most radical group of nationalists, the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale, has not yet joined the stronger but more moderate separatist groups. The present Prime Minister of Quebec, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, declared in January 1969 that "the hour of decision approaches even nearer for Quebec. There is a whole gamut of nuances between the status quo and full national sovereignty." No one expects the status quo to last. Bertrand himself is for proclaiming a republican form of government in Quebec and close collaboration with France in the cultural field to save Quebec from cultural "suffocation." There are various suggestions put forward to satisfy separatist aspirations in a surviving Canadian framework. The leader of the Liberal Party in Quebec speaks of being *maître chez vous,* the former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson envisages Canada's future as a "cooperative federalism," whereas his successor Pierre Trudeau suggests a "just society" in which both languages would enjoy equality throughout Canada.

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[6] See the article by Julian Mounter in the *Times* (London), October 26, 1968.

[7] See Yann Fouéré, "Plaidoyer pour le F.L.B.," *Le Monde,* January 30, 1969. The editor of the *Avenir de la Bretagne* in Saint-Brienc concludes his plea for an understanding of the terrorism of the National Liberation Front of Brittany with the words: "Ils ont mené, . . . au prix de graves risques personnels, un combat désinteressé; ils ont sauvé ce que les Celtes appréciaient plus que la vie: l'honneur." These are sentiments characteristic of all incipient nationalist movements, not only the Celtic one. The important aspect is that the leading Parisian daily found it worthwhile to print them.

Quebec nationalism is not simply a Canadian problem. It threatens the relationship between two NATO members. On January 24, 1969, Quebec Deputy Premier Jean-guy Cardinal concluded a five-day visit to France after a gala dinner at the Elysée Palace, to which Canada's Ambassador to France, Paul Beaulieu, had not been invited. Agreements between France and Quebec provided for French help in establishing a new Quebec University, for six Quebec scientists to study at the French space research center at Bretigny near Paris, and for the eventual launching of a Franco-Quebecois communications satellite. A joint commission was established to stimulate French investments in Quebec. All this conforms to the new stress in France on the community of francophone nations. At the end of September 1968 a congress of francophone parliamentarians concluded with a speech by André Malraux in which he declared that the French language was about to assume the role Greek had played in antiquity. French civilization was, according to Malraux, the most universal of all present-day civilizations. Though the Association Internationale des Parlementaires de Langue Française disavowed all political aspirations, one of its resolutions demanded a francophone space satellite to break the American and Soviet monopoly of space communications.

On February 20, 1969, the first conference of francophone countries ended in Niamey, the capital of the African Republic of the Niger. About thirty countries were represented, though they did not include important ones like Algeria, Guinea and Mauretania from Africa and Switzerland from Europe. Most of the countries were only partially francophone, French being spoken by a small educated elite or by a minority. Ottawa was represented as well as Quebec. The conference decided to establish a permanent Secretariat in France, although the French representative insisted that "la France ne prétends pas à une place supérieure, ni même à une place à part."

The francophone movement is only at its beginnings—the 1970's will tell us whether worldwide multiracial cooperation on the foundation of a European language will succeed or will remain only a phase in General de Gaulle's efforts to establish France, at least culturally, as a world power. But how much this cultural appeal of linguistic ties borders on political nationalist problems can be seen from the fact that the Congrès des Jeunesses Francophones, held in Tunis at the end of December 1968, invited the Béliers, the youth organization of the Rassemblement Jurassien, to nominate one delegate to its fifteen-member executive committee. The Rassemblement Jurassien is a rather rightist organization in the French-speaking Catholic northern Jura in Switzerland. It demands the Jura's separation as a canton from the largely German-speaking Protestant canton of Bern, which acquired the Jura at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. This is a domestic Swiss problem. The Jurassiens demand neither national sovereignty nor to become part of neighboring France, but the organization's general secretary, Roland Bégeislin, has tried to make Jura an issue before international "tribunals" of public opinion. Thus an Association Féminine pour le Défense du Jura demonstrated on September 25, 1968 before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. In any case this small separatist movement has for years deeply and emotionally preoccupied public opinion in the one Western country assumed to have solved satisfactorily its problem of the peaceful coexistence of various ethnic and linguistic groups.[8]

The outstanding example of how the forces of nationalism can break up a Western nation is Belgium. In this center of the European Economic Communities and of NATO, the Flemish and the French-speaking Belgians have arrived during the 1960's at a practically complete separation, both constitutionally and in all the various fields of human communication. Linguistic frontiers have become legally extremely rigid. Even in the one great Catholic university of the country, which has been bilingual though situated a few miles within Flemish territory in Louvain (Loewen), the Flemish students demanded the removal of all francophone instructors and students to a new campus in adjacent French-speaking territory, which would have to be built at great expense. The Belgian episcopate, the owners of the university, opposed this plan unanimously three years ago; now they have been forced by the aggravation of Franco-Flemish relationships to agree to the Flemish demand. The preservation of Brussels as a bilingual island creates even greater difficulties, because the French-speaking population and its international component is sprawling out into the new suburbs which are all in Flemish territory. It is perhaps worth mentioning that the Netherlands has not tried to intervene in the Belgian ethnic-linguistic conflict, though the Flemish population is Dutch-speaking and lives in contiguity with the Netherlands. There has been no Great Netherlands movement corresponding to efforts to unite the "Celtic" peoples or the francophone states and populations.

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[8] See Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Liberty. The Swiss Example* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954) and his monograph, *Nationalism in the North Atlantic Community,* published as Monograph No. 3 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, 1965.

V

For two decades NATO has fulfilled its primary task of protecting Western Europe. Because of NATO, Europe has had a feeling of security to sustain it through the years of economic weakness and adjustment to a new social orientation. But the world of 1969 is no longer that of 1949. It is no longer a bipolar world. New nations and new foci of great economic power—Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany—have arisen; the military blocs have suffered the disintegrating assaults of nationalism; the rapid development of weapons systems, jet-communications and space research distinguish the changed situation. The social fragmentation of American cities and the threat to economic progress through social conflicts in Italy and France have been gravely intensified. A new youth, in the universities, in the high schools, and among workers, speaks with an unprecedented acerbity against established authority and rejects with contempt the "hypocritical" and "obsolete" standards of its parents and grandparents. What can be the task of an Atlantic Community in the 1970's?

From the perspective of 1969, I would define the task of a revived and relevant Atlantic Community, with its vital centers in the United States and Canada, Britain and France, the Netherlands and Scandinavia—perhaps also in a Vatican resuming and broadening the spiritual reforms of John XXIII not only for the Church but as a model influencing other communities—in three ways. First, to lower the importance attached to the principle of national sovereignty among its members and ethnic-linguistic nationalism within its members, thus setting an example to other peoples fascinated by Europe's nineteenth-century value system which gave supremacy to national independence and sovereignty. Second, to concentrate most of its intellectual, moral and economic resources on creating a better domestic society: combating the poverty of city slums, overcoming the remnants of class confrontations, enriching the life of the masses by putting the comforts of a technological age within their reach and activating their participation in Atlantic cultural achievements. Third, to find ways of establishing, out of inner strength but also out of a sense of its own imperfections, a *modus vivendi* with other civilizations and systems of social order based on mutual respect and mankind's need for global peace.

This seems an "idealistic" program; it may even be a utopian fantasy. But it might counterbalance the materialism, the belief in force, the emphasis on one's own "rights" and assumed privileges, which exist today and will continue to play their part in shaping the minds and actions of peoples and societies. By shifting the emphasis we may appeal more to our youth and free ourselves, to a certain degree, from the suspicion of hypocrisy our youth raises against us, and not without some justification. We still think in terms of 1945 or 1949, though we are equipped with the boundless technology of the present. Yet the Atlantic Community can have a future in a world oppressed by unprecedented fears, by apathy and often by despair. This world is waiting, as the examples of a Gandhi or a John XXIII have shown, for a new hope. In the unforeseen conditions of the 1970's, the spirit could be as strong as massed air forces.

To achieve these difficult tasks, on which the future of modern Western civilization may depend, the Western nations will have to act in unity, taking common counsel. None of them can lean only on its own wisdom. The Atlantic Community will need to be a true community of purpose, thought and action to face the burdens and responsibilities of the 1970's.

NATO, BRITAIN AND SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

by Denis W. Healey

IN 1949 when NATO was set up, all that the Red Army needed in order to reach the North Sea was boots. While the Western powers had demobilized heavily in the previous four years, Russia's forces were still comparable in size and quality to those she maintained at the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, at this time the Soviet Union had no nuclear forces of her own. A prime purpose of establishing NATO was to extend America's nuclear deterrent to cover Western Europe.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

In the past twenty years, the military balance between NATO and the Soviet bloc has changed in many ways. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have built invulnerable second-strike strategic nuclear forces; thus neither has any prospect of avoiding unacceptable damage in a nuclear exchange, even through the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. The Soviet Union also has over a thousand shorter-range nuclear missiles capable of striking targets anywhere in Western Europe. The United States has deployed 7,000 nuclear warheads on allied territory in Western Europe for delivery by various means.

In conventional terms, the military balance in Europe is decidedly less unfavorable to the West than it was in 1949. The figures in Table I are taken from *The Military Balance 1968-1969* published in London by the Institute for Strategic Studies; they would not be contested by the allied governments except in detail.

When it became apparent in the middle 1950's that the Soviet Union would soon be capable of inflicting unacceptable nuclear damage on the United States, even after absorbing an American first strike, some Western theorists believed Moscow would test NATO's solidarity and will by making a limited conventional attack on one of the more exposed allies. This has not proved to be the case. Russia showed more caution during the Berlin crisis in 1959 than she had during the blockade eleven years earlier.

TABLE I

THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE

	Northern and Central Europe[a]			*Southern Europe*[b]		
Category	*NATO*	*Warsaw Pact*	*(of which USSR)*	*NATO*	*Warsaw Pact*	*(of which USSR)*
Ground forces available to commanders in peacetime (in brigades or brigade equivalents)[c]						
—armored	26	70	*44*	15	30	*15*
—infantry, mechanized and airborne	46	100	*50*	55	80	*42*
Ground forces available after mobilization of first-line reserves (in brigades or brigade equivalents)						
—armored	27	96	*55*	18	42	*18*
—infantry, mechanized and airborne	55	150	*72*	80	90	*46*
Troops in brigade forces available in peacetime (in thousands of men)	450	600	*330*	425	390	*200*
Medium/heavy tanks available to commanders[d]						
—in peacetime	4,800	11,500	*6,000*	1,600	4,300	*1,100*
—after mobilization of first-line reserves	6,100	14,600	*6,750*	1,800	5,500	*2,600*
Tactical aircraft in operational service[e]						
—light bombers	50	450	*400*	——	200	*200*
—fighter/ground-attack	1,500	1,650	*1,120*	540	980	*740*
—interceptors	720	3,000	*2,000*	280	1,360	*1,000*
—reconnaissance	530	280	*200*	130	210	*160*

N.B. This table excludes consideration of strategic weapons and seapower.

a. Includes, on the NATO side, the commands for which the AFCENT and AFNORTH commanders have responsibility; France is not included. On the Warsaw Pact side, it includes the command for which the Pact High Commander has responsibility, but excluding the armed forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Soviet units normally stationed in the Western USSR and such troops as would be committed to the Baltic theater of operations have, however, been included on the Warsaw Pact side.

b. Includes, on the NATO side, the Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces and such American and British units as would be committed to the Mediterranean theater of operations, and on the Warsaw Pact side, the land forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, and such Soviet units normally stationed in Hungary and Southern USSR as would be committed to the Mediterranean theater.

c. This indicates the brigade "slice," i.e., the brigade itself together with those divisional forces needed to keep the brigade operational in the field. It should be noted that the average Warsaw Pact brigade is about 60 per cent the size of the average NATO brigade.

d. NATO is estimated to have on average some 50 per cent more anti-tank weapons.

e. The division of tactical aircraft into these categories must be regarded as very approximate, since some aircraft can be adapted to more than one kind of mission. In general, it can be said that NATO has a higher proportion of such multipurpose aircraft than the Warsaw Pact. According to the 1968 posture statement of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, NATO aircraft, on average, have a much higher capability than those of the Warsaw Pact in range, payload, loiter time, and crew training. The NATO superiority was expressed by Mr. McNamara in the following way:

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Payload index	100	35
Index of typical loiter time	100	20-40
Index of crew training	100	55

French air strength is not included.

Ironically, the only direct Soviet challenge to Western solidarity arose in circumstances diametrically the opposite of those predicted by the theorists—in the nuclear threat to the American homeland posed by the placing of missiles in Cuba.

Experience suggests, therefore, that the security of Western Europe rests as firmly as ever on the fact that NATO presents the Soviet Union with unacceptable risks of escalation to strategic nuclear war in case of a large-scale Russian attack. Any putative reduction in the readiness of the United States to accept escalation rather than surrender is more than outweighed by the stupendous increase in U.S. nuclear striking power, the deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads in Europe, the continued presence of large numbers of American servicemen in the threatened areas, and the detailed arrangements for common action in case of war which have been made through NATO. Faced with these hard facts, no rational Soviet government would stake the survival of the Russian people on a guess that, in the event, the United States government would prefer to see its allies occupied and the U.S. Army in Europe destroyed rather than raise the level of the conflict.

As the figures in Table I show, nuclear escalation would be the only alternative to surrender in case of a major Soviet attack. NATO is outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact on the Central Front by more than two to one in infantry formations and nearly three to one in armored formations; after mobilization of first-line reserves, this disparity is increased. The Warsaw Pact superiority in aircraft is nearly two to one.

Attempts have recently been made to argue that this bleak picture is overpessimistic and fails to take account of qualitative factors. For example, a Soviet division has only about half the strength in manpower of a NATO division, NATO forces have a superiority of 50 per cent in anti-tank weapons, NATO has a higher proportion of multipurpose aircraft than the Warsaw Pact, and NATO aircraft are greatly superior in factors such as range, payload, loiter time and crew training.

No one would deny the need to take qualitative factors into account, but we are still a long way from deciding which factors are relevant and what values should be attached to them. What is clear is that the Warsaw Pact has advantages in two particular respects so great as to render doubtful any prospect NATO might have of putting up a successful conventional defense for more than a few days. These advantages are numbers of tanks and surprise. Strength of armor is likely to be decisive in any operations in Central Europe, especially in the open country of North Germany. The Warsaw Pact outnumbers NATO in tanks by more than two to one in peacetime and by two-and-a-half to one after mobilization.

The odds are compounded by the advantage gained by the Soviet Union in being the aggressor. As her invasion of Czechoslovakia showed, no matter how long the political warning period, she would probably be able to achieve military surprise—the "operational initiative," as the late General Ailleret put it in a lecture just before his tragic death—certainly as to time and possibly as to place by skillful concentration of troops under the cover of exercises. Her overall superiority in armor would therefore be greatly multiplied at the decisive point.

The Strategy of the Alliance

While there are still deficiencies in some of NATO's forces that could and should be made good without substantial increases in military expenditure, NATO could not forgo reliance on nuclear escalation in case of large-scale attack without an order of increase in European military budgets which in present circumstances is beyond the realm of practical possibility. Moreover, it is far from clear that NATO would be acting wisely in seeking to achieve security in Europe through the building of a Maginot Line of conventional forces.

In the first place the Soviet ground forces are organized, trained and equipped primarily for nuclear war; Soviet military doctrine envisages a full-scale attack with tactical nuclear and chemical weapons in the NATO area. Thus a large conventional force in Western Europe might turn out to be irrelevant to the main contingency for which it was built up. Second, it cannot be assumed that the USSR would not respond to a major increase in NATO's forces by increasing her own proportionately. Third, particularly for countries like Germany which are in the front line, deterrence is the only acceptable strategy. A large-scale conventional war of movement would involve destruction for the people living in the area of the battlefield no more tolerable in prospect than that imposed by a strategic nuclear exchange. Finally, there is the unanswerable question: Why change a strategy which has worked and shows every sign of continuing to work very well?

For all these reasons any serious attempt to cast doubt on the continuing validity of deterrence by the threat of nuclear escalation is more likely to feed the latent pressures in Europe for independent national deterrent forces than to encourage European countries to build up their conventional strength—and this would do more to destabilize the existing relationships between Eastern and Western Europe than any other foreseeable development.

To reject an all-conventional strategy for the defense of Western Europe is not, however, to deny that conventional forces at roughly the present level have a vital role to play in NATO's strategy of deterrence by the threat of escalation. In the first place, the presence of large numbers of American and British troops in the area most directly threatened is a key element in making the threat of nuclear escalation credible, as is the deployment of many thousands of nuclear warheads under American control in Western Europe. On the flanks of NATO the ability of allied conventional forces rapidly to reach a threatened area plays a similar role in deterrence. Second, the decision on the initial use of nuclear weapons may well be a difficult one. NATO must have sufficient conventional forces not only to identify a major deliberate attack but also to hold it until the nuclear decision can be taken. The former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, put the same point in his 1969 posture statement as follows: "We therefore require conventional forces in being and in reserve sufficient to halt and hold any probe or limited conventional attack [and] to deter a large conventional attack by confronting the aggressor with the prospect of hostilities on such a scale as to pose a clear risk of escalation to nuclear war. . . ."

Moreover, one of Moscow's purposes in maintaining large military forces is the maintenance of colonial control over the peoples of Eastern Europe. The desire for political liberty and national independence is as strong in Eastern Europe as in Africa or Asia. The decay of the USSR's European empire may lead to further explosions like those already seen in East Berlin, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, perhaps in circumstances posing a more direct threat to the stability of the European military balance. NATO must maintain enough conventional forces to police its frontiers against the consequences of such explosions: this is one situation in which a strategy of deterrence alone is not sufficient.

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION

If Western Europe is to enjoy continued security against Soviet attack, two further components are needed besides an adequacy of nuclear and conventional hardware: the integration of military forces and consultation on plans for the use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviets put a quarter of a million men into Czechoslovakia in three days. The capacity for tactical surprise in modern warfare is such that there will never be time for an alliance to work out how to react to aggression when aggression actually occurs. The alliance can hope to react effectively to any threat only if its members are prepared to commit themselves in detail and in advance to common action. It is not enough simply to agree on what action would be taken in a crisis; it is essential also to make physical arrangements in peacetime for the collective command, control and deployment of allied forces in time of tension or war, and to test the arrangements regularly in joint exercises. It is this structure of prior commitments which has given NATO its unique value as a deterrent to war, for the demonstration of solidarity in peacetime is the best possible deterrent against any temptation to test that solidarity in actual war.

Although British nuclear forces are wholly integrated into NATO strike plans, this degree of nuclear integration is difficult to achieve across the board for various reasons. But the work of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group has shown that problems which are insoluble in theory may be manageable in practice. The alliance is well on the way to solving the physical problems of rapid communication in a crisis on the basis of common information as to what is happening. The German and British governments are now working together on the development of a NATO doctrine for the initial use of nuclear weapons in a number of typical situations. Success in this task could largely eliminate the difficulties that might otherwise arise in establishing collective control of the actual decision to use them.

THE SOVIET THREAT AT SEA

Quite different problems are posed by the increase in Soviet naval activity, particularly in the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Russian ships, for example, only started to appear regularly in the Mediterranean in 1964, but the June War saw a rapid increase, and over the last year or so the squadron has consisted of a cruiser, a submarine depot ship, eight to ten destroyers or smaller escorts, eight to ten submarines, two or three landing ships and about fifteen supporting auxiliaries. Last

September, furthermore, the helicopter cruiser *Moskva*—a new type of ship—made its appearance in the Mediterranean. Recently the squadron has carried out its usual winter rundown and now consists of one cruiser, one submarine depot ship, seven destroyer/escorts, about eight submarines, three landing ships and some ten supporting auxiliaries.

In the official British view the primary role of the Soviet vessels is to provide for the defense of the homeland and contribute to deterrence against Western attack. One of their tasks is thus to shadow those Western ships, such as aircraft carriers, which are capable of launching nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union and to sink them, before they are themselves destroyed, in the event of general war. Their deployment is designed to demonstrate their ability to "mark" the West's nuclear strike ships in the same way as a footballer marks his opposing forwards. The construction of nuclear-powered ballistic missile firing submarines indicates the USSR's appreciation of the value of the seaborne strategic deterrent force.

But there are signs now that the growing Soviet fleet is beginning to flex its muscles in the kind of activities traditional to a naval power. The use of ships in the Mediterranean squadron unsuitable for the "marking" role, the maintenance of a small naval presence at Port Said and Alexandria since the sinking of the *Eilat*, and the deployment of ships to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean—all these are indications of increasing Soviet awareness of the uses of sea power to influence political ends.

The problems this growth of Russian naval activity poses to the West are threefold. The first arises from the marking technique and imposes on the West the need to be sure that it preserves its ability to strike first, if its deterrent threat is to remain credible. The second is the potential of Soviet naval forces to support and augment the military threat by ground and air forces to countries on the flanks of NATO which do not permit the presence of American and other alliance troops on their frontiers with the Soviet Union. This reinforces the need for the ACE mobile force, an integrated command that can be rushed to danger spots in a crisis.

The third problem is that of the political influence of Soviet naval power—"gunboat diplomacy," brought up to date—in which the ability to exert pressure matters a great deal more than the often undesirable option of opening fire. It is true that the

Russian fleet is greatly outnumbered by the NATO fleets and that the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean is greatly inferior to the U.S. Sixth Fleet with its two attack carriers and two dozen other ships. But the mere presence of Russian ships enables the Soviet Union to exert political influence on the neutrals and on her client states in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area. Equally, it will tend to restrict NATO's freedom of maneuver, compared with the situation, for example, during the landings in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958.

Looking to the 1970's

As we look ahead into the next decade we can foresee the possibility of further changes in the military balance arising partly from the economic burdens imposed on the superpowers by the arms race and partly from the growing strength of China.

Economic pressures are already moving the U.S. and Soviet governments toward negotiations for some limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems. The U.S. government has given notice that the United States cannot be expected indefinitely to bear the lion's share of the defense of Europe inside NATO.

How Chinese policy will develop after the Viet Nam war and what resources Peking will devote to what sort of military power for what purposes, it is difficult to predict. But if, as seems likely, China grows in military strength and remains hostile both to the United States and to the Soviet Union, a new factor of immense importance in the global balance will not only present a challenge to countries in Asia like India and Japan but will also exert increasing influence on Soviet-American relations in Europe. On the one hand Russia will be even less ready to risk all-out conflict with the United States for fear of leaving China residuary legatee. On the other hand, the Chinese military threat will set limits to the degree to which the Soviet Union and the United States can afford reciprocal arms reductions. In any case until the USSR comes to terms with nationalism in Eastern Europe the chances of any substantial reduction in Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe will remain limited.

A European Identity in Defense

What does seem to emerge strongly from a look at the possible developments of the next decade is the case for more military cooperation among the European members of NATO—the establishment of a European identity within the Atlantic Alliance. In the past many Europeans, this author among them, have been reluctant to move too far or fast in this direction for fear of encouraging a reduction in the U.S. commitment to NATO. But today the argument points in the opposite direction. As all American leaders have stressed, nothing would do more to encourage the United States to maintain its necessary commitment than the sight of the European countries working effectively together inside the alliance.

In any case, once the United States and the Soviet Union begin discussions on the future of the nuclear balance between them, issues of the most vital and direct importance to the countries of Western Europe will arise. Unless Europe is prepared to put a collective view on these issues, the chance of influencing the course of the discussions will be remote. It is not difficult to conceive situations, too, in which movement toward solving some of the issues that separate the peoples of Eastern Europe from their West European brothers could be made easier to the extent that Western Europe is less dependent on the United States for its security. Finally, if European defense budgets remain limited while defense costs rise, as seems certain, the European countries may be able to get much better value for whatever money they can afford to spend on their defense by exploiting the opportunities created by interdependence.

BRITAIN'S ROLE

British defense policy in the last two years has been determined primarily by this assessment of Soviet military policy and its implications for the West. We have decided that Europe must have first call on our defense resources and that our contribution to the alliance should be strengthened by forces made available by our withdrawal from the Far East and the Persian Gulf. Our present contribution to NATO is already substantial. Britain is the only European member providing an integrated contribution to the nuclear forces of the alliance. Hers is the strongest European navy in NATO. The British Army of the Rhine numbers 53,000 men, supported by a strong tactical air force, equipped with the most modern weapons and consisting of long-service professional soldiers, many with recent combat experience. In the event of a crisis, Rhine Army would be rapidly reinforced to about 120,000 men.

As a result of recent decisions we have been able to offer a substantial additional contribution which will help to fill the most serious gaps in NATO's present capabilities. For example, Britain has decided to deploy a third squadron of VTOL Harrier strike aircraft to be stationed in Germany. Not only will these aircraft increase substantially the amount of conventional close air support available to Rhine Army but, because of their independence of orthodox runways and bases, they are a great deal less vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks of the kind which destroyed the Egyptian air force in June 1967. Moreover, Britain has decided to earmark for NATO 20,000 men of the Strategic Reserve stationed in the United Kingdom. This force consists of three infantry brigades and supporting units, a parachute brigade of two battalions and an SAS regiment (the British Special Forces unit), together with appropriate airlift and air support. It could be used in Central Europe to reinforce Rhine Army, and would undoubtedly give a good account of itself there, but its mobility makes it especially suitable for rapid deployment to NATO's vulnerable flanks.

Another contribution that will prove especially valuable on the flanks is the amphibious force which Britain earmarked in 1968. This consists of two helicopter carriers, both with an embarked commando unit, and two assault ships which can each carry a battalion of infantry—a total of about 6,500 men in all. They can arrive at a trouble spot in a matter of days; they can if necessary remain unprovocatively out of sight for weeks, ready to intervene the instant they are required.

We have thought it right to take special measures to reinforce the Mediterranean in view of the increased Soviet naval activity there. Britain has retained in the Mediterranean two frigates previously planned to be withdrawn to the Atlantic and will add to them a guided missile destroyer in 1970. She has also rearranged her naval deployment program so that from January 1969 onward there will be a major fleet unit—aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier or assault ship—almost continuously in the Mediterranean. During this year a squadron of maritime reconnaissance aircraft will be transferred from the United Kingdom to Malta; this, in company with our allies in the Maritime Air Command Mediterranean (MARAIRMED) established last year, will keep a close watch on Russian naval activity in the area. Britain also expects to contribute to the proposed new on-call naval force in the Mediterranean.

In addition to these physical contributions to the alliance's capability for meeting the various types of threat that may be posed by Soviet policy, Britain in the last twelve months has encouraged a greater European identity within NATO. If Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Britain can reach agreement in the next month or so on the construction of a new combat aircraft, this will provide a solid and indispensable foundation for greater European cooperation in defense procurement. Britain has developed close bilateral relationships through common staff talks with a number of European countries including France. This type of staff discussion must form the groundwork for intergovernmental discussion of the major strategic issues facing the alliance. I believe Britain's cooperation with the German government on the preparation of political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in NATO will be a landmark in the military history of the alliance. We have also encouraged informal discussions among the European defense ministers of some of the problems of the immediate future.

CONCLUSION

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 demonstrated the impressive capability of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the readiness of the Soviet government to use them for political gains when the risk of fighting is low. It also demonstrated NATO's ability to preserve the immunity of its members against such an attack provided it maintains the necessary political solidarity and military strength.

While NATO needs conventional forces at the existing level to police its frontiers, to suppress minor conflicts without the use of atomic weapons, and to make nuclear escalation credible if large-scale attack is threatened, NATO's success in protecting its members over the last twenty years argues against an attempt to match the Warsaw powers in every element of their military capability.

Possible developments in the world over the next decade emphasize the need for the European members of the alliance to cooperate more closely with one another within NATO and to be prepared to carry a larger share of the burden of common defense. Britain is ready to play a full part in such an effort.

NATO, THE SOVIET UNION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

by Sergo Mikoyan

IN evaluating the twenty-year activity of NATO it is essential to determine in what measure that activity corresponds to officially proclaimed goals. Since the goal was mutual defense by the participants against an attack from the East, it is specifically with reference to this problem that NATO's activity must be assessed.

The following motto spread through Brussels in the April days of 1969—"NATO—twenty peaceful years." Let us put aside the question of the NATO ministers' advertising talents, of their preoccupation with "communicating with society." It becomes imperative to determine who deserves credit for the stability that has characterized Europe over the last twenty years, a stability sharply in contrast to the ceaseless chain of conflicts on the continents of the Third World.

Political, social, economic and cultural differences between the European continent and, for example, Africa or Asia are absolutely obvious. It is these differences which go far to explain certain things which are claimed in Brussels as NATO's own achievements. But the basic explanation of Europe's relative stability, claimed as a result of NATO activity, is that the aggression from which fifteen countries are defending themselves in fact exists only in their fantasy.

In reality, there was not a single day in those twenty years in which the NATO armies could say that they could successfully defend European territory in a war with the Soviet Union. Consequently, a war was avoided not due to this organization's efforts. Rather, no one made any attempt upon the NATO countries' territories. At least, this holds true for outside attempts: the armed conflict on Cyprus took place within the organization's framework.

The nature of this article being, so to speak, an anniversary one prevents me from developing this argumentation further. Its essence is most precisely formulated by a man whose opinion in this case is indicative: "The Soviet Union itself is intensely interested in ameliorating tension in Europe." The man is Willy

Brandt, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the DBR (Federal Republic of Germany).

Why should the Soviet Union attack the territories of the NATO countries? Certainly not in order to add the DBR's fifty million people to the DDR's (German Democratic Republic's) twenty million. To accuse the USSR of such aspirations is excessive even in the eyes of NATO's Brussels advertisers. In February of 1969 a *Der Spiegel* correspondent demanded a straight and unwavering answer to this question from the DBR chancellor's parliamentary secretary. The latter was compelled to reply: "The issue of a threat of Soviet intervention is, primarily, not a question of military security. The issue is the threat of Soviet political manipulation of these supposed rights [referring to Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter and to the Potsdam Agreements which the West Germans assumed had become antiquated], in connection with the obligation set forth by the agreement on nuclear non-proliferation."[1]

Thus it is obvious that Bonn needs NATO not for defense against "Soviet invasion": rather, Bonn needs NATO in order to avoid becoming a signatory to the agreement on nuclear nonproliferation.

I

This leads to another consideration of NATO's activity. We are far from thinking that it is unproductive. The basic general result has been that NATO, created in response to the Cold War and the threat to European security, has itself become a factor stimulating cold war, increasing tensions and, thus, also, the threat to the Continent's security.

NATO's *raison d'être* has not remained unchanged over twenty years. Without delving into history, let us consider who uses this organization at present and to what purposes.

Primarily, of course, we are referring to the United States of America. Summarizing her approach to the problem, one can extract two basic goals that are served by Washington's Atlantic policy. The first is to consolidate and maximally prolong its leading role, its military and political hegemony over Western Europe. President de Gaulle understood this perfectly and made corresponding practical decisions. The second goal relates to the Soviet Union and can be characterized by the Indonesian-devised term "confrontation." Its formula is to have a backstop of fourteen countries, to lean on their weight and significance, to use them in alignment against the USSR for the realization of the United States' own political and diplomatic ends.

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[1] *Der Spiegel,* February 10, 1969.

Thus, Washington's view of NATO is that this organization is highly useful, maybe even unique, in serving the U.S. government's interests. It is easy to understand the tender love and unprecedented faithfulness of all U.S. Presidents toward NATO.

The other capital for which NATO's existence is of unquestionable benefit is Bonn. The DBR government uses its membership in the organization for four basic purposes: (1) for hegemony in Western Europe, temporarily as the United States' lesser partner; (2) for gaining access to nuclear armaments; (3) for pressure on the USSR in order eventually, by whatever methods possible, to swallow "the zone," i.e., the DDR; (4) applying the same methods as in (3), to achieve changes in boundaries and "a return" of territories now in Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and other lands.

The DBR's western borders will become a primary issue after the above-mentioned four problems are resolved. Assuming success in the East, it is easy to foresee how quickly and easily German "revanchists" might then force any concessions from their Western neighbors.

Thus, for Bonn NATO is also a unique, priceless organization whose longevity may be prayed for in Catholic and Protestant churches alike. That which Hitler achieved with two allies in 1933-1938 by impudence and blackmail, the Bonn regime, with NATO's help, can achieve by blackmail alone, accompanied perhaps by peaceful lullabies. This is the plan of certain political groups in West Germany. In truth, this republic does not resemble the Hitler state, in spite of certain unpleasant traits. But such distinctions are poor consolation for her neighbors.

The remaining NATO countries play the role of clients, if not statisticians, in that serious political game which the Atlantic Community serves. Even in them one can find fervent supporters of the community. Still, we are not talking about the opinions of this or that political or governmental figure, but about governmental interests, from which their present-day policies emanate. Why these countries stay in NATO or support it is an entirely different question. The causes vary. They can all, however, be reduced to a simple formula: one chooses the lesser of two evils. Not everyone is courageous enough to try the French path. It is not without cause that Canada's Premier Trudeau, when asked about possible limits of nonsubservience to Washington, answered:

> It would depend what violent American hostility really meant. If it were a war of words and some verbal disapprobation, with perhaps some waving of big sticks, I don't think it would deter Canada from doing what we think would be right. Obviously we couldn't in any circumstances have a foreign policy which was completely contrary to the interests of the United States of America. I just don't think they would allow it. They would use all kinds of means to prevent it. It's a matter of pushing as far as you can and of following the things you believe to be right.[2]

II

The question of European security is, of course, tightly intertwined with Soviet-American relations. These relations are always invisibly present at any session of the NATO Council.

Today, as always after the inauguration of a new American President, there are new expectations, perspectives and tendencies. From the White House come hazy pronouncements which, depending on interpretation, can satisfy both the "hawks" and the "doves" and provoke both pessimism and cautious optimism. An aphorism describes a pessimist as a well-informed optimist: thus, let us listen to the voices of well-informed people.

It seems that one of them is Richard V. Allen, President Nixon's adviser who was formerly on the staff of Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. A recent article in *Nation's Business* interprets Dr. Allen's views on the Soviet Union and détente in the following words: "The USSR used the period of détente, so called, to move ahead with an antiballistic missile system, achieved new mobility for Soviet strategic forces, perfected an ability to support wars like Viet Nam and built up a threatening naval force in the Mediterranean."[3] Others voice similar thoughts. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, writes of Soviet "destabilizing activity" in the de-escalation period. Allen's thought is tremendously important in viewing Soviet-American relations. It suggests that a de-escalation period is dangerous for the United States for it is then, supposedly, that the Soviet Union attempts to achieve certain important strategic advantages. If the U.S. President follows this line of reasoning, can we expect steps toward de-escalation?

Reality, however, does not correspond to such conclusions. Advantages that the USSR supposedly attains in a covert manner are actually a propaganda creation which suddenly becomes convincing to its authors. Let us begin with the fact that the period of American perpetuation of war in Viet Nam is labeled a period of reduced tensions.

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[2] Canadian Prime Minister's Interview, London BBC, January 5, 1969.
[3] "Russia: Future Friend or Foe," *Nation's Business*, December 1968, p. 67.

Moreover, the United States was first in developing an anti-missile defense. After McNamara's departure it became evident that one or another system was going to be developed. Talk of anti-Chinese orientation fools no one. President Nixon, speaking of the Sentinel system at a February 6 press conference, made quite clear which opponent was in mind. At the same time, during the summer of 1968 and the beginning of 1969, the Soviet government lucidly expressed a readiness to participate in negotiations on halting an armaments race stemming from anti-missile systems. This offered a real chance for an agreement in the near future. Instead of answering, the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, under the cover of allusions to China, began maneuvering toward the creation of a "minimum" system which, subsequently, was decided upon. A "minimum" system does not change the situation greatly. The development of any system requires time and a certain order of priorities. Today the order of priorities is veiled as American benevolence.

Allen's second point concerns assurance of increased mobility for Soviet troops. But who does not remember that military mobility (for U.S. forces) was proclaimed a vital issue by President Kennedy and was intensely pursued under General Taylor? It is entirely natural that changing military doctrines are determined by reality and, thus, that the Soviet Union had to maintain its armed strength to meet the requirements of these modern doctrines. After all, who could seriously expect that the pleasant Dobrynin-Rusk conversations, held in the quiet offices of governmental departments, or even the conclusion of a few conventions between the two countries would induce the USSR to abandon efforts to modernize her armed forces and thus weaken her defense capability?

Finally, there is the question of the Soviet Navy's disposition in the Mediterranean in 1968. Serious European observers reject the opinion that this measure comprised a threat or an attempt to outflank NATO from the south. It is interesting that American Admiral Anderson was perturbed over a lack of European anxiety over this development. Of course, it is easy to point out that by 1968 the navies of the United States and its allies were dispersed throughout the whole world—with the possible exception of the fountain on Pushkin Square in Moscow.

And so it happens that the thesis of Russian cunning during de-escalation, dangerous in its purposes and results, is not simply a substitute of propaganda for realistic political perspectives, but is an example of how one can be imprisoned by one's own propaganda. This example deserves special attention since in it we see an interesting psychological phenomenon transformed into a dangerous political tenet.

III

Most recently NATO advocates have delightedly grasped at the affair known in Prague as the "problematics of August 21st," that is, the entrance of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia.

Many are convinced by talk of a "new situation." But an attempt to move from such vague phrases to concrete analysis clearly shows the illusory nature of such argumentation in reference to NATO defense. Where is the difference between Soviet troops on the Czech-German border and Soviet troops on the DDR-DBR border? Talk of encirclement from the south is irresponsible: in case of military necessity such a maneuver could be performed in a few hours. Redeployment of Warsaw Pact troops within the Pact's member nations has no relation to the Atlantic Pact members' security. This is a perfectly clear political reality, no matter how enticing and expedient assertions to the contrary may be.

Of course, it is possible to understand Brussels' advertising officialdom. If the groundwork is prepared psychologically, then it becomes possible to inculcate a given thought without any hard proof. It is natural for them to impale the Czechoslovak affair upon the twenty-year-old spit of a Soviet threat to Western Europe. For many, the *shashlyk* displayed thereon seems edible. But upon closer examination the advertised commodity's real value has not increased.

The demonstrative chorus of "concern" voiced over the Czechoslovak affair is well illustrated by the DBR's attitude toward the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Bonn has always viewed this treaty as a bulldog views an approaching muzzle. For a long time the agreement has not been signed. Even though it can only be accepted or rejected, the DBR's leading political circles talk of some sort of amendments, thereby actually sabotaging the signing. While the United States was convincing itself that the agreement would bring a de-escalation of tensions, the DBR was doing everything in its power to make it simply a scrap of paper, for without the DBR's signature the agreement would be of questionable value. In an extreme situation, moreover, there was the possibility that such a signature would be made as a purely tactical maneuver: the agreement could be torpedoed later, in the ratification phase.

Only a few days after August 21, appearing in Geneva, Willy Brandt rejected the agreement outright while referring to the latest developments in Eastern Europe—as though before them Bonn would have endorsed the agreement, or as though the agreement had any connection with those developments.

IV

On March 17, 1969 a meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Commission was held in Budapest. The participants reiterated a proposal they had made in early 1966 calling for a Pan-European conference on European security and cooperation.

Although, naturally, no categorical objections to this idea could be raised, nor any on principle, nevertheless over the past three years the proposal has been ignored. Causes for this passivity are obvious. They stem from those parties and those goals which NATO serves. In the period preceding the North Atlantic Pact's twentieth anniversary such a process would have been dangerous in the eyes of those who needed NATO's continuance not for guaranteeing European security, but for other ends.

Besides, such a conference would lead to the DDR representatives sitting at a conference table with thirty other participants. This would mean the collapse of the DBR's monopolistic claim to represent the German people, a claim devoid of reality. Of course, such contact might precipitate a real de-escalation of hostility, but why does Bonn need this when its primary goals are more easily attained within an environment of tension?

This is why no all-European conference has met over the past three years. Let us not speculate about whether it will occur in the future. It is obvious that if such a meeting is convened, this will happen in spite of Bonn's strategic logistics—and only because the Warsaw Pact proposal has been evaluated not according to interests of the controlling powers in NATO, but in the context of Europe's real security.

The Continent's division into two opposing blocs increases tension by its very nature, regardless of the division's causes. Results become causes. Talk of defensive intent, after all, does not change the essence of the situation.

In the introduction to Anatol Rapoport's intriguing book, *Strategy and Conscience,* Professor Karl Deutsch makes the following cogent observation:

> Building a large number of air raid shelters, by one country . . . may signal to *its human adversary* that its government is now more impressed with the likelihood of war than it was earlier. This may increase international tension and make war somewhat more likely, so that mass shelters would leave it, on balance, more endangered and not less.[4]

It should be noted that NATO, of course, does not busy itself solely with bomb-shelters. The argument that West German rearmament is imperative for prevention of a supposed Soviet takeover of West European territory does not stand up under serious examination.

The stability of the two opposing camps in Europe is maintained not by a concrete interrelationship of power on the European continent, but by what is known in the international lexicon as "mutual restraint," or the threat of "massive retaliation." The doctrine of "flexible response," for all its importance in the last few years, pertains to other continents and regions of the globe which are not so essential in the power equation. The example illustrative for NATO is West Berlin, in which are stationed forces inadequate even for a local conflict of the kind typical in the Third World.

NATO's existence and threatening stance toward the East does not, in itself, solve the problem of guaranteeing West European security. It only increases international tension, thereby complicating an already difficult situation existing on the Continent.

V

For working out a guarantee of European security it is not enough simply to meet in, say, the Geneva Palace of Nations, though this would be a significant development. It is imperative to come to such a meeting with a briefcase empty of conditions contradicting the interests of security. A basic condition for security is abandonment of demands for redrawing European boundaries. And yet the Bundestag periodically passes resolutions proclaiming present boundaries—both east and west—to be utterly unsatisfactory to the DBR.

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[4] Karl Deutsch, in Anatol Rapoport, *Strategy and Conscience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. ix.

Optimists assume that these resolutions are tactical maneuvers and that their authors will reject "revanchism" in exchange for certain (which ones, after all?) concessions. Similarly, some optimists assume that demands for nuclear armaments are dictated only out of need to achieve equality in status and rights. France is cited as an example, while it is forgotten that that country has no claims on other's territories. She is not intent on annexing Belgium, or Switzerland, or even Quebec. These arguments remind one of those pessimists who advocated giving the DBR nuclear weapons through the multilateral force (MLF) plan, for otherwise, it was feared, she would violate the 1954 accords and acquire these armaments herself. Certainly they did not realize the true meaning of their pessimism—for if the DBR could so easily violate the 1954 accords, then why would she not violate any control agreement signed by NATO? The situation brings to mind a thirty-year-old thesis: "Better to relinquish the Sudetenland by international agreement; otherwise they will take it themselves."

Soviet public opinion is unanimously against all revanchist tendencies—to the west as well as the east of present-day DBR boundaries. They would not approve of any diplomatic moves contrary to this position. They have a right to expect that the responsible element of the DBR's population understands a certain set of propositions: To whip up ill feeling and to base policy upon the use, or the threatened use, of force is, so far as the fate of the German people is concerned, the height of irresponsibility. The lost territories cannot be regained, just as the tens of millions of lives lost in countries victimized by Hitler cannot be regained, or as the destruction, suffering and loss endured by European countries cannot be reimbursed.

In professional diplomacy, of course, emotionalism is often displaced by sober analysis. But to remain sober an analysis must consider emotion if the latter is shared by millions and millions of people. In any case, the Soviet people are determined that European diplomacy will safeguard those vital requirements and desires which are not only in their own interests, but applicable to the interests of all European peoples, including the population of West Germany.

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

by Alastair Buchan

ON the twentieth anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance its future appears more assured than it did on, say, its eighteenth. In 1967, when Viet Nam had brought American prestige in Europe, especially in the smaller countries, to its lowest ebb since the days of Coolidge; when France appeared to be seriously considering a strategy of armed neutrality based on an expanded nuclear force; when it seemed possible that Britain might further reduce her European forces in order to sustain her global commitments; when Germany's *Ostpolitik* had led her to embrace "peaceful engagement" with even greater gusto than President Johnson; and when de Gaulle's second exclusion of Britain from the Common Market seemed to doom the prospects of a European grouping within the alliance, it was at best uncertain whether NATO would survive in any meaningful sense through the next decade. A bilateral German-American alliance seemed as probable. But now that the magic date of April 1969, which had been labeled in so much Soviet and other comment as "the end of NATO," has become history, it seems extremely unlikely that the classic factors which have broken up alliances in the past will be powerful enough to bring about NATO's demise in the next decade.

The prospect of a *renversement des alliances* on the part of any of the major allies is hardly serious, especially since the Czechoslovak invasion has invalidated much of the basis of French policy toward Eastern Europe. Similarly, the sense of enervation evident in 1967, which was leading to divergent perceptions of the whole problem of European security in Paris, London, Bonn and Washington, is now much less evident. Another cause of the dissolution of alliances, that their continuation carries greater risk than advantage, which had some weight in European capitals when it seemed possible in 1965 and 1966 that the Viet Nam war would escalate, has lost its force, while the sense of irrelevance which is undermining alliances such as CENTO is no longer operative.

I

The secondary but equally vital purpose of NATO, to provide a framework within which modern West Germany can live, mature and gradually establish a language of common interest with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, remains as important as ever, and is so perceived by both Germans and non-Germans, especially as the Federal Republic's economic power grows in proportion to that of her neighbors, both West and East. At the same time, some of the internal tensions within the alliance have been relaxed. Lyndon Johnson's virtual ignoring of Western Europe, except on trade and monetary questions, is a thing of the past, as is the danger that the United States might become obsessed by its Asian preoccupations. The prospect of superpower negotiations always creates tremors of apprehension in Europe, but in the case of the impending discussions on restraint in strategic weapons systems, the Europeans identify their interest with such restraint; fear that this may lead to decisions being taken over the heads of the European capitals has been partly disarmed by President Nixon's recent tour.

The gradual erosion of the Anglo-American "special relationship" has modified the Continental fear that NATO is dominated by Anglo-Saxon assumptions, even though it has not removed France's basic distaste for integrated politico-military organizations. Britain's decision has been to concentrate her limited strategic forces in Europe rather than to let them remain dispersed. The Nonproliferation Treaty and Germany's impending adherence to it are removing some of the popular Germanophobia of her ex-enemies, while the growing complexity of the superpower strategic balance is diminishing the importance and so the divisive effect of British and French nuclear weapons. Finally, there has of late been some sensible innovation in the techniques of policy and decision-making within the political-military organization itself, aided in some respects by the withdrawal of France: the placing of the Military Committee alongside the Council; the evolution of a system of four-to-five-year force planning in place of the old Annual Review; the creation of an arms control unit within the Secretariat; and above all the Nuclear Planning Group which makes European countries constructive, not merely carping, critics of U.S. strategic planning.

But these are modest improvements and achievements in face of the growing complexity of the East-West relationship in Europe and the difficulties of managing so large an alliance in a period when the nuclear stalemate, and certain genuine elements of détente, give increasing autonomy to all its members. Assuming that there is no radical change in the balance of power during the next few years, the principal problems which the alliance will have to confront seem to me to be as follows.

II

The asymmetry between the nature, size and deployment of communist and Western land and air power in Europe which has existed for many years is likely to increase. NATO may now be formally committed to a strategic doctrine of "flexible response," but the fact is that, unless there are a series of crises which induce a considerable increase in West European military manpower and expenditure, the means of pursuing it are not likely to be available. On the contrary, there is no reason, budgetary, economic or demographic, why Soviet forces in Central Europe should not remain at some thirty or more divisions west of the Vistula, with a large reserve in the western part of the Soviet Union: the age group twenty to twenty-four in the USSR will double between 1967 and 1975. Against this, NATO forces in the center can only with the greatest difficulty be maintained at twenty-four divisions with a modest reinforcement capability, in view of rising costs and competition for public resources in all countries. If the Soviet Union should be prepared to face the balance of risks involved, there is no reason why she could not concentrate a superiority of three to one against a particular sector of NATO defenses together with a similar disparity in airpower. As most people now realize, the evidence from maneuvers and pre-crisis deployment is so difficult to interpret clearly that the certainty of having adequate strategic warning of such a move cannot be taken for granted.

In other words, stability in Europe and the use of NATO as a mechanism for keeping the peace will continue to remain dependent to an important extent on the presence of American nuclear weapons and on the readiness of the United States to threaten their use in a crisis. The central role of the United States cannot be abrogated or transferred without a radical reorganization of power within the alliance. At the same time, the Czechoslovak crisis, the Brezhnev doctrine of socialist unity to which it gave rise, the tensions within Eastern Europe, and the growth of a modest but real Soviet intervention force in the Mediterranean, open the prospect that the spectrum of possible crises and conflicts with which the NATO system is designed to cope may have to be broadened to pay particular attention to

Southern Europe. In that region a number of irredenta and historic feuds, Greek-Turk, Greek-Bulgar, Yugoslav-Bulgar, or between Rumania and her neighbors, could re-emerge to jeopardize the peace of Europe, even if a Soviet assault on Yugoslavia may be a somewhat remote hypothesis.

Furthermore, we cannot discount the possibility of recurrent Czech crises, one of which might take a more violent form with the danger of a spillover of conflict into Austria or Bavaria if, say, Czechoslovakian forces decided to escape forcible disarmament by Red Army units. The structure of the NATO forces may thus have to provide for stamping out, deterring or containing local conflicts, principally but not exclusively in Southern Europe, as well as deterring pressure on a larger scale against the whole of Western Europe. Europe in the 1970's could be a more dangerous place than in the 1960's even if a tacit agreement, which President Nixon clearly hopes to negotiate, emerges between Washington and Moscow on the means of controlling crises in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe.

III

These strategic contingencies have to be considered against a political background that is not especially propitious. On the one hand, the European observer seems to sense a considerable weariness in American public opinion with the whole burden of universal responsibility. Not least does this have to do with the need for a large military commitment in Western Europe, an area whose nations are nearly as rich in per capita income as the United States is and who are not plagued by many of her domestic problems. Such weariness has been manifest before, after the Korean War, for instance, when a Republican President was in the White House, but the difference between the early 1970's and the mid-1950's is that the defense bill has doubled in the interim, and now there is much fiercer competition for public resources to fight crime, poverty and racialism, as well as the probability of increased expenditure on strategic systems. It is hard for the average American, including the average Congressman, to reconcile himself to the continuing centrality of the U.S. role in the stability of Europe.

But from the European standpoint there has been little or no progress, except in the realm of ideas, in maximizing European military resources through cooperation in order to assume a greater share of the burden, and it is difficult to be sanguine about any prospect of rapid progress even now that President de Gaulle has left the Elysée. There are certain hopeful developments. There is now much greater communication between European military staffs, though mostly on a bilateral basis. One project, the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft, a successor to the F-104, is being studied on a four-power basis by Britain, Germany, Holland and Italy, and the initial problems of reconciling requirements have been largely overcome; but it must clear several hurdles of increasing height—design, development, finance and production—before there is evidence enough that European governments can build an advanced weapons system in harness to warrant considering permanent institutions, such as a European Defense Commission. In any case the doubts that have been cast on the value of the European Economic Community and on whether it is the right vehicle for bringing Britain into integral association with the other European powers, make one wonder whether the whole business of Europe's economic and political construction may not have to be reconsidered and renegotiated almost *ab initio*.

Moreover, both sides of the Atlantic share a common problem, namely, the growing restlessness with the established order, and especially with any form of military service, of a younger generation which remembers nothing of the Second World War and little about the Cold War. This has different aspects in different countries. It embraces racial problems in the United States, but hardly at all in Europe; student unrest in Berlin, on the other hand, has more important international implications than in Berkeley. One must assume that all the major developed countries are going to become increasingly introspective, in the early 1970's at least, and will find international alignments of diminished relevance to the problems actually confronting politicians day by day. British or American troops, for instance, could do nothing to help control student disorders in Germany or labor unrest in Italy.

Even if one takes the view that the present highly conservative regime in the Kremlin is likely to continue to show caution in its confrontation of American power, and to be primarily occupied with its quarrel with China, one cannot be entirely sanguine about the prospects for stability in Europe. For one thing, this conservatism, as exemplified by the assault on Czechoslovakia, has dispelled much of the reality of "peaceful engagement" in Europe, even if stability can be preserved in superpower relations by negotiation. In the years before 1968 it was possible to argue that if détente could be preserved and if stability in Europe could also be maintained, a natural process of communication between Eastern and Western Europe at the political, economic and cultural levels could lead to a greater intermingling of interests, in which ideological differences would be minimized. Once this situation had begun to develop it would be possible to think seriously about a more comprehensive European security system. The events of August 21, 1968 revealed the Soviet Union's fear of precisely such a development, and the fact that this avenue seems closed for the time being tends to increase in both halves of Europe the sense of restlessness with a status quo that the component countries are unable to modify.

The assault on Czechoslovakia has not altered the political or military balance of power within Europe. What it and recent developments within the Western alliance have done is to make certain kinds of European structures or European-American relations seem less probable than others. *Europe des Etats* is likely to remain a Gaullist or Rumanian pipe dream. At the same time, a return to the situation of the 1950's, when there was continuous military alarm in Europe and American dominance in NATO was virtually unquestioned, seems improbable in the 1970's, partly because of the deadlock at the strategic level which makes the hypothesis of a deliberate Soviet assault on Western Europe increasingly implausible, partly because the United States is no longer prepared to exercise such dominance. NATO, for reasons already discussed, is now unlikely to fragment in the sense of losing significant members or becoming converted into a primarily German-American alliance.

The goal of partnership, the Grand Design of the Kennedy era, is incapable of realization in the early 1970's since the foundations of a system of European defense and political cooperation are not yet laid. More than this, there is a distinct fear in most European breasts that to pursue the organization of Europe to the point where the European NATO powers could treat on terms approaching equality with the United States in the political-strategic field, say by the creation of a European nuclear force, might encourage either a Soviet-American "special relationship" or American isolationism.

IV

So one is left with the evolution of the present system, the development of as much European cooperation as possible, the lightening of the U.S. commitment to the extent that is prudent, the consideration of goals that have some hope of attainment with respect to the final organization of European security. Here one can only suggest the shape of Scylla and Charybdis, the worst and the best alternative, assuming that the real course of the future lies somewhere in between.

The worst alternative would be a decision to cut significantly and at short notice the number of U.S. ground forces in Europe, perhaps as a consequence of Congressional pressure on the defense budget for fiscal 1972, without substantial reduction in the number of Soviet forces in Central Europe. The psychological effect of such a decision would be even more damaging if it accompanied or succeeded a successful Soviet-American negotiation on restraint in the deployment of strategic systems and on the control of conflict or the resolution of Soviet-American interests in other parts of the world, the Middle East or Viet Nam, but with no signs of equivalent progress on the outstanding political problems of Europe. Were this to happen, not only would the European balance be shaken, but it would bring into being a European caucus, which would include Britain and Germany, animated by hostility to the United States and the urge to put pressure on her, rather than to make trans-Atlantic cooperation within NATO more effective. It might even tempt the Soviet Union into a more adventurous policy, particularly in Southern Europe.

At the same time, every European government is aware that the level of American forces prevailing for the past two decades cannot be retained in Europe indefinitely in order to provide credibility to the U.S. strategic guarantees. The ideal solution, and the one most likely to fit the requirements of conflict control in Europe in the next ten years, is one whereby the European powers gradually assume greater responsibility for old "shield" functions in Central Europe, employing both mobilized and reserve forces for the purpose, and exploiting such technological developments as the personal anti-tank weapon and simple defenses against low-flying aircraft which will become available in the 1970's. A somewhat reduced American contingent (plus the Canadian brigade if it remains) could then be given greater mobility, so that it could move rapidly to any part of the NATO area to stamp out or contain local conflict, or deter Soviet pressure on a small power with an effectiveness that only American forces, backed by the great strategic power of the United States, have to a greater extent than those from other countries.

This probably means introducing the "sky cavalry" concept into Europe, together with somewhat heavier mobile forces. Such a change would have to be made gradually, for it would involve considerable re-equipping and retraining. It would only become feasible as the level of European military efficiency rises, and this must result from closer cooperation and more specialization if it is not to be very costly. European cooperation will not occur in this field merely for its own sake, but only if it is clear that a complementary function to that of American force is the most effective way of keeping the United States militarily committed to the security of Europe. Three highly mobile U.S. divisions in Europe, normally based in Germany but able to go North or South at short notice, perhaps using the facilities of an integrated European logistics system operated by a European Defense Commission (which also controlled an Advanced Weapons Authority), would fill a gap between the needs of stability in the center and the increasing possibility of conflict on the flanks in a way that six American armored and mechanized divisions in Bavaria may not. This plan would also provide an avenue to cooperation between France and NATO, since mobility between the center and the Mediterranean is handicapped without the use of French airspace and facilities.

But the alliance system will become increasingly difficult to operate, even if the division of military responsibility is clarified, unless it has a coherent political objective that the postwar generation (which now accounts for about half the votes in Europe) can accept. To my mind this is not to be found in hopeless aspirations for the end of superpower involvement in the European balance, or by the dissolution of the alliance system and the imposition of arms control arrangements which have no hope of acceptance in other areas of the world. The realizable avenue of progress is to acknowledge the growth of a special relationship between the two superpowers, to accept the permanence of the two alliance systems in Europe, but to envisage them increasingly as systems of crisis management and as a means of giving credibility to external guarantees, until the point is reached when a bridge can be built between them. This might take the form of a European Security Council, perhaps with headquarters in Berlin, with certain explicit functions, such as the inspection of arms control agreements or crisis consultation, yet without destroying the residual security provided by the alliances themselves.

SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN WESTERN EUROPE

by André Beaufre

NATO was established in 1949 on the hypothesis that Western Europe was threatened militarily and politically by the Soviet Union. This hypothesis, after the events in Prague in February 1948, appeared plausible, and justified an immediate collective effort to regroup and rearm the West European states and to reinforce their defense by American troops.

Since then, the notion of West European defense has undergone important transformations. In effect, the development of nuclear weapons was to modify progressively the concept of direct defense by conventional forces into a concept of indirect defense by the threat of nuclear reprisal. Defense became a concept of deterrence. In reality, this concept evolved constantly in response to changes in nuclear forces and technological progress. As long as U.S. strategic nuclear forces disposed of an overwhelming superiority, deterrence was obtained by a threat of massive retaliation. Defense became a simple warning mechanism. When the Soviets gained the capacity to respond with considerable strategic nuclear forces, it appeared that the Western allies could not take the risk of a Soviet response for minor stakes. For such stakes it was necessary to maintain sufficient conventional forces in order to be able to impose a "pause" designed to give time for deliberation before a massive reprisal was launched. As conventional means became insufficient for such a mission, the Western allies strengthened their defense capabilities by arming themselves with tactical nuclear weapons.

Parallel to the problem of European defense, global nuclear strategy imposed new constraints on the confrontation. In the first phase, it was necessary to give greater recognition to the unstable character of the nuclear confrontation resulting from the enormous—and possibly decisive—advantage which would accrue from a nuclear Pearl Harbor. This situation might be remedied by adopting effective measures to make a surprise attack impossible, but these, because of the short delay in reaction they permitted, could involve a grave danger of war by error.

In order to correct this danger of war by error and also to refine the use of the threat of reprisals, the Kennedy Administration at the beginning of the 1960's adopted the concept of invulnerable reprisal forces. In order to avoid risks resulting from tactical nuclear arms deployed in Europe, the United States tightened control over these arms and sought to persuade her allies to reinforce their conventional forces so that nuclear weapons would be used only as a last resort. The doctrine of massive retaliation was abandoned for that of "selective response" (flexible response) which, in case of conflict, was designed to confine the struggle to the lowest possible level of violence, while the adversary's escalation would be prevented by the threat of "assured destruction." This reform tended in reality to constrain the adversary to keep to a form of war limited both in intensity and area.

These modifications were fully in conformity with American interests in avoiding a nuclear confrontation in which the United States itself might be endangered. But it appeared in Europe that these changes reduced the overall value of deterrence and that limited European conflicts, with potentially disastrous local results, would again become possible: hence, the long debates between the proponents of "massive retaliation" and the supporters of "selective response." Regardless of the theoretical aspects of the debate, it became evident that the weakness of conventional forces in Europe would lead, no matter what the doctrine, to a defense founded on an early use of nuclear arms. The discussion was more academic than realistic. The opponents of flexible response emphasized its weakness in regard to general conflict.

Meanwhile, the political environment changed following the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviets had gained a greater awareness of nuclear deterrence, yet had lost by their hasty adventurism. Moreover, de-Stalinization permitted hope that the Soviet leadership would no longer be bent upon ideological and military expansion, but would sincerely embrace peaceful coexistence. In fact, a détente was initiated between the Soviet Union and the United States, and later between the Soviet Union and the states of Western Europe.

This was fortunate, because at this time nuclear deterrence thrust us into a new period fraught with grave danger. The Soviet Union had constructed, similar to the United States, an invulnerable retaliatory force. The two possible adversaries were then vulnerable to a devastating retaliation. As a result, the credibility of a nuclear first strike — hence, nuclear retaliation to a conventional attack — became weak if not invalid. Faced with this situation, it was necessary to restore credibility. For this reason, the Soviets, French and Germans emphasized the possible irrationality of a rapid and massive nuclear reaction. In contrast, the Americans staked their hopes on the rationality of limited war, maintained by nuclear deterrence, and sought to reinforce conventional forces. This period of danger is still with us. Nuclear deterrence remains precarious and its credibility must be reinforced. NATO's conventional forces are too small to allow the allies to forgo plans for the early use of nuclear arms. However, a tendency is developing, especially in Great Britain, to reserve the first use of nuclear weapons to tactical ones. These have, in effect, the advantages of making unforeseeable the results of ground warfare, hence of aggression, while maintaining in reserve the strategic threat as an obstacle to total escalation. Yet, one cannot conceal a certain concern about the possible use of nuclear arms in the case of war in Europe.

THE PRESENT

Analysis of the present political situation suggests that contemporary problems differ from those of the 1950's. On the world scene, the détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, begun after the Cuban missile crisis, has undergone sudden changes of fortune, notably because of Viet Nam and the Middle East crisis, where the United States and the Soviet Union confront one another indirectly, and the Czechoslovakian crisis. However, it has been established that the general trend, despite all obstacles, is that of rapprochement between the two superpowers. The logic of this trend lies in the identity of their principal interests: to avoid conflict between themselves, reduce their defense expenditures to an acceptable level, maintain as much as possible their nuclear monopoly, and safeguard peace in the world. To the extent that it should materialize, the Chinese threat can only reinforce this commonality of interests.

In these conditions, the old dramatic opposition between East and West changes its character: it is no longer a question of a struggle to the death, but of a limited concurrence due to powerful common interests. The ideological conflict has lost some of its importance.

For this reason, the Nonproliferation Treaty was pushed through and the possibility emerged of an agreement on the control of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons, a moratorium in the development of nuclear weapons which have been dominant for twenty years. Such an agreement can only raise many political problems, especially in Europe, and therefore has important strategic consequences. Moreover, serious questions raised by the Viet Nam war and the Middle East crisis appear to be on the road to solution or at least in the process of being absorbed. Events combine to give a general impression of détente whose extent one cannot foresee but from which one can conclude that the Soviet threat to Western Europe no longer exists.

At the same time, it is impossible to ignore several disturbing factors in Europe. Germany, still divided, remains potentially the source of serious problems. The Soviet Union keeps alive the ghost of the German threat as a means of maintaining Moscow's control over her Central and East European satellites. American policy toward the Federal Republic has helped the Soviets to set up the Germans as the bogeyman of Europe while sustaining the Bonn government's unreasonable hopes regarding reunification. The German question in the heart of Europe constitutes a continuing threat.

But other threats exist. De-Stalinization has set in motion an irresistible liberalization movement in the former satellite states, and even in the Soviet Union itself. The Czechoslovak crisis and the evolution of Rumania, following the experience of Yugoslavia, demonstrate that great changes are inevitable. These changes can be the source of serious crises whose consequences on the international level must be reduced. In the Soviet Union, there are many indications of a malaise that Soviet leaders cannot fail to recognize. A *crise de regime* in the USSR cannot be avoided and constitutes one of the most important prospects of the 1970's. This almost certainly will result in upheaval. Until now, the underlying instability in Eastern Europe has been met by a hardening reaction of the purest neo-Stalinist style. This policy which reinforced the power of hard-line Soviet elements, especially in the army, is not without risks in the event of revolutionary disintegration in neighboring states.

In the West there is evidence of internal instability. Everywhere, student troubles have revealed that the Western world is in the throes of a *crise de civilisation* which will inevitably lead to further serious disorders. The outcome cannot be discerned, but could result, at one extreme, in a series of reforms leading to peaceful evolution, and at the other extreme, in a revolution involving internal conflict, such as the Spanish Civil War, which might lead to international warfare.

On the global scale, there is unrest in almost every part of the world: South America suffers from a social neocolonialism and explosive political problems are likely to disrupt the existing political order. Newly independent Africa seeks solutions to difficulties resulting from overpopulation, while the bastion of white South Africa prepares for uneasy reckoning days. In Asia, where the prospects for Japan and China are the determining factor, the future is uncertain, and China is trying to assume leadership of a world revolution.

In sum, even if Soviet-American tensions are resolved, disturbing problems remain in Europe. Such problems result as much from the fact of Germany as from domestic instability in the various states. The remainder of the world faces the prospects of upheavals. It is in this political context that the problem of European security must be considered.

THE INDISPENSABLE NEW ORGANIZATION

The preceding political analysis leads to several important organizational consequences: (1) The problem of the defense of Western Europe has lost much of its former urgency because there is no longer a permanent Soviet threat. The most important matter is to strengthen European security by appropriate measures to prevent or minimize crises either in Europe or in the vicinity of Europe. The problem is thus more political than military.

(2) The security of Germany requires particular solutions of a military and political nature. Germany must be part of a defensive system which will guarantee her security and give the Germans a greater measure of participation in Western defense.

(3) The military system created by NATO corresponds only partially to these two objectives: NATO is a defensive military alliance activated only after an act of aggression has taken place; it is not a security system that can function effectively in peacetime. The conception on which NATO rests, with an integrated military command under U.S. leadership and an international council composed of ambassadors, does not lend itself to the game of subtle crisis maneuvers. NATO, as it has developed, constitutes a defensive system burdened with an outmoded military structure

and unable to adapt easily to the political imperatives of a security system.

(4) The conclusion which emerges is that Europe requires, on the one hand, a military system of contingent defense composed of a rejuvenated NATO including a separate European pillar; and on the other hand, a political security system which, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, would have a distinct European component. This is the bare outline of the organizational structure needed to cope with the new situation in Europe.

STRATEGY FOR THE CONTROL OF CRISES

The strategy to be applied by the proposed new political security system presents peculiar problems that it is important to delineate and analyze. A crisis is a state of tension in the course of which there is a risk of escalation toward military conflict (the maximum risk that must be avoided) and in which one party seeks to prevent the opponent from gaining a certain political or military advantage (the minimum risk), in fact, the stake of the crisis.

This definition leads to the recognition of two concurrent objectives: (1) To limit the conflict, a result that can be obtained by conventional and nuclear deterrence effected by the "defensive system." (2) To halt unfavorable action, which often will take place outside the zone covered by the defensive system, as in the case of Czechoslovakia. This will be the role of the "security system."

It is the second aspect that makes the control of crises a difficult problem, different from that originally envisaged by NATO. NATO deterrence aims only to prevent war or aggression. If the West had wanted to prevent armed aggression against Czechoslovakia, it would have been necessary to paralyze Soviet action — in other words, to reduce the Kremlin's freedom of political and military maneuver by relevant actions on the level of the Cold War.

What is the essence of freedom of action in the Cold War? In this form of struggle, force is always veiled or insidious; all acts which fall below a certain level of violence and which do not involve our own forces are possible. It is a question of paralyzing the initiatives of the adversary by measures that inhibit him. We are familiar with many examples of this inhibition: the action in 1956 against France and England at Suez; French action in 1957 at the time of the bombing of Sakiet on the Tunisian frontier; and the events which, even now, have led the United States to limit its bombing of North Viet Nam. In all of these cases, it is the psychological atmosphere of international opinion or of the adversary's domestic public opinion that will be influential above all. This requires active political maneuvering on the international level, a primary form of action which is absolutely essential.

A second form of action consists in threatening to undertake an offensive operation at the Cold War level that the adversary would not be able to sidestep and which he would consider to be at least as important to him as the benefits he hopes to gain from the action he has undertaken. It is of crucial importance to set forth the objectives that can be attained by means of the Cold War, as Khrushchev at certain times did: for example, he threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany which would have automatically brought into question the status of Western access to Berlin.

But these two forms of action still cannot suffice. In this case, a third form may be utilized. This is certainly more risky, for it joins the Cold War and military conflict, both conventional and nuclear. In fact it is less a question of threatening to make war if the adversary does not give up, than of *proving* to the adversary by actions that he risks military conflict if he continues. This is, for example, what would happen in case of a blockade on the access routes to Berlin if the allies demonstrated their determination to reopen the routes by arms, if necessary. This is what transpired during the Cuban missile crisis when the United States declared the partial naval blockade of the island. As a result of such action, the deterrence which exists at the military-strategic level is transferred to the level of the Cold War.

As can be seen from this analysis, crisis maneuvers set forth a series of steps designed to prove to the adversary our willingness to accept the worst contingencies rather than to give up. This procedure is essentially a psychological maneuver in which each move is carefully calculated to make the enemy lose his freedom of action, while avoiding steps that are too dangerous. One of the essential conditions of this maneuver is to calculate each move in such a way as to leave the adversary a choice between escalation and disengagement. It is absolutely necessary to avoid forcing him to the wall.

Let us now examine the question of the control of an exercise based on these lessons. In the case of Cuba the crisis was controlled from Washington by a series of decisions taken on the basis of conclusions drawn from consideration of a number of possible moves and their consequences — short of an ultimatum. Thanks to this method the decisions turned out to be exactly adapted to the problem.

From this experience, the United States learned the lesson that crises can be controlled only by a single command — in the Cuban case, the President of the United States. Before reaching this technically sound conclusion, the United States had made an effort in the alliance to obtain centralization under the guise of the integration of nuclear forces. For the Europeans, it was unthinkable that a crisis in Europe would not raise different points of view among European nations. It was difficult to envisage a crisis concerning Berlin or East Germany in which the Federal Republic, France, Great Britain, or even the Low Countries would not have a vital interest at stake.

The Americans then sought coordination through a system of advance planning on crises, including agreement on what kind of action would be taken in a given contingency. This advance planning effort, which greatly resembles that of military planning in case of war, does not stand up under scrutiny. First, concerted action would have little chance of being approved by fifteen nations; for example, Denmark or Iceland would never have been associated in a military blockade of Cuba. Then, whatever plan was accepted, the probability is that the crisis would not correspond exactly to the foreseen contingency. The prepared plan risks not being applicable. Moreover, the reaction of public opinion at the moment of the incident is difficult to evaluate: A country which was reticent during planning could become greatly exercised as a result of a wave of public indignation, as happened in the United States at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. A country which showed itself very firm during planning sessions could be constrained by domestic opinion to adopt a much more prudent attitude. For these reasons the method of the scenario, even with variants, did not appear satisfactory.

Consequently, the only possible solution is one that gives the alliance members a choice of action. It is less a question of building a scenario than of preparing decisions that will be taken at the moment of the crisis by the different states.

As part of such preparations there must first be a complete list of possible measures, together with a full appreciation of the consequences these measures can have on world opinion and on the adversary. This is, in fact, what was done in the case of Berlin. This exploration of possible policy alternatives, undertaken jointly through numerous common exercises by the Western powers both as part of their national planning and in allied operations, must also give each partner a greater understanding of the alternatives and the risks, as well as the reactions – positive or negative – such actions would provoke on the part of the other partners. They can thus be referred to as a kind of "menu" on which each dish is well known.

It remains then to assure the best possible coordination of national decisions which will have to be taken quickly at the crucial time. Among several possible solutions, the one is preferable that provides for a "warning network" permitting instantaneous communications among the heads of government. In case of emergency, a satellite television system between the two sides of the Atlantic could be of vital importance. Each government, with full knowledge of the different measures to be taken, would then be able to decide whether to associate itself with actions envisaged by the others. Although maximum coordination would be realized, differences of policy would still be inevitable. This appears to be the only realistic solution. The costs of a political warning network would seem to be at least as justified as those that were agreed upon for the NADGE early warning system to detect incoming aircraft and missiles, for example. Before trying to win a war, it is better to place into operation a system which might avert military conflict. If such a system had existed in 1914, World War I probably would not have taken place.

Let us examine now the prevention of crises. From the perspective of Europe, where tensions have been reduced and where warlike impulses do not seem to exist – at least for the moment – the main point of strategy relates to prevention of war rather than preparation for war. This preoccupation permits the view that crises appear not to have been intentional, but the result of a chain of more or less fortuitous circumstances or of an erroneous judgment of the adversary's reactions.

According to this line of thinking, two new ideas appear. The first, unthinkable twenty years ago and even ten years ago, is to try to extend the political warning network to the possible adversary. This is what was done after Cuba by the establishment of a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow. If, on both sides, the intentions are peaceful, no matter what the stakes of the moment, a communications system between adversaries can play an essential role in avoiding serious misunderstandings, as well as in ensuring that political measures intended by certain steps are clearly understood.

The second idea includes treating crises as one would treat war, i.e., trying to forecast them and, thus, to prevent them as an early phase of averting war. The problem of preventing crises rests on the same principles as that of preventing war; one must study the underlying causes and gain an understanding of the signs of crisis and, when these signs make an appearance, apply measures capable of preventing the crisis from developing. This is clearly the problem of maintaining peace, not by juridical systems based on treaties but by management of appropriate means. In this phase, even more than in the management of crises, communication with the adversary is essential.

DEFENSE STRATEGY

A strategy for controlling crises is not sufficient. It is necessary that planning be undertaken for the case where the crisis cannot be controlled and might escalate to the level of a military conflict. Besides, the existence of effective plans for this eventuality cannot fail to have a strong dissuasive influence on the adversary.

This why a defensive strategy must be founded with emphasis on nuclear deterrence. Deterrence by strategic means is of the first importance and can be attained by the threat to use invulnerable strategic forces — in the first place, by the existence of nuclear submarines, and then by the existence of missiles in hardened silos. The essential role of this strategic force is to assure devastating reprisals that can be delivered on the possible adversary, and thus prevent him from having recourse to his nuclear armaments.

The deterrence of conventional attack must be assured by a defensive apparatus. In the present balance of conventional forces, which cannot be modified appreciably under current political realities, NATO's conventional means are insufficient to assure by themselves a credible defense. In these conditions, the conventional defensive apparatus must be reinforced by tactical nuclear weapons, ensuring that any conflict would quickly escalate to the nuclear level. This prevents the aggressor from knowing in advance exactly how his attack will develop. However, in the case of minor incidents or in limited confrontations resulting from revolutionary situations, conventional forces must be prepared to fight without nuclear support.

At the same time, the conventional defense capabilities must be greatly dispersed in depth, so that a surprise push will not swiftly endanger the safety of the whole defensive system. It could be reinforced by the existence of territorial militia, thus avoiding the use of large conventional units in surveillance missions.

CONCLUSION

The preceding survey has sought to distinguish between security, which aims to prevent a crisis from becoming a military conflict, and defense, which aims essentially at deterrence.

It is necessary to view clearly the great change imposed by the existence of nuclear arms, namely, that preparation for war, still vital to ultimate national security, surrenders its place today to the quest for more rational conduct in the prewar phase. For this reason, the management of crises, and even more the prevention of crises, has become absolutely indispensable. The stakes in modern war have become too large to be acceptable. We must learn new rules for the prevention of wars if we are to make progress toward security and human welfare.

A STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR NATO IN THE 1970'S*

by Timothy W. Stanley

MILITARY strategy, in the modern world, is born rather than made. Only one of its parents is the traditional "selection and application of military means to achieve political ends." The other parent—the one with the dominant genes—consists of a combination of military technology and available resources. The gender of the strategic offspring which will be born in the 1970's has therefore already been determined, and at "conceptions" far longer ago than nine months.

Invention is more often the mother of necessity than the other way around; it was the availability of the "system" combining reliable navigation, maneuverable sails, and cannon which largely determined European naval—and hence geopolitical—strategies in the sixteenth century. In more recent times, the strategic nuclear doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union have evolved as much through technological accidents as through conscious decision. The USSR acquired an initial lead in high-thrust booster rockets capable of carrying large warheads of high yields, and thus avoided the requirement for miniaturization and greater missile accuracy which the United States, lacking comparable thrust, had to develop—to its advantage.

The strategic doctrine that NATO adopts in the 1970's will therefore be shaped for the most part by the forces and weapons systems then available; and these, given the current long lead times, will essentially consist of components already in being or in advanced development, such as MIRV's or aircraft like the C-5 transport.

Looking at NATO's strategic doctrine from the more traditional standpoint of its other, "political" parent, the range of options is much narrowed. NATO's *raison d'être* as a defensive alliance excludes a number of offensively oriented postures that might otherwise be available, even to a military coalition. It is important, however, to understand that while this may be a political given, it need not be intrinsically so. For example, if one viewed the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in "game theory" terms of Blue and Red opponents, it would be logical, and perhaps even desirable, for Blue to adopt a strategy of posing a military threat to Red, not only at the level of strategic nuclear weapons, but in terms of conventional capability to exploit unrest in the satellite countries and credibly threaten offensive actions at several different points. The resource inputs to such a game, if based on the present real world situation, would support the feasibility, for the NATO countries outnumber the Warsaw Pact in population, resource base, level of technology and, perhaps most important, resources that could be made available for defense purposes without serious economic dislocations.

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*The author will soon leave government service to become a Professor of International Relations; he has written this article in the latter capacity. The views expressed are purely his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States government or any of its agencies.

But there are at least three good reasons why such a hypothetical posture would be neither feasible nor desirable in the real world. First, the objectives of the NATO countries remain purely defensive: that is, they are concerned with deterring specific kinds of aggressive behavior toward themselves; they have never been concerned with coercing a change in Soviet political attitudes by military means, or with enforcing a collective foreign policy vis-à-vis third areas. Second, as a peacetime coalition NATO lacks the central direction and the ability to make its resources respond to a single policy orientation, even if one could be agreed upon. And third, a large majority of the NATO publics and government officials would not support such an offensive posture. The political urge toward "détente politics" is a major domestic factor in all NATO countries, and has been officially enshrined in the so-called Harmel Report on the future tasks of the alliance. Even the Czechoslovakian intervention may not for long inhibit a resumption of normal East-West relations in Europe.

In most respects, therefore, NATO's strategic doctrine in the 1970's will be governed by present military technology and the defensive political orientation of the past, coupled with a more active search for a reduction in East-West tension. How these latter factors—the "two pillars" of defense and détente, as the Harmel Report termed them—can best be maintained simultaneously is an interesting and challenging question. There are some inherent limits, for the French have discovered *il faut deux pour détente,* and real détente may appear even more subversive to Moscow than it appears tempting to Western politicians.

II

As the wielder of the West's ultimate nuclear power, the United States has played and will continue to play a predominant role in NATO's strategic concepts. It is worth devoting some special attention, therefore, to the U.S. strategic posture, about which there has been a running debate for a number of years, currently (and curiously) concentrated on the single issue of anti-ballistic missiles.

Proponents and opponents speak with varying degrees of clarity and accuracy about the feasibility of an ABM system, its likely cost, its risks to areas of deployment, and even the diversion of resources needed for domestic problems.[1] But the *real* issue, which transcends the ABM itself, is whether U.S. and, broadly speaking, Western interests are best served by strategic policies that engender a sense of relative security or insecurity on the part of the Soviet leadership. Deterrence rests on one form of insecurity as far as the consequences of aggressive behavior are concerned. The notion that communist behavior in the nuclear age will become more tolerable as this "insecurity complex" is reduced has been implicit, if not explicit, in a number of recent policy statements. For example, Defense Secretary Clifford's final report to Congress dealt with certain U.S. strategic options in terms of their "threatening" the *Soviet* "assured destruction" capability, with the implication that such a threat was to be avoided.[2] This concept involves a number of important questions. It assumes—probably correctly—that such a threat could and would be countered by the Soviet Union by increases in its own programs of offensive and defensive strategic weapons. But it does not raise the equally relevant question of the comparative economic advantage of such an arms race, and the possibility of influencing underlying political tensions.

Few people, even in the USSR, now give more than lip service to the ideology of world revolution, but the dynamics of power relationships within the Soviet Union and competition within the communist world suggest that it will be a long time before the Soviets adopt attitudes permitting a lasting settlement of the European security problem and some basis for a rational world order. The most serious implication to be derived from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is that the current Kremlin leadership fears change in the communist world, even outside the USSR, because of its infection potential.

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[1] On this point, otherwise sound economists seem to become almost pre-Keynesian in treating it as a "diversion" of fixed economic quantities and ignoring the demand-creating multiplier effects on the gross national product.

[2] "The 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1970-74," Statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, Department of Defense, Washington, January 1969, p. 53.

Recent Soviet behavior leads us to believe that there are indeed prospects for increased cooperation in lowering tension in certain areas of "nondirect" East-West conflict—for example, the India-Pakistan problem, as indicated by the Tashkent accords, or even Viet Nam, because the Soviets' major preoccupation is with Communist China. It remains to be seen whether this will be true in the Middle East and other possible trouble spots, such as Berlin, where the recent crisis over the presidential election is at best inconclusive evidence.

Returning to the strategic arms context, it appears that the Soviets have now substantially closed the large missile gap which had opened up against them in the early 1960's. So the question is, should the United States seek to perpetuate a situation of rough parity—or "sufficiency"?

The desirability "in principle" of arms limitations is hard to challenge, and there are real doubts about the *net* security gain from efforts to improve the strategic status of one side. But the arguments for voluntarily forgoing the option to change the status quo by means of a combination of ABM deployments, MIRV's, and other improvements in the strategic offensive forces also involve an implicit assumption that Western interests are best served by a Soviet feeling of strategic security. It would seem logical to require some specific evidence in support of this assumption, and necessarily, in today's world, such evidence has to be given in the coin of Soviet political behavior toward the West.

The Soviets are well aware that in popular political terms their decisions on resource allocation—for example, on major ABM systems—may be easier than ours. But in economic terms, the reverse is almost certainly true. That is, the "opportunity costs" to the Soviets of a $25-$50 billion strategic investment over, say, five years are enormously higher than they are in an $800 billion American economy. In short, given the extended half-life of the revolutionary ideology of the Soviet Union, and given its instinctive turning away from change in any form, powerful incentives are needed to produce any meaningful modification in the Soviets' international political behavior. The threat of economic escalation in strategic weapons is clearly one such incentive. It follows that any willful exercise of restraint on our part which reduces their insecurity should be constantly re-evaluated against the evolution—or lack of it—in the Soviet Union's international conduct.

This line of reasoning can be, has been, and will be challenged by many people; but without belaboring the issue further, it should at least be recognized that because of NATO's inherent inability to develop "offensive" or "bargaining" political-military postures, the U.S. strategic posture vis-à-vis the USSR will necessarily be the underpinning of NATO's strategic doctrine in the 1970's. Perhaps this underscores the wisdom of President Nixon's decision to repair his consultation fences within NATO before tackling prickly and far-reaching issues with the Soviet Union.

III

Discussions of NATO's strategic doctrine in recent years have featured a debate between those strategists (especially Americans) who have insisted that "deterrence" rests on an ability to "defend," preferably conventionally, if it fails, and those (mainly Europeans) whose focus on deterrence by threat of strategic nuclear conflict has tended to de-emphasize the practical problems of defense should deterrence fail. The latter view has partly been a rationalization for political unwillingness to pay the cost of various types of defense improvements, but it is also partly a feeling that "defense" can provide only a Pyrrhic victory—at best World War II revisited, and at worst a nuclear holocaust.

The reluctance to give adequate weight to the role defensive capabilities must play even in support of a strategy of deterrence may account for the widespread misunderstanding about the new NATO strategy of "flexible response" which was adopted formally in 1967. That strategy resulted from the convergence of two factors moving both schools of thought toward the middle: The threat of massive retaliation was increasingly incredible in most of the likelier contingencies as the Soviets developed their own intercontinental missile capability; and, however desirable and theoretically attainable it might be, a full-scale NATO-wide nonnuclear defense (i.e., in the sense that nuclear weapons would be maintained only to deter the enemy from employing them) was too expensive to be politically realistic when a Warsaw Pact attack seemed highly unlikely, and in face of France's defection from the NATO military organization.

The inevitable compromise between these factors led to the 1967 revision of NATO's strategy, the essential elements of which will necessarily project well into the 1970's. Not only have these elements not been widely or correctly understood, but, at this writing, there are still adjustments needed to bring force capabilities better into line with the doctrine.[3] The two key elements which, in the writer's view, are critical for strategic doctrine in the 1970's, are as follows:

First, there must be the certainty of *some* response to any aggression or threat of aggression; that is to say, an enemy must have to reckon with a substantial and sustained "fire-fight" from the moment any of his forces cross one of NATO's external frontiers. Even where the odds are greatly against the defender, there is all the difference in the world between the prospect of an easy *fait accompli* from which an enemy could offer to negotiate from the pleasant prospect of having destroyed NATO's credibility, and an armed engagement mounting in scope and intensity as NATO reinforcements were brought into play.

It must be remembered that the last time "regular" (i.e., overtly recognized) combat forces of the United States and Russia exchanged shots was in 1918. In the succeeding half century there have been a score or more of incidents which could easily, in the pre-atomic era, have led to a *casus belli* and armed conflict. This extraordinary caution underscores the key role American forces play—and will have to continue to play—in the defense of Europe and the deterrence of Soviet adventures.

The second element, given the above prerequisite of an assured response, is a willingness and ability to "escalate." Such escalation initially need not involve nuclear weapons, but can include a number of variants in the conflict scenario, from reinforcement before as well as in response to aggression, to counterattacks, to extending the depth and targets of the air battle. But at some point, which will vary widely with the scenario and locale, it might well become necessary for NATO to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Developing specific options for such initiation—in addition to responding to any Soviet use—is the major task before the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, on which considerable progress has been made during the past year or two.[4]

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[3] The strategy—and the need for force adjustments—has been publicly outlined in a number of speeches by NATO officials: Secretary General Manlio Brosio to the Christian Military Congress, The Hague, March 21, 1968; General Lyman Lemnitzer to the North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, November 12, 1968. See also the NATO Information Service (Brussels) pamphlet, *Defence Policy* ("Aspects of NATO" series), pp. 9-15.

The critical questions concern not so much the doctrine as the force posture which gives it meaning, viewed in the broadest sense, to include both political and military command and control. Under general principles such as the foregoing, it is possible to envisage several different postures. (Indeed, when NATO's official strategy was still "massive retaliation," a force posture substantially larger than would have been needed for a "trip wire" interpretation of that strategy was nonetheless maintained. This suggests that there was a declaratory policy in which NATO believed for "deterrence" purposes—but not sufficiently to take large risks of Moscow calling its bluff.)

IV

To reach a meaningful judgment about the force levels required to implement any variant of a strategic doctrine, one must first appraise the true facts about the relative capabilities on each side of the Iron Curtain. Such an appraisal has been clouded by widely disparate public estimates on different sides of the Atlantic. Some NATO military officials and European spokesmen have maintained that present NATO forces provide a nonnuclear defense against a full-scale Soviet attack whose duration would be better measured by a clock than by a calendar.[5] Numerous American officials, on the other hand, have pointed out that NATO spends more money on arms, and has more manpower under arms, than does the Warsaw Pact.[6]

If one counts only U.S. forces in Europe and discounts those in the United States and elsewhere, the overall quantitative balance, measured in gross resources, is of about the same magnitude; but—and this is significant—a lot of NATO's manpower is in Italy, Greece and Turkey, where it is less available for the Center than is the Soviet counterpart. Moreover, the equation has many variables. It is true that the Soviets could launch an attack—after some buildup, with the attendant probability of warning time—on the order of seventy-odd divisions in the Central Region. By contrast, NATO musters only about twenty-five.[7] But this raises the question, what is a division? The United States takes about 40,000 men and about half a billion dollars in investment and operating costs and calls that block of resources *one* division; the Soviets call a similar block of resources between two and three divisions. Thus, translated into Soviet terms, NATO's strength is more like sixty-odd divisions.[8] When one moves to more sophisticated comparisons, such as numbers of tanks and indices of firepower, tactical doctrine, and the advantages of surprise for the attacker as against his need for a larger ratio of force to space, the matter gets even more complex. According to press reports, NATO is now engaged in a major analytical study of this problem.[9]

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[4] See, for example, the British Defense Minister's report on the U.K.-German studies under the auspices of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in the Parliamentary defense debate, reported in the *Daily Telegraph,* March 5, 1969, p. 27.

[5] Article by Lord Wigg, the *Times* (London), February 20, 1969; see also Denis Healey, "Perspectives of Soviet Military Policy," paper given at Sixth International Wehrkunde Encounter Conference, Munich, February 1969.

[6] This argument has been frequently presented by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven. See, for example, the NATO controversy over some of his figures reported in the *Atlantic News* (Brussels), No. 83, October 31, 1968, and No. 84, November 5, 1968.

But, however one measures and assesses the military significance of the relative numbers of artillery pieces or tanks, or the interaction of the air battle, mere common sense suggests that there is a much closer quantitative balance than the hoary mythology about "Russian hordes" would imply. One can construct scenarios in which everything from tactical surprise, to success of initial engagements, to various defensive lapses, goes in favor of the Warsaw Pact. But one can also construct others in which the reverse is true; and in these, NATO could come out quite well without having to resort to nuclear weapons. The NATO Defense Ministers have concluded that the quantitative level of forces is about right, but that certain qualitative deficiencies must be rectified,[10] and this seems a sensible judgment on the present state of the evidence.

The real issue, therefore, is not so much who is wrong as between the pessimists on one hand and the optimists on the other, but how to increase the prospects that the latter would be proved correct. The interesting question here is how the former can be as right as they are about current qualitative shortcomings and inadequacies while the optimists are as right as they are about the capability which *ought* to be available from the resources governments are currently providing.

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[7] The Institute for Strategic Studies (London), *The Military Balance, 1968-69,* Table 2.

[8] The sources for these estimates are contained in my *NATO in Transition* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 270-282.

[9] *La Libre Belgique* (Brussels), January 17, 1969; *U.S. News & World Report,* September 16, 1968.

[10] NATO Press Communiqué M3(68)1, November 16, 1968, paragraph 8. See also remarks of U.S. Ambassador to NATO Harlan Cleveland on NBC's "Meet the Press," February 16, 1969.

The reasons for these deficiencies and for the "attrition" between what goes in at the "gross resources" end of the pipeline and what comes out as "ready combat capability" at the other end, are varied. Some are implicit in the mere fact of a fifteen-nation alliance, for, however "cost effective," it is not in the present political cards to rationalize the division of labor so that one country concentrates on naval forces, another on air forces, and so on. But other inefficiencies can be overcome by better planning and a better meshing of individual country defense efforts.

Considerable success has been achieved along these lines in recent years;[11] even more would be possible if the European members of NATO were able to utilize the economy of scale. For example, even if one leaves out such major political-economic-technological areas as combat aircraft, NATO Europe will spend on the order of $25 billion on procurement in the next five years.[12] The application of "learning curves" and British and American experience with centralizing supply management so as to increase purchasing power, promote standardization, reduce inventory and lower warehousing costs, suggest that savings of 15 to 25 per cent should be attainable by pooling even half of this amount. Such prospective savings are not to be disdained in an era when defense costs tend to rise even faster than GNP's, partly due to the increasing sophistication of weapons systems, with attendant needs for skilled manpower, while defense budgets must struggle to stay level in real terms.

V

Recognizing that strategy, forces and budgets form a triangular relationship in which the length and slope of each side are affected by a change in the others, one can conclude that with sensible management NATO has the resources to carry out a strategic doctrine along the foregoing lines. Certainly the Warsaw Pact planner must concentrate his attention on the prospects that NATO defense plans could succeed, even as NATO planners must take into account the possibility that they might fail. What, then, must be done to make a strategy of deterrence by "assured response," coupled with a willingness and ability to escalate as necessary, a viable one for the 1970's?

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[11] NATO Information Service, *Defence Policy, op. cit.*

[12] See C. J. E. Harlow, "Defence, Technology and the Western Alliance: The European Armaments Base, A Survey" (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1967).

First, NATO must continue its progress in rationalizing and harmonizing defense planning. It must look for new and imaginative ways to maximize the economy of scale and the potential of cooperation in the broad area of logistics, ranging from standardization of equipment, to the use of automatic data processing, to cross-servicing of supply and staging facilities.

Second, NATO must concentrate on the acquisition at low cost of additional defense potential. This could involve greater use of civil emergency planning assets, e.g., aircraft, transportation and POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants), and it must involve the provision of trained and equipped reserves that can augment NATO's ready posture in a crisis *without* having to await a full-scale national "mobilization"—which might well be ruled out by the political situation.

Third, NATO's ability to respond to an incipient threat must be improved by increased emphasis on mobility, and further development of its political crisis management machinery. There has already been some progress with the ACE Mobile Force, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, the Mediterranean "On-Call," and various contingency force concepts. But over and above such important "flag showing" efforts, NATO must be prepared to bring into play substantial combat reinforcements, particularly on the flanks, in the shortest possible time. Since the United States is highly unlikely to undertake this burden by itself, there will have to be a considerable upsurge in European willingness to establish readily deployable units and provide for their political control and effective military operation in peacetime—particularly in the pre-hostilities phase of any crisis. It might be necessary, for example, to establish *several* mobile forces (each to include an American component) with earmarked air transportation, so that NATO could assure a multilateral response in Greece and Turkey and the North, simultaneously.

With respect to the Central Region, a case can be made that the present American contribution is too tied down to holding a central sector of the line, and that some restructuring to provide a lighter—and hopefully cheaper—forward defense, but with high-quality mobile formations in position to counterattack any penetration, might be in order. Out of such restructuring might come a role for the increased air mobility American forces have acquired as a result of Viet Nam; this could enable them to be SACEUR's "in-theater" strategic reserve, so that they could be engaged wherever a major confrontation of American and Soviet military power took place, either to deter the outbreak of a conflict or to induce an enemy disengagement from one that had already started.

Fourth, more attention needs to be given to the specific scenarios and command and control for any initial nuclear escalation phase. It might be possible, for example, to create special nuclear task forces whose movement toward a battle zone would itself be a vital signal to the other side; they could carry out this initial escalatory mission, leaving the bulk of the other forces to concentrate on maximizing their nonnuclear potential, and some of the cost dilemmas of "dual capability" could thus be avoided.

It must be recognized that there would be a middle zone between the initial tactical nuclear engagement and the ultimate strategic exchange for which planning is extremely difficult. But the same uncertainties plague an enemy planner, and in that respect enhance the deterrent. If NATO forces, plans and doctrine were specifically tailored to employ nuclear weapons—initially perhaps on NATO's own territory and against invading forces—to provide maximum military effect with minimum collateral damage, an enemy could well be forced to reconsider his position. If he replied in kind, NATO would be forced to escalate to an across-borders nuclear exchange, which would leave a short step to major nuclear war; if he preferred to play by one-sided nuclear rules, this could give the defender an enormous advantage. At least, NATO would have the option of a possible firebreak which could lower the nuclear threshold in the sense of facilitating the agonizing political decision, and thereby adding to an enemy's uncertainty as to the precise response he would encounter.

VI

In conclusion, NATO seems fairly close to a convergence of the desirable and the feasible. If, through some of the means suggested above, it can further reduce the gap, there should exist a fundamentally sound deterrence posture well into the 1970's and beyond. The kind of political confidence that comes from such a posture would be an advantage in dealing with Soviet pressures in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

The one vital question not heretofore addressed is whether in a period of "détente" eagerly sought by some Western politicians, and an ambivalent Soviet response, the kind of effort needed can be sustained. But this effort is not significantly greater in degree than at present, if more effectively used; and Czechoslovakia has put at least some brakes on pressures to reduce present efforts. Probably the *sine qua non*, therefore, is whether the United States will find it politically feasible to maintain the kind of military presence in Europe which alone can validate and make relevant the defense efforts of the Europeans themselves.

If the Europeans can maintain their level of effort and undertake the qualitative and management improvements necessary, and if reasonable "medium-term" solutions can be found to the nagging U.S. balance of payments problem, Congress ought to acquiesce to a strong Executive Branch judgment that the American presence in Europe remains essential to the U.S. national interest. The notion that the way to get the Europeans to do more is for the United States to "do less" is a delusion, for it is the American presence which makes it strategically relevant for the Europeans to sustain and improve their own defense. This, then, appears to be the keystone to the future: rededication to the common defense via a mutual understanding between North America and Europe, whereby each assures the stability of its defense efforts and thereby ensures the continued political viability of the other's share.

The new U.S. Administration appears to have gotten off to a good start in limiting, if not entirely eliminating, one other potential source of erosion in the North Atlantic Alliance, namely, European fears of talks between the United States and the USSR; the Twentieth Anniversary NATO Meeting in Washington has recently provided at least some common guidelines to help guard against eroding influences such as the intrinsic appeal of détente politics and the tendency to discount the reality of today's defense needs by tomorrow's hopes.

The third area of intramural danger, the prospect that other countries might follow the Gaullist lead, has been contained by the ability of the other Fourteen to pursue their common defense interests on the sensible basis of "with France if possible; without her if necessary." There is, of course, the legal possibility of withdrawal on one year's notice after 1969; but even France joined in the unanimous judgment at the special post-Czechoslovakia NATO meeting last November that the NATO alliance would be needed for the foreseeable future. Norway's parliamentary vote of 144 to six to stay in NATO is a hopeful omen for the outcome of any Danish or Canadian reappraisal.

The ingredients, in short, seem to be present to enable NATO to accentuate the positive and control, if not eliminate, the negative. It is the task of the statesmen of the alliance to mobilize the will to utilize these ingredients effectively. If they can do so, a NATO strategic doctrine of "assured response" and "flexible escalation" for the 1970's is likely to succeed as a deterrent, and thus to sustain the prospects for an eventual East-West security settlement in Europe and the world.

THE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF NATO'S NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN FLANKS

by L. L. Lemnitzer

AS Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, I am charged with the defense of territory that stretches from the northern cape of Norway to the eastern reaches of Turkey, a distance of 3,600 miles. When you consider the magnitude of the area involved, it becomes readily apparent that a discussion of "the flanks" is no simple matter. Thus, prior to examining the strategic problems of these outlying expanses it might be wise to define exactly what is meant by "the flanks" in terms appropriate to Allied Command Europe.

For purposes of military planning, we can say that the flanks are composed of three general zones: the Northern Region, the Southeastern Region, and the Mediterranean. But even within these sea and land masses there can be no easy delineation of flank areas. For example, in the Northern Region the two most critical areas of concern are, first, the Finnmark/Troms area in the very north of Norway and, second, the area in the vicinity of the Baltic Straits. A quick look at the map shows that there is a distance of almost 1,000 miles between them. In the Southeastern Region, we are concerned mainly with an extended, strung-out area made up of the lengthy but shallow northern frontier of Greece; Turkish Thrace; the Straits; and rugged eastern Turkey. Finally, in the Mediterranean, we must face the problems of an international sea whose area is almost three million square kilometers.

While the distances involved in the three defense zones pose distinct problems in themselves, any discussion of the flanks must also take into account the realization that the problems of these areas cannot be indiscriminately locked together, nor solved as a single unit. There are widely varying political, military, demographic, economic and climatic differences between the northern and southern flanks of Allied Command Europe.

But what is common to both north and south, and the central problem to both, is the military and political threat posed by the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies. While there may be internal problems for flank members of the Atlantic Alliance, the major emphasis must be placed on the Soviet threat, for without it most of the other problems would be of far lesser importance.

Although this is not the place for a detailed examination of the scope of that threat, it might be wise to recall some of the more pertinent aspects of Soviet policy that affect the security of the Free World. First, and this is frequently glossed over, there has been no disavowal of the ultimate Soviet objective of a world communist order under the control of the USSR. Second, the recent, successful use of force in Czechoslovakia might lead Soviet leaders so far astray as to indulge in other, perhaps more dangerous military adventures. Third, the doctrine of the so-called Socialist Commonwealth, with the implication of intervention spelled out by Brezhnev, contains all the unpredictable problems of spillover, accidental war, and possible escalation.

All these disquieting uncertainties led the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Ministerial Session in Brussels in November 1968, to raise the warning flag: "Clearly, any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences." We must not lose sight of the Warsaw Pact's distinct military capability for conducting such an "intervention, directly or indirectly."

With this brief discussion of the overall threat posed by the Warsaw Pact before us and with the definition of the flanks of NATO Europe in mind, we may now turn more directly to an assessment of the specifics involved in each of the three flank areas. The remainder of this article will focus on each area in turn, examine the external problems occasioned by the aggressive actions of the Warsaw Pact, and then study such internal problems as may exist and may be considered germane to the strategic considerations of Allied Command Europe.

I

The newest and most publicized threat has been in the area of the Mediterranean Sea, whose overall importance to the strategic defense of the southern region of Allied Command Europe cannot be overstated. The geography of the southern area is characterized by long peninsulas stretching into the sea, or, alternatively, long arms of the sea reaching far inland. These sea and land projections severely complicate logistical and communications problems and do not permit the establishment of a continuous line of defense.

Hence, the importance of the Mediterranean. Without control of this sea, supply of land forces would be severely hampered and the forces would be exposed to attack from many varied and unpredictable directions.

Conversely, allied control of the Mediterranean would not only solve these problems, but would also prohibit the outflanking of all NATO forces in Central Europe. This particular point is of some interest when one considers the political changes that have taken place in the past twenty years. In April 1949, almost all of the North African littoral was under the control of member nations of the alliance. Now, however, none of it is. Increased extension of Soviet influence in this area could result in the *de facto* outflanking of all of NATO Europe.

Indeed, in a somewhat startling report to the Western European Union about a year ago, Mr. Goedhart of the Netherlands warned that "it is no longer correct to speak of the 'danger' of the Soviet Union outflanking the NATO Southern Flank. This danger has become a reality." While this may be overstating the case, it is a fact that there has been an increase in Soviet activity among the nations of the littoral and a distinct establishment of a Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean itself. In regard to the North African states, the Soviets seek not only to enhance their own political position and undercut Western influence; they also have the objective of encouraging greater leftist orientation in the area. This is true not just in Algeria, but in the other states as well. An indication of the degree to which they are being successful may be seen in the recent communiqué issued by the Soviet Union and Algeria at the conclusion of a six-day visit to Algeria by Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny. Besides pointing up long-term agreements of Algerian-Soviet cooperation in a variety of economic and political areas, the joint communiqué denounced what were called "aggressive NATO naval forces" in the Mediterranean and called for the dissolution of all foreign military bases in the area.

So, while Soviet success in the area has thus far been mostly limited to Algeria, its extension to the other North African states of Morocco, Libya, or Tunisia might very well result in the *de facto* outflanking of NATO Europe and thus bears watching.

However, the increased Soviet naval presence warrants attention for reasons beyond concern about the outflanking of Central Europe — for its importance to the problems of the Middle

East and its threat to the southeastern region of NATO. In 1968, the Soviet squadron spent almost 13,000 ship days in the Mediterranean. In terms of military capabilities, such a continued presence affords the Soviet Union several additional options to those it already possesses.

In the event of war between the East and West, the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet could launch attacks from both submarine and surface vessels against allied shipping, as well as against allied naval bases and lines of communication on the Continent, especially those within range of guided missiles. The Soviet submarine fleet of almost 400 units, parts of which have been identified in the Mediterranean squadron, is known to have several cruise missile submarines whose surface-to-surface range is in the vicinity of 400 nautical miles.

In a situation short of war, the Soviet squadron might also take action to prevent politico-naval activities by allied forces in the Mediterranean. For example, it would appear that a Lebanon type of operation could now pose great difficulties, especially in terms of possible escalation.

In the event of a renewal of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a Soviet decision to intervene, military assistance could be rendered to the Arab states from Soviet seagoing platforms.

These are all capabilities which are inherent in the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. The presence of much stronger allied naval forces, as exemplified by the Sixth Fleet, does not downgrade such Soviet capabilities for a moment. In military planning, it is always the capabilities that must be taken into account.

One way to control the Mediterranean is to control its exits, and it is here that the importance of the Turkish Straits, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, becomes so evident. To control the straits, it is obvious that the plains of Turkish Thrace, so easily approached from Bulgaria, must be strongly defended. Equally obvious is the fact that the loss of Hellenic Thrace and eastern Macedonia would result in the outflanking of the straits from the west. The defense of these key areas is the major strategic problem facing Greece and Turkey in southeastern Allied Command Europe.

What would be the objectives of the Warsaw Pact in any attack against this southeastern region of Allied Command Europe? First, of course, would be control of the Black Sea entrances into the Mediterranean. Next, the denial of oil to the nations of NATO Europe. Third, the seizure of bases from which to cut NATO lines of communication. And lastly, the splitting of Greek and Turkish forces.

The control of the Black Sea exits would enable the Soviets to reinforce their Mediterranean squadron from their Black Sea Fleet, which is generally known to have many more fleet units than are required for operations in the Black Sea alone. This reinforced fleet could carry out all the activities previously mentioned, but, in addition, might have sufficient strength to challenge the major units of the Sixth Fleet, to include the aircraft carriers.

The importance of denying oil to the nations of Western Europe is too often overlooked, although this is a possibility that exists whether or not there is a wartime situation. For if the Soviets have been active along the North African littoral, they have been much more so in the Arab states of the Middle East. Peacetime control of this oil-rich area would mean that the Soviet Union could supply all the oil needed by her satellites in Eastern Europe; moreover, it would give the communists tremendous economic power over much of the Western world.

For example, the latest available figures indicate that many of the NATO nations receive most of their oil from the Middle East: the United Kingdom, 79 per cent; West Germany, 66 per cent; Italy, 83 per cent; and France, almost 56 per cent. Denial of these oil resources could effectively disrupt the economy of Western Europe. At this point in time, despite the economic and military aid that Moscow has granted the Arab nations of the Middle East, there seems to be no immediate danger of a curtailment of the oil flow being part of the bargain, but the growing Soviet presence in such countries as the United Arab Republic, Syria and Yemen does constitute a potential danger.

Of more current tactical interest, Soviet involvement in the Middle East has been of concern to NATO naval forces ever since the auxiliary fleets of Syria, the United Arab Republic and Algeria were equipped with a missile firing capability. In speaking of the OSA and KOMAR class boats — modern variations of the American torpedo boats of World War II — my commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, Admiral Horacio Rivero, has said, "I believe that these two classes of vessel represent a real threat to our lines of communication. This would be all the more true if Syria, Egypt, and Algeria were seriously involved against our countries."

NATO's naval lines of communication are of immense importance since it has been estimated that 90 per cent of wartime supplies to the peninsular nations of Italy, Greece and Turkey would come by sea. In the matter of bases from which these lines of communication could be hampered, the Soviets at present do not have any Mediterranean bases which could be used for offensive purposes in the future and which are needed for important maintenance today. There have been many rumors about the possible development of the large naval facility of Mers-el-Kebir, at Oran, Algeria, but there has been no evidence of any actual takeover. We do know that the Soviets make frequent use of the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Port Said, and that of Latakia in Syria, but for the most part their maintenance and replenishment is done in the sheltered anchorages of the Mediterranean: Kithara in the Aegean; the Gulf of Hammamet off Tunisia; the Hurd Bank off Malta; the Gulf of Sirte off Libya; and the Alboran Islands off the Straits of Gibraltar.

The possible fourth objective of any Soviet attack in the southeastern region, the splitting of Greek and Turkish forces, would be designed to weaken the NATO defensive posture in the area and would be a necessary component of some of the other objectives discussed.

Summing up then for the southern flank, to include the entire Mediterranean, we might do well to apply a sort of reverse logic to some recent Soviet propaganda directed against the powerful United States Sixth Fleet. According to the Soviets' continuing propaganda campaign, the purpose of the Sixth Fleet is to repress national movements of liberation, give backdoor support to Israeli aggression, grant "thinly disguised assistance to the Greek black junta, and the reactionary regimes of Spain and Portugal," and, of course, give overt backing to U.S. oil interests in the Middle East. A reversed reading of these distorted purposes would seem to give a clear idea of what the true Soviet aims are on this key flank of NATO Europe.

One major internal problem facing the southern flank countries of Greece and Turkey, which has a definite effect on any strategic consideration, arises from the lack of an adequate industrial base, both for military and civilian purposes. In 1967, for instance, the Gross National Product of Turkey was the lowest of any of the NATO nations, while that of Greece was the third lowest. This has only emphasized the importance of providing them with mutual aid in the military sphere. NATO has given special consideration to Greece and Turkey to assist in speeding their economic growth and improving the standard of living of their peoples. Member nations have also established consortia to coordinate the mobilization of resources needed for increased economic development. In this connection, the efforts of the United States in granting military equipment and supplies have been of special importance. Such military aid still plays a key part in meeting the requirements for modernization of the Greek and Turkish armed forces, whose units are relatively strong in terms of quantity but who have a distinct need for qualitative improvements.

II

Turning now to a completely different type of flank area, we can examine the problems facing Allied Forces Northern Europe, especially in the Finnmark/Troms region of northern Norway and the area of the Baltic approaches.

In northern Norway one of the principal objectives of any Soviet attack would be to establish bases on the coast. The geographic possibilities are tremendous when it is noted that the coastline of Norway, some 2,100 miles long, has hundreds of large and small fjords which, if straightened out, would reach more than halfway around the world. A second objective would be to deny NATO forces the use of Norwegian bases and facilities. Here it should be considered that this northern area does more than dominate the sea routes from the Barents Sea into the Atlantic; it also sits astride direct air routes from central Russia to North America, providing important early-warning facilities. From the Soviets' viewpoint, the advantage of early warning it affords would be equally applicable to their own warning and air defense system, and thus constitutes what would be a third Soviet objective.

Should it decide to pursue such objectives, the Soviet Union possesses readily available land, sea and air forces which could be employed against northern Norway from the Kola Peninsula and which far outnumber the NATO forces in the area. The extent of this military strength was recently brought to public notice by reports indicating that the Soviet Arctic Fleet is the most powerful squadron in the Soviet Navy. It was estimated to contain approximately 180 submarines, supported by over 200 surface vessels. This presence in the Arctic was clearly demonstrated to Norway in the summer of 1968, when, following the deployment of large Soviet land forces directly along the frontier in the North

Cape area, a major Soviet naval exercise was held in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea.

The Soviets had conducted such exercises in those areas ever since 1963, but never had they done so in such strength and with as much publicity. Not only were the forces of the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland involved, but the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy personally directed the maneuvers. According to Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov, the purpose of the exercise was "to polish-off questions of defending the socialist countries from the direction of the seas and ocean, to perfect control, interaction, and combat coordination of the Socialist Brotherly Fleets." While NATO analysis is in agreement that the primary purpose seemed to be to practice defense against possible NATO seaborne attack, the exercise nevertheless showed the Soviets' ability to project their naval power into an area sensitive to NATO.

These factors, when combined with observations that surface unit participation was the largest ever noted in a Soviet naval exercise and that major amphibious elements were present, clearly pointed out the gravity of the situation to Norway. It was considered so severe that the Norwegian Defense Minister, Greig Tidemand, felt constrained at the time to inform the Storting that "both in the area of our land and sea frontiers, as well as in the air, there are being held a consistent series of varied exercises which contain a possibility of escalation."

Much the same situation exists in the Baltic region, some thousand miles to the south, where Soviet objectives would appear to be similar to those we have previously discussed. As with the Black Sea, they would certainly wish to gain control of the Baltic's exits, to include control of the Kiel Canal. Seizure of this area would split the northern and central commands of Allied Command Europe and would ensure the security of Soviet flanks prior to any operations against Central Europe itself.

Here again the Soviets have large and readily available ground forces that could be committed in a surprise attack across the flat plains of Schleswig-Holstein, which has few natural defense barriers. At sea, the recent creation of marine infantry units and the acquisition of additional landing craft for the Soviet Baltic Fleet increases the amphibious threat. The submarine capability of that fleet is based on the estimated assignment of about seventy submarines. What is more, these land and sea forces are all capable of operating under air cover, since they are just a few minutes' flying time from Soviet-occupied territory.

The peacetime activities of the Soviets in the Baltic are of major economic and political importance to them, as can be seen from an analysis of their merchant shipping. Not only have they increased their port and shipyard capacity in the Baltic, they have also improved their system of transportation facilities such as pipelines, railroads and waterways, so that matériel can be more easily moved from the production centers in the interior of the USSR to the Baltic Sea. Of consequence, too, are the deliveries of military equipment to underdeveloped countries which have been made in increasing measure through use of the Baltic merchant fleet.

In wartime, when the strategic importance of the Baltic becomes far greater, the major emphasis is on the protection of the flank as an attack is made against Central Europe. This makes the problem of this flank area important not only for its own sake, but for all of Western Europe.

Of special interest to strategic considerations in the Northern Region is the fact that neither Norway nor Denmark permits outside forces or nuclear weapons to be stationed on its territory. To understand the reasons for this attitude, one must recall the long history of neutralism in Scandinavia. Prior to 1940, Norway had known peace for 126 years. Denmark had enjoyed the same climate for seventy-six years. Neither country had participated in World War I. Their military expenditures between the world wars had been extremely limited. Indeed, despite the experiences of World War II, once that conflict ended neutralist sentiment rose again. It was only the shock of the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in 1948 which provided a grim warning against such sentiment. Even after having been invited to participate in NATO, both these northern tier countries, along with Sweden, first considered the idea of a Scandinavian Defense Union. Sweden's insistence that the proposed union adopt a completely neutralist attitude between East and West and the realization by the Norwegians and Danes that they could not militarily support neutralism caused the idea to be discarded.

But then, before Norway actually signed the North Atlantic Treaty, she unilaterally declared that she would not allow external forces or bases to be established on her territory unless there was an actual threat of war against her. The maintenance of this position, which has also been followed by Denmark, accounts for the lack of integrated military forces and nuclear weapons on Norwegian and Danish soil. It is worth recalling, however, that even before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968, both Denmark and Norway had publicly reaffirmed their belief in the validity of the collective defense aspects of the North Atlantic Alliance.

III

In the preceding pages I have outlined many of the strategic problems facing Allied Command Europe on its northern and southern flanks: in the north of Norway, in the Baltic approaches, in the area of the Turkish Straits, and in the great Mediterranean Sea. It should be clear that most of these problems are directly attributable to the threat posed by the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies.

Now, what has the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and more specifically Allied Command Europe, done to counter this threat? One of the primary ways by which we show NATO's continuous interest in the flanks, and thus affirm our belief in the solidarity of the alliance, is through the use of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. This is a multinational, multiservice force which can call on battalion-size units from eight different countries and air squadrons from five of the member nations, and which is designed to show the credibility of our deterrence and defense by clearly demonstrating its capability to deploy rapidly to the flanks. Through frequent exercises the NATO flag is displayed in those areas of concern to us. For example, last summer we deployed the ACE Mobile Force in northern Norway, using ground troops from Italy, Canada, the United Kingdom, and, of course, Norway. Air and naval forces from six different nations took part in this maneuver. The mobile force also plays a role in the south, since we alternate exercises between the two major flank areas. Again, last summer, in an exercise called Deep Furrow, we deployed approximately 25,000 allied soldiers, sailors and airmen to that area of Hellenic Thrace and eastern Macedonia in which we have particular strategic interest. We expect the capabilities of the ACE Mobile Force to be expanded even further with the future assignment of additional United Kingdom ships and troops, made available from British units withdrawn from east of Suez.

Similar missions intended to show solidarity on the flanks and thus add to the deterrent posture of NATO are being, or will be, carried out by internationally integrated naval task forces. One such force which frequently operates in the northern regions of my command is the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, under the command of Admiral Holmes, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, whose headquarters are in Norfolk, Virginia. During 1968, this force was composed at various times of twelve different ships representing seven different nations, clearly exemplifying the cohesion of the alliance. A similar force for use in the Mediterranean has recently been approved by the Ministers "in principle." This concept calls for an "On-Call" Naval Force with units from five different nations, to be used to enhance the alliance's deterrent posture and, once again, demonstrate the solidarity of its members.

In view of the Soviet naval presence in the southern region, we have recently created a new command, Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean (MARAIRMED) at Naples, which will increase NATO's maritime surveillance capability in the Mediterranean area. Additional forces have been committed to Allied Command Europe for use in the southern region by Italy, Greece and the United Kingdom.

These are but some of the actions taken to indicate the importance NATO attaches to its flanks. The continuing exercises of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, the actions of the Standing Naval Force, the forthcoming creation of the On-Call Naval Force for the Mediterranean, the establishment of Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, the continued pronouncements of the North Atlantic Council — all these are designed to show that Allied Command Europe considers its flanks to be an integral part of NATO Europe.

The strategic problems of the flanks in the northern and southern regions of my command are not capable of any simple solution, but they are under constant study by both the military and political authorities of the alliance. I believe that we have made great strides in solving many of these problems; we will continue to do so. Paramount in our considerations and actions will be the reminder from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty ". . . that an armed attack against one or more [member nations] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. . . ." The unity of purpose demanded by that declaration holds true for all the members of Allied Command Europe, from the northern cape of Norway to the eastern reaches of Turkey.

NATO'S DEFENSE STRATEGY

by Pasti Nino

IN general, the potential uses of nuclear weapons are not clearly understood, and there is a tendency, especially among the military, to place too much reliance on them. If aggression by the conventional forces of an enemy cannot be halted by conventional means only, many strategists contend that a considerable employment of tactical nuclear weapons will change the unfavorable balance of forces on the battlefield and give victory to the defensive side. In this way, it has been suggested, nuclear weapons can solve NATO's defensive problems. This author has doubts about this line of thought. From it, a Maginot Line-type psychology may develop. The history of the Maginot Line, the Atlantic Wall and the Siegfried Line provides convincing examples of the need for a better understanding of the capabilities, limitations and ramifications of new weapons systems, including nuclear armaments.

NUCLEAR FORCES

Before examining the most appropriate role for nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe, it will be instructive to review the classification of such weapons in order to avoid difficulties introduced by the current confused and confusing definitions.

Although nuclear weapons are usually separated into strategic and tactical classifications, this division is far from clear and convincing. What may be tactical for Canada and Portugal may be strategic for nations bordering the Iron Curtain. Even when tactical nuclear weapons are aimed solely at military objectives inside the satellite nations, and even when considerable restraint is adopted, intensive use of such weapons could cause serious injury to the civilian population, with all the inherent political repercussions. If the enemy employs the same kind and number of weapons in retaliation against NATO lands, the losses in Europe would be so great as to be unacceptable and incompatible with any real defense. Europe is too densely populated for a substantial exchange of nuclear weapons not to be disastrous.

According to the results that may be achieved by the use of nuclear weapons, the best classification is the following: weapons against the Soviet Union; weapons against the satellites; and battlefield weapons. Weapons against the Soviet Union are those targeted against Soviet territory. What is really important in the case of weapons against the satellites is the location of their targets rather than their range. Battlefield nuclear weapons are employed to a shallow depth in the battlefield zone (from zero to twenty or thirty miles). They would be used against enemy forces which have actually invaded NATO territory.

Weapons Against the Soviet Union — the Deterrent

Today both the United States and the Soviet Union are able to destroy each other completely. No practical way has yet been found, or is likely to be found in the foreseeable future, to prevent such destruction once a decision has been reached to employ nuclear weapons. The two defensive possibilities — to destroy the weapons in flight or on the ground before they are launched — are inadequate. The problem of intercepting missiles before their arrival on target has been more or less solved from the technical viewpoint, but the solution is not practicable because of its cost, which is higher than the cost of the incoming weapons. The investment of resources in the defensive effort provides a lesser return than investment in the offensive effort.

Interception is effective only against countries which, for financial or technical reasons or both, are able to produce but a small number of intercontinental nuclear weapons and cannot keep pace with the defensive efforts of larger nations. The United States and the Soviet Union may be deploying a "thin" anti-ballistic missile defense primarily in order to protect themselves against the threat from third nations.

The chances of destroying, by a preemptive attack, the nuclear delivery systems of the enemy before they can be employed are not good; there is no assurance that the delivery capabilities which survived the preemptive attack would not be able to produce tremendous destruction. In other words, attainment of what is now called a "first strike capability" — the ability to destroy such a large number of enemy delivery systems as to render acceptable the damage produced by the surviving ones — is impossible. Both the United States and the Soviet Union can prevent the other from acquiring such a capability.

Because both sides have a large quantity of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, including ground-based, sea-based and air-delivered missiles, and because their delivery systems are to a large extent dispersed, protected, mobile and immediately usable, a "first strike capability" is not within the reach of either. Both sides have, and will continue to have, a "second strike capability," which is the capability to absorb an enemy surprise attack and still be able to retaliate and produce tremendous destruction on him.

For the first time in history, offensive weapons of unprecedented destructive power, capable of wiping out mankind in an extremely short period of time, have been created. They can be employed within a few minutes since they do not require a long and costly process of mobilization. There is no practicable defense against such weapons. Because of this totally new situation, man has rediscovered an old truth: there are two fundamental elements necessary to wage a war, namely, armed forces and the will to fight. When it becomes impossible, i.e., too dangerous, to deal effectively with the enemy's armed forces, we must operate against his will to fight. This is what is normally called the deterrent. The deterrent is psychological pressure on the enemy's will for the purpose of convincing him that war would be disastrous for both sides.

Second strike capability, as previously defined, is the basic component of deterrence. Today, the United States and the Soviet Union have second strike capabilities sufficient to destroy one another, even if one or the other launches a surprise nuclear attack. The deterrent is basically a "political" means of avoiding war; it is not a military weapon because, if employed, it would cause the destruction of both sides, rendering any "victory" meaningless. In order to perform its preventive function, the deterrent must be credible. It is not sufficient that it is real and strong; the potential enemy must believe it to be real and strong.

Credibility is of two kinds: political and military. To be politically credible, a deterrent must be effective against major aggression only. Since actual employment of the deterrent is equivalent to mutual suicide, such extreme action would be unjustified and thus unbelievable in response to a minor aggression when vital interests are not at stake. This point, so simple in its philosophical essence, causes serious problems within the alliance. NATO has no agreed yardstick for measuring aggression, for determining when it is major or minor or when it changes from minor to major. To put it more simply, we do not know when the United States and the Soviet Union may judge that aggression in

Europe is major. Therefore, it is legitimate for European countries to question whether the United States would be ready to employ its strategic nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe, thus taking the inevitable risk of being destroyed in turn by Soviet retaliation. There is no direct answer to this question. After three years recently spent in the United States, this author is convinced that U.S. strategic nuclear forces would be employed when necessary, but this is a personal conclusion that has more of a psychological than a rational basis. The fact remains that the Soviet Union has so far carefully avoided any provocative action in Europe which might have produced a direct military confrontation, even when NATO conventional forces were weaker than the Warsaw Pact forces. This is a clear indication that the Soviet Union has taken seriously the U.S. commitment to defend Europe with all necessary means.

On the other hand, Europeans have no alternative but to rely on the United States. For financial reasons, it is impossible for each European nation to produce its own deterrent. A common deterrent, financed by all European nations – one that might be within their present financial capabilities – would not be credible, because the decision to employ it would require agreement by all participating nations.

This leads to another ingredient of political credibility: the deterrent must be under the direct control of a single political authority. At the time of decision, the general situation would be so serious that no time for protracted discussions or agreement would be available. If the deterrent could not be employed within minutes of the outbreak of major aggression, its effectiveness would be dubious and its preventive potential lost. In the present state of Balkanization in Europe, an internationally-controlled deterrent would be highly ineffective.

To be militarily credible, the deterrent must be effective whatever the enemy's course of action. In modern nuclear terminology, this means reliance on a second strike – the capability to absorb a surprise attack under the most unfavorable circumstances and still be able to retaliate and inflict unacceptable destruction on the enemy. To obtain a second strike capability, the following ingredients, among others, are essential: a large quantity of nuclear warheads; a considerable number of delivery systems, diversified (ground-based and sea-based missiles, air-based weapons, aircraft), protected, dispersed, mobile, ready to be launched on a moment's notice; a number of satellites to locate enemy targets; a highly accurate detection net to provide immediate information about enemy employment of nuclear weapons; a reliable communications net to collect and centralize all necessary information at the decision level, and to transmit orders promptly to the executing units; a nuclear organizational structure and forces constantly at peak readiness in order to react within minutes in any emergency; and the best possible defense against enemy strategic weapons. But even when all these ingredients have been combined in a smooth and effective organization, only the first step has been taken. The second equally important step is that each component of the nuclear second-strike force must be constantly improved to keep pace with a quickly developing technology.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to estimate the total cost of a deterrent,[1] there is no doubt that it is far more expensive than any European nation can at present afford. Of course, both the political and military limitations of a European deterrent would disappear if Europe were united as a single political entity. Until such time, an alliance between the European nations and the United States is essential for the defense of Europe.

A limited deterrent is a contradiction of terms. If one nation possesses only one per cent of the nuclear power possessed by another nation, there will be no psychological balance of threat and, in consequence, no deterrent effect at all. However, a limited nuclear capability under the control of one nation, while having no military value outside NATO, could have political value inside the alliance. If, for example, Europe should be reunited in the future, the nation possessing an independent nuclear capability might feel entitled to exercise its leadership within a united Europe. On the other hand, if two nations possessing independent nuclear weapon forces joined a united Europe, each would be a limiting factor against the claim of the other.

A credible nuclear deterrent is a necessity for a nation with worldwide responsibilities, for otherwise it could not counterbalance the influence of an opposing nation in any part of the world. A nation not possessing a real deterrent would be unable to

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[1] Note: The U.S. budget for its strategic forces in millions of dollars is as follows:

Fiscal Year	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
$ Millions	11,252	10,403	9,257	7,075	6,685	6,893	7,884	9,618

But these figures do *not* include intelligence, communications, research, development, testing and evaluation, and they do *not* include theater nuclear forces and their delivery vehicles.

exert appreciable political or military pressure against nations possessing a credible deterrent.

But the deterrent has limitations. Because of its great destructive power it is not appropriate in situations where vital issues are not at stake but where the issues are sufficiently serious to require a compromise solution. There are many circumstances that may initiate armed conflicts which remain far below the nuclear threshold. A nation with worldwide responsibilities must possess, in addition to the deterrent, sufficient conventional forces to exert its political and military influence anywhere in the world and to deal with minor contingencies. The Soviet Union appears to be increasing her conventional forces, particularly the naval component, in order to make her presence felt in any part of the world, as required by Soviet interests. Conventional forces have changed their role: they are no longer designed to fight a general war of the magnitude of the First and Second World Wars, but to exert political-military pressure whenever the nuclear deterrent is too powerful to be effective.

In short, the very existence of the deterrent on both sides, the United States and the Soviet Union, prevents a military victory along the lines of the world wars; were the deterrent to be employed, the consequent tremendous destruction would render any victory meaningless. This is the important lesson of the era of nuclear plenty. Military confrontations of limited aim and scope are still possible, but purely military solutions are impossible. Any and all military confrontations of the nuclear age will be settled only when a compromise solution acceptable to the two powers — the United States and the Soviet Union (and China when and if she acquires a real deterrent) — has been negotiated. This is a feature of our times that has no equivalent in the previous age of conventional weapons. We have yet to understand all the political and military implications of this unprecedented situation. When we apply the experience of past wars to the current nuclear environment we arrive at paradoxical conclusions. What we need today is a more vivid imagination and a better understanding of the nuclear age.

NATO Nuclear Doctrine: The Use of Satellite and Battlefield Nuclear Weapons

The basic difference between nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and satellite and battlefield nuclear weapons is that while the former are employed against targets located within

Soviet territory the latter are employed against targets outside the USSR. This is a crucial distinction, because the use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union would almost inevitably trigger the employment of the deterrent by both sides, while the employment of satellite and/or battlefield nuclear weapons would not necessarily produce the same result. Thus, while nuclear weapons against the USSR must not be used except as a last resort, other nuclear weapons may be used if and when necessary in order to defend Europe; their use might not be incompatible with the defensive aim.

The two basic questions that a NATO nuclear doctrine must answer are the following: When must nuclear weapons be used? How should they be used?

If the enemy is the first to employ nuclear weapons, NATO must immediately employ its own nuclear weapons, in accordance with the doctrine proposed in the second part of this article. But this event seems extremely improbable. If the enemy has not used nuclear weapons, NATO must still use them when the following two conditions exist simultaneously: the enemy aggression threatens the political integrity of one or more NATO nations, and no other conventional forces are available in time to counter enemy aggression.

These are the two conditions which justify, and make credible, the initial employment of nuclear weapons. It is essential not only that the two conditions exist, but that public opinion inside and outside NATO be fully informed and prepared for this eventuality. There must be effective political preparation: we must be able to prove that what we did was right, the issue was vital, and we had no other means to defend ourselves. We must remember that it is not easy to establish who is the aggressor and who is the defender. In spite of the fact that NATO will never initiate aggression, enemy propaganda will do its best to convince world public opinion of the contrary. We must also keep in mind the likely reaction of world opinion against the side which first uses nuclear weapons. Either we would have to succeed in convincing world opinion that their use was absolutely essential and that we had no other means of halting the aggression, or we would risk losing at the conference table what we might have gained on the battlefield.

It is not possible in peacetime to determine at what point enemy aggression threatens the political integrity of one or more

NATO nations, because this will depend on the political situation existing when the aggression actually takes place and on the sensitivity of the theater where the aggression occurs. What is essential is that NATO must clearly state the principle that *it is fully prepared to use all necessary weapons, including nuclear ones, in order to prevent the political collapse of one or more NATO nations through armed aggression.* The political authorities of the nation concerned are in the best position to judge when nuclear weapons must be used on their territory; hence, their agreement is mandatory before any nuclear weapons are used for its defense. Of course, the agreement of the nation that owns the nuclear warheads is also mandatory.

Finally, time is a vital element. Because requests are justified only when the military situation is acute, any delay in the employment of nuclear weapons might have serious unfavorable consequences. In order to shorten this time, good communications are needed for a rapid exchange of messages and information, and the NATO Council must be constantly informed of the military situation so that it will be prepared to respond to a request to employ nuclear weapons.

When and if all the available conventional resources, both NATO's and the nation's, have been employed without success in stopping the enemy's aggression, and its penetration has compromised the political stability of one or more NATO nations, the employment of nuclear weapons is essential. Options open to the enemy after NATO starts to employ nuclear weapons, as well as subsequent NATO reactions, must be taken into consideration in order to reach the best possible balance between advantages and disadvantages. The enemy's options are: to stop fighting, go on fighting conventionally, retaliate with the same kind and number of nuclear weapons as employed by NATO, or escalate to the employment of nuclear capabilities.

If the enemy stops fighting, NATO would not need to employ additional nuclear weapons because it would have sufficient time to mount a conventional counterattack to restore the integrity of NATO territory. He would stop if he has misjudged the will and political solidarity of NATO; the employment of a few nuclear weapons of any kind should convince him of this, provided the targets selected are not so important as to provoke his retaliation.

If NATO employed only defensive nuclear weapons, the enemy might decide to continue to fight conventionally, because these weapons are probably not capable of halting enemy aggression. On the other hand, NATO, having employed the first nuclear weapons, would be under pressure of public opinion which undoubtedly would be unable to draw a distinction between defensive and tactical nuclear weapons.

The military value of defensive nuclear weapons, including atomic demolition munitions (ADM's), anti-aircraft weapons, and anti-submarine weapons, may be overestimated. ADM's, for example, produce passive obstacles. Their sites, dictated by the terrain configuration, may be easily discovered by the enemy. If he knows that we might employ ADM's, the enemy could plan effective measures to overcome these obstacles without suffering an unacceptable delay. While ADM's may complicate enemy planning to a certain extent, they are not likely to defeat the aggression.

Anti-aircraft nuclear weapons would be effective against massive raids in close formation, flown at sufficiently high altitude. But this is an unlikely form of attack for modern air forces. Against minor formations flying at low altitudes, nuclear weapons have little effect on the enemy and may cause a prohibitive amount of damage on our own territory. Anti-submarine nuclear weapons would add little to the NATO potential for destroying enemy submarines, because the most difficult problem in ASW is locating, rather than destroying, enemy submarines.

However, defensive nuclear weapons might prove useful for the following two purposes: to initiate escalation at the lowest end of the nuclear spectrum when it is politically advisable, and to bolster the defense when other nuclear weapons have already been used. If the enemy continued to fight and advance with conventional arms because the defensive weapons used by NATO were not sufficient to stop the aggression, NATO would be compelled to employ additional battlefield nuclear weapons.

Let us now assume that the enemy employs the same kind and number of nuclear weapons employed by NATO. This is the most likely move following NATO's employment of battlefield nuclear weapons, provided the enemy is determined to go on fighting. The power of the nuclear fire makes it impossible for the enemy to continue using only conventional weapons while NATO employs nuclear ones.

While it is difficult to evaluate the psychological and military effects of the first employment of nuclear weapons, we must try to imagine how a nuclear battle might develop. After the first few battlefield nuclear weapons were used by NATO, the enemy would be compelled to change his posture from a conventional to a nuclear one and replace the units destroyed or disorganized by the nuclear fire. This might slow down or stop his advance for some time.

The most positive aspect of the first employment of battlefield nuclear weapons would be the delay imposed on enemy ground operations. But this delay would not last long, and the enemy, by employing nuclear weapons in turn, would again exert pressure on NATO forces greater than they would be able to withstand: nuclear weapons employed by both sides would wreak comparable destruction upon both sides, and would not alter the imbalance of conventional forces which favors the enemy.

Almost inevitably, NATO would be compelled to use nuclear weapons for deeper and deeper interdiction in order to prevent the arrival of enemy forces on the battlefield. The enemy would follow suit and again any momentary advantage would be lost by NATO. After a limited period of time NATO might have exhausted its available ground units, while the enemy, having a greater number of units, might still be able to support the ground battle and be in a stronger position than before. More simply stated, the employment of equal nuclear firepower by both sides would not change the balance of conventional forces, except at the very beginning when an advantage could be gained by the side which first employed it, and at the end when an advantage would be gained by the side which had more ground units available.

The Soviet Army is particularly well trained, equipped and organized for nuclear warfare and may be in a better condition to wage such a war than the NATO forces. Politically, the use of a considerable number of nuclear weapons in Europe, particularly when they are employed for deep interdiction, would produce unacceptable destruction. Furthermore, because battlefield nuclear weapons would not be employed inside Soviet territory, they would have a limited deterrent effect, if any, on the Soviet will to halt aggression. Hence, this is not the way to employ NATO's tactical nuclear weapons.

The first use of a few battlefield nuclear weapons may be in NATO's immediate interest, but if the enemy responds in kind we must not do more of the same. NATO must try to find a different solution for the defensive problem. This means a new step in deliberate escalation. A few "warning nuclear weapons" must be employed within the satellite countries which have supported or requested the enemy's aggression. The aim of these weapons is not so much to destroy or delay the enemy forces as to show our determination and our political cohesion. In other words, NATO must convince the satellite countries and the Soviet Union that we are prepared to run *together* all the necessary risks for collective Atlantic defense.

To add credibility to the deterrent effect of exploding a few nuclear weapons inside the satellite countries, NATO must have a general nuclear plan directed against the satellite countries with a credible second strike capability and a full range of targets — military, industrial and urban — similar to the U.S. nuclear plan against the Soviet Union. Knowing that NATO has the means to destroy them, the satellite governments might exert stronger pressure against the Soviet Union to halt the war.

"Warning nuclear weapons" might be detonated at sea near the enemy coast or high in the sky, avoiding damage to the enemy, or they might be used against isolated military targets in order to destroy the target while avoiding casualties among the civilian population, or they might be employed against isolated industrial installations, avoiding major urban centers. The choice of targets must be made according to the political situation existing at the time of the aggression.

This employment requires detailed political preparation to stress NATO's determination and political cohesion, and to prevent its being construed as the beginning of a general nuclear war. If the enemy responds in kind, NATO should not use additional "warning" weapons, for the reasons already stated — destruction of Europe and limited or no deterrent effect on the Soviet Union. Rather, NATO would have to take another step in escalation by shooting one or two "warning nuclear weapons" inside Soviet territory, even though this would be a most dangerous step toward general nuclear war.

In sum, battlefield nuclear weapons and satellite nuclear weapons must be employed if and when necessary, to demonstrate clearly our firm determination to accept every necessary risk in order to defend NATO. But their use must indicate short steps of escalation between conventional and general nuclear war. If the steps are not credibly shown to be sufficiently short, the Russians may escalate in their turn by using such weapons extensively in Europe, a development that is not acceptable to the West European nations. It should be clearly realized that the deterrent value of "battlefield" and "satellite" nuclear weapons is small against the Soviet Union, but they can be effective against the satellites.

Battlefield and satellite weapons are basically psychological weapons. They must be used in limited numbers, when and if necessary, so as to avoid large-scale destruction in Europe and at the same time convince the enemy that he must stop fighting. This is possible only if their employment makes the employment of the deterrent appear more credible and imminent.

Number, mix, delivery means and targets for such weapons must be chosen so that they constitute a vital component of the forces we need for defense. But too many of these weapons are deployed today in Europe. In such large numbers, they may give the impression, on both sides, that we would employ large quantities of them before going on to the next step — the employment of nuclear weapons on Russian territory. This is in no way a deterrent for the Soviets, who might believe they have sufficient time, while Europe is being devastated, to halt the aggression before suffering any direct punishment.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES[2]

The population of the NATO nations, without France, is 465 million. The population of the Warsaw Pact nations, without Albania, is 338 million. Thus, NATO has a population more than one-third larger than the Warsaw Pact nations.

The Warsaw Pact countries as a whole have a Gross National Product (GNP) less than 40 per cent that of NATO, and the absolute superiority enjoyed by NATO in comparison with the Soviet bloc is almost certain to increase during the next five years. The 1967 defense budget of the NATO nations, excluding France, totaled $90.338 billion; the Warsaw Pact nations' defense budgets, excluding Albania, amounted to $40.248 billion (if the Soviet budget is evaluated at the "real" estimated value of $35 billion). Thus, the NATO "defense budget" is 2.25 times greater than that of the Warsaw Pact. Considering that the cost of the Viet Nam war, included in the U.S. defense budget, runs about $22 billion a year, the total NATO defense budget exclusive of Viet

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[2] When other sources are not cited, the figures presented in this section are extracted from *The Military Balance 1967-68,* published by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Nam is $68.338 billion, still nearly 1.75 times as great as that of the Warsaw Pact.[3]

Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's statement on February 1, 1968 before the Senate Armed Service Committee on the U.S. Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget disclosed the following facts:

> In all regions except Norway, the NATO-Pact forces are about equal in manpower. NATO has about 900,000 troops deployed in all regions of continental Europe, compared to 980,000 troops for the Warsaw Pact. While manpower comparisons, alone, are not a conclusive measure of military strength, I believe they are reasonable first approximations of relative ground force capabilities.
>
> In the case of air forces, our relative capability is far greater than a simple comparison of numbers would indicate. By almost every measure —range, payload, ordnance effectiveness, loiter time, crew training— NATO (especially U.S.) air forces are better than the Pact's for non-nuclear war.
>
> Our tactical air *capability* has increased dramatically, relative both to 1961 and to the threat. Under our presently planned program this trend will continue through the early 1970's. This increase in overall capability results from the modernization of the forces together with major improvements in conventional ordnance. For instance, we have doubled the payload capability of our tactical aircraft since 1961, and we will double it again by 1972.
>
> In 1961, only 15 per cent of our fighters had all-weather air-to-air capability; today about 50 per cent do, and by 1972 80 per cent of them will. With respect to conventional munitions, modern air-delivered anti-tank weapons reduce substantially the number of sorties required to destroy a given number of enemy tanks compared with the general purpose bombs used in 1961. Similarly, we have developed guided air-to-surface weapons, such as WALLEYE, which reduce the number of sorties required to destroy a target such as a bridge.
>
> In contrast, the present Communist tactical air forces are designed primarily for defense over home territory. Although their aircraft are well suited to the short range interceptor role, they have low payload when used offensively and limited loiter time when used defensively. Today, only about 25 per cent of the Communist force, as opposed to 53 per cent of the Free World force, are modern aircraft with a significant attack capability. By 1972, more than 75 per cent of the Free World inventory will be modern attack aircraft, while the Communists will still have only 25 per cent in this category. As a result, the Free World aircraft can carry, on the average, 1.8 times as much payload as the Communist aircraft today and this will increase to 3.7 times as much by 1972, as shown in the table below.

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[3] The 1968 defense budget of the NATO nations, without France, is $97 billion; the Warsaw Pact's defense budget, without Albania, is $46 billion; the cost of the Viet Nam war is $25 to $30 billion. The ratio of the NATO-Warsaw Pact defense budgets has not changed appreciably.

PAYLOAD CAPABILITY OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
(Free World 1961 = 100)

End FY	*U.S.*	*Total Free World*	*Total Communist*
1961	55	100	53
1967	117	167	69
1972	214	264	70

Indeed, our relative advantage is substantially greater than the foregoing payload comparison indicates, since we also have better munitions and pilots. The result is that in any major contingency there is little doubt that we and our allies could provide more offensive airpower than the opposing forces. Perhaps the greatest uncertainty in the tactical air force is our own vulnerability to attack while our aircraft are on the ground. We need shelters and other defensive measures to protect against such attacks.

In conclusion, NATO's general capabilities compare favorably with those of the Warsaw Pact.

An examination of Warsaw Pact forces and doctrine yields the following conclusions: On the *military side,* the Warsaw Pact force posture is a clearly defensive one based on deterrence. On the *political side,* it is an aggressive posture designed to influence the will and cohesion of the NATO nations. The Warsaw Pact strategy is designed to enable the communists to gain political advantages without fighting a war.

Similarly, the increasing emphasis the Soviets are placing on their navy points in the same direction. The navy adds considerably to their deterrence, but because they have no effective air component to support the fleet, and because they are still unable to influence conventional ground battles by delivering expeditionary forces at any substantial distance from home bases, the offensive conventional capabilities of the growing Soviet Navy remain limited. Politically, however, the Soviets will be able to show their flag in all oceans and be in a better position to counter more effectively the influence of the United States Navy.

This conclusion accords with McNamara's assessment:

> Whereas Soviet developments in the area of strategic systems—notably ABM's and FOBS (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System)—give evidence of a continuing search for security through more advanced arms, ostensibly military applications of power such as recently increased levels of Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean appear to be primarily diplomatic gestures aimed at recouping political losses suffered as a result of Moscow's inability to forestall Israel's victory over the Arabs in June 1967. Soviet naval craft in the Mediterranean, including guided missile cruisers, a number of sub-year-round operations, have effectively shown the flag. Although modest in size and in punch compared with the U.S.

Sixth Fleet, the Soviet fleet provides the type of visibility which Moscow has elected to seek.

The political importance of the Warsaw Pact forces is stressed by German authorities in their "Government Policy Statement" made during the Bundestag debate on defense on December 6, 1967: "No one should overlook, however, that the instruments of power available to the Warsaw Pact could be used for the purpose of exerting political pressure."

The Soviets may some day change their posture, and if they do, NATO defense planners must take this into consideration. But today there is no indication of change in the Soviet posture and, in any case, a considerable amount of time and money would be required to effect such a change.

Ground Forces in Central Europe

The Central Front is a highly sensitive sector because of its political and military importance, the division of Germany, and the peculiar situation of Berlin. We will not examine whether its political and military importance makes aggression more or less probable. Past experience demonstrates that even during the most serious political crisis, no shooting action has ever occurred. But because probability is an uncertain factor, it is important to evaluate the military capabilities of the opposing ground forces.

If the Warsaw Pact chooses to launch a surprise attack it must employ the forces available on the Central Front without any substantial reinforcement from outside in order to avoid giving warning of the impending attack and thus losing the benefit of surprise. The following Pact ground forces are immediately available for such an attack: twenty Soviet divisions, deployed in the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany (SOZG), six East German divisions, and fourteen Czechoslovakian divisions.

These estimates are based on pre-August 1968 figures. It is difficult to obtain reliable information on Soviet forces currently stationed in Czechoslovakia and on the meaning of these troop shifts for West European security. The report on "Czechoslovakia and European Security," presented to the Assembly of the Western European Union in mid-October 1968, pointed out that:

> In spite of the military strength of the NATO countries, represented chiefly by the forces of the United States, the Soviet Union was able to employ a massive concentration of military force to invade Czechoslovakia on two perfectly safe assumptions: (1) there would be no confrontation in Czechoslovakia with NATO forces; and (2) the NATO forces will

not take advantage of Russian involvement in Czechoslovakia to seize any territory elsewhere along the postwar boundary—in spite of the obvious political and strategic advantages to the West of the access routes to Berlin.

. . . .

While your Chairman was originally of the view that as far as Western defense planning is concerned, the strategic implications of the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia do not significantly change the situation, a majority of the Committee believed that the balance of forces in Europe had changed significantly. It can be argued that a change in the nationality of the troops lining the frontier with Western Germany is not of great significance, considering that Czechoslovakia has so far always been assessed by the West as a reliable member of the Warsaw Pact. Any marginal increase in military effectiveness on this front of some 200 kilometers can have been achieved only at the cost of depleting Russian forces elsewhere and of reducing the reliability of the 14 Czechoslovak divisions. Moreover, the area of this frontier—the Bavarian forest—is bad terrain for tank operations. The main threat in Central Europe remains unchanged along the much longer 700-kilometer front between Eastern and Western Germany, most of which runs through the very good tank country of the North German plains.

But the view of the majority of the Committee was that the center of gravity of the Soviet forces has moved nearer to the iron curtain, thus placing them in a better position to launch a surprise attack against Western Europe.

General Lyman Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, speaking to the North Atlantic Assembly in Brussels in mid-November 1968, declared that "despite publicized withdrawals, the risks to NATO Europe remain markedly higher; the Pact capability for moving forward has been enhanced; the military balance in Central Europe has been altered to the disadvantage of the West."

Ambassador Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, addressing the Western European Union Assembly in Paris in mid-October, expressed the opinion that West European security remains safe "with the support of our North American friends – not without them." NATO's conventional and nuclear strength outweighs that of the Warsaw Pact, even though the latter may enjoy local advantages in conventional strength. There is no reason for pessimism as long as the Atlantic Alliance remains united, Brosio said, and there is no reason to start an arms race, which would increase tension. "Without transforming Europe into an armed camp, we must be ready to secure our policy of peace and détente against any surprise."

In spite of the fact that the Warsaw Pact forces directly facing

NATO in Central Europe have increased their overall strength, and that their center of gravity has moved nearer to the Iron Curtain, I do not believe the gain in military forces has balanced the loss in political cohesion. The fourteen Czechoslovakian divisions that were fully reliable before the invasion can no longer be counted on in case the USSR decides to launch an aggression against NATO. In addition the Czechoslovakian population has stubbornly resisted Russian political pressure. And, finally, a considerable withdrawal of Russian forces has already taken place. President Nixon in his news conference on February 6, 1969 in Washington, answering a question concerning the Nonproliferation Treaty, stated that the situation "has changed in the sense that the number of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia has been substantially reduced." I believe the Warsaw Pact military threat against Central Europe is not greater today than it was before the invasion.

In Western Europe there are NATO forces corresponding to twenty-four divisions, exclusive of French forces. Since in fighting manpower a NATO division is 50 per cent larger than a Warsaw Pact division, the NATO divisions are approximately equal in manpower to the corresponding divisions of the Warsaw Pact.

It is more difficult to assess the divisional firepower of the two blocs. In general, divisional firepower may be considered equal in spite of the fact that NATO divisions are on the whole stronger in this respect than those of the Warsaw Pact. In case of a conventional surprise attack, while fighting manpower is equal, the Warsaw Pact forces might have an advantage of about one-third more firepower.

In case of a surprise attack the defense would have to stop or delay the enemy advance for a sufficient period of time to reinforce the threatened sector. Front-line NATO forces would be able to deny success to the enemy provided there is time for their redeployment. The immediate massive employment of superior NATO air forces should help to gain the necessary time, and no employment of nuclear weapons should be necessary.

If the enemy decided to reinforce his ground units before attacking, NATO would have to utilize the warning period to reinforce its defensive forces. The immediate massive employment of all available air forces would be essential in order to give NATO the longest possible time for mobilization, reinforcement and redeployment before the use of nuclear weapons became essential.

According to McNamara,

> NATO tactical aircraft reinforcement would about equal the Pact's in the early stages of mobilization, after which we could add considerably more aircraft than the Pact. Our main advantage in this area, however, stems from the great superiority of our aircraft, pilots and weapons. . . .

If the Soviet Union is able to deploy a large number of divisions and their necessary logistic support in Central Europe, then NATO's prospects for stopping the aggression with conventional forces decrease. The length of time NATO would be able to contain aggression without employing nuclear weapons would depend upon the number of Warsaw Pact divisions deployed and the amount of warning time given by the Soviets' preparation. But McNamara pointed out that:

> In any event, the Soviet Union, and especially her Eastern European allies, would have to assume that the West might react against such an attack with nuclear weapons. Considering the destructive potential of both our theater and strategic nuclear forces and the fact that such a deliberate attack would constitute a clear threat to our vital interests, the Soviets should be strongly deterred from attempting this strategy.

NATO flanks seem to be weaker than the Center vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact forces. However, on the flanks Soviet forces would be directly involved at the very beginning of any aggression, and thus it seems highly improbable that Moscow would initiate any direct confrontation with NATO. The following measures seem to be the best ways to prevent or halt aggression on the flanks: prompt deployment in the threatened region of NATO units of different nationalities, including Americans, in order to demonstrate that aggression in any part of Europe is aggression against NATO as a whole; immediate massive employment of air forces; reinforcement by sea; and a clear statement that no military *fait accompli* will be accepted by NATO.

NATO's conventional reaction to any conventional enemy aggression must be planned, prepared and fought in the spirit that it is the best way to defend Europe, and not in the belief that it is a preliminary phase before an inevitable nuclear engagement takes place. However, if and when, for any reason, conventional forces cannot stop the enemy's aggression, and the political existence of one or more NATO nations is threatened, then the use of nuclear weapons would be mandatory. NATO must leave no room for doubt or misunderstanding on this point.

Employment of Air Power in a Conventional Role

NATO's ability to stop indefinitely a surprise attack or a large-scale attack without employing nuclear weapons depends to a large extent on its ability to exploit its air superiority against enemy armor during the first hours of the aggression. Air forces can enter an engagement quickly; they are effective when used with conventional weapons against enemy armor. The importance of NATO air forces in the conventional defense of Europe is stressed by many NATO nations. McNamara's statements concerning NATO air superiority and NATO's capability to reinforce its air forces more swiftly than the Pact during the mobilization phase have already been cited. The British "Statement on the Defense Estimate 1968," presented to Parliament in February 1968, declared:

> It is also agreed that, within the total resources available to NATO, adjustment should be made particularly in the air forces, with the object of extending the conventional phase of hostilities, should war break out; this would give more time in which any decision to use nuclear weapons could be taken.

The German Federal Republic's "Government Policy Statement" of December 1967 contains the following passage:

> To a larger extent than before, NATO's strategic concept assigns to the air attack units the mission of providing conventional support for the land forces. Their mobility, their capability of rapidly concentrating their forces, and their effectiveness—all these make them particularly suitable for the execution of this mission. . . . It is therefore necessary to employ the air attack units to an increased extent in a conventional role. However . . . the nuclear capability must be maintained. This means that Pershing units and part of the flying units must remain available for nuclear employment. . . . The flying units concerned will have the secondary capability for execution of conventional combat missions.

All fighter bombers and, if necessary, all fighter aircraft must be immediately employed to destroy the enemy's armored forces on the battlefield, while all light, medium and heavy bombers must be immediately employed in a close interdiction role. The availability of even a few B-52's or similar heavy bombers would add greatly to the defense of NATO. The psychological and military impact of their commitment would be important, particularly if they were used to reinforce the flanks. Weapons and training must be provided as soon as possible in order to give the NATO air forces a substantial capability to fight a conventional war.

Too much importance has been attached to the battle for air supremacy. When employing conventional weapons and when massive air raids are not possible on either side (because of the high vulnerability of the attackers to surface-to-air missile defenses, and because there are not sufficient aircraft available to support the necessary number of raids), the battle for air superiority is a long and uncertain job. If NATO air forces are employed to fight air superiority battles, we may lose the ground battle before we gain control of the air. The Middle East War is highly misleading if we try to apply its lesson to Europe. First, the two contenders had no nuclear weapons. Second, they were not directly supported by nations with a substantial capability to increase their air forces. Finally, the geographical area was limited compared with that of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Thus, to apply the experience of the Middle East War to any possible European war would be dangerous.

Measures such as aircraft redeployment and on-base dispersal, protection on the ground, camouflage, and a combination of high and low SAM and gun defenses would be sufficient to prevent unacceptable losses to NATO air forces. The defense of ground units must be assured by means other than aircraft, e.g., guns, rockets and missiles. Against low-altitude enemy raids, the effectiveness of air defense carried out by interceptors is limited. In any case, the highest priority mission to be assigned to NATO air forces is the stabilization of the ground battle. Only after this mission has been accomplished should an air superiority battle be envisaged, depending on the political and military situation prevailing at the time.

The emphasis placed on aircraft as a means of delivery for nuclear weapons dates from the years 1954-1955, when ICBM's were not yet in existence and aircraft were the only delivery means available. Because of the great lead of the United States over the Soviet Union, both in air offense and air defense, it was believed that the United States had nuclear superiority and would be able to maintain this indefinitely. The "massive retaliation" strategy had at that time a crushing deterrent effect. This explains the priority assigned to air offense, defense, superiority and survivability. The "Sputnik" launched by the Soviets on October 4, 1957, by demonstrating their capability to produce ICBM's, rendered the "massive retaliation" strategy obsolete and inapplicable.

It is of interest to note the following paragraph from McNamara's February 18, 1965 Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget:

> Our present system for defense against manned bomber attack was designed a decade ago when it was estimated that our opponent would build a force capable of attacking the United States with many hundreds of long range aircraft. This threat did not develop as estimated. Instead, the major threat confronting the United States consists of ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic missile forces. With no defense against the ICBM's and only very limited defenses against the submarine launched ballistic missile, our anti-bomber defense could operate on only a part of the attacking forces. Moreover, the anti-bomber defense system itself is vulnerable to missile attack.

Today the basic delivery means for nuclear weapons are missiles, and the great majority of these are hardened or have mobile launchers so that they are far more survivable to a surprise attack than aircraft. By keeping aircraft on the ground in Europe waiting for their nuclear employment, NATO risks having them destroyed before they have any chance of being used, and in the meantime they will not be fulfilling their vital role during the conventional phase of an aggression.

Fait Accompli

One point of particular importance is the possibility that the enemy may achieve a quick limited success and force NATO to accept a *fait accompli.* The possibility of a *fait accompli* depends on NATO as much as on the other side. If NATO chooses not to accept it but to fight back against the aggression as long as necessary to restore the integrity of its territory, there will be no *fait accompli.* In other words, if NATO maintains its political and military solidarity and makes it clear that it will never join in diplomatic discussions before the integrity of NATO territory is restored, no *fait accompli* is possible. The enemy will be convinced that he can gain no success through a limited surprise attack, and NATO public opinion will know that the alliance has both the will and the means to defend itself effectively, North, Center or South.

CONCLUSIONS

We have not yet reached a clear understanding of the escalation psychology. To be effective, escalation, in the political field as well as in the conventional and nuclear military fields, must produce at least one of the two following results: the opposite side is unable to match the escalation and for this reason ends by losing the contest; or the opposite side lacks the strength to survive the damage wrought by escalation. If neither of these results occurs, escalation will produce only a higher level of tension or destruction with no advantage to either side.

The advent of the nuclear age and the large number of independent nations have given a new dimension to the psychological-political aspect of escalation that has not yet been fully understood by either political or military leaders. In this context, certain measures are needed for the defense of NATO territory. These must aim at achieving the following results: (1) demonstrate that NATO has the will and the means to defend its territory against any aggression, minor or major, in any theater, North, Center or South, and that it will never accept a *fait accompli* even of limited scope; (2) make credible the employment of nuclear weapons if and when necessary, in such a way as to minimize the danger for the NATO countries and maximize it for the Warsaw Pact countries; (3) produce these results without any substantial numerical increase in conventional forces, and with a possible decrease in the battlefield and satellite nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, thus keeping the way open for détente with the Warsaw Pact nations; and (4) effectively counter Soviet political pressure by giving public opinion in the West a credible assurance of the NATO capability to defend alliance territory with the resources currently available. Such a defense, which is impossible without NATO, must not be an obstacle to détente, but it must discourage the Soviets from starting any minor aggression intended to be a probe against NATO's solidarity and determination.

THE FEASIBILITY OF WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE

by J. A. Graf Kielmansegg

SINCE August 21, 1968 the defense of Western Europe has become a more interesting topic to the public and to governments than it had been for a number of years. The topic is complicated, since between the feasibility of a defense of Western Europe, which the Atlantic Alliance is undoubtedly potentially capable of mounting, and the requirements for actually carrying out such a defense, there lies a formidable array of "ifs" and "buts" – some permanent, some variable and some dependent on temporary circumstances.

It would be wrong to consider the defense of Western Europe without reminding ourselves that it has to be planned and operated as part of the defense of the whole Atlantic Alliance, and, vice versa, that the defense of Britain, Canada and the United States against the Warsaw Pact nations has to begin at the Iron Curtain in Central Europe – and this by no means only as a consequence of alliance obligations but because of the vital self-interest of these countries. Atlantic defense includes the territories of the fifteen allied partners in the two continents north of the Tropic of Cancer (as defined in the treaty) as well as the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the western part of the Baltic and Northern Polar seas. In this area, whose European extent is from the North Cape to the Caucasus, continental Western Europe, referred to in the NATO alliance as the Central Region, is the central and at the same time the front-line bastion of the West. The essential outer defenses are already in the enemy's hands. The last advanced post, the Czechoslovak Republic, fell in 1948, and in 1968 was integrated more firmly than ever into Moscow's system. The fall of this Central Region would mean the fall of the whole West European fortress.

It is permissible, in matters of defense, to consider *pars pro toto*, the part for the whole, since it is Western Europe which exerts the strongest political, economic and military influence on Western policies throughout the world, though Western Europe does not initiate or carry out those policies by itself. The decisive significance Western Europe has for the Western world, and would have for the Eastern, will continue as long as the center of world politics remains in the Atlantic framework. Should the center one day be transferred to the Pacific, which could well occur in the not too distant future, then Western Europe might possibly become a peaceful and even common backyard of the United States and the USSR. But so far this has not occurred.

It is an extraordinary fact that in public discussions of the problem of Western defense one fundamental question is hardly ever raised: What do we wish or expect from a successful defense? This is a vital question, and not at all as easy to answer as one might at first suppose. Moreover, it brings with it a series of further questions, of which the most important are: How long should the defense be continued? Where, how and with what means should it be carried out? Does defense begin only when the shooting starts? The answers we find for these questions, both individually as well as in their relation to each other, will determine the feasibility of defense. However, one answer is clear from the beginning. In the fundamental political situation of this second half of the twentieth century, and especially under the technological conditions now obtaining, defense must begin in peacetime if it is to have the one result generally desired and expected: the retention of our security and our freedom.

I

But what exactly do we mean by security? Different people have totally different ideas on the subject. The fact that individuals, governments and even nations attach widely differing meanings to this term is at the bottom of many difficulties and misunderstandings. It can lead to the point at which one government genuinely considers its country's security threatened and another, quite as genuinely, sees it maintained.

In other words, it is essential first of all to make sure that we know what degree and kind of security we require, and for how long we require it. One may think this an obvious truism, but how often is it the case that we know something perfectly obvious and yet fail to apply our knowledge? Because we need a yardstick against which to measure the feasibility of defense, I will say that my own idea of what, in a general sense, security should imply is simply a condition under which a defined political area — nation, group of nations or sphere of influence — can be secured against direct and indirect military aggression. The politics of security, as an integral sector of foreign policy (which, curiously, it is by no means always considered to be), must therefore have as its objective the upholding of this condition, the condition of peace. If this proves impossible, the political entity must be able to prosecute a successful defense "to preserve and to restore the integrity of the territory," in the words of the so-called Ministerial Guidance given by the North Atlantic Council in 1967 to the NATO military authorities. The adjective "successful" subsumes the vitally important time factor: to continue the defense until the enemy's aggression is thrown back.

Security and its major component, defense, are both largely governed, as far as feasibility and the probability of success are concerned, by three factors: geographical, political and military.

The geographical factor includes such matters as the relative positions of certain areas, land surface formation, vegetation and climatic conditions. The sea plays a decisive role, and it is not fortuitous that the treaty on which the Western alliance is based is called the North Atlantic Treaty. Even if the defense of Western Europe must take place on and over the continent, nevertheless it could not take place at all without the sea at its rear and on its northern and southern flanks. The reader may perhaps be surprised that I attach so much importance to this geographical factor. But in spite of all the modern possibilities of rapid movement and the potential for mass destruction, geography still plays a role no less significant in the modern context than that which it has played in the past. We may say geography is a constant; we have to accept it as it is and organize our political and military security so as to achieve the most favorable relationship to the geographical facts.

Political security rests on treaties, guarantees and pacts; and also on promises and tacit agreements or unwritten understandings. The political defense feasibility of the West as a whole, as also of each separate member state, is based on the North Atlantic Alliance and the NATO organizational machinery (to which, since July 1, 1966, France no longer belongs), and additionally, for the Common Market countries and Britain, on the Western European Union. There has never been a stronger security guarantee under an alliance, ratified by treaties, except for the European Defense Community which was unfortunately wrecked by France in 1954. The other two basic possibilities for political defense – armament limitation and control and a political agreement or treaty with the potential opponent – do not exist in the present situation. These methods have been discussed for years, especially in connection with a European security system. They will continue to be discussed in the years ahead, I believe, with no useful outcome, because security is conceived differently in East and West and its attainment is quite differently envisaged.

The system of political security on which the feasibility of West European defense rests is composed of the NATO and Western European Union treaties; one is bound to admit that so far as words and documents go it is a good system. We must not forget that it has been successful for twenty years.

But – and this is perhaps the most important of the "buts" and "ifs" I referred to at the beginning – implicit in every political treaty, in every political pact, is a certain spirit. It is this spirit that determines the actual effectiveness of any treaty, and brings the written word to life and keeps it alive. If this spirit tires or is injured – and both have occurred within the Atlantic Alliance – then only weakness can result. Political weakness within an alliance inevitably engenders a weakness in the deterrent power of that alliance because its credibility is lowered, even though the technical military means of deterrence, both as regards quantity and type, remain sufficient.

II

To speak of deterrence is to enter at once both the political and the military spheres. Apart from the purely tactical handling of military forces, one can no longer regard these two spheres in isolation. Consequently, in discussing the military side of defense feasibility, the politico-military aspect cannot be neglected. Military security, the third of the three factors which I suggested as governing the feasibility of defense, arises out of the type and size of the defense potential and the instrument that can be developed from this potential, and out of the capacity to use the instrument more or less successfully.

In his last speech as Prime Minister, Winston Churchill said: "So long as our security is not a child of rationality it must remain a child of fright." This short sentence, showing that the ultimate aim of politics, i.e., security, is devolved from rationality, pinpoints the reason why deterrence has always been, and still is, the basis of NATO strategy: the objective is the continuance of peace. Deterrence as a basic principle has not changed, but its structure has. At the start a more or less monolithic conception, it has become something more complicated, made up of various parts. During, say, the first ten years of NATO, deterrence was a purely nuclear business, developed logically enough from America's superiority in nuclear armament, which, incidentally, resided less in the quantity of nuclear weapons she possessed than in the fact that the Soviets could not have seriously damaged the American continent, while she could have inflicted immense damage on the USSR. But as soon as Moscow had developed the capacity for a nuclear strike against the United States, whichever side decided to strike first would immediately have a decisive advantage. To prevent this, both sides more or less simultaneously developed what has come to be called a second-strike capability: the capacity, after receiving a first nuclear attack, still to strike back to the point of annihilation, thus establishing a balance of risk. In this way, the nuclear stalemate came into being, and in the field of strategy it still holds sway. I do not think it would be wrong to expect this state of affairs to continue, notwithstanding the introduction of ABM, MIRV and FOBS systems, which are not yet really efficient on either side.

This statement may sound somewhat surprising coming soon after President Nixon's Safeguard decision, but in order to eliminate the atomic stalemate as a *political* phenomenon, the technological lead must be so great on one side that it would not only be of military interest but, as far as the time aspect is concerned, also of political relevance — thus rendering possible a different policy. Such a lead is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

However, one cannot overemphasize the fact that this state of affairs applies to the strategic sphere only, comprising the Soviet and American territories, whereas Europe, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, is to be regarded as a tactical area. It is most important to understand this. The nuclear stalemate is not without influence on the tactical sphere, but in terms of flexible response it is probably not influential enough to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. In the nuclear field, defense is more than assured, and our deterrent capacity is quantitatively and qualitatively adequate. But the criterion of deterrence strategy is the determination to translate it into action should the need arise. It is a rational strategy, and therefore its weakness lies in its assumption that a potential enemy will think and act with similar rationality. In my opinion the Soviets act rationally, but theirs is an altogether different kind of rationalism, based on a different scale of values leading to quite different criteria for decisions and for calculating risks. Failure to recognize this fundamental difference, which we in the West are inclined to do, constitutes grave danger.

The nuclear stalemate which reduces the likelihood of large-scale strategic nuclear war, at the same time increases the probability of a war fought with conventional armament, including possibly small-yield, short-range nuclear weapons for tactical purposes. It was this consideration, together with certain others, that caused Washington, from about 1962 onward, to institute within the Atlantic Alliance a gradual change-over from the strategy of massive retaliation, which was becoming more and more questionable as far as America was concerned, to one of flexible response, also sometimes, though rather inaccurately, called the strategy of step-by-step deterrence. A nuclear deterrent alone is only half effective. An effective deterrent must rather be put together from nuclear and conventional components, and the latter must be strong enough to deter an enemy from running in, as it were, under the nuclear guard with a conventional attack.

In other words a conventional stalemate must be created, with exactly the same characteristics as the nuclear: readiness for immediate and effective engagement from the first moment of aggression. I do not suggest that we should aim at an exact conventional equivalent to that of the East; it would be unrealistic to expect that such could be established, and it is also unnecessary. A state of stalemate can be achieved with fewer pieces on the chessboard than one's opponent has. What I understand by the term conventional stalemate is a proportion between the conventional forces of both sides enabling us to establish a situation where the risk becomes too great for the opponent. To achieve this is a decisive element of the flexible response strategy. A flexible response really means that one would not reply to every aggression with massive retaliation — although one must be able to do this — but rather on a scale and using weapons commensurate with that particular aggression. The defender must always be able to confront the aggressor with a credible risk that his attack will fail. Theoretically, this is sensible and logical, and it transfers the general nuclear response from the first to the last resort. From a purely military point of view, also, there is no criticism to be made of a flexible response strategy, always provided — and this is essential — that the means made available by the politicians are proportional to those of the enemy, and are of a type, strength and deployment which will enable the response to be really flexible and, more important still, on time.

In my opinion — and not mine alone — the NATO conventional component is not, up to now, capable of achieving a conventional stalemate, in spite of the fact that the NATO Political Directive of May 9, 1967 unambiguously calls for such a posture. Even before the events in Prague last August, General Lemnitzer had spoken publicly about an "already minimal defense posture" and condemned the "progressive dismantling tendency" of the allied governments. He repeated this criticism after August 21 still more emphatically, and with some bitterness, both in Lisbon and Brussels.

The fact we must recognize is that between the accurate appreciation of the general situation reflected in NATO political directives and the means the governments of NATO nations are prepared to supply to implement their directives, an extremely dangerous discrepancy exists. One might go so far as to say the left hand has no desire to know what the right hand has signed. Perhaps there are powerful reasons, political or financial, which bring about this discrepancy, but in that case we should realize the resulting dangers to our capacity for defense.

No amount of numerical juggling can do away with the dangerous conventional superiority of the East on land and in the air. If I say that the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact are the most effective in the world, and incomparably so in conventional forces, I am not merely giving my opinion; I am quoting SACEUR. Besides this serious statement of the position as it existed before August 1968, there is the military significance of Moscow's intervention in Czechoslovakia. Briefly, the long-standing threat from the East, so often forgotten or dismissed by wishful thinking, is now again plainly visible and more than ever demands attention. Quantitatively, the Eastern bloc's military strength is no greater than it was before, but the danger it represents to the West has increased considerably. An additional eight to ten divisions are thought to be stationed in Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany. In these satellite countries the Soviets have carried out a number of military measures, apart from the actual occupation of Czechoslovakia, which have greatly improved their capability for launching an attack — improved it precisely in regard to the three main factors on which military strategy hinges: time, area, forces. Militarily they are capable of launching such an attack at any moment. The Soviet-Chinese tension does not constitute an impediment in this respect.

At any rate the Soviets have shown again and unmistakably what so many Western politicians and large sections of the public under the influence of détente-euphoria did not believe, or did not wish to believe: that the use of military power to obtain their political ends is still, as it always was, in their eyes a perfectly natural and legitimate method, if they believe they cannot protect their vital interests in any other way. Indeed, it is a method their communist ideology supports, and it grows out of the different kind of rationalism prevailing in Moscow, which stems from an altogether different mentality to ours.

The emphasis on the potential threat from the East must not be taken as indicating that I believe in the probability of an actual attack at some particular moment; I do not believe the Soviets are contemplating an outright attack on Europe. At present, they are not even interested in such an idea. I can think of other ways than military involvement by which Soviet predominance in Europe can be achieved. But their improved capabilities in Central Europe make it even easier for the Soviets to give way to temptation and, grasping a favorable opportunity, make use of their conventional superiority in a swift limited action, should the men in the Kremlin believe they will not thereby incur the risk of immediate nuclear retaliation. Such an attack is by no means as unthinkable as many would like to believe, especially if the West does not succeed in putting an end to the erosion of the Atlantic Alliance and does nothing to strengthen its conventional deterrent power. As far as the *likelihood* of Eastern aggression against Western Europe is concerned, I would like to quote from a recent number of the *Times* (London) : "It may be in the highest degree improbable that Soviet tanks will cross the West German/Warsaw Pact border. The degree of improbability, however, is exactly proportionate to the tank strength on the Western side and the political determination behind it." This is clear, realistic and correct.

Ever since the flexible strategy was adopted, there has been a gradual weakening of the defense power of NATO Central Europe, a weakening that may soon be fatal. The small number of reserves has not increased, and the "augmentation" of forces of which the West is capable has been anything but rapid. But above everything this weakening is a straightforward result of the reduction of land and air forces present in Central Europe. The process began with the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966, and has continued ever since with the recall of British and American troops, the thinning out of Belgian forces, the halt on a further buildup of the German armed forces and now, as a special birthday gift to NATO, the Canadian announcement of a phasing-out intention. This diminution is not, as is sometimes suggested, an element in the new flexible strategy. It is, on the one hand, a consequence of financial restrictions and domestic pressure, and on the other, at least by some member governments, a conscious effort to implement the so-called politics of example.

True, this weakening trend seems to have been suspended since August 21, 1968, but it is difficult to say whether it has been reversed. Three measures were envisaged to mitigate its consequences: rotation of units, participation in exercises in Central Europe, and redeployment in time of tension or crisis. Leaving aside rotation and exercises, redeployment can mean a genuine augmentation of the forces in being, provided it takes place in time.

The real difficulties in such an operation are not transport problems. Transport nowadays is rapid and will continue to improve. The serious problems arise either before or after transport has been effected and are of a political kind, especially beforehand. In the case of the United States and Britain the redeployment itself; in the case of Germany and Britain raising the active units to full war strength; in the case of Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany the building up of reserve units and so-called mobilization units — all these measures require political decisions which are not easily made in a time of crisis. They cannot be taken by NATO, for they are the exclusive responsibility of each government. For the Central Region, that means seven governments; eight with France. They are likely to arrive at different assessments of the situation, to have different ideas regarding crisis management, and to envisage different practical possibilities for the handling of it. Moreover, domestic circumstances will influence foreign policy now in one direction, now in another. At any rate there seems to be not more than a 50/50 chance that in seven, or perhaps eight, different capitals the necessary decisions will be taken on the basis of equal assessments, on an equal scale, and in time. A 50 per cent chance is not good enough for a major element of strategy.

III

The basic requirements for successful flexible response are in practice identical with those of defense. The feasibility of defense — using the word in the sense of chance as well as method — is thus dependent on whether and to what extent these requirements are met. To sum up, I would suggest the following three propositions:

(1) Flexible response must begin in peacetime at the first sign of a weakening in the effectiveness of the deterrent, and not just before, or in response to, the first shot. Its means and methods must be carefully attuned beforehand, and be both political and military. The primary aim of flexible response is to re-establish effective deterrence, and has nothing to do with escalation.

(2) Militarily, the first essential for a successful flexible response is the presence of sufficient forces, with reference to type and quality as well as quantity, in the front-line area. In the case of Western Europe this would mean the allied forces in West Germany. What is meant by "sufficient" must be deduced from two criteria: from the opponent's general military capability for aggression, including limited or indirect aggression; and from the demands made on the military command by the political leadership in respect of success, taking into account the time and space factors. Also inherent in the problem of sufficient forces are the questions of how rapidly, and on what scale, redeployment and augmentation can be decided on and put into operation.

(3) For the phase immediately after the outbreak of an armed conflict, one must be aware that the weaker the available forces on the spot are, the lower must be the tactical nuclear threshold — in other words the sooner nuclear weapons must be employed.

On the application of flexible response, I would caution allied governments that fear of escalation is not the same thing as crisis management. The slowing down of escalation for the sake of a supposed gain in time only hands the initiative to the enemy and represents a time loss. If the enemy is ready to act, it is he alone who gains an advantage. Failing acceptance of the three above propositions or, worse still, if they are accepted but not acted upon, the strategy of flexible response, however useful in theory, is in all probability doomed to collapse.

NATO, through military weakness and political erosion — for which the United States and the West European countries are equally responsible — has come very close to the point at which it could offer an irresistible temptation to Moscow. There are dangers which, though not bound to arise, quite certainly *will* arise if we do not take steps to prevent them. I am not by nature a pessimist and have no intention of painting a blacker picture than the facts warrant. But I submit that we must recognize these facts for what they are and not for what we would like them to be.

Potentially, the North Atlantic Alliance is in a position to maintain the defense and security of the NATO allies. I have no doubt that we can defend ourselves successfully if we want to, if the nations and governments are prepared to forgo wishful thinking and self-deception to do whatever is necessary in money, sacrifice and effort. This has nothing to do with stepping up the Cold War, but a lot to do with clearheaded determination. Security on a foundation of adequate strength on the one hand, and a diminution of tension on the other, are not at all contradictory elements, as they are often artificially made to appear; they are complementary components of the one basic objective: a secured peace.

FRENCH MILITARY POLICY AND EUROPEAN FEDERALISM

by Edmond Combaux

IN December 1967 the late General Charles Ailleret defined France's military doctrine as an "All Horizons Defense."[1] His thesis may be summed up in three points:

(1) France can no longer orient her defensive effort in response to one overriding menace, such as the German armies before 1914 or Hitler's *Wehrmacht* in 1939. The danger posed by Stalin's imperialism after the Second World War justified France's membership in NATO and the partial integration of her defensive forces and those of her allies into the NATO Command. However, since the formation of NATO the situation has changed. France has acquired her own nuclear armaments. At the same time, the probability of Soviet aggression has diminished, and NATO's collective defense system has become dangerous to France because of its integrated nature and the excessive influence wielded by the United States. Anxious to reassert control over her defense and ensure her independence, France withdrew from NATO's military commands.

(2) The international system is still characterized by insecurity. Soviet and American nuclear missiles, and within a few years those of China, could intersect in the skies over France. In Asia, Africa and South America, there is risk of war. France must be able to respond to threats from any corner of the earth. The first-generation French strategic nuclear force based on "Mirage" airplanes of limited range could not meet this requirement. Nor can the projected second and third generation French strategic forces meet her needs, even though their power and range will be greater.

(3) General Ailleret concluded that, consequently, France must have, in significant quantities, intercontinental ballistic missiles and an omnidirectional thermonuclear force capable of reaching any point on the earth, and capable of being linked

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[1] Charles Louis Ailleret, "Défense 'dirigée' ou défense 'tous asimuts,' " *Revue de Défense Nationale,* December 1967, pp. 1923-1932; translated and reprinted in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly,* Spring 1968, pp. 17-26.

to a space force when the military utilization of space becomes a reality.

Ailleret's doctrine did not entirely satisfy Frenchmen. Some warned of disproportions in the military structure that would be created by the doctrine, and wondered if the architects of French defense did not fail to recognize the existence of certain subtle equilibria of any human society which are determined by sociology, economy and military science itself and by the relationship between this society and its army.

However, few foresaw that scarcely five months after publication of the doctrine a revolutionary outbreak would paralyze Paris, dramatizing the problems and risks of placing so much emphasis on military power in view of the vulnerability of France's domestic political system to disorder. The events of the spring of 1968 provide the context for a discussion of French defense policy.

NEW DIMENSIONS OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS

The Internal Imbalance of the French "All Horizons Defense" Doctrine

The French Armed Forces Minister, Pierre Messmer, referring to the "All Horizons Defense" policy, wrote: "It is founded on an axiom, i.e., a truth which is self-evident but not demonstrable," the axiom of French independence.[2] From this assumption, he develops the doctrine with perfect logic and clarity. An autonomous defense would obviously be worthless if it could not be exercised under all circumstances, in all forms of conflict. France must possess a force structure armed with all the offensive and defensive instruments that modern technology has created for combat at the various levels of power: guerrilla weapons, conventional weapons, nuclear weapons. The major weapon will be the thermonuclear strategic force, but the doctrine does not belittle the need for other weapons. Beneath the strategic forces are "battle forces" equipped with tactical nuclear weapons capable of offensive operations even outside France's borders. If these battle forces were defeated and French territory occupied, France would have guerrilla forces as a last resort.

No expert could dispute the theoretical bases of such a coherent system. But if France can achieve it, will it lead to a balanced system of defense? While France has just come into possession of an atomic delivery system based on manned aircraft, and exploded her first H-bomb on August 24, 1968 at Fangataufa, the strategic forces for many years have absorbed a large share of military expenditures. As a result, France's battle forces have been reduced to such an extent that they are no longer capable of defending her territory. If NATO cannot provide protection from the East, how can France protect a 700-kilometer border between the North Sea and the Alps with only five divisions? France's internal defense capabilities have also suffered from the paucity of available resources.

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[2] Pierre Messmer, "L'Atome, Caise et Moyen d'une Politique Militaire Autonome," *Revue de Défense Nationale,* March 1968, pp. 395-402.

The French military program is clearly oriented toward the nuclear level and is inspired both by a need for security and a desire for prestige. It enables France to take her place among the greatest in the select club of nuclear powers, to be better heard, and, on the worldwide level, to defend her interests with greater effectiveness. With respect to her partners in the Common Market, the possession of atomic weapons endows France with authority and particular responsibilities which will give her, when she so wishes, an increased influence on the destiny of Europe. But the obvious advantages that France's present military policy provides must not lead her to close her eyes to its inevitable disadvantages and difficulties. Vigilance is all the more necessary since the "All Horizons Defense" doctrine is presented as an extension of existing nuclear policy.

To move from a defense posture of continental-range nuclear weapons to the development, within a few years, of planetary weapons and later to space forces will require a considerable increase in the effort devoted to nuclear armament. The inevitable result will be to reduce French capabilities at the battle force and interior defense levels as a proportion of total defense. A greater distortion would be introduced into France's military organization.

In their desire to defend the priority given strategic forces, certain strategists seek to minimize the difficulties inherent in the "All Horizons" doctrine. Modern warfare, they argue, will no longer be fought with large forces. Rather, it will involve equipment and weapons so complicated and so costly that they will have to be entrusted to professional soldiers. Hence, they call for a small army of specialists. The nuclear weapons that would be used would be so destructive that a conflict would be over quickly. It would no longer be necessary to keep forces on the battlefield for a long time, to call up numerous reserve units, and to mobilize industry. In brief, the prospect of short wars, fought without many soldiers, justifies the "All Horizons Defense" doctrine.

The Vision of a Disembodied War

Not a few French military specialists attach reservations to these theses. First of all, they are not based on experience. How could it be otherwise? Nuclear weapons have not been used for the simple reason that, because of their excessive power and range, they are as poorly adapted to the conflicts of our age as the torpedo and rifled artillery would have been to the wars of the Middle Ages.

Second, the proponents of "All Horizons Defense" generally overestimate the security that the simple possession of nuclear weapons can confer on a power. There are differing degrees of nuclear deterrence capability. In almost all circumstances it can exclude nuclear combat but it cannot prevent other forms of war. If one were to offer to two armies, on the point of fighting, weapons so terrifying that all their fighting men would flee, would not they reject them and settle their quarrels with other arms?

Finally, in modern warfare it is not only armies that fight. There is also public opinion. Most students of nuclear strategy neglect the social phenomena which are basic to the conflicts of our era. The purely material data introduced into their calculations do not take sufficiently into account either the psychology of people who are more and more "sensitized" by modern means of information, or the close relationships which are established at a time of great strain between populations and their governments.

For these reasons, nuclear strategy has been elaborated in an atmosphere of unreality. But blame does not rest solely with the authors of strategic doctrine. Nuclear weapons represent a tremendous leap ahead in military evolution; their total integration into a rational art of war is impossible in our day. Such integration can be brought about only by changes in human behavior. Perhaps, because they are unable to imagine the social, political and economic conditions under which future generations will live, our experts are irresistibly led to excluding this important variable from their calculations. Whereas the news media report to us about peoples around the world who are shaken by the most violent and profound revolutionary currents and are engaged in seemingly interminable conflicts, strategists find the problems of construction and use of nuclear and thermonuclear arms more fascinating and are concerned with the mathematics of a war based on advanced technology.

Indeed, is not the strategists' future war, which some think of as a princely game, devoid of reality? How many times during the great crises of the Cold War have we been warned that the triggering of the nuclear apocalypse depended on the whims of a few Heads of State? They hold control over great strategic forces and are the silent and secret masters of their unleashing. We are given the impression that they are demiurges taking risks for the destiny of their people, that they will gamble with the life of entire nations, as in a poker game, by rules which are codified by the subtle dialecticians of nuclear deterrence. These dialecticians do not hesitate to imagine the role that bluff plays in this macabre exercise. To raise the value of their stakes, the second-rank powers would declare that at the slightest indication of aggression, their nuclear weapons would be brought into play—not against armies too spread out and insufficiently vulnerable, but rather against cities, especially the largest ones with their great civilian populations as hostage.

We must dismiss such theories. They neglect the fact that the Heads of State of nuclear powers are not ordinary gamblers free to indulge their passions and capable of abandoning themselves to irresponsible impulses. Attached to their nations, they do not take lightly their duty to translate faithfully by their acts the will of their people. These theories also have a pernicious effect on public opinion. In modern states, national defense is based on the consensus of citizens. The concepts inspiring it must be understandable and acceptable by the vast majority. The "All Horizons Defense" doctrine cannot escape this law; it must be reconciled with the rule of reason.

The Aristocratic and Democratic Concepts of Defense

There is one well-established fact: Those in charge of the security of France, attentive to the somber reality of our times, cannot forgo commitment to planetary armaments and the conquest of space. The "All Horizons Defense" doctrine springs from this affirmation. But another fact, generally misunderstood but just as important, compels recognition: The advent of nuclear warhead missiles has changed the world balance and created social and political transformations which must be understood and mastered.

The implications for France's defense policy are profound. They relate to both technology and sociology. Let us consider, for example, the balance between the strategic forces on one hand and the battle forces and internal defense units on the other. Technology governs the former; the human factor is preponderant in the latter. The ratio of one to the other raises a fundamental problem of the science of war.

Historically, there have been two sources of armies: aristocratic and democratic. According to the aristocratic concept, the army is created by the prince. It is a professional army used to keep domestic order and to wage war outside. Military power resides in the specialized war apparatus. The people have only a small part in military affairs. This is the direction in which we might be led by giving a greater priority to strategic weapons.

According to the democratic concept, the army is raised by the people themselves. Military power arises from the nation. The primary defense measure consists in arming the greatest possible number of citizens by giving them simple weapons. They receive more powerful arms as soon as the arsenals can provide them. The power of such armies increases by stages: machine guns, bazookas, mortars, cannons, tanks, batteries of rockets, aircraft and missiles. In this pyramid of arms, which is capped with thermonuclear bombs, each nation goes as far as it can, depending on its wealth and industrial capacity. Thus, no democracy could, without the risk of detaching the army from the people, build its military system like an upside-down house. The nuclear panoply has little value when there is nothing underneath it but a small army and a people resigned to entrusting its defense to a few pyrotechnists of the atom.

We may illustrate this defense concept by an example that evokes the memory of Carnot, one of the most skillful military engineers of his time. Although no one knew advanced weaponry such as the model 1777 rifle and Gribeauval artillery better than he, he went before the National Assembly when France faced great danger in 1792 to ask for simple armaments, for pikes, because "The pike is in a way the arm of freedom . . . because finally they are not very costly and can be made quickly." And he added, "Moreover, there do not exist at the present time in France and cannot exist for a long time yet, enough fire-arms for all the citizens to be equipped with them."

The military experts of the period were undoubtedly indignant about the decree of August 1, 1792, drawn up by Carnot for the manufacture of pikes. If they had had computers, they would have proven that one hundred thousand pikes were not as effective as a few thousand rifles supported by a few cannons. But they would not have been able to calculate the magic quality of the appeal of pikes to the people, to the conquerers of the Bastille, to those who had lived through the great days of the Revolution, to the *sans-culottes* who later, better equipped, were to confront all the European armies.

By contrasting the aristocratic and democratic concepts, we do not mean to choose one and reject the other. As a matter of fact, they complement each other in modern defense systems. Two phenomena combine to favor the evolution of large armies. Inherent in the development of strategic forces are such features as the long-range trajectory, giant bomb and space combat, together with large industrial and political concentrations. At the same time, advances in communications technology provide the means to mobilize larger popular forces for combat.

Thus, the professional army and the people's army, because of the modern conditions of development of societies, are indissolubly bound together. If this is the case, the higher the pyramids of weapons crowned with nuclear missiles, the larger must be the base with its armies or coalitions of armies. Our conclusion is that great strategic weapons capabilities cannot be undergirded by small armies.

The Influence of Atomic Weapons on National Power

For political, economic and military reasons, one can argue that the more powerful the weapons and the wider their range, the greater should be the population, territory and wealth of the nations building them and threatening to use them.

Civilized nations do not go to war for the purpose of annihilating people but rather to settle by force differences that diplomacy cannot resolve and to restore a peace which permits their common survival. As a result, there is a certain proportionality between the deterrence value of the threats that a nuclear power can hold over its adversaries and the importance of a wide spectrum of capabilities which it disposes to sustain combat and absorb the adversary's blows. Security in the nuclear age must be founded on the immense resources of the nation and its space.

A certain equilibrium must be struck between the effort and the resources the people devote to constructive works in peacetime and those they are willing to reserve to war. The more potentially disastrous the war, the more essential it is to go to war only if an immense production apparatus and enormous resources accumulated in peacetime are available. This assertion contradicts the notion that nuclear weapons will shorten wars. Indeed, they may lengthen them since the fear of nuclear war, with the limited war, may heighten the conflict. Later, when the political and social transformations demanded by the nuclear age are completed, it is by no means certain that the wars of the twenty-first century will be of short duration—especially if they are waged between nations or federations of nations or alliances capable, by virtue of their size, power and advanced defense technologies, of resisting the assault of nuclear missiles for a long time. Only large concentrations of economic and industrial power could cope with the challenges of a world in which there are space forces and planetary armaments.

It is not sufficient to develop the biggest bombs and rockets with the longest trajectories. Such weapons must be integrated into a coherent defense system. Some have reasoned: "Planetary weapons and All Horizons Defense? Why not? Vauban fortified all the frontiers of the Kingdom." This is true, but Vauban also took care to adapt the fortifications and the arms of his time to the terrain in which they were to be used.

Defensive strategy has been subject to many transformations throughout the ages: the fortified castles of the Middle Ages, with lookouts in their towers, Vauban's fortified cities, the polygonal plans of Cormontaigne and Montalembert with their long-range artillery casemates, the vast entrenched camps of 1870 in which an army could find refuge, the even more extensive fortified regions of Séré de Rivières, the continuous fronts of 1914-1918, and the Maginot and Siegfried lines of 1939. In our time, air interception forces and batteries of ground-to-air missiles associated with the air-ground battle corps are designed to ensure the inviolability of borders and of national air space; strategic forces with observation satellites, huge radar chains, and intercontinental rockets launched from the ground or by submarines can strike the distant bases of the enemy. But, in the end, a law remains constant through all these changes: The range of the arms always determines the radius of the fortresses or the size of fortified areas. Any state which claims an independent defense must have militarily secure terrain on which its armies can maneuver, and refuge and storage areas where a part of its population may work and live in safety from the blows of the enemy. For this reason, the great nuclear powers attempt to extend their influence around them, to impose it by force if necessary (as in the case of Czechoslovakia), to create vast alliances so that their external defense lines are located far from the home base and at a distance proportionate, if possible, to the range of enemy batteries. They seek to erect defenses impenetrable by rockets and to install, around all sensitive points, active and passive means of protection, at great cost to themselves. The gigantic outlays made by the United States and the Soviet Union for the creation of anti-missile defense systems, as imperfect as they are at the present time, are only the most recent responses to an old strategic need.

These remarks do not at all diminish the importance to France of progress in military technology and the need for French scientists to advance as far as possible along the road toward planetary weapons. But they underscore the fact that it is not sufficient for France to possess rockets of intercontinental range. Moreover, it is essential to recognize the environment in which these weapons operate and the limitations of their use. They will have value only if they are part of a coherent defense system. Because the dimensions of the system greatly exceed the capabilities of our nation, the need for a permanent defense association between France and her neighbors is inescapable.

If the architects of the "All Horizons Defense" doctrine were to put this matter of European cooperation into the background, their plans would be an absurd mixture of archaism and futurism, an illusory attempt to paste a veneer of tomorrow's revolutionary arms onto a military policy whose style and inspiration would remain attached to the past. The time is over when France's military architects could find space for her fortifications and arms inside the natural boundaries that Richelieu conceived. A strategy which bases the future security of France on a few rockets of intercontinental range located in the middle of our little national domain will be inadequate. Sooner or later, France must develop with her neighbors a greater defense establishment. To go beyond her boundaries or to decline are the alternatives for her.

DOMESTIC ORDER AND EUROPEAN FEDERALISM

Defense Policy and Domestic Order

If the will to fight is the essential precondition for any military power, France's defense policy cannot be based only on calculations of the range and power of her nuclear missiles and the number of her divisions. It must also consider the French people themselves, their attitudes and goals, and the impatience and anger created by obstacles to their most profound aspirations. Furthermore, *in the future* France must associate her defense efforts with those of her nearest neighbors, consider their feelings and problems, and find the common bonds and common destiny that would unite them.

To widen a nation's frontiers in order to protect its people in a world threatened with a nuclear apocalypse is much more than a material problem. It is a moral problem and the principal one of our time. We are entering a world where man must dominate colossal forces which at any moment could crush him and destroy vast regions of the globe. Computers endow us with superhuman powers of analysis, calculation and synthesis. Modern science puts us into direct contact with the infinitely distant, the infinitely large, the infinitely small. The technology of space opens roads to the conquest of outer space.

We seek to move toward this future without knowing how to get there. We are burdened with obstacles and contradictions resulting from our inability to adapt to the existing political, economic and social structures. These contradictions that threaten our liberty, happiness, prosperity and internal and external security concern the relations between the individual and society, labor and capital, states and federations of states, the beneficent science of men and the science which produces lethal weapons.

To create a harmonious society which reconciles economic planning with liberty and justice, local and regional freedom with the wisely measured prerogatives of central power, supranational requirements and the will of each people to conserve the immaterial heritage of its language, customs, traditions, institutions and soul, is an almost superhuman task—rendered all the more difficult by destructive forces of turbulence, violence, nihilism, adventurism and anarchy loose in our world.

As always, at all the perilous turning-points in history, the young generation is the most susceptible to the seductions of disorder. This generation was born at the end of World War II. The demographic explosion in France which followed the war swelled its number. A singular force animates it, namely, a "bellicose" impulse overflowing with vitality. Youth would like nothing better than to go out in quest of new frontiers, guided by a grand civilizing ideal. Since it does not see any prospect for such adventure, it strains to break the bars of its cage to launch a revolution or crusade, like the young "madmen" of 1789 who threw themselves, with the same wholeheartedness, into the idyllic Revolution which Jean-Jacques Rousseau prophesied, then into the Civil War and the Terror, ending in the hecatombs of the Napoleonic Wars.

How have we prepared for this torrent? We have a France cut off from her ex-colonies, Algerian departments and overseas enterprises; a France that possesses so many gifts and so many talented people who might contribute to the birth of a united Europe but which seems to be disillusioned about the prospects for progress toward the joint development of social, judicial, military and political institutions; a France whose imagination risks being slowly smothered for lack of space. Thus, we have recently had the spectacle of a part of our youth removing paving stones for building barricades and dreaming of the most violent acts of subversion. If this youth were one day to yield completely to the demon of adventure; if national cohesion were to dissolve into great domestic quarrels; if the psychosis of disorder were to spread to our neighbors and allies; if Slavic imperialism, menaced in its turn by the contagion of anarchy, were to throw itself into the Western void thus created, what would become of our elaborate external defenses and what would become of France and Free Europe?

Strategy and the Limits of French Independence

Under the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Western Europe has already begun to be built under our eyes. France has participated in the creation of the Common Market which has broadened our economic space. The admission of the other states, and especially Britain, would benefit the European Community. But political and military evolution have not proceeded at the same pace. Certainly, the maintenance of French troops in Germany proves abundantly that in spite of France's withdrawal from NATO and her claims of independence, she cannot exclude the European Community from her defense plans. But the temporary character of NATO, the imprecision of its obligations, the failure of the first European Defense Community leave unsolved the problem of the progressive widening of France's strategic space. This strategic space is today dominated by the United States and the fragility of our structures is such that it would be Soviet tomorrow were the United States to withdraw its support from Western Europe.

To strengthen the prospects for an independent European strategy that is not purely illusory, it will be essential to return to the idea of a federal or confederal Europe which could eventually assume responsibility for defense. Will European federalism, depicted as Utopian today for reasons of political divergencies, become tomorrow for strategic reasons an absolute necessity? Or is it vain to discuss such a question at the European political level since such a federation does not exist even in embryonic form? Is it not futile to examine such a matter within a strictly French context since France's prevailing defense policy calls for total independence and rejects any idea of permanent military interdependence? Many Frenchmen believe that changes in technology will make European federation a more and more urgent proposition.

Perhaps it is in the nature of things that, during periods of great change, policy gradually loses its power to embrace reality because it floats like a phantom between the decrepit present and the powerless structures of the future. In these periods when the people are disoriented, strategy must be altered. It is usually subordinated to policy, limited to the function of directing the action of the various elements of material and moral force to enable the nation to reach the goals set by policymakers. But in the exceptional situations in which policy remains committed to the goals of the past, in an impasse from which it has no issue, strategy must change the means and the ends by examining the policy itself. Let us submit to strategic thought the problem of the adaptation of our society and our security to the demands of the modern age.

Strategy is not lacking in analogy with the cyberneticist's black-box. The hermetically sealed box is filled with numerous invisible and complicated mechanisms of which the cyberneticist knows nothing concerning their layout and interconnections. Only certain inputs and outputs are accessible. The inputs are the levers or the buttons on which the cyberneticist can work. The outputs are the terminals to which he has connected, for instance, the measuring instruments used to observe the result of his manipulations. The whole problem for him is to discover the usable properties of the contents of this mysterious box, e.g., by what combination of manipulations on different levers it could be of use to him. The burglar does the same thing when he tries all sorts of keys and combinations to open a safe. The child does the same thing when, ignoring the lock-and-key mechanism, he learns to open the door by turning the knob. The difficulty for the strategist lies in the fact that modern sociological systems on which he exercises his art are presented to him as large black-boxes endowed with an ever increasing number of inputs and outputs. All the art resides in discovering the combinations of levers and manipulations which will enable him to obtain the desired effects.

For centuries, since France has been France, the central concept of her strategy has naturally been that of a sovereign France, totally independent of her neighbors, fighting against some and allying herself with others, depending on the circumstances and the interests of the moment. This simple key has been used frequently, and to it France owes her greatness and her glory. But we must learn to recognize that, because of the enormous upheavals of our age, strict French independence is no longer an adequate postulate except in well-defined fields, and there are many fields in which it is no longer capable of unlocking the doors to the future.

A totally independent French strategy would have little power over the contradictions raised by the disordered world surrounding us. It would suggest to us, for instance, that such problems should be solved one by one. Under her strategy, France would oppose the superpowers whose colossal nuclear power compels them to share in the management of the world. France would revolt against the schism dividing Western Europe and the communist bloc and would strive for the impossible marriage of the two ideologies. Of what use would it be? France might reap a small applause, but success is hardly likely to crown these noble undertakings.

To enter the future, France must have another strategy which transcends politics and opens new roads. This strategy must discover, among the infinitely complex contradictions surrounding us, the one that is the principal contradiction, that plays the dominant role. This contradiction is the one in which the nation-states oppose and divide the European community, as in former times the feudal system divided the kingdom of France. We must be sure, first of all, that we can resolve this problem. Having done this, we will have no trouble in reducing the others.

To defend her national heritage, the richness of her civilization, language, culture, and influence in the world, France must defend her freedom and independence, but she must also work with all her strength to establish a broadened political and military space in which her Common Market partners can take their place and which will later be extended to all of Western Europe.

In this way the Atlantic Alliance will find a new equilibrium. Europe will be better able to resist the pressures that the Soviet-American duel exerts on the Old World. Europe will be able to show what a federal power must be in our day—democratic and liberal, preoccupied with safeguarding the general interests of its people, eager to develop their various cultures and promote their spiritual and material enrichment by cooperation and sharing, and respectful of their local, regional and national liberties. For the construction of the future society, a federal Europe would have the opportunity to liberate the productive forces from their artificial restraints, and stimulate industry, commerce, agriculture and art. Europe could contribute to a scientific renaissance by increasing responsibilities and programs of private and state laboratories, national or federal, which work toward the development of the most advanced technologies: physics, nuclear energy, electronics, biology and the conquest of space.

European Federation and "All Horizons Defense"

The federative movement will encounter vigorous opposition. Some will declare as heretic the introduction of the smallest grain of supranationality into a field they consider "reserved": the foreign and the military policies of France. What reason would we have to refuse supranationalism in these areas when we find it acceptable and necessary in the economic field, which is just as important to France? Others will warn that the creation of a West European Federation would lead us to national obscurity. On the contrary, such a Federation would provide the opportunity for an outpouring of the French spirit determined to make its mark on the Europe of tomorrow.

A European unification strategy is the necessary accompaniment of a defense policy which provides for the acquisition of planetary weapons. Neither France, Britain, Italy, Germany nor the Benelux countries can build a coherent defense system if they remain separate. In the case of Germany, the limitations of sovereignty inherent in the prohibition against her possession of atomic weapons can, in the long run, undermine national morale and alter policy. The solitary and independent French atomic effort, indefinitely prolonged, will introduce into France's defense a distortion which might eventually become prejudicial to her political, military, scientific and industrial equilibrium. It will be destructive of France's political equilibrium because too narrow a nationalism is likely to prove inadequate to the needs of the new generation for participation in great causes. It will be destructive of France's military equilibrium because no modern defense system can be confined to her national territory. It will be destructive of France's scientific equilibrium because her scientists cannot direct too great a part of their efforts toward military research without neglecting the important social dimensions. It will be destructive of France's industrial equilibrium because the principal task of industry is to manufacture useful products and to supply markets, not to exhaust the best of its resources in the building of colossal arms and nonproductive equipment.

But, having cited all these reasons in opposition to the "All Horizons Defense" doctrine, I do not reject the whole of it. In the evolution of armament techniques, it may become the common defense doctrine for Western Europe. It is more and more difficult to speak of independent strategies for the nations of Western Europe, yet they will find meaning if they are integrated within a broadened federal strategy. Such a development will obviously call for fusion of interest among the federated nations and agreement on common foreign policies.

Of major importance is the question of relations with the Soviet Union. This question must be settled at the European level and in harmony with the United States, since the particular response of one West European country given without the agreement of its partners would have little influence. The constraints that the Soviet political system and its nuclear power impose on the Soviet Union must not be taken lightly. The brutality with which the Red Army repressed the Czechoslovakian movement toward greater freedom demonstrates the limits of Soviet maneuverability. It also illustrates the limitations of Western propaganda in producing a thaw in the Soviet bloc.

The same wisdom must inspire relations between Western Europe and its great American ally. The spring 1968 unrest in the Latin Quarter, during which the people of France viewed with alarm the pro-Russian and pro-Chinese commandos arguing about leading roles in the insurrectional agitation, revealed the fragility of France's defenses against subversion. Let us not forget that Atlantic solidarity remains a rampart against Slavic imperialism. Let us know how to profit from the protection it gives France to organize the union of free people of Europe and to lay down the foundations of an independent European strategy.

And, especially, France should not turn her back on American friendship.

CONCLUSION

At the end of this analysis, several conclusions may be drawn. The "All Horizons Defense" doctrine is based essentially on two ideas: (1) the necessity of extending the development of nuclear weapons to intercontinental ballistic missiles and to the conquest of space; and (2) the political affirmation of the French will to survive in an increasingly dangerous world, in which the security and the independence of France must be based on the possession of the most powerful and advanced arms.

This doctrine is logically coherent. It can guide France's military policy for the immediate future provided that: (1) the effort to equip our strategic forces does not introduce excessive distortions in our military organization and does not harm the social and economic equilibrium of the nation; and (2) France resists the temptation to justify the priority given to nuclear armament by overly "mechanistic" theories of modern warfare.

Over the longer term, new necessities will intervene, the first of which is born from military science, the second from sociology: (1) France's strategic space must be enlarged. The development of planetary weapons will change the existing equilibrium of states. France will not have the capability to create a modern defense system. Future French planetary weapons will have no value if they do not take their place in an organization associating France's armies with those of the European Community and, if possible, all the forces of Free Europe. (2) The correlative need exists to broaden France's political space. Internal defense, from which military science cannot be abstracted, requires an adaptation to the new conditions of France's political, economic and social structure. Such a task can only be undertaken successfully within a European framework.

In Europe, opposition to federalizing tendencies has been voiced. National leaders appear powerless to take steps toward supranationality. In face of this failure, the forces of disorder see inviting prospects for submerging Europe. In such circumstances, strategy must transcend politics. It can intervene to show the new roads which we must resolutely follow and the errors we must not commit. The foundations of a West European Federation must be laid before a realistic "All Horizons Defense" system can be erected.

WESTERN EUROPE: SECURITY THROUGH INTEGRATION

by F. O. Miksche

SINCE France has pulled out of NATO's military command structure, a weariness manifests itself more and more in the heart of the Atlantic Alliance. Some statesmen continue to emphasize in forceful tones the solidarity of the Western world and avow that they will make it more credible in future years. But the ardor with which they return to such declarations appears to be more a sign of doubt than proof of their conviction. While France, in the vain hope of re-establishing her military sovereignty, continues to build atomic weapons, none of the European member-states of NATO is prepared to consent to sufficient sacrifices for Europe's defense.

Nevertheless, it was to be expected that speeches on détente would provoke psychological disarmament within NATO. In addition, the supposition was incorrect, despite arguments advanced in the 1950's, that in the nuclear age conventional forces had ceased to play an important role. Under these conditions the governments of Western Europe had little incentive to show enthusiasm for investing considerable funds in "outmoded divisions" or for creating the necessary conditions for mobilizing reserve forces. They gradually became accustomed to the idea of placing themselves under the protection of the Americans, and with the passage of time they recognized this state of things as normal. After all, why should the European states of NATO have to rearm? The United States, the principal power of the Atlantic world, was engaged in serious negotiations on disarmament. It is not only the Europeans' fault that Western Europe remained insufficiently armed.

The disturbing element in this development is that there is no proof of the good will of the Soviets to make a serious effort to resolve their political disputes with the West, whether on the Berlin question, German reunification or the normalization of relations with the countries of the East. The Czechoslovak crisis has demonstrated that, today as yesterday, Moscow's attitude remains inflexible on all questions which since 1945 have provoked East-West tensions. Meanwhile, the Soviets pursue diligently their political infiltration of the Middle East, while Asia and Africa are increasingly shaken by troubles. The world offers the spectacle of growing confusion; everywhere there are manifestations of revolutionary upheaval.

On the plane of world politics the Soviet music of pacifism is only the accompaniment of the left hand: it is the right hand that plays the melody. Confronting Europe, the Soviets' chief objective is the disruption of the Western camp. The Kremlin's thought is simple: While détente provides Moscow with an indirect strategy of great scope for political action, the West, by recognizing the status quo, renounces any policy that would have the goal of fighting the "peaceful" expansion of communism. In effect, Moscow's foreign policy is the instrument of Soviet Pan-Slavic expansion which has created its own "ethics." What serves these aims is good, what contradicts them is bad. From the communist point of view, "the struggle for peace" is identical with the policy of the Soviet government. While following a peace policy in accordance with its ideology, Moscow regards any attitude hostile to its interests as dangerous to peace.

One would be deluding oneself by denying that communist propaganda has already succeeded in undermining the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance. That can be demonstrated, above all, in the tendency of Western governments to pursue, as much toward each other as toward the Soviet Union, a "flexible policy," in which France excels; in other words, they are attempting to maneuver individually without realizing that for the Soviet Union they can scarcely be valuable intermediaries. They fail to perceive how much they aid Moscow's game of "divide and rule"—the Soviet tactic of deepening old cleavages and creating new divisions in the Western world.

NATO AND EUROPE

While Moscow uses the Warsaw Pact not only as a powerful instrument against NATO but also for dominating its own allies, the Atlantic Alliance does not grant protection except in the improbable event that there will be direct military aggression by one or several powers from the East. Most people identify West European security with a line—the Iron Curtain—which in case of aggression would be held in a mobile or fixed way with or without the use of nuclear weapons. However, what the West must defend by mobile means are not battle lines so much as political and economic policies dealing with affairs generally outside the geographical limits of the alliance. In the age of global struggle limiting the geographic area of Western unity and collaboration only invites the Russians to bring pressure to bear by means of a political offensive toward regions beyond the perimeter of the alliance. Without a common global strategy, which must rest on cooperation, the West cannot surmount the crises that will develop during the years to come.

This appears all the more important because in our age of abiding conflicts between ideologies, civilizations and races, the traditional distinction made between the state of war and the state of peace has become outmoded. In effect, the nuclear balance of terror has given birth to new forms of war which manifest themselves as domestic revolutions, even when they are provoked and conducted by a foreign power. The camouflaged aggression in an internal conflict makes it thus legally unassailable. Revolutionary war offers fewer political risks and, at the least cost, the maximum chance of success. The extinction of these "tinderboxes" fed subversively from the outside forces one to take the responsibility for eventually expanding the crisis; on the other hand, inaction is equivalent to capitulation, which does not even exclude the danger of having to take up the struggle several years later under less favorable conditions.

Subversion benefits from the policy of détente which characterizes the West's current attitude and whose root is the fear of increasing tension. Surely, the Soviets also are trying to avoid a military confrontation and it is not unreasonable to believe that they have never seriously considered launching a war of conquest. Why would they try to cross the Elbe by force when other less dangerous routes are open to them to attain their political objectives? The custom of miscalculating the Soviet threat in Western Europe as one of essentially conventional military aggression is widespread, yet it has led the West to commit numerous errors in the political and strategic realms.

Cold War or Hot Politics

What has been called the Cold War is a simplified expression designating a "hot policy" on Moscow's part. Although it is believed that the Cold War has ended, the basic options of the Soviet Union in world problems have hardly been modified. Today as before, the Kremlin searches for a decisive victory in the rivalry between East and West, certainly not by using military means but rather by outmaneuvering the enemy, forcing him to retreat through a series of partial surrenders. The recipe for this "salami tactic" is by no means new. In 1856 Karl Marx wrote in the *New York Tribune:* "Counting on the cowardice of the European Courts [today one would say the Western powers], Russia rattles the sabre in the scabbard and raises arbitrary demands as much as possible in order afterwards to appear more modest while satisfying itself generously with the realization of its nearest ends." With substantial success the Soviets exploit the weaker nerves of their Western adversaries, an art in which they are past masters.

This "hot policy" (in order not to use the overworked expression Cold War), with variations in nuance—the relaxing of its intensity on this or that sector of the front followed by new tensions in other theaters of the global operation—is really one permanent conflict between two antagonistic worlds. The different transformations of power relations to which this confrontation of more or less camouflaged forces leads will some day appear to future historians as one worldwide revolution.

While the West, imprisoned in its theory of passive deterrence, renounces a priori anything more than a status quo resistance, Moscow disposes of an offensive military system. The real task of this force buildup consists neither in dissuading potential adversaries from launching an attack against the Soviet Union (for which fewer forces would suffice), nor in attacking the West, but is solely to hold the countries of NATO under paralyzing pressure and hence to guarantee offensive mobility to Soviet policy. The objective of Soviet strategy is not to smash resistance by force, but to neutralize beforehand any policies contrary to Moscow's interests.

In case of grave crisis the Kremlin masters, aware of their absolute superiority in conventional forces, can declare that they do not intend to use nuclear arms except in response to a nuclear attack, while the West, because of its lack of conventional forces, is forced to envisage desperate recourse to suicidal nuclear arms as the only alternative to political surrender. This situation, which leaves to Moscow's "hot policy" a broad field for maneuver, has become a dominating factor in relations between East and West. It permits the Soviets to measure the effect of each one of their moves on the chessboard in such a way that no one could justify a Western reaction which could only be nuclear.

The contrast between the military structure of the East and of the West is striking. In the East, nuclear arms serve only as a cover for conventional arms and not as the principal means of combat. The opposite is true in the West. Moscow's military system is intended to sustain the "hot policy" of the Kremlin, while the deterrence theory of the West is too rigid and passive to offer an effective graduated resistance to Eastern pressure. It is capable of being politically efficacious only in periods of tension.

With only nuclear arms, the West can neither make war nor maintain peace but simply opens wide the doors to chaotic evolution in the world. Declarations according to which the use of nuclear weapons would be inevitable even in the case of conventional aggression are irresponsible. Why try to kill a fly with a hammer? This is why the celebrated theory of nuclear deterrence is unconvincing. It implies the renunciation of an active policy and leads necessarily to the loss of initiative without which one can have no mobile policy, thus no prospect for success.

The urgent question posed for the West is not how a future war must be conducted—employing nuclear weapons or conventional forces, determining the length of a stabilized front, or employing a flexible strategy. What is decisive is to develop a politically usable strategy, a military system whose structure responds swiftly to the action of the adversary. One cannot devise a workable war doctrine independently from that of the potential enemy or effect countermeasures without having taken into account his strategy. Whoever tries to do this risks creating a military system incapable of responding to dangers resulting from political evolution.

If the West does not radically modify its present military system, it will die a nuclear death—even if no bomb explodes—victim of a nuclear paralysis which immobilizes it on the political level. In effect, nuclear deterrence, the defense of peace by terror, is only a paradoxical gamble founded on the "impossibility of the possible." The fact that one possesses more nuclear bombs than the adversary cannot compensate in negotiations for the lack of conventional forces. It is a matter of being able to dissuade the adversary by subtle means at different levels. A politically valid strategy cannot be formulated without a military establishment sufficiently strong in conventional troops supported by an arsenal of nuclear arms.

Military Conditions for West European Security

Europe is exposed to two closely associated dangers: (1) the threat of outflanking by political infiltration and subversive actions, above all in the countries of the Mediterranean basin; (2) frontal pressure from Pan-Slavic communism between the Baltic and the Adriatic seas.

One should have no illusions: these two dangers will keep us in suspense during the 1970's. According to the rules of classical strategy, the Soviets are combining frontal pressure on Western Europe with encirclement from the south. The principal task of a West European strategy will not be defense against an unprovoked aggression in Europe, but the ability to master crises in the Arab world, in Africa or elsewhere. Our destiny will be decided between the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Evidently, the Soviets will act by threats if their plans are thwarted. Tensions that arise outside Europe will have repercussions in the European theater. Unless Western Europe is protected by a sufficiently strong conventional shield, the Soviets will be in a position to extract concession on concession by applying pressure between the Baltic and the Alps.

Before it can master crises without being faced with the alternative of launching an atomic war or surrendering, Western Europe must possess: (1) Military forces for intervention, designed to defend its interests in regions outside the geographical zone of the Atlantic Alliance (the sword). (2) A defense system powerful enough to counterbalance, on the political and military plane, direct pressure from Moscow in Europe, so that it does not have to brandish nuclear threats (the shield). (3) Nuclear forces *of its own* to cover the sword and shield, and deter the adversary from using his nuclear forces.

A useful shield requires at least sixty divisions in order to protect the 1,300 kilometers of front between the Baltic and the Alps. The objection that such an increase in conventional forces would necessitate economically unfeasible changes does not stand up to thorough examination. In Switzerland, a state of six million inhabitants, the Swiss Army, when fully mobilized in wartime, comprises fifteen divisions. This example, and that of Sweden — which can muster, from a population of eight million, 670,000 well-equipped men, together with the most highly developed civil defense system in the West — prove that even in modern industrial societies it is possible to build an efficient military organization, if one acts logically and systematically. Western Europe should not attempt to increase the means devoted to national defense or draw away from the economy indispensable manpower, but to create a military system using more rationally its present level of resources. Integration on a European scale of the production of war matériel would lead to the needed standardization of equipment and to large-scale production that would reduce costs. The integration of armaments industries is the *sine qua non* of a serious European military policy.

Without the Americans and the British, the land forces of the countries with the most direct interest in West European defense, i.e., the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Benelux and Denmark, have a total of nearly a million men under arms. The number of reservists is in the order of two million in France and about one million in West Germany. This is many more than would be needed to mobilize twenty armored divisions and forty infantry divisions, provided these forces were integrated. In peacetime, armored units could be maintained at 75 per cent and infantry units at 50 per cent of their strength; the sixty divisions, with general staffs of different ranks, special troops and a general reserve would total 900,000 men. Such a reorganization of European land forces in NATO would allow effectives to be increased by 100 per cent in case of crisis.

What purpose does it serve to call groups to arms each year and to train them at great expense, without having an adequate conception of their proper use before they are needed in a crisis? Some object that a European war will begin inevitably by sudden aggression, and because there will not be time to mobilize reserves, only those troops under arms will be fully effective. This argument does not hold up under scrutiny. The question whether mobilization is possible depends above all on the unforeseeable political circumstances that would precede the opening of hostilities. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was accomplished in several hours, but military preparations and the deployment of Soviet troops were underway for several weeks and did not go unobserved. In the future, similar situations can occur and are even more probable.

The return in Europe to a classical strategy of mobilization would be incomparably more realistic than the idea of an air bridge. Especially in the case of crises which slowly escalated to more serious levels, a President of the United States would surely find it more risky to send troops across the Atlantic than to place on alert units stationed on the European continent. The Soviets would certainly have greater respect for U.S. divisions based in

Europe than for forces which would have to be moved. Those who know Soviet leaders realize they would take any reduction of American troops as a sign of disinterest by the United States in Europe, and infer from it Washington's hesitation to send reinforcements to the Continent.

Naturally the maintenance of an expeditionary force somewhere in Virginia would cost the United States less than stationing the Seventh Army in Western Europe. But would this force earmarked for Europe remain effective and available? Given existing and likely future tensions in Asia, the major part of these forces would probably find themselves quickly engaged farther afield. And what would happen if the United States believed itself obliged in case of a crisis in Greece or Turkey — countries covered by the Atlantic Alliance — to send troops to this theater that were destined originally for the defense of Western Europe?

In the event air transport of troops did not begin until after the opening of hostilities, some military experts believe that circumstances would prevent mobilization in the old sense of the word in Europe. The enemy would probably have destroyed numerous airports, and American troops would have to make risky landings, raising the danger that the whole operation would collapse. The project of an air bridge between America and Europe is subject to more drawbacks than the procedure of mobilization.

No Security Without Integration

Whatever objections these ideas provoke at the first hearing, the necessity of forming a European defense community, internally balanced and integrated, is evident. In our epoch, it is no longer possible to have a strictly national military policy. Without integration it has become impossible to oppose an efficient counterbalance to the Soviet Union. We are far from achieving this goal. Since General de Gaulle shut the door on NATO, a process of disintegration has taken place inside NATO. Without France, European defense is reduced to peripheral positions incapable of supporting any fallback position. In effect, this defense would break down into two isolated zones: the North, comprising Norway, Denmark, England and Germany, and the Mediterranean, with Italy, Greece and Turkey. Supplies for the main front between the Baltic Sea and the Alps can only pass through Great Britain and the Benelux countries so long as the ports of Le Havre, Brest, Nantes, Rouan, Bordeaux, Marseilles and Toulon are not available. An efficient Western strategy depends above all on close Franco-German cooperation.

The Federal Republic forms the essential forward position for the defense of France, while France constitutes the indispensable defense-in-depth for Germany. Without France, West European strategy loses coherence. The biggest trump in General de Gaulle's hand was the geographical position of his country, a trump which was insufficient to win over the other allies' cards. Paris can certainly prevent the building of an efficacious defense for Western Europe but cannot, despite its nuclear force, alone ensure its own security.

Undoubtedly de Gaulle was correct when he declared that a state which renounces its national defense responsibility is no longer a state. But in order to re-establish full sovereignty, France should – aside from her nuclear force (most difficult to create with her small national framework) and instead of relying on the planned six divisions – raise at least twelve active and twelve reserve divisions and provide a territorial and civil defense as well as highly trained air and naval forces.

It is not the United States that has deprived the countries of Western Europe of their past military independence; it is the fact that they have become too small to be able to adapt themselves to today's required larger dimensions. This is why it is impossible for France to acquire alone the strategic autonomy so desired. This goal can be obtained only within a larger unit, a supranational body. In the face of these indisputable facts, the vision of a strategically independent Europe dwells in the realm of utopia.

The future of the Western world depends on our finding the wisdom to give a new dynamic content to the Atlantic Alliance, a form which corresponds to today's situation. The pursuit of yesterday's policies or the mere reconstruction of NATO by means of superficial changes in structure will not be sufficient to meet the needs of the epoch that lies ahead. One can hardly fix broken china and, if one succeeds, it will not survive any hard knocks. Would it not be wiser to place into operation a new strategic system conforming more to the dangers that threaten to break out during the 1970's?

There is no alternative to the alliance between Western Europe and the United States. The question to resolve is that of agreements which must be established between Europe and America. The highly industrialized continental states of Western

Europe with their 200 million people cannot remain forever a simple bridgehead for the United States in our hemisphere.

If we assume that the Americans consider the world inevitably from their own point of view – in a way which does not always coincide with ours – the need for an autonomous West European strategy is manifest, so long as there are distinct European interests to defend. In any case, it is easier to conceive a common policy based on two independent military systems than to pursue only one strategy with different political goals. It follows from this that Western Europe must become an equal partner to the United States, but she cannot do this so long as she does not dispose of all the necessary means for her security, including her own nuclear forces.

No matter what the differences of opinion on this problem, it is certain that Western Europe, without an integrated strategy, will never be able, if only for economic reasons, to place into operation an efficacious defense. Military integration presupposes political integration. The evident interest of the nations of the Old Continent is thus to close ranks, unify policies on vital issues, concert efforts and coordinate actions. There is no other realistic solution than to bring the whole of Western Europe into a large integrated state under a sovereign executive with the capacity to play an autonomous role on the world scene in the political and military as well as in the economic and scientific realms. The creation of a united Western Europe would conform equally to the interests of the United States. In effect, the Americans find themselves confronted with the alternative of having either to continue to sustain a fragile Europe which is in their charge, or finally to encourage the formation of a Europe that will free them of a burden they cannot forever support.

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

by Marc E. Geneste

HISTORY seldom forgives the lack of imagination in defense matters, yet, unfortunately, in this realm conservatism and military scholastics carry a tremendous weight. The French know this basic truth better than anyone, because they paid a disproportionate price in June 1940 for having kept their military thinking essentially along the lines of the war they had won only twenty years earlier.

Today, twenty years after the creation of NATO, we must take a fresh look at the alliance that has lived complacently since 1949 while formidable changes have occurred in the political and military environment which shaped the original organization and strategy.

Several new factors are immediately evident: some vital aspects of the threat in Europe are no longer the same, and, to some extent, might be much worse. The value of U.S. military guarantees has been put into question as the "credibility gap" in the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe has increased. Britain and France have become European members of the nuclear club, while their crumbling colonial empires have opened the Third World to subversion. In the technical field, ballistic missile defenses have recently destroyed the myth of "ultimate weapons" and "technological stalemates," while nuclear propulsion for ships offers competing nations a chance to explore the oceanic vastness. The Nonproliferation Treaty tends to freeze the nuclear pattern of the planet.

Most of the new data conditioning the global environment proceed from the growing influence of the atom, which was in its infancy at the birth of NATO. The military puzzle is no longer the same, especially in Europe where the thunder of Soviet mechanized divisions invading Czechoslovakia has left a threatening cloud on the horizon. European defense, the objective of the Atlantic Alliance, has to be re-evaluated in light of the changes of the last two decades. And, above all, we must proceed from the fact that two European members of the alliance, Britain and France, have made their entrance on the nuclear chessboard.

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

I

The recent invasion of the Bohemian plateau by Warsaw Pact forces compels us to reconsider a basic problem of our times: Will deterrence work in Europe? For how long? We should especially take a hard look at one fundamental and perhaps misleading assumption which is the cornerstone of deterrence, namely, that the statesmen who have the power in the nuclear age to usher in the apocalypse will act rationally. Will they? Can they?

Even if those leaders can avoid launching a deliberate attack in peacetime, would they be able to control events in a time of crisis and prevent escalation to nuclear exchange? Does rational behavior in peacetime retain the same meaning for leaders who are under the tremendous psychological pressure of international crisis and escalating conflict?

The two military phenomena that have dominated the world scene during the last twenty years seem to work in opposite ways on this critical issue. The first, the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, has given political leaders the unprecedented power to destroy everything, including themselves. The concept of deterrence, which is as old as the world, has gained its modern meaning from a more or less conscious solidarity of hostages; everyone has become someone's hostage under the reciprocal threat of thermonuclear exchanges. Hence, since World War II, peace has slept under the sobering shadow of H-bombs, and World War III has been avoided, even during the darkest Stalinist years. This achievement of scientists has given modern leaders a new sense of responsibility—fear being the beginning of wisdom. And the trend will not be reversed in the foreseeable future: modern weapons will probably prevent the initiation of those wars that in the past have resulted from deliberate political will. The Western military system has been devised mainly to block these "paths of glory" wars and has succeeded in eliminating them.

But the new look in military matters actually enhances a second factor contributing to armed conflicts. The refinement of age-old tactics, under communist military doctrine and codification, has permitted dedicated people with primitive weapons to check conventional, well-equipped armies and achieve significant victories against the established political order. Many recent examples, e.g., China, French Indochina, Cuba, Viet Nam, Algeria, have proven the extraordinary efficiency of guerrilla warfare, sometimes initiated by a handful of ruthless and skillful men to challenge the legally constituted authorities and overthrow the local government.

Today, a sizeable flow of literature celebrates the virtues of guerrillas, the Viet Cong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Che Guevara, and cloaks them with the legendary aura of a Robin Hood. The current and universal student unrest—in the free and the communist worlds—seems to be more an end in itself, the desire of young men for action, than the alleged translation of metaphysical discontent against existing ways of life. But this potential, this dynamism, might well be harnessed and organized for any *cause célèbre,* along the lines of Mao's and Giap's subversive operations that have proven so effective in "people's warfare" and so attractive to youth.

In this respect, an explosive situation exists in Eastern Europe. After fifty years of totalitarian control over the Russian people and twenty-five years over the Czechs, Poles, Rumanians, Germans and other satellite peoples, the communist system seems to be gravely ill. The natural aspirations of men for at least a modicum of individual freedom have created tremendous internal pressures in the Soviet world; they recently surfaced in Czechoslovakia but exist everywhere, including Mother Russia herself.

There can no longer be the slightest doubt about the deeply rooted discontent among the youth and the intellectuals in the communist empire. Free societies probably can and sometimes must accept a dose of state control for the sake of social justice; but totalitarian systems cannot admit, for the sake of liberty, any breach in the concept of total state control. It is heads or tails; the coin cannot stand for long on its edge. "Communism and freedom" is an impossible combination. The Kremlin bosses have clearly seen the danger in opening the door to the Western winds blowing on the Bohemian plateau. Their world would have crumbled. They owe everything to the system: their rank, power, faith. They could not risk such a gamble, so they sent mechanized divisions to close the door. As seen from the Mecca of communism, they were right: the first heretics must be burned before the whole place becomes heretical.

But, as seen from the universities, from the bottom of the system, the door has been closed to any hope of improvement, i.e., "liberalization," through legal means. The pressure is bound to mount as time goes by, and sooner or later, under the hermetic and heavy cover of "new Stalinism," reach explosive proportions.

The only way out is revolution with its traditional and formidable leitmotiv of freedom.

This is the kind of "grand idea" for which subversive groups can recruit thousands and millions of followers. And the communists are the masters of this type of organization. In other words, the infernal machine so cleverly built up by the Kremlin rulers to subvert the Free World could backfire and blow up in their own hands. Starting from Czechoslovakia, the fire might engulf Poland, Hungary, Rumania, all the satellites and finally East Germany, where it would reach its maximum danger as far as world peace is concerned.

What type of political control could prevent brothers from helping brothers to escape from their nightmare and possible massacre in case of a general uprising in Eastern Europe, which would certainly reach East Germany? And what type of self-control can be expected from the Kremlin's wielders of nuclear power when they see their world crumbling all around? What would be their reactions under such tremendous psychological pressure, in the face of what might become for them a matter of life or death? Would they refrain from releasing their formidable military strength, which could probably escalate to nuclear exchange? Would they not be tempted to bury the planet along with their lifetime dream?

The frailty of deterrence becomes clearly apparent in the wake of the Czech invasion; it did not collapse, for the Czech Army did not fight. Deterrence has been built on an understanding among a handful of responsible men, whose fingers rest on reliable triggers. Unfortunately, the problem goes beyond them. They might be masters of themselves, but not of the course of events.

The atom has another strange effect on international politics. The instinctive desire to avoid nuclear war at all costs drives the members of the nuclear club not to complicate the task of their fellow members. We have an obvious and egoistical interest in the capability of the Kremlin to keep control of events in the troubled communist world. This type of nuclear solidarity has already prevented the West from assisting the Berliners in 1953, the Hungarians in 1956, and the Czechs in 1968 against the Red Army.

The "bipolar world" is a by-product of the military atom. The difference between the two worlds lies in the fact that, in the West, some part of national sovereignty has been willingly delegated for the common defense and welfare to the central power and can be withdrawn at any time, and the social system is freely chosen by the individual. In the East, the whole system has been imposed by Moscow and extends to the way of life of citizens living at the limits of the empire. The amoral solidarity of the nuclear powers conduces to a large extent to maintaining the enslaved people indefinitely in their helpless condition: the philosophy of nuclear deterrence indirectly helps to build up the internal pressure in Eastern Europe toward the breaking point, and hence contributes to its own failure.

The two modern forms of warfare—nuclear and subversive—seem to unite their malefic strength and drive toward an explosion of uncontrollable violence in Eastern Europe. Totalitarian systems breed war, either because of the personal ambition of dictators or the peoples' irrepressible quest for freedom.

II

If one admits that World War III might spring from the course of uncontrollable political events more likely than from the deliberate will of individuals in power in the Kremlin, we should re-examine current military systems. They have been devised, on the whole, to impress fellow club members not to undertake hazardous adventures. The limit of allowable risks was reached in the climax of the 1962 Cuban crisis. What would have happened then if some erratic warning light had started a false missile alert at the very time the Soviet fleet was heading into the U.S. blockade?

This frightening experience probably helped the "nuclear gentlemen" to understand the true meaning of nuclear responsibility, to close the ranks of the club, and establish direct telephone lines of communication. Club solidarity was taken to extraordinary lengths in North Viet Nam where U.S. B-52's tried to destroy the Viet Cong supply lines through heavy bombing which transformed large parts of terrain into lunar landscapes, but carefully avoided the main target: Soviet ships bringing weapons and equipment into Haiphong. This kind of "nuclear ethics" encourages the nuclear knights to fight the Viet Nam war to the last Vietnamese and even to the last Marine, rather than to risk exchanging direct shots between club members. There are two interlocked worlds today: the nuclear world in which the balance of terror holds sway, and the pre-nuclear where the old Clauzewitzian laws of war and peace are still valid—especially among underdeveloped countries where the notions of nuclear responsibility are unheard of. In Viet Nam, in the Middle East, in Nigeria, the atom has been totally ineffective, and it might be argued that nuclear paralysis and reciprocal neutralization of the superpowers has fostered more than hampered the development of local crisis.

The military postures devised to achieve deterrence in the nuclear world have completely failed to prevent the development of political or military crisis in the nonnuclear, for example in Korea and Viet Nam. Though the arsenals of massive holocaust are built up to monstrous proportions to impress governments, they seem not to impress people. The Viet Cong appears to be no more impressed by his nuclear opponent today than was the Viet Minh by his conventional enemy, the French, twenty-five years ago. In the minds of most people, general nuclear war is such an unthinkable event that the mechanisms in being which could produce this supreme insanity are not taken seriously. There is not the slightest chance that the fear of escalation to nuclear exchange would serve to restrain the development of trouble and violence among the masses in Eastern Europe. Thus, the problem of war and peace in Europe now lies beyond the level of deliberate government decisions.

The fear of a planned surprise invasion of the European peninsula from the East, which was quite logical at the time of Stalin and which gave birth to NATO, may be discarded. Deterrence has worked and will work in this field, and it has recently been reinforced by the prospect of internal troubles within the Eastern bloc, which will deter communist leaders from embarking on such an adventure.

The danger lies in the type of action Soviet leaders would undertake if confronted with a general uprising in their empire. We no longer have to fear the Kremlin's political strength and ambitions of the past, but rather its present political weakness associated with a formidable and still growing military capability. The problem is no longer to prevent the outbreak of conflict but to limit its effects. Deterrence should be able to work within the frame of a crisis set in the psychological environment of civil war, that is to say in the worst possible conditions. To deter the Red Army from going too far or too fast, once the gigantic machine is on the move, is another matter than to deter it from starting in the first place.

Deterrence may have been the best—or at least the cheapest—defense when the initiation of a conflict was dependent mainly on the personal decision of some "nuclear gentleman." Now, defense is the best deterrent to help him retain his self-control in a "crisis management" situation, and it is the only way to stop the impetus of the Soviet Army should it start to roll westward. The defense of Europe in the 1970's has to be rethought along lines that are quite different from the deterrence problems of the 1950's. Nuclear problems must be re-examined in the light of developments during the last two decades, especially the exact deterrent value of U.S. nuclear forces and the role that can be played by the two newcomers on the European nuclear scene, Britain and France.

III

In the history of strategic doctrines, none has been more short-lived and perhaps more harmful for the present needs of European defense than the "Massive Retaliation" threat of the 1950's. Although they have been repeated a thousand times, it is useful to be reminded once again of the hard facts that ruined the doctrine and contributed to the current disarray of NATO.

First, there was the Yalu affair. American prestige suffered a severe setback at the hands of massed conventional Chinese armies, because U.S. forces under General MacArthur did not use the nuclear weapons which were available then in significant quantities only to the United States. Rightly or wrongly, U.S. policymakers made an historical choice: for the first time, against the will of their generals, political leaders did not dare to use their full military strength to achieve military and political victory. This was the first and probably the chief setback for the atom as a weapon. Who would believe that Washington would use nuclear weapons later, when retaliation against the U.S. mainland was assured? This dilemma produced the "paper tiger" label following the halfhearted prosecution of the Korean War.

Second, there was Dien Bien Phu, where the French made a desperate stand against Viet Minh regulars, a deliberate show of strength to halt communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Once more, against the advice of Admiral Radford, U.S. policymakers decided at the last minute not to employ tactical nuclear weapons which might have rescued the doomed citadel. Fifteen years later, the same enemy continues to assault American soldiers. Another opportunity to turn the tide of events had been lost.

Third, in 1956 when Britain and France embarked, perhaps lightly, on their ill-fated Suez military adventure, they had to back down in the face of Soviet rocket rattling when Washington grumbled that the U.S. nuclear umbrella was not exactly devised to cover such types of undertakings. London and Paris had a lesson in the practical effects of nuclear blackmail, felt the limits of solidarity when the atom threatened to enter the game, and evaluated the real standing of nonnuclear nations. The lesson was not lost.

Fourth, in Viet Nam the United States appears willing to suffer another Dien Bien Phu—e.g., loss of a Marine outpost stormed by communist infantry—with all its consequences for American prestige, rather than authorize the use of small nuclear weapons, such as the Davy Crockett, which could change the tactical picture. Suicidal human waves cannot be stopped indefinitely by conventional means, and the fortress strategy—Khe Sanh type—is bound to lead, sooner or later, to a defeat similar to Dien Bien Phu, depending on the cost in casualties Giap is ready to accept. Perhaps both sides feared the inevitable entrance of the atom into the conflict so much that they went to the conference table.

The above examples may not be convincing on the ground that anything was better than opening an atomic Pandora's box. Perhaps world peace won in those faraway places what the credibility of the U.S. atom lost. But, in any event, European defense was certainly not reinforced by the widening "credibility gap" opened in the psychological "Maginot Line" built on the atom, which had protected peace and Europe in the postwar years.

The gap has been opened even further by the Americans. Since the beginning of NATO, U.S. generals in command of allied forces in Europe have requested, time and again, the authority to use nuclear weapons to carry out their defensive missions, which cannot be met otherwise due to the crushing superiority of the Soviet land forces. This authority has been constantly refused by U.S. politicians, down to the use of the smallest Davy Crockett, short-range artillery shells or land mines—weapons that obviously cannot be used even by a "mad commander" to launch an offensive of his own. These weapons cannot be used even in self-defense without the political "green light" from Washington. The continental Europeans slowly realized that, between the Soviet steamroller and the Atlantic, nobody had the power to fire the weapon on which their defense had been built.

The French bomb, intended to serve as the "Continental Bomb," was largely a by-product of this reluctance of American politicians to delegate to their soldiers the authority to do their job with modern weapons. And this lack of confidence is to a large extent the result of the Massive Retaliation strategy, the value of which gradually declined until Maxwell Taylor blew his "Uncertain Trumpet" and buried the idea with the help of Sputnik. Massive Retaliation no doubt had merit in the beginning, when the United States had a nuclear monopoly and later a crushing strategic superiority. We probably owe to this strategy the peace Europe enjoyed during the dark Stalinist years. But its initial success outlived its real usefulness. Now European defense is paying the heavy price of fears and illusions generated by this philosophy on both sides of the Atlantic.

Defense based on massive strategic exchanges and their widely publicized and horrible effects has conveyed to the U.S. public the correct conviction that anything is better than such an eventuality. The United States has become painfully aware of her new vulnerability and the loss of her protective ocean barriers. In fact, today she seems to be paralyzed with the fear that any form of nuclear warfare is bound to trigger immediately the thermonuclear holocaust, since war has been so long thought of by everyone in terms of "countercity strategy," indiscriminate massacre and hell on earth. The psychological impact of the atom has reached such emotional proportions that any attempt to change the picture—for instance, by giving the military the authority they require—would become a turbulent political issue in the United States. To point out that historically wars have been more or less limited; to conclude that very likely the first use of tactical nuclear weapons would generate a tremendous and universal counterpressure to limit or stop the conflict rather than to extend it—all this logical reasoning would be useless. The atom has inherited from its first terroristic use at Hiroshima and the subsequent "terrorist" strategic doctrines such a reputation that any "first use" of a small nuclear gadget is summarily equated with blowing up the planet.

No wonder, then, that the reversal of U.S. strategy from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response, in this emotional environment, led to the opposite excess. The pendulum, shoved mostly by young computerized civilians from the Pentagon, swung a little too far, and led to the thesis that no firebreak is thinkable in the nuclear arena, once the first "fission for war" has been initiated. The threshold of first use has been raised to the summit of tactical absurdity: the "pause" approach requires the ground commanders in Europe to fight the Soviets with conventional means before resorting to the only serious weapons they possess —and then only if the situation is deteriorating. Soviet might and doctrine guarantee that, if communist forces strike, the allies' situation *will* deteriorate. One half of West Germany is likely to be lost because of this "nuclear shyness," the delayed tactical nuclear engagement will become infinitely more difficult, if at all possible,[1] and the subsequent nuclear counterstrike will be made on allied territory and among allied populations.

Of course, the panoply of Flexible Response, ideally, should include the possibility of conventional response. Unfortunately the same reasons which led the United States to her present "nuclear complex" have produced in the European public another type of nuclear complex that has ruined all hope of creating the necessary means for a comprehensive Flexible Response in the foreseeable future.

Massive Retaliation and the deterrence philosophy worked so well in the beginning that the U.S. nuclear umbrella rapidly became Western Europe's normal shield in the public mind. The traditional means of defense in this part of the world—universal draft, general mobilization, powerful and well trained reserves, mass armies and the like, i.e., the French concept of Nation in Arms—seemed to be old-fashioned taboos that could be supported only by outmoded generals unable to adjust to modern times and still dreaming of cavalry charges or at best the World War II blitzkrieg.

When the holes in the U.S. strategic umbrella became quite obvious, Britain and France opened their own small umbrellas under the holes. There were many other reasons—the McMahon Act, international prestige, economic and technological progress —for this move, but in the military field possessing one's own small umbrella had a psychological value, contributing in some European quarters to preserving the Massive Retaliation concept that had been abandoned by the Americans. Above all, atom-uranium 235 and plutonium have a dual capability, for building plowshares as well as swords; unlike armored divisions, unused bombs can be turned back to peaceful use through nuclear reactors producing electric power.

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[1] For a discussion of this very important problem, see Marc E. Geneste, "The Fence and the Defense," *Naval Institute Proceedings,* October 1963.

Europeans ask: Why then bother about mass armies? The atom solves all problems. Why put up with the universal draft? It is a taboo from the past. Why organize a total mobilization as in 1914 and 1940? Nuclear war will be short anyway.

These notions have been nourished under the nuclear umbrella and are widely accepted in Europe. They are strengthened by the sharp economic competition between developed countries, especially between America and Europe: it is tempting to reduce the share of the GNP devoted to preparing for unlikely armed conflict in order to concentrate on waging the real economic war.

Massive Retaliation provides the solutions. Deterrence has deterred the Europeans from building their defense. Unfortunately, for the reasons pointed out above, deterrence might fail. Then the problem of defense becomes paramount. To be realistically organized, European defense must take into account the two main effects of twenty years of deterrence: on the one hand, the apparent U.S. reluctance to rely on the atom; and on the other hand, the European refusal to rely on and pay for conventional defense. Some middle-of-the-road solution must be found if Europe is ever to be able to face down an opponent who has never sacrificed his enormous conventional military might to the illusions or the mirages of Massive Retaliation, and is now able to play both games. At least, the Soviets should not have the choice of weapons: they must know they will have to play *our* game. This is step number one in any improvement of NATO. Only Europe can convince them, and the two European club members, Britain and France, which were not nuclear powers twenty years ago, must play the major role.

IV

The Nonproliferation Treaty is a new effort to freeze the nuclear map; the first attempt was the McMahon Act, which failed. Short of achieving true international détente and practical disarmament agreements, it is hard to believe that the NPT will be more successful in the long run than was the McMahon Act. Nevertheless, the nuclear map in Europe will probably be frozen for a long time to come, since the nonnuclear European members of NATO do not seem interested in individual nuclear military adventures, and Germany is prevented by treaty from undertaking one.

This leaves Britain and France as the only two West European members of the club. The geographical confrontation vests these two nations with considerable responsibility for revising NATO nuclear affairs in consultation with their distant partner, the United States, and improving the psychological climate in Western Europe.

The U.S. nuclear credibility gap can be traced to the belief that only national survival—an immediate matter of life or death —would justify the opening of Pandora's box. "Rather our friends Red than we dead" might be the motto of those who argue that, in the nuclear age, alliances have no meaning. No one can say for sure whether this interpretation is correct; only experience will tell us. But, seen from the other side of Europe, such views do not reinforce the already questionable credibility of the U.S. nuclear commitment. Rightly or wrongly, these theories place the commitment in doubt and demand another solution—one that gives the Europeans a share in the responsibility of pulling the trigger. Since death can come on foot to Paris but not to New York, an enemy headed toward the Atlantic coast would expect that a French nuclear reaction would be at least as likely as an American.

It certainly cannot be denied that three triggers—U.S., British and French—are three times more credible than one; two of them are devoted to the survival of the homeland, not of friendly but outlying provinces. The McNamara charge against independent nuclear deterrents, which were in his words "costly, unuseful and dangerous," failed to take into account the credibility factor of the Western atom as a whole, as Soviet marshals would see it when they looked toward the Atlantic coast. Of course, he would have been right, but only if he had dared to delegate to his own commanders in Europe the power to shoot when attacked. Short of this crucial move, opposition to independent European deterrents could only reinforce the doubt about U.S. determination to play the nuclear game at all. For who would seriously believe that France or Britain are so irrational as to release a nuclear strike without the utmost provocation? If these nations cannot be credited with some political maturity, if British or French fingers on the trigger are seen by American politicians as a dangerous situation for world peace or U.S. security, it would be better to forget immediately about the alliance. In any case, this situation is now a fact of life, like it or not; we had better capitalize on it if the alliance is to be improved.

If we definitely forget the McMahon era, when Washington tried desperately to keep the Western monopoly of the atom and devised a scheme whereby everything in NATO, except the main thing, was to be integrated; if we genuinely agree to forget former prejudices and take a fresh look at the whole nuclear business, and think of an alliance in nuclear terms, we immediately find that the three Western club members complement each other to achieve deterrence. The two front-line small nuclear partners, France and Britain, need to be backed by the formidable U.S. arsenal, while the U.S. atom in the background can borrow from its advanced guards the credibility it currently lacks.

V

A genuine partnership in nuclear strategy among the three Western club members is a prerequisite for a strengthened alliance, because no lasting confidence can be built on the sand of equivocal attitudes, uncertain commitments and doubts such as those of the recent past.

This cohesion might even be more important than the credibility of the U.S. atom vis-à-vis the Soviets, who have no more reason to invade Western Europe in 1969, with the Chinese at their back and their own internal problems riding them hard, than they had twenty years ago.

The true problem of European defense is less the deterrence of a coldly planned, massive and surprise Soviet attack than devising ways to deter or stop the forward motion of the Red Army during the course of an escalating conflict. Of course, Western strategic superiority or at least parity must be maintained at all costs, as well as the present mastery of the seas, so as not to give the opponent an incentive to try to gain global predominance in one all-out gamble. But the most immediate threat is on the ground, in the domain of land warfare so badly neglected for twenty years in the West, where the voices of tacticians have been silenced by the thunder of intercontinental rockets and the megatonnage of thermonuclear strategy. The answer is a forward defensive strategy to protect against any hostile incursion, and the only means available are the tactical weapons in which the West apparently still has a large margin of superiority.

The first step is to admit and demonstrate unequivocally that any war in Europe involving NATO forces is going to be a nuclear war; that any westward move of the Red Army will be met on the spot by an impenetrable barrage of nuclear land mines, nuclear artillery and all the modern hardware in being capable of destroying instantly any spearheads the Soviets might be tempted to launch across the Iron Curtain. Let us throw out the absurd notion of a "pause" which requires us to change horses in the middle of the stream, to play the initial part of the game with bows and arrows and switch to gunpowder upon receiving a phone call from Washington.

Paradoxically, it is conceivable that nuclear weapons properly used could prevent escalation to the massacre of cities. The unprecedented power of military forces, concentrated on other military forces, could obliterate the latter fast enough without being obliged to destroy their civilian roots. Let us turn away from a trend in modern military thinking which has coldly proposed to solve military problems through the mass slaughter of civilians, and has led us to our present "nuclear shyness." Apply nuclear power in the battle area. Limit nuclear war, not in violence, for that is unrealistic, but in its geographical extension.

The key question is: Are Western ground forces (U.S., British, French and German) equipped with enough nuclear weapons, and are they properly trained to use them to perform this vital blocking action? Are their means and their doctrine adequate?

Very likely the answer is no. The use of the atom was not so credible that the tacticians could safely put all their eggs in the uncertain nuclear basket. The so-called dual capability military organization has been invented with this result: On the assumption that a world war would be nuclear, there was no need for mass armies, and consequently we do not have enough divisions to fight a conventional war against the Red armies. On the assumption that the use of the atom was not a foregone conclusion after all, especially in marginal or Third World conflicts, allied land forces had to be kept in condition to fight with TNT. Western tacticians have the impossible task of winning with the same tool either the Battle of Cannae or the Battle of the Bulge.

It is not necessary to be a professional in military tactics to understand that when one parameter of land battle—firepower—is multiplied a thousandfold, the other—maneuver—cannot remain the same. A defensive plan cannot integrate the phenomenal destructive power of tactical nuclear weapons in the same way it would a firepower a thousand times weaker. The plan cannot be the same. Dual-capable tactical doctrines are a fallacy. Therein lies the most disastrous effect of equivocal attitudes in nuclear matters. It is true that "war is too serious to be left to the military"; the decisions and overall policies are the province of political power. But on the other hand, battlefield tactics are too serious to be left to politicians. Political interference in tactics has kept the finger of distant U.S. politicians on the trigger of the smallest forward-line nuclear weapons in front of the Iron Curtain.[2] This situation diminishes the credibility of the tactical atom, so vital for deterrence; its use, even in self-defense, cannot be assured. No serious tactical doctrine can be built on hypothetical weapons.

Without doubt, the defensive power of even the smallest nuclear weapons appears so formidable that any ground offensive employing conventional means alone has little chance of success —provided nuclear defensive tactics are adequate and battlefield maneuvers are organized to allow the free play of firepower. World War I firepower was able to block movement on the battlefield. Today's nuclear firepower, ten thousand times greater than the TNT of World War II, would certainly block the movements of modern conventional armies which have not improved greatly over World War II capabilities. This would leave the attacker with the choice of starting a nuclear conflict, the responsibility of geographical escalation, and a considerable waste of nuclear potential to silence the many defensive nuclear batteries in order to open a path for his highly vulnerable columns on the ground. There is no space here to discuss those technical matters which deserve close scrutiny. But in general, due to the crushing advantage of present-day firepower over ground mobility, the proper use of tactical nuclear weapons would rule out any risk that the enemy would engage in "limited objective" military adventures. Never in history has defense had such an advantage in land warfare; likewise, never has peace had such an opportunity.

Contrary to the official beliefs of the last decade, it is certainly possible to imagine a Flexible Response involving nuclear weapons. In fact, to keep the peace, the atom needs heavy artillery in the rear and advanced guards on the front line. To a large extent, the H-bombs in the background extend their salutary shadows toward the front, contributing decisively to the psychological effectiveness of tactical weapons. Further, since they are linked on the escalation ladder, the H-bombs lend their enormous weight to the smaller weapons while, at the same time, borrowing from them some credibility.

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[2] See Marc E. Geneste, "Politique et tactique," *L'Armée,* France, August 1963.

To sum it up, in the middle of the ladder of escalation, which ranges from the guerrilla to the "unthinkable," lies a nuclear threshold that is no longer the immediate step to general holocaust. The tactical nuclear barrier lies across the path of military adventures in a much more credible manner than the former threat of apocalyptic and reciprocal destruction. This psychological and, if need be, physical barrier is probably the surest and cheapest way to block the mechanism of escalation that threatens peace in Europe.

Naturally, such a nuclear barrier should not have "credibility gaps" or doctrinal holes in it. The responsibility for building it rests primarily on a nuclear partnership of the three Western allies which are members of the nuclear club: Britain, France and the United States.

VI

Europe reached its majority in the nuclear age, with the accession of France and Britain to the club. This gives the Europeans the responsibility for organizing their own defense with the help, but no longer under the total control, of the United States, which has many other world commitments. The three partners complement each other, thus closing the nuclear "credibility gap" of the recent past. This solidarity must now be extended to the front line, to building a nuclear "Maginot Line" of peace in Europe, with proper means and tactical doctrine. Clear and common strategic and tactical doctrines are infinitely more important for solving forthcoming deterrence and defense problems than the former "integration" concept, which failed despite the guidance of the Pentagon's "whiz kids." Who could seriously believe that the U.S. monopoly of strategic thinking for the defense of Europe would continue indefinitely after the U.S. monopoly in nuclear weapons had been broken? The McMahon Act was an attempt to keep the Promethean fire on the western side of the Atlantic. This nationalistic policy was certainly justified in the beginning; any nation would have tried to keep for itself as long as possible an achievement of this magnitude. But was it not somewhat naive for U.S. politicians to try to promote the North Atlantic Community while giving such a blatant demonstration of nationalism and egocentrism?

Building the Atlantic world in the nuclear age is a long-range undertaking. It must be based, first of all, on a common policy with respect to the technical achievement which dominates our present and future: the use of atomic energy for military and civilian purposes. U.S. leaders must be careful, in promoting the present Nonproliferation Treaty and the prospective negotiations on ballistic missile defense, not to convey the same impression they gave to their European allies when they enforced the McMahon Act. Already, in some quarters, the possible BMD agreement with the USSR, rightly or wrongly, looks like a sort of "nuclear Yalta." The two superpowers might agree to deploy ballistic missile defenses to be secure against all other nations—excluding each other. They would climb to a new technological plateau, out of reach of other nuclear competitors. The nuclear solidarity of the two superpowers would then appear to be more important than the solidarity of the United States and Europe in Western defense.

Britain and France, pending the political unity of Europe (which will ultimately give Europe as a whole the nuclear status it deserves), must be party to these negotiations and agreements, if we in the West want to avoid the errors of the past. In the 1970's the defense of Europe against the communist threat, as well as future political developments in the field of European unity and arms control, requires a close and lasting nuclear partnership among Britain, France and the United States.

The West has three pieces, one big and two small ones, on the nuclear chessboard, instead of the one at the beginning of NATO. This is the major development of the last twenty years. European defense, and possibly disarmament, depends on the way we organize and coordinate their action for the sake of peace.

BRITAIN'S ROLE IN EUROPE AND NATO

by Frederick W. Mulley

THE North Atlantic Alliance is the most extensive collective self-defense system ever known. In the Washington or North Atlantic Treaty which is the basis of the alliance, all fifteen parties undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Moreover, in the preamble to the treaty the parties record their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments and promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area. Therefore, we are now commemorating the signing of a treaty the intentions of which can in no way be interpreted as aggressive.

After the Second World War European resources were depleted. The U.S. government recognized that to preserve peace the United States needed to retain a physical presence in Europe. It responded to the situation with the Marshall Plan, which helped us all through that difficult period. When the Berlin airlift and the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia occurred in 1948, West European armies were being disbanded, and East European forces could have overrun Europe. Perhaps only the deterrence of the West's nuclear weapons, which at that time the Soviet Union had not developed, prevented this. But in the 1950's Soviet nuclear capabilities advanced until both the United States and the Soviet Union had the power to devastate each other. Later still, each country had the power of so-called second strike. This is the position we maintain today: a balance with mutual ability to inflict near-instantaneous destruction. It naturally influences our views of the 1970's.

We must at all costs avoid the vicious circle of the arms race, and it may be taken as axiomatic that both we and the Soviet Union want to avoid this scourge. How can we use and develop our present institutions to achieve this goal? There are lessons, too, to be learned from the last twenty years, and these include recognition of the fact that the security provided by the North Atlantic Treaty has enabled the countries of Europe to re-establish their economic growth and living standards. More than that, by rapidly developing their trade, investment and aid abroad they have helped other, not least the developing, countries of the world along the road to progress.

THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE

The fifteen countries of the alliance have achieved some of the highest living standards in the world. But this effort, and the benefit it implies for other parts of the world, can only be maintained if the strengthening of our economies continues. Investment only occurs when there is expectation of return, be it social or financial. Therefore on all counts we need to preserve peace and ensure our security. For this we must seek to maintain the balance in Europe, albeit desirably at a lower level of defense cost. At the same time we must try to eradicate underlying political problems. Europe is still divided, and we need a political settlement including a solution to the German question acceptable to both sides. We want disarmament and arms control, which would in turn release resources for other purposes—bolstering our economies, social investment, and helping the welfare of developing countries. One would hope that member countries of the Warsaw Pact would view the situation in a similar light. It would be a great achievement if the West's aid to and trade with other parts of the world could be matched by Warsaw Pact countries including the Soviet Union.

It is not feasible to curtail the alliance unless we can be sure of achieving a definitive solution to the key question of European security. Disbanding NATO while the Warsaw Pact remains intact would jeopardize our future and would heighten rather than ease political tensions in Europe. As Prime Minister Harold Wilson said in the House of Commons on December 17, 1968: "Obviously any sane and civilised man looks forward to a world in which there are no military blocs of this kind but the way to reach that situation is not by unilaterally abandoning the Western Alliance."

Although, from August of this year, governments can under Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty give one year's notice to withdraw, there is no sign of any wishing to do so. On the contrary, all fifteen members of the alliance unanimously agreed at the Ministerial meeting in Brussels in November:

> The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to stand as the indisputable guarantor of security and the essential foundation for the pursuit of European reconciliation.

> By its Constitution, the Alliance is of indefinite duration. Recent events have further demonstrated that its continued existence is more than ever necessary.[1]

This is the prevailing mood as we enter the 1970's. To borrow a metaphor used recently in reference to the alliance: "You don't do away with the dam just because there has not been a flood for twenty years."

THE AIMS OF THE ALLIANCE

The three major objectives of NATO are: the defense of its members, deterrence of outside attack, and improvement of relations between East and West in Europe. Defense and deterrence were the key to the alliance's *raison d'être* during its first years, but the third has evolved as tension in Europe decreased. The alliance is now firmly committed to work for détente and the promotion of a genuine improvement in East-West relations. It is therefore an objective to be pursued with all reasonable means at our disposal. But as realists, and thinking of our future generations, we can do so only on mutually advantageous terms, not on conditions set by the Soviet Union. In pursuing this third objective we must not forget the first two. There was perhaps early last year an unfortunate tendency for public opinion to exaggerate the extent of the détente achieved. This led to pressure on politicians to cut defense expenditures. But such cuts would have been untimely. Events in Czechoslovakia last August showed the public the true realities of the situation and helped restore the balance. The pursuit of détente is perhaps best summed up in the words of the communiqué issued after the Ministerial meeting in Brussels in November 1968:

> Consistent with Western values the political goal [of the alliance] remains that of secure, peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between East and West.
>
> The Allies are determined to pursue this goal, bearing in mind that the pursuit of detente must not be allowed to split the Alliance.
>
> The search for peace requires progress consistent with Western security, in the vital fields of disarmament and arms control and continuing efforts to resolve the fundamental issues which divide East and West.[2]

It is only at our peril that we play down any one of these three aims of the alliance. But this is not to say that if a genuine indication of a desire for relaxation of tension comes from Warsaw

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[1] *Washington Post,* November 17, 1968, p. A 20.
[2] *Ibid.*

Pact countries we should not respond. We are quite ready and willing to do so. For the present, and the early part of the 1970's at least, progress will be slow. But meanwhile we have as an alliance made a definite overture to the Warsaw Pact countries.

STOCKTAKING IN THE ALLIANCE

At various periods in its history, the members of the alliance have sat back and asked "Where do we go from here?". In 1956 the Committee of the three "wise men" considered nonmilitary cooperation in NATO. In 1960-1961 the alliance carried out a long-term study of its political, economic and civil emergency planning roles. But the most recent stocktaking started in December 1966 at the suggestion of the distinguished Belgian Foreign Minister, Monsieur Pierre Harmel. As a result, far-ranging studies were carried out by five eminent figures from member countries on East-West relations, interallied relations, general defense policy and relations with other countries. Their views were studied by the Council and incorporated in the so-called Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance which was approved by all fifteen parties to the treaty. It was published as an annex to the communiqué issued after the Ministerial meeting of the Council in December 1967. The timing might be considered symbolic, because this was the first meeting held at the new Council Headquarters in Brussels.

The Harmel Report showed that the alliance keeps abreast of the times. But much more important, it provided the guidelines for the alliance's work in the 1970's. It explicitly stated that the ultimate political purpose of the alliance was the achievement of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees. As work continued after December 1967, more detailed studies on East-West relations, arms control, and the Mediterranean were prepared for the Ministerial meeting of the Council in Reykjavik in July 1968. Out of this came the declaration, adopted by countries participating in the NATO defense program, in which Ministers agreed that:

> A process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated. To that end, [Ministers] decided to make all necessary preparations for discussions on this subject with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe and they call on them to join in this search for progress towards peace.[3]

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[3] *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1968, p. 444.

It is regrettable that this signal, this definite overture to the Warsaw Pact, as I referred to it earlier, did not meet with a positive response from the Soviet Union. But by this time clouds were gathering on the horizon and in less than two months Czechoslovakia was invaded.

We must not let events in Czechoslovakia divert us from the long-term program mapped out in the Harmel Report. In the shorter term there can be no doubt that they increased our suspicions of Soviet intentions, and that this is a scar which will not disappear easily. The intervention seriously set back hope of settling the outstanding problems which divide the European continent and of establishing peace and security in Europe. The Soviet Union has shown that it is prepared to use force to gain its political objectives, and the recently refurbished doctrine of the so-called socialist commonwealth is ominous. This, too, is a lesson we must carry with us into the 1970's. It dashed hopes for progress which we had been building up for some time.

PATTERN FOR THE 1970's

Looking ahead, we must hope for some improvement in relations between East and West. But much will depend on two factors. The first is the development of relations between Moscow and Washington. Clearly the Soviet Union is not going to abandon its policy of trying to spread its influence and undermine that of the West wherever possible. But the Kremlin's leaders now seem to be genuinely anxious to avoid situations that might lead to a direct confrontation with the United States. Recent developments over the Federal German presidential elections in Berlin and over the Middle East bear this out. In the expectation that the Russians may continue to move in the direction of limited accommodation with the United States lies hope for the future. A limitation on missiles seems likely to be the first area of agreement. But there are other factors in the relationship, as much will depend on each country's attitude toward China and the other's interpretation of it. Then again it is likely that each country's domestic problems will assume greater importance in the political pattern of things. All in all they will want to reduce tension between them to leave them free to tackle these and other problems they will face in the 1970's. But any increase in understanding between the two superpowers will inevitably have an effect on their respective relations with their allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We have full confidence in the American government's declared willingness to consult with its allies on matters affecting their interests. Some may not share our confidence, but I am sure that the Western alliance, by developing its habit of mutual consultation, will be able to avoid any pitfalls.

The second key factor is the Soviet Union's attitude to developments in Europe and the extent to which it will relax its own and the East European countries' restrictions on contacts with the West. Events in Czechoslovakia have shown that Soviet leaders are unwilling to let "liberalization" go too far. They are thus likely to keep a tighter rein than we might have thought a year or so ago.

But in the 1970's the stirrings of nationalism and liberalism in the East European countries will continue to lead to strains between their governments and the Kremlin; and there is some risk that these strains might kindle explosive situations akin to that in Czechoslovakia last year and Hungary in 1956. The countries of Eastern Europe will experience an increasing need for Western expertise and capital. We in Western Europe shall have to work for closer cooperation among ourselves. This will naturally affect both relations between countries within the Western alliance and relations with the United States. But basically American-European interdependence will continue and will be strengthened, partly because of greater American investment in Europe and the natural growth of economic interdependence (the Paris Club, IMF, and the like) and partly because of Europe's need for cooperation with the United States in maintaining its security from Soviet aggression.

The 1970's will see the technological developments which were on the drawing boards in the 1960's being put into effect. Soon supersonic jets will bring New York and London within less than four hours of each other, and Russians will be able to have one breakfast in Moscow and a second in Washington. Satellites will help to improve communications. Industrial progress will mean that consumer durables will become relatively cheaper, and we shall have more leisure time. All this will bring our countries — both East and West — closer together and make us more acutely aware not only of our neighbors' problems but of differences between us.

BRITAIN AND EUROPE

Having traced a likely pattern for the 1970's, what about Britain's role in Europe and the alliance? It is instructive to refer to Prime Minister Wilson's remarks in a statement on public expenditure to the House of Commons on January 16, 1968:

> The House will recognise that it is not only in our own interests but in those of our friends and allies for this country to strengthen its economic base quickly and decisively. There is no military strength for Britain or for our alliances except on the basis of economic strength; and it is on this basis that we best ensure the security of this country. We therefore intend to make to the alliances of which we are members a contribution related to our economic capability while recognising [that] our security lies fundamentally in Europe and must be based on the North Atlantic Alliance.[4]

This is a realistic assessment, though perhaps unpalatable to those with grandiose dreams. Britain does not have the resources at her disposal to play the role of a world power. This implies that she can no longer be a major military power outside Europe. The change is inevitable. It follows that she will pay even greater attention to Europe in the 1970's. Indeed, one factor is already apparent: the process of detachment from her previous commitments in other areas, in particular East of Suez, has already led to substantial improvements in her NATO force contribution.

The main weight of British foreign policy will be concentrated in the European sphere. But Britain has always earned her living by trade, and she would necessarily encourage an outward-looking Europe. Her worldwide contacts with, for example, the Commonwealth and Latin America, which I have just visited, need to be maintained. It is clear, too, that Britain's contacts, both economic and political, with other parts of the world will continue to be important to us and we shall, I hope, be able to play the role of honest broker at international meetings in the United Nations and elsewhere. In her new role Britain will have a freedom of action in diplomatic and other fields which may not be available to the superpowers.

As technology brings us closer together, a higher degree of cooperation is essential. We must remember that the sum of the strength of a group of individuals is never as great as the strength of the group acting together. Therefore, provided the political forces drawing Europe together follow the right line, they will represent a greater force for good and improvement of living standards than that provided by a divided and bickering Europe.

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[4] Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 756 (January 16, 1968), Col. 1580.

This cooperation must be on all fronts, economic, political, technological and defense. In each of these, Britain, like the other countries of Western Europe, has her role to play.

The British government is determined to join the Common Market as a full member. The essential difference between now and 1962 is that the major British political parties are now agreed on this aim. The way is blocked for the moment. But Europe cannot afford to wait for the outcome with idle hands. It is essential to keep up the momentum of European integration by all means that remain open to us. At present we are engaged with other European governments in improving consultation and common action in fields not covered by the Community treaties. A useful start has been made by intensifying political consultation in the WEU Ministerial Council.

Greater political unity is clearly essential. If Europe wishes to use its influence in the world, it must speak with one voice. Only then can it make its voice heard before the superpowers and use its influence to work for the peaceful solution of differences in the United Nations and other forums.

Given economic and political consultation we can, if the will is there, have technological cooperation. In this era of economies of size, it is not economical to develop certain projects if the market for the end product is not sufficiently large. Even units such as the United Kingdom, with 54,000,000 people, will not be able, without some economic distortion or dislocation, to develop such projects within a reasonable time period. International research and development groups are therefore necessary so that the burden can be shared. While individual countries can provide certain knowhow, it is not possible for a single European country to make available the enormous resources that the United States or the Soviet Union is today spending on space projects. Accordingly, British and French experts, and their respective governments and industries, have joined together to develop the first Western supersonic passenger aircraft, the Concorde, which is at present successfully undergoing its first set of air tests. For similar motives, Britain, the Netherlands and Germany are cooperating in the development of a gas centrifuge for producing enriched uranium. But side by side with these more spectacular projects there are also the essential everyday forms of technological cooperation which appear on an increasing scale in international private industry.

BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE

Cooperation with Europe does not stop there. It must extend to defense. The countries of Western Europe which are members of NATO enjoy a special relationship with the United States, whose nuclear weapons form the strategic element in the overall deterrent capability of the alliance. But to ensure that the U.S. commitment continues firm, and that the presence of American forces is maintained on the continent of Europe, these countries have to convince the United States that they do not expect Americans to shoulder the defense burden on their account. Britain believes this is essential and is willing to assume her share of the burden. During the last year, as part of a review of British defense commitments, Her Majesty's Government announced three separate improvements in its contribution to NATO's integrated defense force. Moreover, Britain is deeply interested in close consultation with her partners because she has accepted land, sea and air responsibilities on every part of the NATO front from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean.

In a separate article in this issue the British Defense Secretary, Denis Healey, gives a detailed description of the present British contribution to the alliance which sets the pattern for the future. He also describes the steps taken to encourage a greater European identity within NATO.

EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

There are understandable, but I believe mistaken, doubts in certain circles that closer cooperation among European countries within NATO and a greater willingness to shoulder the defense burden may give the American Administration an excuse to reduce its force levels in Europe. Judging from statements in the U.S. Congress over the last year or so, the contrary is the case. The frustration experienced in the United States has been due to fears that the Europeans (as shown by threatened unilateral defense reductions early in 1968) were not willing to pay their fair share of the defense costs. However, in May 1968 NATO Defense Ministers agreed that there should be no unilateral reductions except as part of a pattern of mutual and balanced force reductions. This is now agreed policy in the alliance. Unilateral reductions would diminish NATO strength without providing any incentive to Warsaw Pact countries to follow suit. But to return to the main argument, for their part the Europeans are fully aware of the Congressional views and have noted the U.S. Administration's encouragement of European defense cooperation. On this basis such cooperation should go forward and develop during the 1970's. As Defense Secretary Denis Healey said in a speech to the British Atlantic Committee on November 6, 1968:

> Perhaps the most urgent area in which European Defence cooperation is needed is that which arises from today's events in the United States. Given the pressures for a reduction in America's contribution to NATO to which the last Administration was subjected by public and Congressional opinions, one of the most important problems facing the new American Administration will be to make up its mind on the scale and nature of America's role in the next decade. I believe it is vital that the European members of NATO should put their views in time to Washington on this issue—and I am certain that their views will be far more influential if they are put to Washington collectively than if, as so often in the past, they must be collected piecemeal from the various European capitals by the various American Ambassadors concerned. Europe must present a collective view to Washington not only on the internal problems of the Alliance, but on some of its external problems too. If, as we all hope, the United States is soon able to begin serious discussions with the Soviet Union on stopping the nuclear arms race between the super-powers—and one of the greatest benefits from a settlement in Vietnam could be progress in this area—the European countries will have a vital common concern to ensure that their views and their interests are not overlooked.

President Nixon, in his first European speech as President, when addressing the North Atlantic Council on February 24, 1969, said "we are ending a period of confrontation and entering an era of negotiations."[5] As relations between Moscow and Washington develop, many of the matters discussed will directly affect America's European allies. But the President pledged to the Council "that in any negotiations directly affecting the interests of the NATO nations, there will be full and genuine consultations before and during these negotiations."[6] We welcome this generous offer. But it means that a common European view is all-important, not only to us but also to the U.S. Administration. For the United States to have talked directly to the Soviet Union on matters involving European security without consultation would have had disastrous effects on the unity of the alliance on which we all depend for our security.

The European grouping in which Britain will play her full role, therefore, will have advantages both for us and for the United

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[5] *New York Times,* February 25, 1969, p. 12.

[6] *Ibid.*

States. Because it is unrealistic to expect sudden and large-scale increases in defense by European governments in present circumstances, closer European defense cooperation within NATO is vital in order to maximize efficiency. By exploiting opportunities created by interdependence we can improve the value we get for money spent on defense. Such cooperation should help to create a better balance within the alliance and give the European countries a true sense of participation.

NUCLEAR CONSULTATION

The nuclear strength of the alliance will still have to play the central role in deterring deliberate attack in Western Europe. The American nuclear umbrella is the ultimate deterrent behind which Europe can develop its economies and improve its living standards. Civilization as we know it today can flourish and flower only in a period of stability and security. Our peoples can enjoy and improve their standard of living, which is their due after the privations of previous generations, only if we can ward off the specter of war and annihilation. But again consultation on nuclear matters, in the Nuclear Planning Group, is essential. Decisions on nuclear matters affect European security, and participation in the Group's discussions lessens the temptation to develop national nuclear weapons. The Group associates nonnuclear members of the alliance with nuclear matters and encourages them to a better understanding of nuclear problems. Its effectiveness will depend on the willingness of all countries to participate fully in its work.

A workable strategy of flexible response, which is considered separately in other articles in this special issue, needs both nuclear and conventional forces to play their part in NATO's defensive and deterrent role. It is argued, therefore, that we cannot rely wholly on nuclear deterrence and that conventional forces must complement our posture. Should a limited attack occur, NATO conventional forces will be required to deal with it. If there should be an all-out attack in Europe, NATO must be able to respond with conventional means for long enough to establish that it is full-scale and deliberate and give time to enable diplomatic action to bring the aggressor to his senses. Failing that, the time gained should make it possible for the allies to take the awesome decision to cross the nuclear threshold in full knowledge of the facts.

CONCLUSION

I have outlined the problems which I believe face us in the 1970's and in the solution of which Britain will hope to play a leading role. Britain's closer affiliation with Europe will be as a member of the economic and political community in whatever form it exists. Our aim will be to make this group as outward-looking and liberal as possible, and to ensure that it plays its full part in international trade and assistance to developing countries. Within the alliance Britain will contribute to its strength and solidarity by all the means in her power, to preserve the defense of the North Atlantic area, to deter any attack, and to improve relations between East and West in Europe.

In this article, I have concentrated on Europe and the North Atlantic area. Greater European unity and cooperation in political, economic, defense and technological spheres are of paramount importance on the basis of an enlarged EEC and with Britain as an integral part. But in this role the United Kingdom will continue to give full support to wider international organizations such as the United Nations and its agencies, the OECD, the GATT, the IMF, the World Bank and others which extend their interests well beyond the European continent and on whose success depends the future of humanity.

THE WEST GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

by Hans Gerlach

NATO's strategy for Central Europe will be even more difficult to formulate and implement in the 1970's than it is at present. And no country will find it harder to help plan and execute this strategy than the Federal Republic of Germany. One is tempted to predict, surprising and disturbing though it may be, that unless far-reaching changes take place in West German leadership, Bonn will be the weakest link in the Western alliance in the 1970's.

There are various reasons for such a pessimistic forecast. They stem in the main from the deep division existing between two processes: On the one hand, in the 1970's strategic doctrine in general—including that of NATO—will be changing, developing and unfolding at an ever increasing pace, especially in Central Europe. On the other hand, the current leading groups in the Federal Republic are inclined, to an extraordinary degree, to overlook, play down or deny the increasing pace of change of the modern world in all spheres, including the military and political. These leading groups, ultra-conservative by tradition, are neither ready nor able to adapt themselves to the changes of the day, let alone to help determine them or give them any fresh impetus. As a result, public discussion and development of strategic ideas have been inhibited, lagging behind developments in other countries, particularly in the United States and Britain. Hopes that this gap can be bridged to any noticeable extent over the next few years are only justified if the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1969 result in a change of leadership in Bonn—which has so far not taken place in the Federal Republic.

I

NATO strategy for Central Europe in the 1970's will be determined by the necessity to retain the territorial status quo between West and East under all circumstances. The very thought of redrawing borders is fraught with incalculable risks. Yet this extreme posture of inflexibility can only endure (and with it, peace in this area and thus in the world) if the essential room for maneuver for its preservation is won by flexibility in other fields, those of space, time and object. The daily endeavor to achieve a synthesis of these two antitheses, this indissoluble mixture of the political and the military, represents the new, more comprehensive kind of strategy that is already in evidence today and that will become ever clearer in the 1970's.

What does this mean for Central Europe? Paradoxically, it means first of all that not even here will it be possible to guarantee the status quo of the borders with complete certainty. All the evasions and stopgaps in terms of space, time and object, all these attributes of a new, more comprehensive strategy, can never operate as perfectly as military resistance which goes into action as soon as the border line has been crossed. However, the day of Maginot lines and their deceptive total security is past.

We must therefore adapt ourselves to the fact that a line in Central Europe which has come into being by chance divides us from a wide field of dangerous events, which are incalculable. One can only predict that somewhere in this area, certainly not far away, a zone begins where the apocalypse will be probable and ultimately unavoidable.

This risk does not exist in any other part of the world in this acute form. Yet the 1970's could bring a change. Other areas, perhaps in the Mediterranean, perhaps in Southeast Asia, could become highly inflammable. But it is also possible that Central Europe (and elsewhere) could become more stable, its perceived importance could be reduced, and the dangerous network of mutual claims could be simplified.

All reasonable people will hope that this will be so, and will regard as sensible a strategy which aims, in the first instance, to make this hope a reality. Unfortunately, this view is not yet generally shared in the Federal Republic, least of all in conservative circles.

At present, only the beginnings of such a strategy exist. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin crisis in March certainly did not make the situation any less explosive. Both cases, especially the one concerning Berlin, showed, however, that each side understood that the playing of trump cards had reached a point where possible profit and risk could no longer be brought into line with each other. Nevertheless, it may be expected that the danger of the line between no-war and war in Central Europe being crossed will recede slowly, if at all, in the immediate future.

Even when the line has been crossed there is still a ray of hope, but it disappears quickly the deeper one moves into the field of incalculable events. No one believes any more that there will be a pause for thought between the use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, especially in Central Europe. Circumstances are such that it will be possible to stop the escalation of conventional fighting only if the attacker immediately encounters the strongest resistance on the dividing line between East and West. Only if the aggressor sees himself forced to take a decisive step in escalating the conflict in order to pursue the struggle to a successful end can he be expected to retire to the point from which he started.

The organization of such a promptly effective and tough defense should now be, and most certainly will be in the 1970's, the most important contribution that the West German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*) can make to the functioning of NATO as a force intended to preserve peace. The question arises, why have the Federal armed forces been only partially successful in doing this, and why, in the future too, will they find it difficult to develop the appropriate responses? The reasons for this cannot be sought solely in the *Bundeswehr,* in its history or doctrine. They cannot even be truly grasped by studying the forces' relations with the population, especially with young people. Rather, the way in which the leading circles in the Federal Republic have reacted, or more correctly have failed to react, to strategic changes is indivisibly bound up with the problem.

II

An almost perfect dialectic exists between the perpetual need to maintain a first-class military defense which can quickly and effectively respond to aggression on the border line, and the supraregional strategy designed to prevent nuclear confrontations, reduce tensions and bring peace nearer. Set against the background of traditional German thinking, however, this two-pronged security posture appears as an almost unimaginable contradiction. The Germans find it difficult to be in a state of extreme defense preparedness and, at the same time, to practice a policy honestly aimed at peace. For them the two are incompatible. For this reason the necessary dialectic has thus far been insufficiently understood, let alone accepted, in Germany. Yet for the 1970's, it must be maintained, affirmed and daily lived with.

A second dialectic exists between military potential—soldiers, their weapons, leadership, spirit, and the degree of resolve of the politicians to use them—and the extent to which one has been able to impart the reality of that potential to an opponent. Only the sum of the two determines the effectiveness of the deterrent exerted by the alliance.

In the Federal Republic, the political and psychological problem of this double dialectic has not been adequately recognized, and often it has been deliberately glossed over. Neither the Federal armed forces nor those politically responsible, who must bear the greatest share of the blame for this failure, have taken remedial measures. Only if the present ruling circles take a new look at things and change their perspective, or if they are replaced, will it be possible to avoid the danger that in the 1970's the Federal Republic of Germany will become the weakest link in the Western alliance.

What do these difficulties of adaptation consist of, and how do they manifest themselves? How are they to be overcome? With these considerations in mind, what should be the Federal Republic's contribution to NATO strategy if it wishes to play a useful role in maintaining the alliance as a means of preserving and shaping peace?

If one applies the double dialectic, one will conceive of two tasks, again dialectically linked to form a perfect whole: On the one hand, Bonn must dissipate the Eastern camp's fear of an attack on it and on the status quo of the borders. On the other hand, the Federal Republic's conventional contribution to swift defense on the border must help to impress the opponent with the defensive capability of NATO as a whole.

These two tasks are connected as are the visible and unseen parts of an iceberg. The political strategy of the Federal Republic, the underwater part of the iceberg, must—naturally within the framework of the alliance and as part of its strategy—be so organized and have such an effect on the opponent that he would rarely, if ever, have to be restrained from taking risky decisions by being reminded of the tip of the iceberg, that is, of NATO's military deterrent which includes the Federal forces and the allied troops on the border. Only those who appreciate that the iceberg's tip is completely dependent on its much greater foundation can understand the present difficulties and tensions within the Federal armed forces, can calculate their further development with reasonable accuracy, and can offer advice as to how weaknesses can be overcome.

III

The description of the present situation and the problems connected with it should begin with the (military) tip of the iceberg. It can be seen more clearly and be better judged. Political strategy, while not invisible like the lower part of the iceberg, is harder to outline precisely and to define. Yet it is decisive. Moreover, in evaluating the Federal armed forces the existing psychological gap is far more important than the military-technical potential.

In the last few months a certain impetus has begun to make itself felt and is apparently going in the right direction—toward the creation of an army defense posture that will be effective and swift along the border.[1] The latest developments in the army have been set in motion by its new Inspector, General Schnez. Never before, since the inception of the Federal armed forces, have defensive operational aims been so closely connected with conventional weapons in the immediate area of the border. Schnez has spoken of a mobile border battle, in which the mountains along Germany's eastern border are to be exploited to the fullest extent. He is working on the assumption that modern-day defense against tanks is as effective as the machine-gun was against infantry in the First World War. Lightly armored vehicles have absolutely no chance any longer in open country. An infantry attack in the old style is absurd.

In conventional defense the individual soldier, using simple equipment, has an advantage over the over-technicalized and motorized attacker. Naturally, he must be well trained and in the best of spirits and mental attitude. He must be available in sufficient numbers. This means that the reservists in the Federal Republic, at present a "sleeping army" of about 1,400,000 men, must be used. This will call for increased spending, more officers and more NCO's. Even in the composition of the active

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[1] The West German air force is much less of a problem. As elsewhere in the world, it is by nature more modern and more receptive to new ideas. The air force is already being re-equipped. This consists mainly in shifting the emphasis from the nuclear strike duties of the 1960's under Franz Josef Strauss to conventional cooperation with the army and navy in the 1970's. Nuclear air defense (perhaps also against rockets) and the use of rockets for tactical purposes will continue to be its task in the future.

One cannot speak so positively of the navy. In the field of military technique and tactics, the navy, like the army, has thus far pursued mainly traditional ideals. However, these concerns go too much into technical details for me to deal with them here. The psychological problems I regard as decisive are related to the army.

Federal forces, there is a shortage amounting to almost 40,000 men. In the long run it will prove possible to bring these contradictory demands more or less into line with each other only if Bonn decides to base land defense on three pillars: first, a highly technicalized, mobile and armored force made up of professional soldiers; second, a force of national servicemen trained specially in defense against tanks and infantry; third, a militia along Swiss lines, which can be called together quickly to complement and support the other two pillars. It is unlikely that Schnez proposes to go quite as far as this tripartite organization. Were he to do so, he would have to overcome a deeply-rooted dislike of militia on the part of Germany's military, springing from the authoritarian state traditions of German society.

IV

"The long march through the institutions, announced by the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition, has now reached the Federal Armed Forces." This sentence is contained in the recently published annual report for 1968 of the Armed Forces Commissioner, Hoogen, who is a kind of Ombudsman for the forces. After the universities and the schools, it was to be expected that the armed forces would be the next major target of attack for the left-wing radicals and a large section of the country's alienated young people, who do not appreciate the task of, or see the need for, or indeed approve of, the Federal forces in their present form.

A symptom of this estrangement is the rapid rise in conscientious objectors in the past year. Their numbers rose from 6,000 in 1967 to 12,000 in 1968. And the number of young men applying for recognition as conscientious objectors only after they had been called up has virtually quadrupled: 871 in 1967, and 3,456 in 1968. In explanation of this trend, the Armed Forces Commissioner mentions in his report such things as "general disillusionment with the state," the "inhumanity of modern warfare," and "wrong ideas about the defense tasks of the Federal Armed Forces within the framework of securing peace."

In view of such unprecedented opposition to military service, it would certainly be risky to seek solutions which, in part at least, would issue in a militia system—the gun in the wardrobe. Ideas of this kind—and this is true of Schnez's plans—can be put into effect only when the political leaders present the military mission of the Federal Republic in such a way that young people can grasp and approve it. Those, such as the present leaders of the Federal armed forces, who take it for granted that the national servicemen sacrifice eighteen months of their lives simply because this has always been demanded of them, and because they do not dare to reject the traditions and sanctions of the authoritarian state, are unlikely candidates for introducing reforms.

The extent to which the leaders of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense cling to outdated concepts can be seen, for instance, in the phrasing of the recently published Defense White Paper entitled "The Defense Policy of the Federal Republic." The very words "defense policy" stop one short. This term can be justified only in a wider context. The Federal Republic cannot defend itself alone, but only within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. As we have pointed out, this defense, or better, the capability to defend, is only meaningful if it serves to preserve peace, i.e., as a deterrent. In the final analysis, the shaping of peace must take first place as NATO's real strategic and political task. The White Paper pays too little attention to such considerations.

In this sense, appeals "to the defence readiness of the whole population, above all of its younger members," appear anachronistic. The hopes expressed in the White Paper that there will be "greater readiness to join the forces on the part of young people" and that "the social significance of military service will be recognized" merely betray the extent to which the authors of such clichés still think in terms of the ideas of yesterday. Their formulas reveal that one can only speak to a limited degree of a new start toward real reforms in the armed forces or toward the development of an army such as the Federal Republic and NATO will need in the 1970's.[2]

The outward image of the Federal armed forces—the uniform, conduct and appearance of the German military—is strongly reminiscent of the past. If, nevertheless, the outsider is favorably impressed by it, then this—apart from efforts such as those of General Baudissin—can be put down to personal initiative on the part of progressive forces of all ranks who feel the need to make the armed forces reasonably acceptable to young people.

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[2] Count Baudissin's aim of turning soldiers into citizens in uniform was undoubtedly a step in the right direction, and the most promising yet made. However, it has been criticized and put into effect slowly, and has even been reversed in part. In most cases people pay lip service to it because this is what is required of them and because it is not yet wise to contradict or work against this idea which stems from the first years after 1945.

The opposite attitude of the more conservative and less critical part of the population makes all attempts to divert the armed forces from their traditional course quite difficult. The chances of doing so without a change in power will remain slight. Because it is uncertain whether the 1969 parliamentary elections will bring a shift in power from the conservative to the more progressive forces, the question of the nature of the Federal Republic's contribution to NATO strategy in the 1970's is also difficult to answer now.

If there is no change, it may be expected that the position of the armed forces in society, and above all in the eyes of young people, will be far more difficult than it already is. Some military decisions which have been described here as essential and desirable—for instance, greater emphasis on the militia system—will then, in all probability, not be taken. The necessary inner readiness on the part of the young men concerned will be lacking. Other decisions, especially the technological-military ones, might well be taken, but their significance would be limited because they would not improve the morale of the troops.

If, on the other hand, there is a change of power, new perspectives and possibilities will open up. Another government could make plain to the public, to young people, and especially to the armed forces, how important and, at the same time, how difficult their task is in the unusual geographical and political situation of the Federal Republic of Germany. For the Federal Republic, in the middle of Europe, positioned on the border between West and East and, in addition, hampered by the special burden of West Berlin, the preservation and shaping of peace is literally a question of existence or extinction. The present Federal government has often stated this. However, it has not based its policies on this conclusion in a decisive enough manner, particularly as far as the armed forces are concerned. A future government would have to do this.

This step is all the more pressing because the present Soviet leadership is obviously finding it hard to come to terms with the tensions inside its own country, within the communist camp, and in relation to the world around it, all of which are closely linked with each other.

V

Another government, which really wishes to prepare the West German armed forces for NATO strategy in the 1970's and help them meet the demands of that strategy, would first of all have to devise a definite peace policy. This would be to a great extent identical with the political strategy already mentioned, the wide range of evasions and stopgaps without which the essential status quo of the borders in Central Europe, and in particular in Germany, cannot be maintained. The reform of the armed forces must, therefore, if one puts the matter in its most pointed form, begin outside the forces in the political sphere.

The first priority is the unconditional and convincing acknowledgment of the territorial status quo. Many Germans still find this a difficult step. They rightly feel that it would mean the full recognition of the defeat of 1945. Yet only this step can bring freedom from the burden of Germany's past.

However, this acknowledgment cannot and must not be restricted to the border between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Oder-Neisse Line must also be included, together with assurance from the Federal government that it regards the Munich Agreement, with which the breakup of Czechoslovakia was initiated, as having been illegal and void from the beginning. It is worth mentioning that such an assurance was about to be given at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968.

Finally, there must be an unmistakable and credible renunciation of nuclear ambitions of all kinds. This would be most convincingly documented by the ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The allies could then be pressed all the more vigorously for a reasonable degree of West German participation in all spheres of nuclear planning when the Federal Republic's interests are immediately affected.

If these steps were taken, the Eastern camp would find it difficult to paint the Federal Republic as the international disturber of peace, although its attempts naturally would not stop overnight, and tensions in Central Europe could not be expected to disappear all of a sudden. Even in the most favorable case a long period would be needed to permit a cooling of passions.

Tensions in Central Europe can only be perceptibly diminished if Bonn seriously attempts to put its relations with the German Democratic Republic on a sensible footing. As the price for recognizing East Germany as the second German state, the Federal Republic would have to demand a solution for West Berlin, or for Berlin as a whole, which would meet the interests of all involved. At the same time Bonn would have to negotiate a rational basis for the conduct of relations along the borders between the two German states. Walls and barbed wire do not fit in with the twentieth century or with the special relationship between the two states of the German nation which share a common origin. The result of this would be the renunciation of the effort by one half of Germany to attain reunification by absorbing the other. On the contrary, some kind of fusion of the two parts on the basis of equality and without alteration of the power balance between West and East would be conceivable. A long period of settled existence side by side, of adaptation and getting used to the situation (on the part of the outside world as well), a drawing closer together, and finally perhaps a confederation would have to precede reunification, even in the most favorable circumstances.

As far as one can tell, this process would take decades. However, every step in this direction is progress compared to the present situation. And even the first of these steps would—combined with the recognition of the territorial status quo—decisively alter the political climate in Central Europe. Then, it would be incomparably easier than it is now to prevent crises in Central Europe or to manage them, and to give the Federal armed forces a task plausible to people both at home and abroad because it would be that of preserving peace.

This would make it far easier for the forces and for individual soldiers to come to terms with their lot. The Federal armed forces would be given a convincing task and, within society, a position that would not be open to question. National service would remain a sacrifice, but it would have a purpose and would appear to the individual as a contribution to the preservation and shaping of peace, without which his existence before and after service would be threatened. The arming and training of Federal forces which saw themselves in this light and were seen in the same way by the world about them would be neither a waste of money nor a danger to the stability and peace of Europe. No one would be able to claim convincingly that they were aggressive, nor would one be able to cast doubts on their defensive power and determination.

Naturally, between the two models that have been outlined, that is, between the Federal armed forces as they exist under present conditions and those that would be conceivable if progressive aims were set, many gradations would be possible. Perhaps it would not be a direct danger to the alliance or to peace even if there were no greater change in the armed forces than in the last three years. However, the latter thought applies only to normal times and to a limited period; young people, in particular, feel that the times today are not normal. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia should serve as a reminder that the West faces an opponent that cannot be expected to act rationally at all times and under all circumstances. Unless NATO can rely on the Federal armed forces and the Federal Republic of Germany to a greater degree than at present, the prevention or, if that does not succeed, the management of new and even more serious crises of this kind is likely to be difficult.

The precondition for the better handling of crises would be the new political strategy outlined in this article. Bonn's recognition of the territorial status quo would prevent, or at least remove much of the risk from, many crises. This is especially true of developments in the Eastern camp which affect the status quo. Serious situations, such as that of August 1968, should not be repeated.

The precise nature of what is the best organization, armament and training for Germany's armed forces is a matter for the experts. In accordance with the ideas put forward here, only the content (not the magnitude) of the German contribution to NATO would have to change relatively quickly in important aspects. This is the responsibility of the Germans—the politicians and the electorate. If there is no real change of power in the Federal Republic at the general elections in the autumn of 1969, the allies will have to exert more pressure than before on Bonn to push forward the adaptation of the Federal armed forces to the NATO strategy of the 1970's, as dictated by conditions in Central Europe. The allies should extend understanding and help to a German government that is ready to take these measures.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE*

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

BOTH at the international level and the domestic level, alliances are formed to enable their members to achieve a shared objective. In literature on alliances at the international level, it is almost axiomatic that alliances are formed in response to perceived external threat and are dissolved as the danger from outside diminishes. Hence they are far less enduring than political communities. They are formed, it has been suggested, essentially "against, and only derivatively for, someone or something."[1] Although a "sense of community" may reinforce them, it seldom brings them into existence.

Alliances are formed to enhance the power of one or more allies against another country or countries, for either defensive or offensive goals.[2] A decision to join an alliance is based on the perception of rewards in excess of costs of alignment. Each country considers the marginal utility of membership, as contrasted with unilateral action. Moreover, prospective members are said to conduct a "search for a 'best' alliance [which] is no different in principle from the search for a lowest price."[3] Ultimately, the cohesiveness of an alliance "rests on the relationship between internal and external pressures, bearing on the ratio of gains to liabilities for individual allies."[4] Once costs exceed rewards, the decision to dealign, or to realign, is taken. But crucial to alliance cohesion is the development of an "alliance ideology," whose function is to provide a rationalization for alliance. In performing this function, ideology "feeds on selective memory of the past and outlines a program for the future."[5] Periodic consultation, especially between a leading member and its allies, both on procedural and substantive issues, contributes to the development and preservation of alliance ideology and thus alliance cohesion.

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*The author is indebted, for comments on an earlier draft of this article, to Professors John W. Spanier, University of Florida, and Herbert K. Tillema, University of Houston.

[1] George F. Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 12. For an excellent review of the literature on alliances, see Edwin H. Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance," *International Studies Quarterly,* March 1968, pp. 65-68.

[2] See Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 21; Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 47-54; William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 66-68.

[3] John G. Cross, "Some Theoretic Characteristics of Economic and Political Coalitions," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* June 1967, p. 184; reprinted in Bruce M. Russett, editor, *Economic Theories of International Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), p. 114.

[4] Liska, *op. cit.,* p. 175.

I

Common to literature on NATO has been the assertion that the Soviet threat to Western Europe has declined, and that, therefore, the cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance has been reduced. It was the communist coup of March 1948 in Czechoslovakia which contributed decisively to the formation of the Brussels Pact and, subsequently, the Atlantic Alliance. In light of propositions about the relationship between alliance cohesion and external threat, and the impact of the 1948 Czechoslovak coup on Western security arrangements, it is appropriate to examine how the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 has affected NATO's cohesiveness. In this discussion cohesiveness refers to: (1) a willingness of states to "do great things together," such as creating joint programs of defense or developing common policies or programs toward outside countries; (2) their performance of frequent symbolic acts, such as joint consultation, the issuance of mutually supportive statements, and periodic indications that the military capabilities of one state will be used, if needed, in support of another state; and (3) the existence of a high probability, as perceived by member states, that one state militarily threatened will receive military aid from other members. Given this definition of cohesiveness, it is possible to assess the impact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia upon NATO.

In the period before the invasion, Western perceptions of change in Eastern Europe appear to have had important implications both for the European integration movement and the Atlantic Alliance. The quest for a "normalization" of relations with communist states competed with the movement toward integration in Western Europe and gave impetus to pressures for the reduction of military commitments to NATO. Indeed, the Soviet invasion created consternation among U.S. and NATO officials and policy analysts; few of them had foreseen the events of August

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

1968, for they did not accord with prevailing beliefs about East-West détente.[6]

Whatever its longer-range significance, the Soviet invasion had several immediate effects on the Atlantic Alliance. First, NATO members sought to avoid responses that the Soviets might construe either as provocative or as evidence of an identity of interest between Czechoslovakia and NATO, since the latter pretext had been used as justification for the invasion. Moreover, it revived in the alliance, and especially in the German Federal Republic, fear that the Soviet Union might be tempted to use military power not only elsewhere in Eastern Europe[7] but also in Western Europe. Second, the invasion cast doubt on the assumptions that have guided West European governments, as well as the United States, in policies designed to promote both détente with the Soviet Union and the loosening of communist-bloc ties by means of increased trade and political contacts with East European countries. According to Alain C. Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, "The sudden aggressiveness displayed by the Soviets in invading Czechoslovakia has introduced the dangerous element of increased unpredictability."[8] Mirroring the dismay of a policymaker whose assumptions have been proven wrong by events, Enthoven admitted that: "It is my conclusion, and, of course, the position of the United States Government, that the Soviet Union has now demonstrated a willingness to use force to interfere in the affairs of another state that many persons had hoped was a relic of the past."[9] But the Czechoslovak crisis had yet another effect. It gave new urgency to a reassessment of the adequacy of NATO's force levels, strategic doctrine and organizational structure.

In keeping with the proposition that the cohesiveness of alliances increases in response to perceived external threat, the Soviet invasion engendered a newfound consensus among NATO countries that reductions in troop strength planned before August 1968 should be abandoned or at least postponed. In the United

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[6] See, for example, Harlan Cleveland, "NATO after the Invasion," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1969, pp. 252-254.

[7] This fear apparently led Secretary of State Rusk to warn that Soviet military intervention in Austria or Yugoslavia would pose a direct military threat to Western security, and that a Soviet attack against Rumania would have more serious consequences than the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. *Washington Post*, November 16, 1968.

[8] *New York Times*, November 9, 1968.

[9] *Ibid.*

States, Congressional supporters of the Mansfield Resolution and the Symington Amendment for large-scale withdrawals of U.S. forces from the German Federal Republic shelved their proposals. Unlike the Berlin crisis of 1961, however, when the United States undertook a major military buildup in Western Europe, the initial response of the Johnson Administration was to call for augmented European efforts to meet the established NATO conventional force goals as a prerequisite to the strengthening of U.S. military units. Washington made an increased U.S. military commitment to NATO contingent upon action by West European countries to provide a greater contribution to European defense.

Perhaps the most complete statement of this position was contained in the address of Under Secretary of State Katzenbach to the West European countries, in which he asked them not only to assume a larger share of the "burden of defense," but to achieve a "Western European unity of will and purpose to allocate [their] resources in a more efficient manner."[10] In the Czechoslovak crisis the United States also found another opportunity to urge upon its Western allies the assumption of a greater role in the world beyond Europe. According to Katzenbach:

> As Europe expands its horizons to encompass more of the world, it will make it easier for the United States—which is pressed from all sides for political, economic and military assistance—to rethink its priorities in a reasonable and responsible manner. And it will make it easier for us to continue our commitment to Western Europe as our first priority interest—which it is and clearly should remain.[11]

II

Among NATO military officials, the Soviet invasion gave rise to new fears, or confirmed old apprehensions, about the adequacy of the force levels of the alliance. In a speech to the North Atlantic Treaty Association in Lisbon, on October 15, General Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, declared that the net effect of the Soviet invasion was to strengthen the Warsaw Pact. "The fact is that Soviet forces are today deployed much farther forward. They are in a high state of readiness . . . Soviet divisions are now in Czechoslovakia, on the borders of NATO where they have not been since 1945, and they are there in strength."[12] Before the crisis the Warsaw Pact (960,000 troops) enjoyed only a slight edge in manpower over NATO (900,000 troops). With the arrival in Czechoslovakia of communist-bloc forces, Warsaw Pact troop strength was increased to about 1.2 million. It is estimated that fourteen Soviet divisions, supported by six East German, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Polish divisions, took part in the invasion.[13] By stationing major military forces on the Czech-West German border, the Soviet Union added about 250 miles to the length of the East-West frontier patrolled by Soviet troops. Soviet forces based in Bohemia now stand opposite the U.S. Seventh Army, which is undoubtedly the most modern and the strongest force assigned to NATO. The Soviets have thus reduced the Seventh Army's mobility, since it presumably would not be available for major action elsewhere in Europe so long as the Kremlin maintains sizeable military units in Bohemia.

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[10] *Ibid.*, October 17, 1968.

[11] *Ibid.*

The efficiency with which the Soviet Union was able to move several hundred thousand troops to battle positions for the occupation of Czechoslovakia reinforced fears, especially in the German Federal Republic, about the stability of the military balance in Europe, the adequacy of NATO capabilities, and Soviet intentions. Although the invading force consisted of regular army units, Moscow was quick to move reserves and homeguard units into support positions. The intervention revealed intensive military planning in advance of hostilities, in marked contrast to a minimum of effective political planning for the post-invasion period. If its performance in Czechoslovakia is indicative, the Soviet Union would be able swiftly to deploy major new forces in Central Europe from reserves stationed on Soviet territory, either to halt undesirable changes in other East European countries or to strengthen the Soviet position in the event of a confrontation with the West over, for example, West Berlin. The Czechoslovak crisis points up dramatically the isolation of West Berlin as well as the severe limitations on Western power to come to the aid of the former German capital. In addition, the crisis was notable because of the apparent inability of the Soviet Union to find an alternative political leadership with which to replace Dubcek in the immediate post-invasion period.

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[12] Public Information Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Release No. 68-23: Remarks by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Fourteenth General Assembly of Atlantic Treaty Association, Lisbon, Portugal, October 15, 1968.

[13] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), September 3, 1968; R. Rockingham Gill, "Europe's Military Balance after Czechoslovakia," *East Europe,* October 1968, p. 17. According to Gill: "About six of the Soviet divisions came from East Germany. This implies that the remaining eight must have been drawn from Poland, the Ukraine, and perhaps Hungary. The invading units of the Red Army were then replaced at their original stations by other divisions brought in from Lithuania, Byelorussia and the interior of the Ukraine farther from the Slovak border. The place of these replacement divisions was in turn reported to have been filled by recruits who were called up in midsummer. NATO officials estimate that the total number of Soviet and eastern European troops included in the overall deployment was approximately twice as great as that in the NATO divisions in the Central European sector."

The Soviet invasion raised further doubts about the strategic doctrine of "flexible response" which NATO adopted in November 1967. This strategy calls for the use, initially at least, of conventional forces in the event of a communist attack in Europe. France has opposed such a strategy since allegedly it might tempt Moscow to attack Western Europe without fear that NATO would respond with nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. Indeed, French withdrawal from the military organization of the alliance in 1966-1967 deprived NATO of the defense-in-depth once afforded by supply depots and bases in France. French opposition, together with the reductions in conventional force levels completed or planned before the Czechoslovak crisis, made dubious the credibility of a "flexible response" posture. In October 1968 General Lemnitzer contended that, as a result of the Soviet invasion, the Western allies "would be forced to commit reserves—to include nuclear weapons—at an earlier point in the conflict."[14] Reportedly, the NATO Military Committee discussed the revision of Atlantic strategy to provide for the early use of tactical nuclear weapons.[15] According to Britain's Minister of Defense, Denis Healey, "nuclear escalation would be the only alternative to surrender in case of a major Soviet attack."[16] Con-

[14] Address to North Atlantic Treaty Association, SHAPE Release No. 68-23. In addition, Lemnitzer declared: "The facts are that the Warsaw Pact powers comprise the most formidable conventional armed forces in the world today, that they are backed by plentiful tactical air support and nuclear power, that beyond this there exists a powerful strategic nuclear capability which can inflict catastrophic damage on the West. These capabilities are constantly being improved year by year by the introduction of new and modern weapons and equipment. Their defense budgets increase year by year. In short, they possess a tremendous military capability and potential far beyond that required to defend against the military capabilities of NATO."

[15] *New York Times,* October 11, 17, 1968.

[16] See the article by Denis Healey in this issue of ORBIS. The superiority of communist forces is "so great as to render doubtful any prospect NATO might have of putting up a successful conventional defense for more than a few days." Healey bases his conclusions about respective NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities on data contained in *The Military Balance, 1968-1969* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968), p. 53. For a compilation of official statements in Europe and the United States in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Western European Union Assembly, *Czechoslovakia,* Fourteenth Ordinary Session, Paris, November 1968.

ceivably, the divergence between U.S. and French strategic concepts concerning the defense of Europe may be narrowed in fact, if not in theory, as a result of the Soviet invasion.

III

The Soviet invasion also led to a reassessment of the adequacy of NATO mechanisms for consultation and decision-making. On August 25, Chancellor Kiesinger called for a summit meeting of NATO leaders.[17] Subsequently, the British government proposed the development within NATO of a European caucus to afford a greater "European identity" within the alliance.[18] Such a grouping might make possible increased defense collaboration among principal European powers, and give Western Europe a voice in the alliance less unequal to that of the United States. Beyond the discussion of such proposals, the Czechoslovak crisis is likely to contribute to more concerted efforts within the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to provide detailed plans concerning both strategy and the use of nuclear weapons, at least at the tactical level, in alternative contingencies in Europe. According to Harlan Cleveland:

> But behind the scenes the invasion has brought into being a NATO work program of impressive and exhaustive scope—a book of lessons learned from the invasion about Soviet logistics and mobility and tactics, a special inquiry in the 'warning' issue, a reestimate of Soviet intentions, a complex consultation about the dampening of East-West contacts, a study on the economic implications, a revision of plans for regional arms control proposals, and a new look at NATO's force plans in the light of the new uncertainties.[19]

Reportedly, there was a major effort to complete studies of contingency plans in response to hypothetical Soviet intervention in such nations as Albania, Austria, Finland and Yugoslavia. Such studies, highly classified, were apparently the object of discussion during the NATO Ministerial meeting of November 15-16, 1968.[20] They represented a dramatic change from the period just a few months earlier, when they would have been unthinkable.

IV

Yet another effect of the Czechoslovak crisis was to delay—but not prevent—ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty by the United States. Even before the invasion, France was unwilling to sign the treaty, and both Italy and the Federal Republic had questioned the adequacy of nuclear guarantees for nonnuclear powers, the effects of the treaty upon peacetime nuclear development, and the omission of the so-called European clause which in earlier versions would not have foreclosed the development of a European nuclear force.

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[17] *New York Times*, August 26, 1968.
[18] *Ibid.*, October 9, 1968.
[19] Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 258.
[20] *Washington Post*, November 14, 1968.

In the period immediately after the invasion, the Soviet Union attempted to increase German apprehension about the reliability of Western defense guarantees. On several occasions, the Soviets suggested that Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter permit their intervention in Germany against "renewal of aggressive policy by a former enemy state."[21] They repeated their long-held contention that the Federal Republic has not been "de-Nazified" and that extreme rightist groups are seeking once again to assert themselves, even though East Germany is reputed to have made considerable use of former Nazi officials in administrative and party positions.

Whatever its effect upon NATO, the Soviet campaign against the Federal Republic appears to have been designed to halt West German efforts to establish commercial and political contacts with East European countries and to prevent the spread of "liberalizing" tendencies to other communist states, including East Germany. The Kremlin may also have hoped to justify the Czech invasion by reviving fears of "revanchism" from Germany—a persistent theme in Soviet propaganda against the Federal Republic. Indeed, President de Gaulle took the opportunity afforded by his visit to Bonn in September to place upon the Federal Republic some of the onus for the Soviet invasion. By expanding contacts with East European countries, the West Germans had, in his view, aroused Soviet fear of German influence and had contributed to Moscow's decision to intervene.[22]

This analysis points up the limitations of the Federal Republic's *Ostpolitik,* which, by subtly seeking to undermine Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, may have appeared sufficiently threatening to Moscow to evoke the response of August 21, 1968 in Czechoslovakia.[23] If the Soviets harbor such fears of German policy, they cannot be expected to view with greater equanimity the policies of "peaceful engagement" or of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" espoused respectively by the United States and France. Thus, not the least of the effects of the Soviet invasion was to dim the prospects for evolutionary, peaceful change in Eastern Europe brought about by Western offers of increased trade, cultural exchanges and political contacts. For the Federal Republic, the invasion diminished sharply whatever hope the Germans have held for eventual reunification.

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[21] See *New York Times,* September 19, 1968; *The German Tribune* (Hamburg), September 14, 1968.

[22] *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* October 3, 1968, p. 9.

[23] See Melvin Croan, "Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht, and the German Problem," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1969, pp. 1-7.

V

After the Czechoslovak crisis NATO members took several specific steps to strengthen their collective military capabilities. These may be summarized as follows:

(1) Improvements are to be made in the "quality, effectiveness and deployment of NATO's forces" in order to provide a better capability for forward defense in Europe. In particular, Belgium, which suspended a planned reduction of her six-brigade army by one-third, announced that she would contribute more regular troops. Norway was to increase ammunition stocks. The German Federal Republic planned to allocate more funds for noncommissioned officers, suspend plans to place nine regular battalions on a training status, provide her armed forces with improved firepower, strengthen anti-aircraft defenses against low-level attack, and increase defense spending by $180 million. Greece would make available four new submarines for NATO service in the Mediterranean. Britain was to transfer ships and aircraft to NATO from Southeast Asia, assign another RAF squadron to Germany, and earmark another battalion for NATO. Canada promised to contribute four helicopter-equipped destroyers and two support ships, but in April announced a "planned and phased reduction" of the Canadian military commitment, to begin at the end of 1969.[24] The Netherlands announced that she would complete the re-equipping of her army. Italy was to increase defense spending by $140 million. In addition, the British returned to Germany for maneuvers a 6,000-man brigade withdrawn earlier in 1968 from the British Army of the Rhine.

(2) The conventional capability of the tactical air forces will be increased.

(3) Increased attention will be given to the problems of NATO's flanks, especially in the Mediterranean. In November

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[24] *New York Times,* April 4, 1969.

1968 a NATO Command of Maritime Air Forces for the Mediterranean was established. In January 1969, NATO defense ministers approved the creation of a small Mediterranean naval force, composed of units from Britain, Greece, Italy, Turkey and the United States. Both the air and naval forces are designed for surveillance of the Soviet warships in the Mediterranean.

Either in response to European pledges of augmented commitments to NATO or fear that the military balance was shifting to the Soviet Union, Washington announced on November 14, 1968 that U.S. force levels in Europe would be strengthened. (1) The United States returned to Germany for maneuvers, held between January 20 and February 4, two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division, totaling about 10,000 men, who took part in a massive airlift. However impressive this effort, the question remains whether it could be replicated under combat conditions in Western Europe. (2) U.S. air units in Europe were to be equipped with the F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft, which has proven successful in the Viet Nam war. (3) The Air Force's Rapid Reaction Force based in the United States was to be earmarked for use by General Lemnitzer. (4) Orders deactivating maritime patrol aircraft in Europe were suspended, making the aircraft available for service in the Mediterranean and along other European coastlines which are a part of NATO defenses. (5) Shelters were to be constructed for aircraft based in the German Federal Republic and the Netherlands. (6) The electronic warfare capabilities of U.S. forces in Europe were to be expanded. (7) The United States would step up efforts to improve the combat readiness of the Army's strategic reserve of active duty forces in the United States, three divisions of which have been earmarked for service in Europe.[25] And (8) the proposed withdrawal of 30,000 U.S. troops from Germany was canceled.

In short, according to the conception of cohesiveness set forth above, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia evoked a response which contributed to the cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. Pledges of new commitments, increases in joint consultation, and the issuance of mutually supportive statements were designed to assure member states as well as the Soviet Union of the reliability of alliance guarantees. In addition the prospect seemed less ominous that one or more members might exercise the option, under

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[25] *Ibid.*, November 15, 1968. See also Robert Ranger, "NATO's Reaction to Czechoslovakia: The Strategy of Ambiguous Response," *The World Today*, January 1969, pp. 21-22.

Article 13, to give one year's notice of termination of their membership when the treaty reached its twentieth anniversary.[26]

VI

The NATO response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia lends substance to several propositions about alliance behavior. First, in the presence of perceived external threat, NATO members took steps to increase their force levels and improve the quality of their military capabilities. Moreover, they attempted to make improvements in the planning machinery and consultation procedures within the alliance. Undoubtedly such steps, even of a limited nature, would not have been taken except for the invasion.

But initially at least there was some division within the alliance about whether the Soviet military action was offensive or defensive in nature and, hence, differing estimates of the threat it posed. Especially for the United States the problem arose of the extent to which policies of détente with the Soviet Union should be subordinated to the strengthening of NATO: at a time when Soviet armies were occupying Czechoslovakia it appeared inopportune to U.S. policymakers to ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty and open negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons systems.

Given the European reaction to the August invasion, the perception of threat within Western Europe may have been keener than within the United States. In responding to European requests for the strengthening of NATO, the United States reminded its European allies that they should increase their contribution to the alliance. Large nations, it has been hypothesized, tend to bear disproportionate shares of the burdens of alliances and international organizations.[27] By announcing that strengthened U.S. commitments were contingent upon increased European contributions, the United States sought to reduce its disproportionate share of the burden. Although it continues to bear by far the greatest burden, the European members of NATO will contribute collectively for the first time the major share of the increases upon which agreement was reached at the NATO Ministerial meeting of November 15-16, 1968.[28]

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[26] The NATO Council Communiqué of November 16, 1968 contained the following statement: "Even the Foreign Minister of France recalled that, for its part, unless events in the years to come were to bring about a radical change in East-West relations, the French government considers that the Alliance must continue as long as it appears necessary." *New York Times,* November 17, 1968.

[27] Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *The Review of Economics and Statistics,* August 1966; reprinted in Russett, editor, *op. cit.,* p. 44.

As pointed out earlier, however, alliances endure not only because of perceived threat, but also as a result of the development of "alliance ideology." Although such ideologies may contain an element of external threat, they draw nations together in order to "do great things together," be these military or nonmilitary, and thus increase the cohesiveness of the alliance. The added commitments announced by its members in response to the Czech crisis gave NATO what may be only a temporary infusion of new strength and purpose. It was by no means certain that the Soviet invasion would contribute to an alliance ideology capable of achieving greater NATO cohesiveness in the 1970's. If NATO is to endure beyond the traumatic experience provided by the Soviet military action against Czechoslovakia, it must develop an alliance ideology responsive to the needs of the next decade.

In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, offered the germinal idea of an alliance ideology. He suggested that the United States, as well as its NATO allies, should distinguish between Western conceptions of détente and Soviet conceptions of peaceful coexistence. While Western proponents of détente have striven for a peaceful world based upon security and far-ranging East-West contacts, the Soviets have pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence aimed toward limited agreements but embodying permanent competition by means short of war. According to Brosio:

> In not accepting detente, the clear intent of the communist camp thereby is to hold their grip on their internal regimes and to weaken, divide and infiltrate the social systems of the non-communist countries. The differences between the two policies—peaceful coexistence and detente—is very real and appeared in all its clarity in the Czechoslovak episode, in which the internal changes in the Czechoslovak regime, due of course to spontaneous sources, but encouraged and promoted by the example and comparison coming from intensified Western contacts, threatened to carry the Czech people from the stage of peaceful coexistence to a stage of real detente. It was for that reason brutally stopped by the leading communist country.[29]

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[28] According to Harlan Cleveland: "The new pledges of men, matériel and money, announced at the November 15-16 Ministerial meeting of NATO, were a big step in this direction. And for the first time in Alliance history, the lion's share—80 to 90 per cent of the new effort—was contributed by the Europeans." Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

[29] Speech to North Atlantic Treaty Association Meeting, Lisbon, October 14, 1968.

Brosio contended that contact with the West has contributed to unrest in communist countries. If policies of détente have led to such contact, and hence to unrest and Soviet repression, the West has much to gain from increased interaction with the peoples of Eastern Europe. But the *sine qua non* for Western policies of détente in Europe is an effective security arrangement for the North Atlantic area. Western policies designed to reduce Soviet influence increase the risk of Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe. They also heighten the military danger facing Western Europe, even though the Soviet reaction may be primarily defensive in nature and designed to stem the tide of undesired change rather than to destroy NATO. The weakening of NATO, together with the West's pursuit of policies of détente, might well tempt the Soviets to take more direct action against the West as the perceived source, from their perspective, of much East European restlessness.

But such a rationale for strengthening NATO, however important it may be to the stability of Europe, is not likely to be sufficient in itself to furnish an adequate alliance ideology for the 1970's. Instead, the quest for such an ideology will lead the NATO members once again, as in the 1950's, to seek essentially nonmilitary collaborative actions, for example, in the solution of commonly shared environmental problems.[30] Short of its transformation from an alliance to a political federation, it is by no means certain that a nonmilitary alliance ideology can be implanted successfully into a coalition formed to meet the defense needs of its members.

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[30] See, for example, President Nixon's speech to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, April 10, 1969, and the Communiqué issued by the North Atlantic Council on April 11. *New York Times*, April 11, 12, 1969.

THE USSR, DETENTE AND THE FUTURE OF NATO

by Erling Bjol

IN the discussion of the future of the Atlantic Alliance, little attention has so far been paid to the possibility of formally extending the commitment of members to the alliance for a specified number of years, perhaps ten or twenty. The Italian government for a while toyed with the idea and then gave it up. A Danish security policy study group has envisaged this possibility,[1] and in recent years a number of bilateral assistance agreements in Eastern Europe have been prolonged for periods of twenty years.

Since NATO has now reached the time when member-states, under Article 13 of the treaty, can leave the alliance with one year's notice, the possibility of suspending this article for a certain number of years or of revising it must be considered. Article 13 provides: "After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice of denunciation." In coming years, this article may help to raise doubts about the wisdom of continued membership in NATO in such countries as Denmark and perhaps Canada, where popular attitudes toward the alliance tend to fluctuate with changes in the international situation. For instance, Danish attitudes were altered by the Czechoslovak crisis: before the Soviet invasion a Gallup Poll showed only 38 per cent of respondents in favor of the alliance, with 20 per cent against continued Danish NATO membership, but the figures after the invasion were 54 and 16.

In the years ahead there will be a constant temptation by local politicians and Soviet leaders to exploit such changes in the public mood, and military planning may be hampered by the resulting uncertainties. Moreover, the confusion created by Article 13 in the period after 1969 may have undesirable international repercussions and could have a destabilizing effect on Europe.

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[1] Erling Bjøl, Niels Jørgen Haagerup, Otto Kofoed-Hansen, Erik Reske-Nielsen and Erik Seidenfaden, *Danmark og NATO* (Copenhagen, 1968), and Erling Bjøl, *NATO and Denmark, Cooperation and Conflict* (Stockholm, 1968), No. 2.

I

Soviet behavior patterns strongly indicate that Kremlin foreign policy moves are attuned to emerging situations and opportunities, and above all to changes in power relationships among countries. Whether latent Soviet aspirations become policy goals is closely linked to Soviet perceptions of existing power balances. After the 1917 Revolution the Soviet Union, in a state of military weakness, accepted the independence of Finland, Poland and the Baltic countries since various forms of "counter-power" were present in this region. In contrast, the independent states of the Caucasus were conquered as soon as British power was withdrawn.

Following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement of August 1939, the balance of power in Eastern Europe changed in favor of Moscow, and the Baltic states were seized and incorporated into the Soviet Union. In December 1941, when the German armies approached Moscow, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden visited Stalin and was informed that the Soviet Union was prepared to support any arrangements whereby the United Kingdom might secure bases and other military facilities in European countries—including France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark.[2] Three years later, however, in December 1944, when the Red Army was advancing rapidly along the Baltic coast, V. I. Semenov of the Soviet Foreign Ministry told Th. Døssing, the Danish Ambassador to Moscow, that Denmark was a Soviet sphere of interest and that a postwar Danish foreign policy independent of the Soviet Union would be considered an unfriendly stance. A few weeks later Dekanozov, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, told Døssing:

> We have reports that Danish politicians consider Denmark a British sphere of influence and an Anglo-American military sphere. Against this we must seriously protest. The latter is in no way certain, the first we do not understand at all.[3]

The Soviets in this period seem to have envisaged the possibility of a Danish "Lublin government" in the event Denmark was liberated by the East. Thanks to the rapidity of the British advance to Lubeck this did not happen. The Soviet military presence was limited to the Baltic island of Bornholm, and Moscow accepted a Danish government dominated by the old political parties. In 1946 the Soviets even withdrew from Bornholm, perhaps hoping thereby to make more embarrassing the continued presence of American bases on Greenland, which at that time were considered vital by the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC).

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[2] Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 27.

[3] Jørgen Haestrup, *Hemmelig Alliance* (Copenhagen, 1959), II, 262-265.

This power-pragmatism in Soviet behavior can be illustrated by further examples: Eastern Europe after 1945, Greece, 1944-1948, Berlin, 1948-1949, and Cuba in 1962. It is not surprising since the Soviet government is the only government which, however much its ideology blurs its perception of political trends abroad, has at any given moment a precise assessment of the international balance of power. Whereas Western information on Soviet military strength always contains a degree of guesswork, corresponding information on Western strength is more easily obtainable, and presumably the Soviet government always has data about its own capabilities as well as Western evaluations of these capabilities.

II

The "situation," the "revolutionary situation," the "correct evaluation of the situation," and "the objective factors" are central concepts in the Soviet ideological quarrel with the Chinese, who claim the primacy of "subjective factors," of "the revolutionary will." A situation can, of course, be labeled revolutionary whenever it suits Soviet policy; thus, situations seem to become revolutionary whenever the power situation appears to favor the Soviets—as it did in Eastern Europe in 1945-1948 in the aftermath of the Red Army's conquests. Would not a weakening of NATO after 1969 cause uncertainty in Western Europe and tempt the Soviets to regard the situation as "revolutionary?"

The Soviets interpret the international political and economic scene in the West as the "third stage in the common crisis of capitalism." In this situation they believe the first step toward the "peaceful victory of socialism" in advanced countries (using the Prague coup of 1948 as the model) must be the dissolution of NATO, which "remains the central nucleus" of "the imperialist military blocs."[4] As long as NATO is not weakened, the Soviets can hardly consider the situation in Europe revolutionary. Yet if NATO's life is explicitly extended, would such an act not be contrary to the policy of "détente" which the Harmel Report

[4] N. N. Inozemtsev, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya posle vtoroy mirovoy voyny* (Moscow, 1962), I, 621.

proclaimed to be one of the two pillars of NATO policy, the other being defense?

What is meant by a policy of détente? What are the criteria of a situation of détente? Unfortunately Western statesmen have been vague in their use of the word détente. Sometimes it is used to describe a policy, and at other times to describe a situation in the relations between East and West which is thought to exist. Sometimes the Cuban missile crisis is regarded as a turning point in Soviet policy which has led to the Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty. Sometimes the détente is dated from Khrushchev's doctrine of "peaceful coexistence." Occasionally, internal developments in the Soviet Union, including de-Stalinization and liberalization, are adduced as indications of change in Soviet policy. But, in general, Western readings of Soviet developments have been both eclectic and superficial. There has been a tendency to take into account only those developments that confirmed the trends one wanted to see; like Nelson before Copenhagen, students of Soviet affairs have often put the telescope to the blind eye whenever phenomena contrary to their expectations of détente arose.

How otherwise could the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 have caused such surprise and shock in the West? The description of the international situation in recent years as "détente" was a purely Western enterprise. Time and time again, official Soviet statements stressed that the international situation was characterized by growing tension. The Soviet doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" has always been presented as realizable "between states with different social systems" but not between different ideologies. In the Soviet view Czechoslovakia was a case of ideological subversion, increasingly being employed by the imperialists in the third stage of the crisis of capitalism. In this period the military strength of the socialist bloc makes direct imperialist aggression impossible. In a speech on March 29, 1968, Brezhnev declared: "Since the imperialists dare not risk a frontal conflict with the socialist world, they are trying to weaken its ideological, political unity."

At the root of much Western misunderstanding of Soviet behavior is the failure to recognize that underlying the Soviet interpretation of international politics is a conception of conflict as an aspect of the class struggle. As V. A. Zorin, the Soviet Ambassador to Paris, explains in his textbook for young Soviet diplomats:

"Diplomacy, like any other social phenomenon, cannot be understood without a class struggle approach to it."[5] This notion is not easily grasped by the Western mind, which is strongly impregnated with the Wilsonian idea that conflict is an abnormal deviation from the natural harmony of forces and must be due to mischievous persons, misunderstanding or bad institutions—and can most likely be eliminated through conflict research.

The Soviet idea that conflict is inherent in the international system does not exclude the possibility of compromise on concrete matters of common interest. As Zorin explains: "The use of the reasonable compromise in international negotiations is the most important method of socialist diplomacy to secure peaceful solution of questions in dispute."[6] However, one should not let himself be deceived. For "pacifist propaganda, conclusion of agreements with the aim of putting our vigilance to sleep and disorienting possible opponents" is the second method of imperialist diplomacy, the first one being aggression.

Time and again Western statesmen seem to have been confused by these principles of Soviet diplomacy. When the Soviets are ready for a "reasonable compromise" which serves their interest, such as the Test Ban Treaty or the Nonproliferation Treaty, the West is jubilant and calls it détente. On the other hand, when Soviet leaders refuse to abandon their concept of conflict and class struggle by accepting the status quo—e.g., Khrushchev in his conversations in 1961 with President Kennedy in Vienna—there is tension. These apparent zigzags in Soviet policy are more a creation of the imagination of the West and the inherent tendency of the Western press toward dramatization of issues than an accurate description of Soviet policy, which combines tactical flexibility with strategic continuity.

The concept of "peaceful coexistence" is not in the Soviet view something sensational and new, but, on the contrary, a characteristic of Soviet foreign policy since the days of Lenin, to whom the term—wrongly, as it seems—is attributed.[8] Moreover, Stalin's policy has been described as "peaceful coexistence."[9] This does not mean that post-Stalin Soviet leaders have continued Stalin's policy unchanged. There have been important modifications: in relation to Yugoslavia, Finland, Turkey, and, above all, toward the non-European Third World to which Stalin did not give much attention. But there has also been continuity, particularly in Soviet policy toward Central Europe. Walter Ulbricht, who was Stalin's creation, remains in power in East Germany. In a recent official Soviet monograph on USSR policy toward Germany, Stalin is explicitly mentioned with approval.[10] In spite of modifications in Soviet policy toward Finland since Stalin's death, textbooks used in the Soviet schools still claim that the Finnish-Soviet War of 1939 was initiated by the Finns firing artillery shells on Soviet territory.[11]

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[5] V. A. Zorin, *Osnovy diplomaticheskoy sluzhby* (Moscow, 1964), p. 12.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[8] Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 203.
[9] See, e.g., V. Prokofiev, *Severnaya Evropa i mir* (Moscow, 1966), p. 171.

The Stalinist revival which has taken place in the Soviet Union since the fall of Khrushchev went largely unnoticed in the West until the occupation of Czechoslovakia, which characteristically was preceded by the nomination of Stalin's one-time closest military adviser, General Shtemenko, as Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact. This trend had been visible for a long time in various fields, most obviously in (1) cultural affairs, where restrictions were placed on authors such as Solzhenitsyn and even stricter censorship on Tvardovski's *Novyi Mir;* (2) the creation of the Ministry for Protection of Public Security under N. A. Shchelokov, Brezhnev's close collaborator during his years as Stalin's proconsul in the Moldavian Republic;[12] and (3) the ideological field with the quiet abandonment of Khrushchev's idea of "the state of all the people," the *obshchenarodnoe gosudarstvo,* which seems to have been a way of preparing for the liquidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, an idea incorporated in the action program of the Czech Communist Party prior to August 1968.

III

An effective Western policy is impossible without a realistic understanding of the Soviet belief system concerning world affairs. Some undoubtedly will argue that ideology is of little importance for the understanding of state behavior. This is valid if one attempts to discern Soviet *operational aims* from communist ideology. Perhaps some of the gravest errors in Western policy have been the result of the confusion of Soviet *aims* with Soviet *expec-*

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[10] P. A. Nikolaev, *Politika sovietskogo Soyuza v germanskom voprose 1945-1964* (Moscow, 1966).

[11] I. B. Berkhin, M. I. Belenskiy, M. P. Kim, *Istoria SSSR* (Moscow, 1966), p. 241.

[12] Michel Tatu, *Le pouvoir en URSS* (Paris, 1967), p. 558.

tations. But to ignore Soviet ideology is to ignore the fact that the very basis of the Soviet government's claim to legitimacy and power is ideological, and for that reason it simply cannot afford not to take its own ideology seriously. The relevant question is: What is the function of ideology as a determinant in Soviet policy-making? Marshall Shulman is correct in suggesting that "if the goal of world revolution is operationally irrelevant, the Marxist-Leninist analysis of Western societies with some modifications retains an important function in shaping the perceptions and expectations underlying Soviet diplomacy."[13] In any event, the guide to the correct understanding of world politics contained in the Party Program of 1961 is constantly used even in the most "scholarly" of Soviet analyses of international politics, for example, Inozemtsev's bulky *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya posle vtoroy mirovoy voyny.*

Soviet expectations about world politics can be summarized in a few words: the capitalist world is hostile, and it is doomed. It is doomed because it is the victim of inherent contradictions: contradictions between classes, between underdeveloped and capitalist states, and between capitalist states themselves. Furthermore, fundamental to the so-called third period in the general crisis of capitalism, which according to Soviet ideology started about 1960, is the notion that the capitalist world will eventually be shaken by a major economic crisis, a consequence of its loosening grip on the world market after the liberation of colonial areas which, according to Lenin, formed the basis of the wealth of the West in the last phase of capitalism. Whenever the West acts according to these expectations the orthodox Soviet belief system is strengthened, and whenever it acts contrary to them the credibility of orthodox ideology is weakened.

Such a consideration should not be forgotten when the West is trying to formulate a policy of détente. For the most part, the latter is understood as a policy of negotiation, of contact with the Soviet leaders. Since the Roosevelt period, Western statesmen have believed that if they could only talk to the Soviet leaders, they might resolve major political differences.[14] This has caused much disappointment. Real détente will come only as the result of a change in the Soviet view of the world. This is less likely to be brought about by hurried and superficial personal contacts at the top, which serve mainly to create an illusion of détente, than through the influence Western actions and *behavior* might have on the Soviet world view and Soviet expectations about world politics.

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[13] Marshall Shulman, *Beyond the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 77.

[14] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 799.

In several ways Western behavior has already cast doubt on some of the basic assumptions of Soviet ideology. During and immediately after World War II Soviet leaders seem to have based their policy on the assumption that a catastrophic economic crisis was imminent in the West.[15] The steady economic growth of the Western countries has made this apocalyptic vision less and less credible and has contributed to the erosion of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The reinterpretation of it contained in the Soviet Communist Party Program of 1961 still clings to the expectation of a coming crisis in the capitalist world, now linked to the loss of overseas markets and raw material sources resulting from the "liberation" of the former colonial territories. The Soviet Union attempts to contribute in its own way to this "inevitable outcome," most recently through its policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the bold aim stated in the party program that "between 1961-1970 the Soviet Union will overtake the strongest and richest capitalist country, the United States, in production," has lost all credibility. The creation of a host of new African states has not prevented the countries of the West from enjoying unprecedented economic growth in the 1960's. It is the economy of the Soviet Union that has failed to live up to expectations. The pace of Soviet economic growth has slowed down. Particularly in comparison with Japan, which entered the take-off phase at the same time as the USSR, the Soviet performance of the 1960's has not been impressive.

Certain propaganda instruments make it possible for the Soviet power elite to maintain the myths so essential to the ideological system on which its claim to legitimacy rests. Moreover, the Western press has an inherent tendency to dramatize sensational news in the noncommunist world, such as conflicts and crises and various events which may be described as such. Consequently, the Soviet press never lacks copy which can be used to depict the world according to orthodox Soviet expectations: strikes and demonstrations, conflicts among Western nations, racial violence.

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[15] Jesus Hernandez, *Yo fui un ministro de Stalin* (Mexico City, 1953), p. 339. Shulman, *op.cit.*, p. 32 ff.

We have no certain way of knowing whether the information system for Soviet decision-making functions in the same way as the Soviet press. But it seems likely that it does. Ambassador Zorin's description of the functioning of Soviet missions abroad suggests that Soviet diplomats actually live in a sort of self-created intellectual and social ghetto, with the Western press their principal source of information. Any system of diplomatic information has a built-in resistance to incongruent information. This tendency is well developed in the Soviet system after years of *Gleichschaltung*. Moreover, Soviet propaganda directed toward Western audiences provides evidence that the basic assumptions of Soviet policy do not differ greatly from those reported in the Soviet press.

But a Soviet intellectual elite, primarily in universities and research centers, has direct access to the Western press and is familiar with the shortcomings of the Soviet economic system. Moreover, certain assumptions about economic forces form the substance of Marxist ideology; consequently, the world political ideology of communism is shaky because it rests on economic tenets which are being eroded, due to the unexpected economic vigor of the West and the unexpected difficulties encountered by the Soviet Union in solving the problems of a more sophisticated society. It should not be forgotten that the political liberalization process in Czechoslovakia began with demands for economic reform.

IV

The Soviet belief system does not only presume a coming economic crisis in the West. It also presupposes growing conflicts among the capitalist countries. The extension of NATO for another twenty years would reduce the credibility of this Soviet expectation. But would not this act confirm for the Soviets their presumption of hostility on the part of the Western countries? Perhaps, but this interpretation could be made less credible if the extended commitment to NATO were accompanied by a gesture which could not possibly be perceived as hostile, such as the *de facto* recognition of East Germany (DDR), proclaimed for years as a goal of Soviet diplomacy. Yet, in all probability, such a step would prove embarrassing to the present Soviet leadership.

In the weeks before the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, Bonn seemed to be moving toward *de facto* recognition. At the beginning of August 1968, the first ministerial-level meetings between Bonn and Pankow were being prepared. A meeting between the East German Minister of Foreign Trade, Horst Sölle, and the West German Minister of National Economy, Karl Schiller, would in all probability have been followed by negotiations between the ministers of the postal services; the Federal Republic had for the first time declared itself ready to meet some of the financial claims of the East German postal service. It is conceivable that this German rapprochement may have been one of the reasons for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Similar moves in the spring of 1967 were ended by Soviet political intervention in Berlin.[16]

The West is accustomed to regard the DDR as the perfect satellite of the Soviet Union. This is undoubtedly true in the sense that it has little scope for independent policymaking. One of the principal reasons for the restrictions on its foreign policy is the diplomatic quarantine imposed by the West in the expectation that this would lead to the collapse of the East German regime. The contrary has happened: the DDR has become politically more stable and economically more prosperous since the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. This stabilization has paradoxically also made it better capable of defending its interests against Soviet exploitation which continues to victimize all East European countries. Although the DDR may be an artificial creation, the mere fact that it has lasted for nearly a generation has given its power elite a certain identification with it. This elite, beneath the unchanging figure of Walter Ulbricht, is changing, becoming more "technocratic," more concerned with the task of making an efficient productive unit out of the artificial state.[17] Compared with the Czechs, the East Germans have been remarkably successful in recent years. But this has not prevented a conflict of economic interests between the Soviet Union and the DDR, dramatically pointed up by the suicide of Erich Appel, chief of the East German Economic Planning Agency. In summary, closer relations with the Federal Republic might give the East Germans greater freedom of action.

What the Federal Republic itself does in this matter will be decisive. But the NATO allies could perhaps ease the way for Bonn by promising a new commitment to the alliance over a span of years, a commitment that may seem particularly desirable to a country which more than ever since the occupation of Czechoslovakia feels exposed and vulnerable to Soviet pressure. A new long-term commitment to Germany might be combined with a revision of the clause of the *Alleinvertretungsrecht* of 1954, so as to permit other NATO countries to normalize their relations with East Germany and give the Bonn government a weapon with which to fight emotional domestic opposition against a rapprochement with the DDR.

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[16] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), No. 18, 1967.

[17] Concerning the changes in the East German elite, see particularly Peter Christian Ludz's careful analysis, *Parteielite im Wandel* (Cologne, 1968).

In spite of the fact that such a policy would be in accordance with stated Soviet aims, it would probably prove embarrassing to the Soviets because it might further undermine their control over Eastern Europe. But it would be difficult for Moscow to oppose this policy, and it might even help to diminish Soviet paranoia which has its roots in Tsarist Russia. Such a policy might contribute to internal changes in the Soviet Union which Chancellor Konrad Adenauer thought was the *sine qua non* of a permanent satisfactory solution of the German question,[18] and which is probably the essential ingredient of a genuine détente, i.e., one that does not require a large dose of Western self-delusion.

V

Changes in the Soviet Union are not likely to come about soon. Khrushchev once spoke of the tremendous forces of inertia.[19] When one of the leading Soviet economic reformers whom this author saw in Moscow in 1967 was asked about the prospects of economic reform, he answered wistfully: "The Soviet Union is a very large ship."

And so it is. It is also a ship with its own form of inertia, constructed by a man who was in the clinical sense paranoiac about the outside world. Stalin's policy of economic planning was geared to security; as a consequence, the whole economic and political system is structured for defense. Soviet planning works reasonably well as long as the customer is the state, and hence for defense purposes, but most inefficiently when the customer is the erratic private consumer. There are many groups with a vested interest in keeping things the way they are, and to keep them that way it is useful to have an international situation which can be described as one of "growing tension." When President Eisenhower

[18] Georg Schröder, "Der Alpdruck des Kanzlers," *Die Welt* (Hamburg), April 20, 1967.

[19] Tatu, *op. cit.*, p. 417.

spoke of the influence of the "military-industrial complex" he had in mind the United States. A similar statement could be made about the Soviet Union.

The present Soviet power elite had special reasons for fearing changes of the kind that occurred in Czechoslovakia. It, after all, rose to power under Stalin. Any liberalization that gave greater freedom to the press and intellectuals and that permitted questions to be asked about the past, would prove embarrassing indeed for Brezhnev, Suslov and other Soviet leaders. In the Soviet Union the "Dubcek generation" is weak. Many of its members died on the battlefields of the Second World War. Few are represented in the top leadership, one of them being Shelepin who also began his political career under Stalin. The next generation, which is untraumatized by World War II and Stalin's reign, is still far from power, and it may take it another ten to twenty years to rise to the top. Evgenia Guinzburg thought that her book on Stalin's concentration camps might not be published until around 1980.

Undoubtedly there are forces for change in the Soviet Union, among the youth, academic economists, authors, and scientific elite who kept a hopeful eye on the Czech liberalization process. The Czechoslovak case demonstrated how a system which had maintained a monolithic Stalinist facade for twenty years could be swiftly eroded from the inside. It also confirmed to some extent the process that Marshall Shulman has called "the osmotic influence" of change in Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union.[20] There were indications that the Czech virus was particularly active in the Ukraine, where the party leader, Piotr Shelest, insisted on Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, and pushed through an energetic "ideological counter-offensive" and purification of his party.[21]

If the Soviet reaction to Czechoslovakia is indicative, the present power elite will fight hard to preserve its position, and may be tempted to take more risks in foreign policy—thus providing another reason for the West to extend the life of NATO and strengthen its defenses. Yet a purely military reaction on the part of the West to the occupation of Czechoslovakia might provide a welcome argument for the present Soviet power elite in defense of its Czech policy.

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[20] Shulman, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[21] *Le Monde* (Paris), September 14, 1968.

VI

If it is true, as Chancellor Adenauer believed, that the real condition for détente is internal change in the Soviet Union, the West needs a strategy whose principal objective will be to bring about internal Soviet development in the desired direction. Some suggestions concerning this strategy have been made above. What they really amount to is a strategy which follows one of Cardinal Richelieu's prescriptions for efficient diplomacy: *Gagner le but, comme les rameurs, en lui tournant le dos.* This is a difficult policy for democratic countries to pursue. How can the West have cohesion, strength and determination without hostility? Inertia is so much easier than initiative. The weaknesses of democracy in the conduct of foreign policy were well described by de Tocqueville; they are as old as Demosthenes. Do we not behave as his "barbarian boxer?"

> The barbarian, when struck, always clutches the place; hit him on the other side and there go his hands. He neither knows nor cares how to parry a blow or how to watch his adversary. So you, if you hear of Philip in the Cheronese, vote an expedition there; if at Thermopylae, you vote one there; if somewhere else, you still keep pace with him to and fro. You take your marching orders from him; you have never framed any plan of campaign for yourselves, never foreseen any event, until you learn something has happened or is happening.

Nervously, the West jumps from illusion to frustration and forgets its frustration in new illusion. While the Soviets, in George Kennan's words, are "prepared for a duel of infinite duration," the very idea of a long-term strategy seems exasperating to the West. This may be the principal reason why the idea of a new twenty-year commitment to NATO has not been considered seriously, and would be politically difficult to adopt.

The public little understands the need for the alliance, and among the youth a clear disaffection can be discerned. This could be countered by a change in Western policy toward the DDR and a stronger effort by the NATO allies to maintain respect for human rights and dignity within their own ranks. The action taken in common by the Danish, Norwegian and Dutch governments against Greece before the European Commission of Human Rights has strengthened their prestige among the critical youth. Indications of changes in Portugal can have a positive effect, since another reason for the disaffection among youth is NATO's image as hostile to the forces of change.

Obviously, the Viet Nam war has been vigorously exploited by forces hostile to NATO, this being so much easier since the United States is probably the first country in history to fight a war without imposing press censorship. A new twenty-year commitment to NATO might facilitate an American disengagement in Viet Nam, insofar as one of the reasons for this conflict is said to be the preservation of the credibility of American commitments.

At present, only one country, Britain, seems to be able to take the initiative toward a long-term commitment to NATO with any chance of success. Long-term commitments are politically delicate matters, and assemblies, as the French saying goes, are only motivated to action by fear, which is not the best of climates for long-term planning. Emotion in foreign policymaking is probably the worst single handicap for the democracies. Not only does it prevent them from devising long-term strategies, but it also leads to narrow tactical rigidity. One way to greater political maturity could be to keep the public better informed on political and strategic matters, a sorely neglected aspect of education in the democracies during the past twenty years.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

by Pierre Hassner

DID anything really happen in Czechoslovakia in 1968? Writing in the spring of 1969, in the context of speculating about the future of the Atlantic Alliance, one may be forgiven if one begins to wonder. Certainly, when former President de Gaulle, in his New Year's Eve talk, noted the progress of détente and supported the right of the French-Canadians and the Biafran people to self-determination, yet merely mentioned Eastern Europe and did not refer to Czechoslovakia; or when President Nixon, on his return from his trip to Western Europe, failed to touch on Czechoslovakia in his appraisal of Soviet intentions and world trouble spots, one is tempted to think that changes in Eastern Europe have little impact on the alliances and fortunes of the West. Beyond some practical military measures concerning warning time, a mild show of moral disapproval, a NATO Council session advanced by one month, and a delay of about three months in U.S. ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty, it would seem that the movement of 300,000 Soviet troops into the heart of Europe failed to change the essential political orientation of the Atlantic Alliance: balance and détente as usual.

The need for a military balance in Europe reflects a reality which has remained constant for the last twenty years, but the primacy of détente today originates in the notion of a basic change in East-West relations, caused, in turn, by a basic change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. That change in Eastern Europe will raise implications for the Atlantic Alliance is axiomatic. After all, not only was the alliance itself formed in response to a threat from the East, but the events in Prague in February 1948—which had much less of a military character than those in Prague in August 1968—contributed as much as anything to altering the West's perception of the Soviet Union and bringing the alliance into being. Recently, however, the increased domestic freedom of the East European satellites seemed to indicate a decline in the Soviet threat and a more auspicious opportunity to end the division of Europe, thereby raising the question whether NATO was not becoming militarily unnecessary and politically harmful.

Why, then, does the effect of the dramatic reversal of trends in Eastern Europe—which has been in the making at least since the beginning of 1967 and reached a climax on August 21, 1968—appear to be only a moderation of détentist trends in the West, rather than a reversal of the same magnitude? Perhaps, at the cost of some hair-splitting, the answer can be based on two distinctions: first, between what is occurring in the East and the way it is perceived in the West, and second, between direct implications (negative or positive—threats or opportunities) and indirect ones (positive or negative examples, inducing imitation or contrast).

The contention of this article is that the direct analysis, in terms of threats and opportunities, has to be put in the perspective of intangible and long-range psychological factors, such as the evolution of attitudes within the Atlantic Alliance and its member countries, and the indirect influence of changes in the East upon these attitudes. When relatively sudden changes in the East's policies occur, their perception in the West and the subsequent reaction may be strongly influenced by the West's own independent evolution as well as characterized by an important time lag.

Just as the Atlantic Alliance has been accused of failing to react to de-Stalinization and of missing precious opportunities while guarding against obsolete dangers in 1953 and 1956, so it may be failing to react to re-Stalinization and missing important opportunities while neglecting new dangers in 1968 and 1969. Just as generals are alleged always to fight the last war, public opinion and statesmen may be waging the last détente.

The Atlantic Alliance was based upon what was perceived to be a serious Soviet threat, and a more vague and distant hope of fashioning the basis of a German and European settlement. In recent years the perception of the Soviet threat has receded. That of opportunity has advanced, but with an ambiguity as to whether this was an opportunity for changing the status quo in Eastern Europe and working for European reunification, or for accepting the status quo in Eastern Europe and working for American disengagement. After Prague 1968, the immediate instinctive reaction in the West was that the military threat might have increased and the political opportunity diminished. The movement toward troop reduction and American disengagement was temporarily reversed. The prospects for a Gaullist Europe *de l'Atlantique à l'Oural* and of German *Ostpolitik* suddenly dimmed.

One might have thought in the autumn of 1968 that the rebirth of the Soviet threat would lead the West to make a new effort toward a West European or Atlantic community. However, the prevalent assessment in early 1969 seems to be that the Soviet threat has not increased, and that, if opportunities based on East European independence have vanished, those on negotiations with the Soviet Union or on extra-European matters are as great as ever.

This writer would agree that the threat of a direct Soviet military attack on NATO remains small; that the opportunities for a new Europe based on the Soviet Union's acceptance of Eastern Europe's independence and of its integration with Western Europe remain what they were before August 1968, i.e., nonexistent, only more clearly so; and that, on the other hand, opportunities for bilateral talks with the Soviet Union have, if anything, increased. But I contend that the crucial factor of the Czechoslovakian affair and the months before and after, namely, the crisis of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, should lead to a different Western evaluation of threats and opportunities.

The threat of Soviet force being used in various regions with a high danger of spilling over into a conflict involving the noncommunist world or threatening its security (e.g., in East Germany, Yugoslavia) has considerably increased, and so has the likelihood of the Soviet empire going through violent crises rather than peaceful evolution. In Eastern Europe, hopes for a status quo acceptable to the West are about as unrealistic as earlier hopes of an evolution which would lead the states of the area and the Soviet Union to an East-West reconciliation based on independence and cooperation. Rather, the most likely prospect is a series of unpredictable strains, crises and clashes.

The Soviet Union is both weaker and more dangerous because of the new situation. Consequently, both the need and the opportunity for influencing her toward a behavior less dangerous to peace and less opposed to popular aspirations within and outside her empire exist today more than ever before. The opportunities must be exploited in the context of whatever negotiations are taking place between her and the West and in the light of alternative opportunities which the West has every interest in keeping open, such as a new China policy or a renewed Atlantic, European and German policy.

II

The analysis of change in Eastern Europe has often suffered from failure to distinguish between the basic levels of international reality and to study the dialectics of their interaction. Here as elsewhere, it may be useful to distinguish between the system, the states and the societies—or between the military-territorial balance of the Continent, the political-diplomatic combinations of states, and the ideological, social and economic evolution of societies. Many Western expectations were based on an incorrect estimate of Eastern realities because they relied on extrapolating trends that were real enough at one level, but failed to envisage the counterreactions of the opposing factors or trends which were no less real at other levels.

Their coexistence does not mean, however, that various periods have not seen one level or the other occupy the limelight or exert a more dynamic or decisive action than the others. If one looks at the first level, the territorial and military one, one might conclude that nothing has changed since 1945. All talk about the end of the postwar world notwithstanding, the European system is still characterized, from the point of view of security, by the direct presence of the two superpowers, their military balance, and the division of the Continent, Germany and Berlin.

The more this balance has been observed as stable and the more the confrontation of the two superpowers has seemed to evolve into an ambiguous relationship of mutual acceptance and "cooperative bipolarity," the more a second level has begun to emerge: that of polycentrism, competing national interests and diplomatic flexibility. Once the two leading powers no longer seemed to regard or brand each other as an immediate threat, their allies and satellites had lost at least one basic reason for accepting an unconditional and automatic alignment. Hence the exploratory groping and maneuvering toward new combinations both within and outside the existing blocs, symbolized by French and Rumanian diplomacy.

On a third level, more constant and hidden but ultimately less easy to control or to stop, runs the subterranean stream through which societies, attitudes and beliefs are transformed. Sometimes, as in 1968, it suddenly bursts into the open, revealing a gap between institutions and expectations, or between generations of the same country, or between countries of the same bloc.

During the protracted Cold War, the territorial division of

Europe and the military domination of its Eastern half by the Soviet Union appeared as almost the only factor. Then, in the years 1962 to 1967, the opposition and the initiatives, the speeches and the travels, by French and Rumanian leaders made the headlines and, toward the end of the period, indirectly challenged the system by their impact on the two Germanys. The establishment of diplomatic ties between the Federal Republic and Rumania, and the intense and effective East German reaction, represented a landmark which foreshadowed some of the aspects of the Czechoslovak crisis.

The real meaning of 1968, however, lies in the relative cutting down to size of the second, diplomatic level, or of polycentric nationalism, both through the spectacular emergence of the third level and the no less spectacular reassertion of the first. On the one hand, both the French and Czechoslovak "springs" show the fundamental importance, even for international affairs, of domestic tensions and transformations. On the other hand, both the French and Czechoslovak "summers" show the conservative and reactive power of the established structures, provided their leaders are ready to use force. In the East, while philosophically, or in the long run, the communist order has suffered a defeat because of the Czechoslovak "spring" and the impossibility of giving any respectable ideological or political legitimacy to the imperial repression, it is no less true that with such defeats the Soviet Union does not need victories. In the long run the Soviet empire may be dead, but in the short run it is the autonomous evolution of Eastern Europe which has been much more seriously wounded. The Soviet Union can suppress in its satellites neither the desire for national independence nor the aspiration to participate in the worldwide spiritual, cultural, technological and economic dialogue, but it is able to slow them down, to repress them, or to silence them, to make it clear that the ultimate limits both of Eastern Europe's global evolution and of the initiatives taken by its various countries are set by the Kremlin.

The Soviet Union's basic priority in Europe is to keep what she has. Her policy, especially since Khrushchev's fall but even as far back as Stalin's death, has been to react to threats (e.g., the disintegration of her empire) and to opportunities (e.g., the disintegration of the Western alliance) that were essentially provided by others who had initiated the dynamics of change. The point is that in the decisive clashes of 1956 and 1968 these dynamics have faltered when opposed by Soviet military might.

Moreover, the Soviet Union, while cautiously trying to expand her sphere and to prevent the organization of the West and exploit its divisions, has always preferred to consolidate the bloc when it appeared to be in danger rather than take the risk of an unpredictable evolution in order to achieve hypothetical gains in the wider European setting. In other words, while the ideal situation for her would be the dissolution of NATO and the preservation of the Warsaw Pact (or of some equivalent based on bilateral treaties but preserving the reality of domination), she has preferred their joint maintenance to the risks of their joint disappearance.

Hence, none of the alternatives to NATO, whether the return to a balance of power based on the nation-states' ability to assert their independence, or an agreement on disengagement and collective security, has had any chance of coming to pass. Of the three basic changes in Europe which appeared to make the system of the two alliances obsolete—domestic changes in, or at least in the image of, the Soviet Union, as a consequence of de-Stalinization; the increased ability of small powers to challenge their leaders; and the increasing inclination of the two superpowers to cooperate—all have been shattered by the Czechoslovak intervention, albeit in different degrees.

To a great extent the freedom of action of the small is a function of the tolerance of the great. The change in the Soviet Union, her *embourgeoisement* or Westernization, have not prevailed, with respect to Eastern Europe, over ideological dogmatism as a principle of legitimacy, over great-power hegemony as a principle of foreign policy, or over the self-preservation of the CPSU ruling group as the ultimate criterion for vital decisions. Indeed, in these three aspects of policy Soviet leaders have mounted a full-swing counteroffensive under the impact of the broader changes and challenges.

If, however, the image of the Soviet Union in the West, especially in the United States, somehow fails for the time being to reflect this counteroffensive in spite of August 21, it is not only because of the time lag in the shaping and reshaping of images. It is perhaps, above all, because in the West there is a growing desire to turn away from a militant East-West confrontation in Europe in favor of concentrating on domestic affairs, especially in the United States; and increased attention in Europe on gaining greater independence from America and on the rivalry involving Germany, Britain and France. In short, the

Western powers *need* a belief in a changed, peaceful, satisfied or disengaging Soviet Union.

The third element—the trend to superpower cooperation—remains the least affected by recent events. In the West, it is widely assumed that this cooperation is possible because the Soviet Union has changed, but this favorable change can no longer be presented as a willingness to disengage or to settle Europe's problems. As far as Europe is concerned, the whole matter boils down to the fact that the Soviets are not willing to challenge the status quo by military means, a situation which was even more markedly true of Stalin after 1948 than of his present heirs. We have decided that the Soviet Union has changed, but in reality it is we who have changed. The détente continues because the West tends to move away from treating it as a means to challenge peacefully the division of Europe toward treating it as a tacit or explicit acceptance of this division.[1]

This was particularly striking in General de Gaulle's policy. The plan of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" hesitated between a call to the East Europeans to assert their independence and a call to the Soviet Union to engage in a dialogue with France. To succeed it needed an element of each, i.e., an agreement by the Soviet Union to replace her direct rule over Eastern Europe, which had as its counterpart American rule over Western Europe, by a more relaxed and moderate influence in Eastern Europe, to be compensated by a greater influence in Western Europe. This was to be achieved by the breakup of the two alliances, the military disengagement of the two superpowers, and the replacement of the present structure by a looser political one based on Franco-Soviet cooperation and influence. Whether the emphasis was on the increased independence of Eastern Europe or on Franco-Soviet cooperation, the postulate was the irresistible character of national will or the prevalence of national interest over ideology—a national interest which was supposed to prompt Russia to disengage because of threats from China, difficulties in Eastern Europe, and opportunities provided by a dissolution of NATO. In the final analysis, the Soviet brand of conservative power, inspired or rationalized by ideological dogma, was immune to every temptation to grant independence to the satellites or to choose a partnership with France as an alternative to the present system.

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[1] On the distinction between the two types of détente and of Soviet-American understanding, see the author's "Germany, Russia and the West, The Debate Proceeds," *The Economist*, November 13, 1965, and Richard Lowenthal, "Can We Make Common Cause with Russia?," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 21, 1965.

The Soviet Union is not prevented, of course, from using France in the opposite function, as the instrument for consolidating the present system. The French, in explaining the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and justifying their own mild reaction to it and their belief that there is no alternative to détente, stress the role of China: Fear of China is now given as the reason for the Soviet Union's efforts to consolidate her rule in Eastern Europe and favor an understanding with the United States, whereas earlier it was thought this fear was forcing her to disengage from Eastern Europe and to reach an agreement with the West Europeans rather than with the Americans. Hence, the French détente policy, instead of presenting itself as a challenge to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and to the Soviet-American dialogue,has come to accept both and, indirectly, to encourage them. The common element is the minimizing of the Soviet threat to European peace and security.

Once he decided to continue to bet on détente, de Gaulle was put in the position of being an ally of "the two hegemonies" against the smaller states of Europe, because what has emerged in Europe is neither a mutual disengagement of the superpowers nor a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, but a Europe whose two halves are essentially subordinated to the basic structure characterized by the Soviet-American-German triangle—i.e., by a situation in which the two superpowers are present on the soil of a divided Germany. This presence of the two great powers is determined above all by the desire to contain or to balance each other and to prevent Germany from becoming dangerous either by means of its own power, its alliance with the other superpower, or a conflict between its two halves. For each of the two great powers, the real power and danger of the other and the potential power and danger of Germany are the two decisive factors for European security—just as the potential power and danger of China affects the security of Asia.

Both the diplomatic initiatives and the social and ideological evolution and revolutions of Western and Eastern Europe—unless they lead (in the case of Western Europe) to the creation of a new unit that would modify the rules of the game—are of decisive importance only to the extent to which they modify the way the United States and the Soviet Union evaluate their respective relations with each other and with Germany. In a similar way, in Asia, despite Japan's superior economic power and India's enormous problems, these two countries are considered by the Soviet Union and the United States essentially in their political and military relationship to the Chinese threat and to the other superpower.

III

Two conclusions can be drawn as to the possible implications of change in Eastern Europe for the Atlantic Alliance. First, on both sides what happens in Europe, and especially to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is likely to be less a cause than a consequence of the policies of the Soviet Union and the United States. These in turn are likely to be influenced, above all, by domestic developments in both countries, the strategic balance and arms race, and extra-European factors, such as their relative priorities and alignments in appeasing, containing or isolating one another and China and in preventing Germany from becoming an explosive problem.

Second, to the extent to which events in other European countries do act as a cause able to modify these alignments, priorities and interests, it will be largely in an indirect way, by acting as examples or provoking crises. If these developments occur in Eastern Europe, the Kremlin will react on the basis of their possible impact on the evolution of the USSR itself or Germany. It was Czechoslovakia's misfortune (as compared, for instance, to Rumania) that her geographical situation and the nature of her domestic developments put her in the most dangerous position from both points of view. She is not only a member of the "northern tier" or "first strategic echelon" of the Warsaw Pact whose inclination to be less bound to Moscow threatened to weaken an essential link between East Germany and the Soviet Union, but her domestic evolution was likely to be infectious among intellectuals in both countries and among many other potential opposition groups, such as the Ukrainian minority. But the same reasons that made it more dangerous for the Soviet Union to tolerate this type of heresy in Czechoslovakia than almost any other deviation in any other context, also show most clearly the inevitable tensions and crises which an even half-successful intervention and repression—even if it brings no serious reactions from the outside world—produces in the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself.

The Soviet resort to force has shown the fallacy of jumping from the historical defeat of the Soviet empire to concluding that its peaceful disintegration is inevitable, although it has confirmed the long-range historical verdict. The ideas of Soviet disengagement or of Eastern Europe winning independence through a successful rebellion have proved unworkable because the essentially static security structure of the Continent enables the Soviet Union to exert its overwhelming physical superiority with impunity. But the status quo based on a return to Stalinist rigidity, or the long-range peaceful transformation of the entire Soviet camp through détente and East-West contacts, has proved just as unworkable. The essential point is the inevitable clash between, on the one hand, the political-military power structure and, on the other hand, popular aspirations to freedom and independence and the universal trends of social and economic evolution.

This discrepancy between levels characterizes, to a certain extent, the European structure as a whole. But in the West, while the dream of an Atlantic Community is probably damaged beyond repair, social, cultural and economic ties provide a framework that limits political clashes and sharp divisions. Although political separation, as shown by the case of France or by the divergent outlook of Americans and Europeans on the Viet Nam war, is a real danger, nonpolitical interdependence is growing. In the East, the natural tendency of societies, and of those states where the government has genuine popular support, is to grow apart, yet the Soviet Union has no intention of disengaging or granting a divorce when asked by her allies—she can always rule by force, but only by force.

In the West, despite a certain discrepancy between the military sphere where the United States is preponderant and the economic sphere which is more balanced, and despite contradictions between growing social interdependence and growing aspirations to political independence, there is room for flexibility and compromise because the different trends are not flatly and inevitably antagonistic. In the East, they are.

This is why the idea of the two halves of Europe and the two superpowers harmoniously converging into a community of developed nations under the influence of technological determinism and multilateral institutions is as illusory as the symmetrical breakup of the two alliances. As soon as the process of détente and convergence sets in, East European states with a democratic or Western tradition and an urgent need and thirst for the outside world, especially the West, will tend to go too far for the comfort of the Soviet Union. There is a real gap between a country like Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union when it comes to Europeanization or modernization. A law of uneven political development emerges, by which contacts and evolution, insufficient for Czechoslovakia, are already too much for Brezhnev and Ulbricht. Evolution will never go far enough, out of fear of its going too far.

The tragedy is that the least open society is also the strongest. It is not Eastern Europe which drags the Soviet Union into Europe; it is the Soviet Union which keeps Eastern Europe out of Europe. On the other hand, a system based on cycles of liberalization and repression must lead to explosions, unless the leading power succeeds in bridging the gap between itself and its colonies, either by assimilating them or by being assimilated by them. This is especially difficult when one can argue that the more developed countries are colonized by a less developed one (an extreme case of what sociologists like J. Galtung call "rank disequilibrium" which must produce revolution and aggression) and when the rulers of the backward colonizer have a vested interest in not having their state follow the path opened by the more advanced colony.

The same type of contradictions that exists between the Soviet Union and the satellites exists also within the Soviet Union itself, between the party leadership and several social groups impatient with the essentially bureaucratic, unimaginative and reactionary character of the ruling group.

We cannot know how long the crisis of the Soviet empire will continue to take the form of a colonial struggle between the ruling power and its satellites, or whether the inner contradictions of the Soviet Union will lead to the crisis which alone can be decisive for Eastern Europe. But what seems certain is that the Soviet world has entered a period of unpredictability and struggle, with no possibility of solving the conflicts either by recreating unity or by admitting separation, and with even less of a chance for a pluralistic toleration of differences within a common framework. Both a stable order and a peaceful evolution seem excluded, unless the USSR first passes through a series of crises, whether cyclical or cumulative. Prospects for meaningful negotiations on European security are likewise bleak until then.

IV

If this analysis is true, then the most meaningful lessons the

West can draw from events in Eastern Europe are the reconfirmation of bipolarity in Europe and the necessity of the Atlantic Alliance, and the reassertion of both Soviet power and its tendency to be used brutally but defensively, to keep satellites in line rather than to acquire new ones. Indeed, the lesson lies precisely in the challenge to the prevailing distinctions between the offensive and the defensive use of force, and to the growing acceptance of a clear-cut distinction between what happens within and outside a great power's sphere of influence.

In her struggle against popular aspirations, it may be said that the Soviet Union is primarily concerned with maintaining her authority in her own sphere, but the dynamic and open-ended character of the struggle gives it an inescapable international dimension. The forces against which the Soviet Union struggles are largely encouraged by the example of independent socialist countries like Yugoslavia, the cultural influence of the West, and the absence of a threatening enemy to use as a scapegoat for unifying the bloc. Hence the present efforts for discouraging contacts, the attacks on Yugoslavia, the hostility toward West Germany, and the psychological buildup against the Chinese enemy.

Before 1968 the Soviet Union had two contradictory détente policies—toward the United States against its Western allies by means of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and toward the Europeans against the United States by means of the European security conference. Both had one goal in common: the isolation of West Germany. But both, while involving no intention of abandoning Eastern Europe, implied the encouragement or the toleration of contacts between the region and the countries toward which the policy of détente was aimed. Today, the Soviet Union wants to continue and even to increase her rapprochement both with the United States and with France bilaterally, and with the West as a whole; but, as compensation for her good will on strategic weapons or on Viet Nam, and for her moderation in the Middle East or in Latin America, she wants to be able to retain complete and exclusive control in Eastern Europe. She wants to accomplish this by encouraging centralization and discouraging contacts with the West, and waging violent ideological warfare against "the imperialist camp." In other words, as far as Europe is concerned, she wants to get "after Czechoslovakia" the same advantages she would have secured before—e.g., the Nonproliferation Treaty, a legitimizing link and advantageous bilateral commercial ties with

France, and a collective legitimization through the European security conference—without having to pay the price of a modest toleration, a loosening up and an opening of Eastern Europe to the outside world.

These measures, while enough to prevent East European countries from seceding, are not sufficient to stop the decolonialization crisis. This being the case, no tacit agreement on spheres of influence can guarantee against the conflicts within those spheres escalating or spilling over into the outside world. On the levels of ideology and power, the challenges to Soviet authority are met by counterreaction and escalation in the opposite direction. Just as the growth of skepticism produces the counteroffensive of bigotry, and the growth of polycentrism the counteroffensive of centralization, so, once the decision is taken to oppose the divisive trends by force, its ideological justification and its political use go beyond what existed before.

The new doctrines of the "socialist commonwealth" and "limited sovereignty" are not merely a rationalization of the August invasion: they apply to other socialist states, including nonaligned ones such as Yugoslavia, and they can have implications reaching to Berlin and the pro-Soviet Arab states. The invasion was followed not only by expressions of Kremlin satisfaction at having proved the strength and resolve of the Soviet Union but by a more threatening attitude toward other communist states and West Germany by claiming the right of intervention based on two forgotten articles of the UN Charter. It has been pointed out that this is the third type of "just war"—the other two being wars of national liberation and of intervention in socialist countries recognized by the Soviet Union, and defensive wars which are the only ones recognized by the West. The publicity given to border incidents with Communist China probably serves the double purpose of preventing a Sino-Western realignment and providing the bloc with a new enemy and a new pretext for centralization, but it carries obvious dangers through potential escalation and important implications for relations with the West.

All these defensive moves have their own dynamics, a sort of reactive imperialism. While aggression against the West is unlikely, the Soviets could look to a dynamic conception of the socialist commonwealth which, in principle, could extend to include Belgrade and the "socialist" Arab countries. A direct clash with the United States is excluded; indirect struggle is not. A frontal attack against America's European allies is prevented by her commitment and physical presence; pressure on neutrals is not. Help for world revolution on "three continents" is minimized; diplomatic and military expansion into traditionally coveted neighboring countries is pursued. If nonaligned countries are more exposed because they are less protected by the United States, and socialist countries are exposed because they are needed more by the Soviet Union, the position of socialist nonaligned or quasi-nonaligned countries, like Yugoslavia, Rumania and Albania, is precarious indeed. It is the general unpredictability of the Soviet Union, at the various levels of the collective leadership itself and of its relations with Soviet society and the outside world, which leads to the conclusion that the present period, far from producing a grand and final stabilization on the basis of division or condominium, represents for the West one of enlarged danger and possibly of increased opportunities.

V

For the Atlantic Alliance, at any rate, recent developments in Eastern Europe certainly have confirmed some old tasks and suggested some new ones.

First, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the renewed emphasis on the division into two camps has re-emphasized the meaning of alliance and the value of direct commitment through physical presence as opposed to nonalignment or to vague universal guarantees, formal or informal. Since August 21, Henry Kissinger's famous sentences have become less valid: "We live in a strange world where neutrals enjoy most of the protection of allies and allies aspire to have the same freedom of action as do neutrals. . . . A country gains little by being allied and risks little by being neutral."[2] All of a sudden, the difference between Czechoslovakia and Rumania, or even between Yugoslavia, Albania, Finland and Austria on the one hand, and the NATO European countries on the other, were made brutally obvious. The feeling of insecurity among the small neutral powers along the periphery of the Soviet bloc, contrasted with the feeling of security in the countries protected by the presence of American power, could not have been more striking. Whether France, Norway or Denmark, without this object lesson, would have renounced the alliance in 1969 is doubtful. (France is known to have toyed with the idea, but is believed to have given it up in the spring of 1968, in the face of unfavorable developments at home and the lack of favorable developments in the East.) Certainly any thought of doing so disappeared in all NATO members after August 21.

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[2] Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 16, 18.

On the other hand, paradoxically, the same event which vindicated the alliance by showing the difference in psychological security between allies and neutrals, also gave it the new task of bridging this gap by extending its umbrella to the latter. If Europe is the safest continent from the point of view of a deliberate or accidental East-West war, it is because the two alliances tie the local balance to the central, strategic one so tightly, through the physical presence of the two superpowers, that war is prevented by the certainty of its escalating into general war or at least into war involving the United States and the Soviet Union. From the point of view of avoiding war (as distinct from avoiding revolution or satisfying the popular desires for unity, freedom and independence), the safest solution would certainly be for the United States and the Soviet Union to face each other, as in Germany, along a military line.

This is not the case in the world at large. Nor is it, as people were reminded suddenly on August 21, quite the case in Europe. The "Third World"—the famous "gray areas," whose security had produced so many headaches over so long a time—was present in Europe, in the guise of the small neutral countries. Some of them are socialist, but fiercely independent, like Yugoslavia; others are Western-oriented domestically but already mindful of Moscow's wishes in vital matters, like Finland. To give them the protection West Germany enjoys would have been beyond U.S. and NATO capabilities and interests and would also have negated the distinction between allies, neutrals and nonaligned states. It is easy to see how the violation of their sovereignty, the use of force against them, or their incorporation in the Soviet bloc would challenge the European status quo, and how it would modify the military and especially the psychological and political conditions of European security and East-West relations.

From this dilemma emerged the course actually chosen by the United States and NATO, aptly called the strategy of "ambiguous response."[3] Based both on diplomatic tradition and on modern conditions of deterrence and crisis management, the policy consisted of expressing interest in the fate of these countries, partly officially, partly through carefully planted leaks; suggesting that an attack on them would modify the European situation and be met with displeasure and heightened concern; and not discouraging speculation about providing effective help to Yugoslavia of the same nature as Soviet help to North Viet Nam, without, however, making a specific threat or entering into a precise commitment. After some hesitation, this strategy was pursued, starting with President Johnson's San Antonio reference to Rumania on August 30 and going on to the November NATO meeting, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach's visit to Belgrade, and Secretary of State Rusk's speech of November 15. It was carried out with a skill that contrasts favorably with the lamentable passivity shown in the weeks preceding and the days following the Czech invasion.

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[3] See the excellent analysis by Robert Ranger, "NATO's Reaction to Czechoslovakia: The Strategy of Ambiguous Response," *The World Today,* January 1969, pp. 19-26.

Even this prudent course has been criticized as a bluff. The argument is that "it is dubious wisdom to embrace marginal areas now," the price of stability being "abstention from helping many whom we would like to help and considerable exertion to protect ourselves."[4] Surely, such an all-or-nothing policy, involving a complete disinterest in the security of any country or region not part of the alliance—from India and the Middle East to countries situated in the heart of Europe—would not only be impossible and disastrous in practice, but would fly in the face of the essential political-military lesson of our time: that interests, alignments, deterrence, security have to be seen as matters of degree. Just as "bloc-ness" (as the Soviet reaction in Viet Nam and Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence* have taught us) is a matter of degree; just as some countries are more allied or identified with the leader and others are more "nonaligned for or against" one side than another; just as some interests have to be protected at almost any cost, some at some risk, and some will be easily abandoned—so the strategies of commitment and the degree of protection they offer will vary between the maximum of self-protection and the minimum of disinterest, ranging through significant thresholds such as physical presence, alliance pledges, unilateral guarantees to neutrals, and informal messages concerning the likely indirect consequences of the opponent's behavior in his own sphere. From expressing "His Majesty's concern" to tacit signs of interest, from retortion in kind to warnings about the unfavorable consequences of a given action, the possibilities of indirect, limited action are sufficiently understood to make nonsense of the idea that the only way to protect our allies is to wash our hands completely of what happens everywhere else. That graduated diplomatic involvement may, in the last analysis, lead to military crisis in case both sides are interested in a given country's security is a fact of life making communication in advance even more necessary.

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[4] Laurence Martin, "Tough—or Bluff?," *The Spectator,* November 22, 1968.

This is particularly true of Europe, including Eastern Europe, if our analysis of trends in the international system at large and in the Soviet empire has any validity. If, as we have argued, the present situation is characterized neither by a return to strict bipolarity, nor by its replacement through convergence or polycentrism, but by some combination of the three, coexistence can work only if the two leaders of the alliances include, in their negotiations and communications, not only their mutual relations and what happens in third areas, but in an obviously more discrete and limited way, what happens in each other's spheres as well. The coexistence of superpowers with each other must involve their coexistence with their respective allies and neighbors. Precisely because active cooperation and negotiation in some bilateral matters is necessary—for example, with respect to strategic weapons—an alliance policy of "each a master in his own house" must be replaced by mutual involvement in the service of mutual restraint. Exclusive preoccupation with one's own sphere is especially dangerous if it means absorption in domestic social problems and passivity in foreign affairs for one side, and colonial or civil crisis and possibly expanding strife for the other.

This may be the case in Europe, where recent events have shown how much a common understanding on the meaning and limits of influence, security, sovereignty, and the use of force was needed, yet lacking—and how superficially stable a status quo may be which might permit the use of Soviet force against Yugoslavia or East Germany.[5] In the short run, attempts to make progress on these ground rules of coexistence—from preventing a second intervention in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere in Eastern Europe, through guarantees for intra-German circulation or for Berlin, to possible talks on arms control—should be part of East-

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[5] On the ambiguities and traps of status-quo thinking as applied to Eastern Europe, see Anatol Shub, "The Lessons of Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1969, pp. 272-277.

West negotiations.[6] In the longer run, especially if the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations is followed by domestic transformation in the Soviet Union, steps toward a European settlement may be taken—provided other developments in the West, like the growth of a cohesive European entity born within NATO and capable one day of living its own life, create the preconditions for an alternative to the present balance.

In spite of the Harmel plan, neither immediate détente nor a long-range settlement is primarily the task of NATO as such. But both involve the members of the alliance, particularly the United States, giving priority to an active and coordinated European policy. Negotiations on European security should be encouraged, provided the West enters them with its own proposals, including steps to protect peaceful change, rather than as a party to legitimizing the political status quo and the use of force by the Soviet Union.

Similarly, bilateral Soviet-American negotiations are highly desirable, provided the United States does not close its eyes to the fact that, for once, it enjoys a greater number of options, and, hence, a stronger bargaining position, than the Soviet Union. First, the economic burden of the arms race (if not the psychological one) bears much harder on the USSR. Second, yesterday the United States, paralyzed by Viet Nam, was singlemindedly seeking a dialogue with the Soviet Union at all costs, while the latter could appeal to America's allies or favor a more militant strategy. Today, the United States has the options of an opening toward China or a return to a greater emphasis on ties with West Germany, possibly in a multilateral framework, both of which are closed to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of Prague and the Ussuri incidents. Moscow may even, in the longer run, be ready to pay a price in Europe for insurance against China, unless the West hastens not to leave the Soviets in any doubt over its support—forgetting that the more powerful opponent and the one which has expanded its rule over pro-Western populations and holds the key to an essential problem like the German one is not China but the Soviet Union.

Talks about troop reductions could in the context of Sino-Soviet tensions take on a new meaning in which, again, NATO would be involved. The primary role of the Atlantic Alliance must remain the defensive one of helping to stabilize Western

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[6] As H. Wehner suggested in his remarkable Bundestag speech of October 18, 1968, on the meaning of the Moscow doctrine for peace and security.

Europe. But the growing instability of the rest of the continent makes it imperative for the alliance to take an interest in preventing troubles which might take it by surprise, and also in preparing for a situation which, through the creation of a stable, free and unified Europe within a framework of East-West reconciliation, might one day make NATO unnecessary in its present form.

GERMANY AND A NATO POLICY TOWARD THE EAST

by Stephan G. Thomas

A STUDY of the source material on the origins of NATO shows that there is a direct connection between Stalin's imperialist conflict strategy and the German problem. Ever since the time of Lenin, there had been long periods of pro-German tendencies within the Soviet leadership elite. The real change in attitude began during the final phase of World War II when Stalin started developing his expansionist ideas about a Soviet Germany. Stalin went on the assumption that after the war the Soviet Union would be able to force its system on the vanquished. Moscow believed then that the German people were as powerless and helpless as they would ever be, and that the sovietization of Germany could be implemented by means of the "socialist occupation," as the chief political commissar for the Soviet Zone of Germany, Tulpanov, described it in 1946. In his hopes and illusions about the achievement of Soviet objectives for the domination of Germany, Stalin was swayed by the euphoria of dogmas about Soviet ascendancy, which are an inherent part of the system, and encouraged by the Ulbricht group in Moscow, whom the Soviets intended should play the decisive role in the process of sovietization.

Stalin's plans for domination foundered on the historical realities in Berlin and Germany. They came to grief because the Germans were determined not to live under Soviet despotism. Similarly, thirty years previously, Lenin had mistakenly looked for a communist revolution in Germany. In Lenin's case, the realization that he had made a fatal historical mistake led to a realistic change of communist policy toward Germany. Stalin, on the other hand, persisted in his stand and pursued his objectives. It took the creation of NATO and its military strength and the determination of the West to thwart the Soviet offensive. The existence of NATO forced the Soviets to carry out a pragmatic revision of their conflict strategy and provided the environment for a liberal-independent political development in Berlin and the Western zones of Germany.

In the part of Europe where the Soviet Union ruled as sole occupying power, the states were one by one brought into line as Soviet satellites: Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and finally Czechoslovakia in February 1948. The Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany became the operating base for the communist penetration of the whole of Germany, and the Ulbricht regime was the tool of this expansionist policy.

Early in 1948, Tulpanov described the ranking of the individual satellites in Soviet strategy as follows:

> If we picture a big river and take one bank to be the bourgeois capitalist democracy and the other bank the Socialist system, we could say today that Yugoslavia has already reached the other bank, Bulgaria is just swimming the final strokes to reach it, Poland and Czechoslovakia are roughly in the middle of the river, followed by Rumania and Hungary, who have only covered a third of the distance, whilst the Soviet Zone of Germany has so far only swum a few strokes from the bourgeois bank.

The Ulbricht regime figures last in Tulpanov's metaphor, not because it is the least important factor in the Soviet strategic concept, but because, under the terms of the still valid Four Power Statute for Berlin and the whole of Germany, sovereignty had to be denied it. The Berlin blockade, instigated later in the same year, was intended to force a change in the power constellations between East and West. The confrontation ended with Stalin's defeat. Of the many—to some extent heterogeneous—consequences of this defeat, the most important was the change in West Germany's politico-strategic role between East and West. Yesterday's enemy became a partner in warding off the communist threat to Berlin and eventually an ally in the Atlantic defense community.

During this period the defense instrument of the Western world gradually took shape, starting with the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, the NATO Pact of April 1949, and finally the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO in May 1955. This brief outline of the history of NATO shows the clear organic relationship between Germany and the aims of Soviet power politics. Germany is the central object in the power confrontation of the East-West conflict.

There is another important factor in the relationship of Germany to NATO and its policy toward the East: the interaction between the dogma of Soviet ascendancy and the direct consequences of the communist aggrandizement doctrine for Germany's security. A look at the past twenty years shows that every time a fundamental appraisal of the world situation is carried out in Moscow, using the dogma of communist ascendancy as a yardstick, the consequences of Soviet conflict strategy are felt in Germany, especially in the most sensitive spot, Berlin. This is what happened in 1947, after the proclamation of the Zhdanov doctrine on the "antagonism of the two world blocs": The Cold War became a fact of life and the blockade of Berlin followed in 1948. Ten years later, in 1957, history repeated itself when Mao proclaimed at the Moscow Conference that "from now onwards the East wind will prevail over the West wind," and the phase of the revolutionary struggle against the "imperialistic West" was ushered in. The disagreeable consequences for Berlin and Germany then were that Khrushchev issued his Berlin ultimatum, and Ulbricht was able to complete the process of total sovietization which had been interrupted by the East German riots of June 17, 1953. This phase of aggressive Soviet policy culminated on August 13, 1961 in the erection of the Berlin wall.

The contribution made by the Federal Republic to the NATO alliance lies in the importance of the *Bundeswehr* as a military instrument and in the psychological-political integration of the new Germany within the Atlantic Community. The political leaders and parties in the Federal Parliament have always been in broad agreement on the Atlantic defense alliance, as shown in the resolution passed by the German Parliament in March 1958:

> In accordance with the requirements of this defense system and in view of the rearmament of the possible enemy, the armed forces of the Federal Republic must be equipped with the most modern weapons so that they can satisfy the obligations undertaken by the Federal Republic within the framework of NATO and are able to make the necessary effective contribution towards safeguarding peace.

The extent to which Germany has been integrated into NATO was attested to by General Norstad as early as March 1960:

> In my work with all the Governments of the Alliance, I am impressed by the extent to which Germany sinks her own particular national interests in the face of a common threat. Germany was one of the first to support allied authority and integration under allied command. The Germans were the first to support integration of the supply system. They were always in favor of it. They were also the first to develop their own armed forces as part of the allied force instead of as national forces. In this sense, they have always shown themselves to be in the lead. Their conduct was always "allied" and continues to be. The situation is that whatever they do is done within the framework of NATO and serves NATO, and this merely strengthens my opinion in this respect.

The realities of power politics and the geopolitical situation determine for the Germans that peace and the security of Germany and Europe are guaranteed only by the existence of NATO. This explains why they are virtually unanimous in rejecting the view that has come into vogue in recent years in the West, which holds that NATO and its basic strategic concepts should be revised. Because of the Federal Republic's direct proximity to the Soviet orbit and the fact that the communist totalitarian regime in the eastern part of Germany constitutes a permanent provocation and threat to it, the West Germans have noted with uneasiness the voices urging the conversion of the military pact into a "détente community."

The real meaning of détente in this context needs to be made clear. Détente should coincide with genuine coexistence. As a political principle it can work only when based on a real equilibrium of forces. Thus it should be recognized as a dynamic principle and not just as a formula for appeasement. Historical experience has proved that appeasement of totalitarian regimes is fatal in the long run. Détente should be understood as an element of political strategy in countering the dogmatic and aggressive conservatism of the communists.

This is why the NATO Ministers' Brussels declaration on November 16, 1968 as a reply to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia is of particular significance:

> The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to stand as the indispensable guarantor of security and the essential foundation for the pursuit of European reconciliation. By its Constitution, the Alliance is of indefinite duration. Recent events have further demonstrated that its continued existence is more than ever necessary.

In a détente policy understood in this sense, a decisive role falls to Germany. In our epoch the important point is to put Germany's relations with the nations of Eastern Europe on a genuine peace basis. Germany is committed to pursuing a policy of détente and peace toward the East European nations. Her *Ostpolitik* rests not least on the tragic experience of recent decades of European history and is governed by her determination to begin a new chapter in the relations between the German people and the peoples of Eastern Europe.

Willy Brandt, Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party and Foreign Minister, recently expressed this desire for peace and détente in the following words:

> Europe should become a zone of détente and of peaceful neighborly relations as the preliminary stage leading to a permanent peace settlement. German policy must be peace policy. It is our pride to place Germany's weight in the scales on the side of peace. That is our national dignity, this alone safeguards our existence. A good German cannot be a nationalist. The nation is not a fetish to him, but something evolved by historical processes which he takes for granted.

Brandt described it as the aim of German policy "to overcome the division of Europe and Germany." But he stated just as unequivocally that "this course can only be pursued within the framework of the Atlantic defense community" and that "NATO represents the basis from which efforts to reduce tensions and to solve the German problem can take place."

This is the realistic basis for Germany's peace policy within the framework of NATO. It is outlined in the 1969 White Paper on the Federal government's defense policy as follows:

> The most important function of German policy is to keep the peace and preserve and protect the freedom and independence of the Federal Republic of Germany. Our security and defense policy is based on our membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and is an inseparable and integral part of the Federal Government's overall policy. The purpose and aim of this policy, as stated too in the Government declaration of November 29, 1968, is "to give our country and people external security."

In contrast, the Soviet policy of aggression, which found its expression in the Brezhnev doctrine following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, represents a continuation of the Soviet conflict strategy initiated by Stalin. Nevertheless, despite the setback of the Czech tragedy, the West should persist in working for détente, helping to shape a genuine peace organization, and putting forward appropriate initiatives so as to prove the credibility of its desire for cooperation and détente with the peoples of Eastern Europe.

The more a Western policy of peace, and particularly the German contribution toward bringing about a détente, gains credibility, the greater are the chances for the whole of Europe to achieve a genuine peace settlement. One day the Soviet leadership in the Kremlin will have to recognize that continuing its traditional conflict strategy is contrary to the spirit of our epoch and must lead to an isolation of the Soviet Union in Europe.

THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

by Eugene Hinterhoff

THE menacing growth of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, especially since the Six-Day War of June 1967, came to public notice in the West as a surprise, although in fact it is only the most recent manifestation of the historic Russian drive toward warm water ports and the Mediterranean Sea.

Russian naval penetration beyond the Dardanelles during the Tsarist period and the more recent moves under Soviet strategists bear many similarities, despite differences in political systems. The first incursion of the Russian fleet into the Mediterranean took place during the Russo-Turkish War of 1769-1774. Catherine II, coordinating Russian policy with Pitt's concept of a "Northern Coalition" designed to contain the Bourbon coalition (France, Spain and Austria), decided to send her Baltic fleet under Count Orlov's command to the Strait of Constantinople. With the help of a British naval force spread over the Atlantic area to secure the route of the Tsarist fleet, the Russians were able to carry out their strategic plans. British facilities were put at the fleet's disposal at Portsmouth, Gibraltar and Port Mahon on the Spanish island of Minorca, held at that time by Britain. In April 1770 Orlov won a resounding naval victory at Chesma off Ismir (Smyrna), destroying the entire maritime force of the Ottoman Empire. Yet his direct assault to force the Dardanelles was beaten off by the French-commanded Turkish artillery positioned on French-built fortifications. After suffering heavy losses, Orlov reverted to a naval blockade of the Straits, which lasted over three years and inflicted considerable damage on French trade with Constantinople, Greece and Asia Minor.

Although the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji brought these operations to an end, Russian naval power steadily expanded toward Egypt and the Levant. Two naval squadrons were assigned to patrol the Egyptian and Levantine coasts, using as a temporary base harbors in Cyprus. In addition to blockading the coast, these units brought arms and ammunition to groups engaged in uprisings against the Turks in Egypt, Yemen and Syria. In 1772, a Russian flotilla entered the harbor of Alexandria and delivered supplies of arms to the Egyptians. A second squadron appeared in Beirut and landed troops who held the town for nearly two years. Some of the Russian units moved along the coast to the south in the direction of Jaffa, Gaza and Alexandria others moved northward toward Latakia (in Syria), penetrating into Anatolia in order to establish contact with Orlov's main force cruising between the Archipelago and the Anatolian coastline.

In assessing the outcome of this operation, the Russians undoubtedly concluded that it had been made possible only by British protection and the port facilities available to Russian naval units. Consequently, they must have realized that an essential precondition to success in the future would be Russian possession of permanent naval bases in the Mediterranean. This lesson was not forgotten by the Tsars or by later Soviet leaders.

The second Russian naval operation in the Mediterranean took place in 1798 after Admiral Nelson's victory at Aboukir, when Tsar Paul I joined the anti-French coalition, consisting of England, Austria and Turkey. The strategic reasons for sending the Russian Black Sea fleet through the Straits with Turkish permission was to reinforce Suvorov's land forces fighting the French in Switzerland and Northern Italy.

Although Paul I agreed to place his naval forces under Nelson's command, Admiral Ushakov, who commanded the Russian flotilla, did his best to ignore Nelson's operational directives and endeavored instead to implement St. Petersburg's strategy which had little to do with the war against Napoleon. With the help of the Albanians, Ushakov conquered the island of Corfu, where he established a Russian naval base; and, in spite of Nelson's remonstrations, he attempted to conquer Malta, to which Paul I, in his capacity as a Chancellor of the Order of Knights of Malta, had strong claims. Nelson's objections to Paul I's plans resulted in the Tsar's decision to withdraw from the anti-French coalition and to remove his fleet from the Mediterranean.

The third and last Russian incursion into the Mediterranean under the Tsars took place in 1806 when Russia was at war with Napoleon and feared an invasion from the Black Sea by Turkey, which had become an ally of France. The Russian plan called for a breakthrough into the Straits and the simultaneous movement of the Baltic fleet into the Mediterranean by the same route taken by Orlov's naval expedition more than a generation earlier.

In spite of the active cooperation of the British fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Duckworth, this joint action was not successful, although the Russians, with the aid of Montenegrins, did manage to capture several Adriatic ports, including Cattaro and Raguza (Dubrovnik). These achievements aroused suspicions in the minds of British leaders, who concluded that their erstwhile Russian ally's primary interest in that area was to establish a permanent presence.

After the crushing Russian defeat by Napoleon's forces at Austerlitz and the peace treaty at Tilsit in 1807, Alexander I ordered Admiral Senyavin to return home. As the Russian fleet rounded the Iberian Peninsula, it was intercepted by the British and interned in Spanish ports until 1812, when Russia and England again fought together against Napoleon. The British internment of the Russian fleet marked a watershed in history and a turning point in British strategy toward Russia: Britain decided to strengthen her mastery of the Mediterranean by maintaining several naval bases, including Gibraltar, Malta, Port Said and, until 1864, Corfu.

Since the early nineteenth century, Britain has steadfastly blocked Russia's repeated attempts to penetrate the Mediterranean and long opposed Russian efforts to establish a privileged relationship with the Ottoman Empire. British hostility effectively ended Russia's presence in the Mediterranean, and her subsequent naval appearances—for instance, as a participant in the British-French-Russian destruction of the Egyptian fleet at Navarino in 1827—were of short duration.

II

During the First World War Russia seemed to have made considerable progress toward the realization of her traditional aim of free passage through the Straits. Under the secret Sykes-Picot pact of 1916, she was given the right of free passage through the Dardanelles and a dominant position over Constantinople. When Lenin came to power, one of his first acts was to denounce the agreement, restoring Constantinople and the Straits to Kemal Ataturk—a purely symbolic gesture, since Moscow at that juncture was not in possession of either.

During the Second World War, the Soviet attitude changed radically. In November 1940 Molotov, on his visit to Berlin, shocked and angered Hitler with Stalin's demands for spoils after the destruction of the British Empire: a naval and air base in the Straits and the Eastern Mediterranean. A few weeks after Molotov's departure, Hitler ordered the German High Command to prepare for a swift campaign against the Soviet Union. When the USSR found itself in the Allied camp, Stalin advanced at various international conferences his claims for bases in the Straits and the Eastern Mediterranean, and claimed part of the Italian fleet together with Soviet participation in the trusteeship of Libya.

Stalin's efforts to seek a final solution to the question of the Straits were strengthened by outflanking moves, including communist subversion in Greece in 1944-1946 and the Soviet courtship of Turkey. Soviet pressure contributed to the Soviet-Yugoslav split in 1948 and the Soviet-Albanian rift. If Tito had yielded to the Soviets and allowed them to establish naval bases in Yugoslav ports along the Adriatic, the Kremlin in due course would have attained complete mastery over the area.

Only after Stalin's death in March 1953 (attributed to a stroke following the news that Tito had joined the Balkan Pact), did the Soviet Union repudiate Stalin's anti-Turkish policy and officially inform Ankara of the withdrawal of all Soviet territorial demands. The Straits were to remain Turkish, but in the second half of this century other avenues for Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean were to be sought and found.

During the Stalinist era, Soviet warships appeared only on rare occasions outside the closed waters of the Baltic and Black seas. Then, in September 1957, the cruiser *Zhdanov,* of the Sverdlov class, paid a visit to Split in Yugoslavia and went on to drop anchor at Latakia. A month later, a small Soviet flotilla again visited Split. In 1958 four Soviet submarines made a voyage from the Baltic to Valona in Albania, and the next year four more of the same type (W-I, 100 tons), accompanied by a depot ship, arrived by the same route at Valona. As a result of growing tension between Albania and the Soviet Union, however, four of these submarines soon returned home, leaving four others behind in the Albanian port, where without proper maintenance they probably became fit only for scrap.

III

The principal Soviet naval buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean began in 1964, marking the abandonment of Stalin's policy of maintaining the "inner front," namely, the territorial frontiers of the Soviet bloc in Europe and Asia, as the Soviet defense perimeter. A new policy, based on the enhancement of Soviet naval power, was begun under the dynamic leadership of Admiral S. Gorshkov. Soviet leaders set out to strengthen the USSR's capacity for pursuit of an ambitious policy far beyond the Eurasian land mass. After 1964 Soviet warships appeared more often in the Mediterranean. Organized in small flotillas, they remained for several weeks in various ports of call, thus establishing a semi-permanent presence in the area. By the spring of 1967, before the Six-Day June conflict, the Soviet flotilla assigned to the Eastern Mediterranean consisted of a heavy cruiser as flagship, two missile destroyers, a few frigates and submarines. After the Six-Day War the Soviet naval presence increased dramatically and assumed threatening dimensions.

As of early 1969 Moscow's naval task force in the Mediterranean consisted of a heavy cruiser of the Sverdlov class; one or two light cruisers of the Kynda or Krupnyi class (6,500 and 4,000 tons, respectively), equipped with missile launchers; three or four destroyers of the Kotlin and Kashin class (3,800 and 4,000 tons, respectively); three to four landing craft; and a number of frigates, submarines and supporting logistical ships. A battalion of Soviet Marines with light armored vehicles is aboard landing-craft vessels. Recently this armada was reinforced by the new helicopter-carrier *Moskva*, which may be joined by a more recently built sister ship, *Leningrad*. This small but easily reinforceable, modern, well-equipped and highly maneuverable task force, capable of prolonged self-sufficiency, represents a challenge to the United States Sixth Fleet for the mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean. The addition of the helicopter-carriers gives it an offensive capability that threatens Israel, Albania and Yugoslavia.

Since June 1967 the Soviet naval presence has given rise to great concern at SHAPE and in Western capitals. The sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Elath* in 1967 by a long-range Soviet-built homing missile, for which there is no counterpart in the armory of Western navies, increased apprehension in the West. Despite its potential threat to Yugoslavia, Tito may have encouraged the rapid Soviet buildup since the Yugoslav leader reportedly believed the Israeli preventive strike of June 1967 was an American-inspired attempt to unseat Nasser, who for years has been his close friend. This belief led Tito virtually to align Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet Arab states, whose interests he defended with great vigor. As evidence of his encouragement of the Soviet buildup, he granted Soviet planes overflight rights en route to Egypt, which was contradictory to his proclaimed policy of nonalignment.

Later, in face of the Czechoslovak crisis and especially following the Soviet invasion, Tito began to change his attitude toward the Soviet Union, for he saw a potential Soviet threat to his own country. Reportedly, he has now warned Nasser against the potential danger of accepting Soviet warships in Egyptian ports and large numbers of Soviet advisers whose presence and often arrogant attitudes have resulted in growing friction with the Egyptian officer corps.

IV

The present Soviet naval penetration into the Mediterranean has political and military implications. It represents the reactivation of the traditional Tsarist policy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which sought mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean. More than the symbolic "showing the flag," the Soviet naval presence is part of a long-term strategy to take advantage of the precipitate British disengagement from this area and strengthen Moscow's political influence both east of Suez and in North Africa.

The political implications are more important than the military ones. The Soviet Mediterranean fleet is inferior to both the U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO naval forces in the area, especially in view of the recent assignment by Britain to NATO of two commando carriers and two assault ships after their withdrawal from east of Suez. Nevertheless, the Soviet presence fashions a new regional balance between the superpowers which is fraught with the potential danger of escalation. During the Six-Day War, for example, Soviet warships shadowed the movements of the Sixth Fleet, incidentally casting doubt upon Arab allegations of Anglo-American assistance to Israel in the initial phase of hostilities when the Egyptian air force was destroyed on the ground by a preventive Israeli air strike.

The Soviet naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean can serve as a flexible instrument of Kremlin diplomacy, enabling Soviet leaders to take advantage of changes in the political climate in the area. Consequently, the Soviets are casting their eyes on Cyprus after having declared during the Cyprus crisis their support to both Turkey and Greece. At the same time, they have kept close watch over developments in Malta, where resentment against Britain has mounted. The Soviets appear ready to offer economic aid in order to strengthen Moscow's links with the Maltese. They hope that if one day Dominic Mintoff's Labor Party comes to power, one of its first acts may be a declaration of neutrality, followed in due course by the movement of Malta toward alignment with the Soviet Union. Both Cyprus and Malta could provide the Soviets with excellent naval and air bases, which would greatly improve the maneuverability and combat value of their Mediterranean fleet.

A similar situation could have arisen in 1967 in Greece, when Andreas Papandreou made his bid for power. The withdrawal of Greece from NATO would undoubtedly have been one of his first moves, and he would have sought to strengthen Greece's ties with the Soviet Union. Instead, the Soviets have been reduced to vitriolic attacks on the present government, loyal to NATO.

From the Soviet point of view, Spain is potentially one of the biggest prizes. If the United States could be evicted from its air and naval bases in Spain, the Soviet position in the Mediterranean would be dramatically changed.

The closure of the Suez Canal represents a far greater setback to Soviet policy and strategy than to the West because so many of the Free World's giant tankers are unable to negotiate the Canal's shallow waters. The closure of the Canal imposes upon the Soviets the burden of longer sea communications with the east of Suez area, and especially with the port of Haiphong, through which each year millions of tons of war matériel pour into North Viet Nam from Soviet-bloc countries. The closure of the Canal prevents the Soviet Mediterranean fleet from extending Soviet influence more firmly along the coastline of the Red Sea, only occasionally visited by the Soviet warships, and into the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

As a result of the increasingly active Soviet diplomacy in the Red Sea area, a Soviet naval task force, if it was able to move through the Canal, could acquire the use of facilities in the ports of Yemen and Somaliland, perhaps including Hodeida, Djibouti and Aden. The Soviets might supply the pro-Soviet government of South Yemen (formerly the Aden Protectorate) with long-range guns to be placed on the island of Perim in order to hamper

Israeli shipping from the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean by keeping the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb under their trajectories. This would create a situation similar to that of the Tiran Straits before the June 1967 war, but it would be much more difficult for the Israelis to redress than was the Tiran Straits dilemma.

Taking up the short- and long-term military implications of the Soviet naval buildup, we can see, first of all, that the Soviet naval presence operates as a deterrent to any Israeli preventive or retaliatory strike directed against Alexandria or any other port which pro-Soviet Arab governments have placed at the disposal of Soviet warships. Second, in the event that the Kremlin took a calculated risk by becoming directly involved in support of its Arab protégés, the amphibious capabilities of its Mediterranean fleet could permit limited action against the Israelis. In the same way, this naval force could be used in conjunction with Soviet land operations against such countries as Albania or Yugoslavia. Moreover, if the pro-Soviet Houari Boumedienne gave Moscow the use of the Mers-el-Kebir base (returned to Algiers by de Gaulle some nine years ahead of the expiration of the date specified in their agreement), it could greatly improve Soviet capabilities for action against either Albania or Yugoslavia.

Soviet action against Albania appears more plausible than against Yugoslavia. Whereas the latter could result in a confrontation with the West, in view of the serious difficulties which would arise for the security of NATO's southern flank, the West might not respond to Soviet action against Albania. Soviet success against Albania would not only ensure Moscow of a base in Valona or on the island of Saseno opposite Valona, but it would create a favorable situation for bringing pressure to bear upon Greece, promoting subversion and uprisings against the Greek government. In such a situation, a Soviet naval presence near the coast of Greece could be valuable.

In case Moscow decides to move against Yugoslavia, the Soviet fleet could take action in conjunction with overland operations of Warsaw Pact forces by staging amphibious attacks near major ports or by blockading them. Since Yugoslavia, in the event of Soviet aggression, would become dependent on supplies of Western arms, such a blockade could hamper the Yugoslav cause. The important question is whether the West, anxious to assist Yugoslavia, would go so far as to try to achieve a naval breakthrough with its attendant risks. In all likelihood, the West would opt for a compromise, an airlift, in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The long-term implications of the Soviet naval buildup may be even more alarming. To a considerable degree, they depend on the strength of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities which Moscow has emphasized in recent years. If the Soviets could force the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the Mediterranean would become a Soviet lake with the Soviet Navy in charge. The Soviet leaders must regard this as at least a hypothetical scenario in which the growing naval power of the Soviet Union plays an increasingly important role.

THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE*

by Lawrence B. Krause

ONE is tempted to think we have reached a nadir in the Atlantic Alliance, but even this judgment may be too optimistic. When it comes to alliances, experience has shown that the situation can always get worse. This is not meant to minimize the importance of President Nixon's eight-day journey to Europe. It will have beneficial effects on U.S. bilateral relations with the countries visited and possibly on the alliance as a whole. The expression of interest in Europe by the new administration has no doubt been greatly desired and warmly received. But expressions of intent lose their appeal unless followed within reasonable time by concrete actions. The United States' failure to take or outline concrete actions and the Europeans' unwillingness to encourage American initiatives are telltale signs of the malaise of the alliance. When deficiencies are so painfully obvious, the acceptance of the current weakness is discouraging. The need is for a dynamic and responsive alliance, not merely an endorsement of the status quo.

The difficulties in the alliance have military and political as well as economic manifestations. This essay will concentrate on economics but not to the exclusion of the other aspects, because no part is understandable without some attention to the whole and because all the parts condition one another.

The military alliance of which NATO is the instrumentality and whose twentieth anniversary is commemorated in this issue of ORBIS shows signs of inability to adapt to a changing environment. NATO can be seen as having three interrelated functions: to deter aggression from the East, to fight aggression if deterrence fails, and to maintain and certify the purity of West German democracy. The United States has a central role in each of these functions. Deterrence, if it is to be accomplished, rests solely on U.S. nuclear might. Repelling aggression depends mainly on U.S.

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forces in situations when nuclear weapons are the appropriate response; when a conventional response is needed, U.S. forces can work with those of other countries. Overseeing West Germany need not be entirely a U.S. responsibility, but has become one because only the United States has sufficient leverage to influence the Germans and offset the destabilizing pressures coming from Paris. With the United States doing all this, what is left to be done by allies, and without allies what is meant by an alliance? Unless there is a reassignment of roles among its members, NATO is fated to become a receptacle of coordinated bilateral military arrangements between the United States and several European states, or even an elaborate superstructure set up only to cover American military power. NATO as an alliance has not been responsive to changing stimuli. When liberalism was on the ascendancy in Eastern Europe and East-West détente seemed to be on the horizon, NATO was permitted to become static and its basic *raison d'être* was questioned. But when Czechoslovakia was invaded, possibly signaling the resatellization of that area, NATO was not markedly revitalized. One wonders how future challenges, other than a direct military assault, will be met.

The same sense of indirection or drift afflicts the political scene. As originally intended, the political cohesion of the alliance was to develop in three distinct stages. First of all, the European states were to develop political unity among themselves. Then a partnership could be forged with Europe on one side and North America on the other. Finally, a united Atlantic Alliance could promote peace, justice and prosperity throughout the world, with the developing nations being particularly well served. Needless to say, this process has been stymied at stage one. Little Europe of the Six has remained essentially a restricted group. Even within the Six, every movement forward toward unity seems to be accompanied by movement backward. Indeed, one needs refined instruments to measure net changes in either direction.

In general, the national states of Europe seem to be so preoccupied with domestic problems that an era of inward-looking politics may be at hand. Narrow economic considerations tend to dominate all forms of policy, both domestic and foreign, in the United Kingdom. In France, attention is riveted on the prospect of social instability, although an active foreign policy is a major concern. The situation in Italy is the same except for the lack of any perceptible foreign policy goals. In Germany, what attention can be diverted from the twin problems of the student left and the reactionary right is absorbed in the never-ending drama of a divided country. In Belgium, energies are directed toward maintaining peaceful coexistence between the two language-cultures during the difficult transference of economic and political power from the Walloon minority to the Flemish majority. While there are obviously exceptions to this sweep of parochialism, the changes that have occurred during the last ten years are truly startling.

On the economic front, one finds evidence that both contradicts and supports the picture of national separatism. The contrary evidence is impressive. International trade has prospered beyond the most optimistic predictions of just a few years ago. Many large business firms now invest and operate across national boundaries with almost as much ease as between regions of a single country. Also the massive flow of people among countries as tourists, students and guest workers is extraordinary. To be sure, these trends have not been confined to the countries of the Atlantic Alliance, but they have been particularly marked among them.

But even here, progress has been marred by an ever-growing list of exceptions. Within the last couple of years, rather frequent use has been made of unilateral trade measures to ease balance of payments or other national problems. The new economic ideal of export-led growth bears a strong family resemblance to the discredited beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930's. Political pressures have been increased to urge countries to develop "national policies concerning foreign direct investment," which is merely a euphemism for restricting such investment on the part of receiving countries. As for the principal sending country, the United States, it did not hesitate to restrict these flows when national interest seemed to require it. Finally, interferences in the flows of tourists and guest workers have become more frequent.

ROOTS OF CHANGE

Four factors can be identified as major influences in diverting the Atlantic Alliance from its intended path: the de-Stalinization of Eastern Europe, the role of President de Gaulle, the consequences of the Viet Nam war, and the effects of economic prosperity. Qualitatively, they are a diverse collection and other factors might conceivably be added; however, these appear to have had the most direct impact on the essential functions of the alliance.

The alliance has always been defensive in character, particularly in its military aspects. NATO was born of necessity and nurtured by anxiety. The threat was that of Soviet aggression. After Stalin's death, as more liberal and national forms of communism developed in Eastern Europe, serious doubts questioned whether the Soviet threat to Western Europe was as great as it once had been or whether it existed at all. The West European countries tried to improve their diplomatic and commercial relations with their Eastern neighbors for their own economic advantage, to encourage this liberalizing trend, and to assure the Soviets that the West was ready for détente if that was their intention. Under such circumstances, it was difficult to sustain interest in military preparedness. Europeans felt justified in reducing their commitments to NATO and comforted by the thought that they were promoting peace while their essential security was being maintained by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia has altered the situation, but it has been too recent to be evaluated for its enduring consequences. In Western Europe, the invasion has been viewed as an undesirable but somewhat understandable defensive response by the Soviets to an unconstrained process threatening the internal stability of some of the more rigid East European states and the USSR itself. As such, it has not been interpreted as increasing the direct threat to the West. However, enough concern has been generated to call into question the inevitability of the disintegration of Soviet hegemony in the East. While Europeans are probably unprepared to strengthen NATO substantially, they now appear willing to sustain it in the event that they have misjudged developments behind the Iron Curtain.

The role of President de Gaulle in diverting the alliance from its intended path is both profound and difficult to appraise. De Gaulle claimed the political leadership of Europe for France and believed this sustainable only by maintaining a strong French identity and undermining the position of possible challengers to French dominance. Under his authority, France blocked British entry into the Common Market and thereby prevented a major expansion of the Community, withdrew its forces from the integrated command structure of NATO (although remaining in its organization), and played a noncooperative game in Common Market matters and certain international economic negotiations such as those for Special Drawing Rights. These were extremely important events. The difficulty in appraising de Gaulle's impact comes from not knowing what French policy would have been in his absence or how far European unity would have developed even with active French participation. Some have argued that he merely recognized difficulties others were glossing over, and that it was substantive problems that prevented further integration. There is some truth in this position, but the weight of the evidence leads one to believe that de Gaulle himself was the major barrier to progress.

The divisive effects of the Viet Nam war upon the alliance were widespread and probably not fully appreciated in the United States. Americans were wont to ask the rhetorical question, "If we refuse to meet our commitment in Viet Nam, how can we maintain the credibility of our commitment to Europe?" But Europeans were asking instead, "With all U.S. attention and many U.S. resources devoted to Viet Nam, is it possible for the United States to meet its commitment to Europe?"—this despite the fact that the United States was alone in not substantially reducing its commitments to NATO. Europeans felt that Viet Nam was standing in the way of East-West détente and could possibly involve them in a nuclear war over an area in which they have little commercial and no strategic interest. Furthermore, they blamed part of their own student problems on Viet Nam and thereby relieved themselves of some responsibility for making educational reforms. The impact of Viet Nam on the alliance can be judged in part by the much-improved psychological atmosphere following President Johnson's speech of March 31, 1968, which was taken in Europe as a U.S. promise to end the war.

The most subtle and possibly the most pervasive factor changing the alliance on both sides of the Atlantic has been the effect of growing economic prosperity. Without denying opposite tendencies, some general consequences of prosperity which lead to disunity should be noted. Prosperity leads to expectations of even more prosperity, and if expectations are frustrated, social instability is generated. This phenomenon has often been recognized in less developed countries, but it is at least as relevant in developed ones. For example, the son of a working man in previous years accepted the inevitable—that he could never get to college since poverty forced him into the labor market at an early age. But with growing affluence permitting the "lower classes" to contemplate and to achieve higher education, they become frustrated by the lack of university facilities; hence, both son and father grow angry at society. Similar examples could be given in terms of housing, medical care, air pollution and the quality of life in general. With mounting social problems, governments necessarily become inward-looking.

While some problems are created by rising incomes not rising fast enough, others are caused by incomes rising at varying rates in different countries. This leads to a problem of adjustment among countries and appears in the form of persistent balance-of-payments surpluses and deficits. The basic difficulty comes from a kind of cultural lag in that the adjustment mechanisms have not kept up to date. The policy measures that were adequate to bring adjustment in the past are no longer politically acceptable or economically justifiable. With interruptions in prosperity no longer inevitable, the public will not tolerate a conscious policy of recession or inflation to re-establish external balance. Better to have restrictions on international transactions. Yet such restrictions exacerbate relations among countries, causing problems for the alliance.

Contribution of Economics to Alliance Interdependence

In order to appraise the contribution of economics to the current state of affairs, it is well to recall the role economic relations were thought to play in the original concept of an Atlantic Alliance. In President Kennedy's words, "We believe that a united Europe will be capable . . . of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas."[1] "Capability" was thought sufficient for the endeavor, since willingness must surely follow from mutual self-interest. This belief was specifically endorsed by British, German, Italian and other European statesmen. However, economic relations can also be divisive, requiring improved institutional machinery for conflict resolution, and this aspect of alliance affairs has received inadequate attention.

The major assumption underlying the belief that economic forces would be a unifying factor was the expectation that eco-

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[1] Address of John F. Kennedy at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, July 4, 1962, in *Public Papers of the Presidents* [278] (Washington: GPO), p. 538.

TABLE I

ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF REAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND EXPORTS
(In Percentages)

	1955-1960	*1960-1965*	*1965-1968*[b]
Federal Republic of Germany			
Aggregate growth	6.3	4.9	4.9
Per capita growth	5.5	3.7	4.1[c]
Export growth	12.4	7.2	9.2
France			
Aggregate growth	4.8	5.3	5.0[a]
Per capita growth	3.8	3.9	4.1[c]
Export growth	7.6	6.6	4.4
Italy			
Aggregate growth	5.5	3.8	5.7[a]
Per capita growth	4.9	3.5	5.0[c]
Export growth	16.5	14.7	12.3
United Kingdom			
Aggregate growth	2.8	3.5	4.3
Per capita growth	2.3	2.75	3.75[c]
Export growth	2.7	3.4	3.7
United States			
Aggregate growth	2.2	4.8	4.6
Per capita growth	0.5	3.3	3.5
Export growth	5.0	5.1	6.4

[a] 1967 data

[b] 1968 data are averages of first three quarters of the year

[c] Population data cover 1965-1967

Sources: OECD Main Economic Indicators, November 1968.
IMF International Financial Statistics, various years.
Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, February 1969.
Joint Economic Committee, Economic Indicators, February 1969.

nomic expansion would continue apace in alliance countries and lead to an intensification of international trade. As seen in Table I, this expectation was justified. Economic growth measured both on an aggregate and on a per capita basis has not only kept up to the rapid rate of the 1950's, but actually advanced beyond it in some countries in the 1960's. Even a laggard country like the United Kingdom achieved respectable progress, especially if judged by its own previous experience. In addition, international trade made spectacular advances—even faster than income growth.

Thus the interdependence among countries that comes from international trade intensified.

The most notable economic achievement binding the alliance occurred with respect to international trade: the negotiation of the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Kennedy Round was widely recognized as the most comprehensive tariff negotiation ever undertaken. Its successful conclusion was supposed to herald a new era of good feeling in commercial policy and, because of this, it was of great political importance. However, its economic consequences were less than earth-shaking.

The truly revolutionary aspect of the Kennedy Round was blocked before formal negotiations were even started. In the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the President was empowered to remove American tariffs completely in return for similar action by the European Economic Community (EEC) on products whose trade was dominated by the two areas. When Britain was refused entry into the EEC in 1963, however, the number of products falling within the definition of dominance was so reduced as to denude the provision of any meaning. Furthermore, the bargain actually struck in the negotiations left a residue of ill feeling on both sides of the Atlantic. Europeans were particularly anxious to have the United States remove the American Selling Price (ASP) method of determining the value of imports for tariff purposes used for certain chemicals and a few other products. The American negotiators persuaded the Europeans to make two separate agreements: the major tariff-reducing agreement which had balanced benefits for the participants; and the secondary agreement which provided for the end to ASP in return for a further reduction of European chemical tariffs and a few other concessions. This agreement was conditioned on acceptance by the U.S. Congress, since ASP is embedded in law. As feared by the Europeans, the Congress, so far, has been unwilling to eliminate ASP. To Europeans, ASP stands as the symbol of American protectionism even though its trade coverage is narrow.

Among Americans, the treatment of agriculture in the Kennedy Round caused disappointment. The United States is interested in agriculture because it provides between 20 to 25 per cent of U.S. exports and because of the ever-improving competitiveness of American agricultural production. All parties had agreed that agriculture was to be treated separately because of the peculiar nature of the barriers inhibiting its trade, but the results of the negotiations were supposed to afford to agriculture the same degree of liberalization given nonagricultural products. It was this promise which mobilized the crucial backing of American agricultural interests in support of the Trade Expansion Act and without which the act would not have been passed. But precious little was obtained in the Kennedy Round for agriculture. Even the one initiative of promise, the acceptance by non-food-exporting countries of the obligation to share in the expense of providing food aid to poor countries, has proven to be meaningless. It has merely encouraged these countries to subsidize further their highly inefficient farmers in order to provide the surplus needed for distribution. While on balance one still can conclude that the Kennedy Round was worthwhile, it was so mainly for defensive reasons: the agreement reached averted a major political defeat besides disarming protectionist interests for a few years and reducing quite a few tariffs.

An even more serious threat to the alliance than the aftermath of the Kennedy Round comes from interdependence itself. Interdependence brings into conflict uncoordinated national economic policies. Even small annual differences in the evolution of national economies with respect to fundamental factors such as prices can cause serious imbalance if they persist. If, in addition, occasional large divergencies appear—bursts of inflation or deflation—great pressures are generated. These pressures are usually contained, but with increasing frequency they have been erupting as international financial crises. The condition arises because there is neither a mechanism to coordinate national policies to prevent divergencies from occurring, nor an effective adjustment mechanism to offset divergencies that do occur. The former "deficiency" comes from the unwillingness of countries to surrender national sovereignty; the latter, from maintenance of an international monetary system that is not designed well enough for current needs.

The fact that countries do diverge in economic behavior is seen in Table II (as well as in Table I). Taking the period 1955 to 1968 as a whole, for instance, the divergence between French and German consumer price increases amounted to 32.8 per cent.[2] A part of this and previous divergencies was offset by

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[2] No single price index is particularly well suited for international price comparisons. The consumer price index was chosen because it is readily available for most countries. Its deficiency relates to the inclusion of non-internationally

TABLE II

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, EXCHANGE RATES AND ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN RESERVES

	1955-1960	*1960-1965*	*1965-1968*
Federal Republic of Germany			
Price index[a]	8.3	16.5	6.6
Exchange rate	1.0	4.0	.6
Reserves[b]	4029	383	1706[c]
France			
Price index[a]	33.3	20.4	10.4
Exchange rate	—28.7	0.0	1.1
Reserves[b]	297	4071	—1093[c]
Italy			
Price index[a]	9.3	27.5	7.2
Exchange rate	—0.7	0.7	0.3
Reserves[b]	1981	1652	626[c]
United Kingdom			
Price index[a]	13.8	18.6	11.1
Exchange rate	0.0	0.0	—14.7
Reserves[b]	1463	—715	—368[c]
United States			
Price index[a]	8.9	6.1	10.7
Reserves[b]	—3440	—3900	—975[c]

[a] 1963 = 100

[b] In millions of dollars

[c] 1968 data are averages of four quarters of the year.

Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, various years.

the French currency devaluation of 1958 and the German revaluation of 1961. For a number of reasons, complete offsets are seldom necessary, but large persistent divergencies do cause difficulties—a hint of which can be seen in the reported changes in countries' official monetary reserve positions. These divergencies are not created by accident, but persist because they reflect deep-seated differences in economic structures and national preferences. For France to achieve its full growth potential, a certain amount of inflation is required to overcome regional and occupational rigidities, and the French public is prepared to tolerate this price increase. However, in Germany the situation is different. Having been sensitized by previous bouts of hyperinflation, the German

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traded goods and services. It is most useful in measuring competitive changes between neighboring countries such as France and Germany or Canada and the United States.

public is intolerant of any perceptible increase in prices and, therefore, economic policy is geared to this end. Reinforcing these divergent trends, France suffered a slight burst of inflation because of the events of May-June 1968 and Germany encountered a deflationary pause in 1967 because of excessive use of restraining policy.

Given that divergencies do occur—one could also point to the U.S. inflation following the intensification of the war in Viet Nam or the unnecessarily sluggish Italian economy of recent years—pressures are created within the international monetary system that need correcting. Unfortunately, there are few mechanisms for adjustment in the system, and even fewer that are easily usable. Internal adjustments accomplished by reversing the consequences of inflation by deflation, and deflation by inflation, are neither politically attractive nor economically efficient. External adjustment through conscious changes in exchange rates is constrained by the monetary rules of the system which are geared to fixed exchange rates, and such changes are severely complicated by the possibility of massive private speculative capital flows.

It is not surprising that international financial crises have occurred, nor are they undesirable per se. A crisis may be the only atmosphere in which difficult but necessary decisions can be made. Because of this, crises can be productive. The crisis of November 1967 surrounding the devaluation of the British pound was productive because the pound was basically overvalued and this situation had to be corrected. The March 1968 crisis over gold was productive because an institutional change reducing the role of gold was needed and a crisis served to produce the international agreement establishing the two-tiered system.[3] But some crises, like the German mark-French franc affair, may debilitate and lead to temporary rather than lasting solutions.

In summary, it can be said that economic factors are making alliance countries more interdependent, but institutions or mechanisms have not evolved to deal with the consequences of interdependence.[4] Conflicts occur because divergencies between countries are not prevented by policy measures or corrected by automatic adjustment mechanisms. Thus economics has added a further burden to political and military relations.

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[3] The mini-crisis of the Canadian dollar in February 1968 was probably unnecessary, but it was productive in that both the U.S. and Canadian governments recognized the need for full coordination of policy to maintain the close integration of the capital markets of the two countries.

[4] For a more detailed discussion of this point see Richard N. Cooper, "The Dollar and the World Economy," in Kermit Gordon, editor, *Agenda for the Nation* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1969).

EXTRAPOLATION OF TRENDS

The pressures on governments emanating from economic relations can be, and to some extent have been, countered by restrictive policies. This resurgence of nationalism unhappily meshes with what is happening on the political scene. Without some conscious effort to rekindle the spirit of international cooperation, a dreary trend toward more extreme forms of nationalism seems likely. In the realm of economics, the outline can already be seen in terms of commercial policies, investment policies, and balance-of-payments adjustment policies.

Small-scale skirmishes have already occurred in what could turn out to be a major trade war between the United States and the EEC. Protectionist interests in the United States have mounted a campaign to limit the force of foreign competition, particularly in the textile and steel industries. In the EEC, new proposals have been suggested by the Commission to increase the protection afforded inefficient agricultural producers, which would affect a major share of EEC agricultural imports. The seriousness of the situation is reflected both in the large amount of trade involved and in the nature of the controversy—the fact that it is heavily laced with righteous indignation makes political compromise difficult.

The prospects for conflicts over capital flows, while less certain than those over trade, are still present and are disturbing. International capital flows, particularly direct investments, have the potential to become a strong, unifying force since such investments spread the gains of technological advance with economic benefit for both sending and receiving countries. The United States has contributed to bringing this investment into a conflict situation by unilaterally interfering with it for balance-of-payments purposes.[5] In the longer run, however, European restrictions may be even more damaging due to the "Servan-Schreiber effect."[6] Through literary exaggeration, foreign investment has been made to appear as a danger to the sovereignty of individual European countries. While Servan-Schreiber himself did not advocate restriction to meet the challenge, the natural political reaction to fears of "foreign domination" is to impose restrictions even if they are not a cure for the supposed malady. This reaction is likely to undermine receptivity to all foreign investment, not just American; witness the French rejection of the attempt of an Italian company to buy a French automobile producer, and the German rejection of a takeover bid by a French company for German petroleum interests. Clearly, nationalistic sensitivities are on the rise.

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[5] Three defenses can be offered in support of U.S. mandatory controls on direct investment: (1) the situation at the end of 1967 required a drastic and decisive move and this was the best of the available alternatives, (2) the controls only affect the financing of investment and need not reduce the amount of direct investment undertaken, and (3) other countries urged such action upon the United States and generally approved it even if they were not consulted.

Conflicts over fundamental balance-of-payments goals may be the most serious challenge because they threaten the development of interdependence. If countries under existing institutional arrangements cannot solve their balance-of-payments difficulties without sacrificing important domestic programs, then they are likely to break the rules and undermine the institutions themselves. Furthermore, balance-of-payments difficulties are likely to get worse. The French restrictive measures and the German artificial expansionary measures taken in response to the franc-mark crisis are both in violation of the Rome Treaty. An economically more sensible response—a change in exchange rates—would also have caused the EEC difficulties because of the Common Agricultural Policy and because large and sudden changes in exchange rates, in their turn, create substantial adjustment problems. Within a fully integrated area, discrete changes in exchange rates cause convulsions, and if these are required periodically to overcome accumulated divergencies among countries, then the value of the arrangement is subject to question. To a somewhat lesser degree, the same problem arises from interdependence among all developed countries, and the prospect that countries will attempt to isolate themselves from "foreign" disturbances seems great.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES

The extrapolation of existing economic trends among alliance countries gives us an ominous picture. Yet need this be the outcome? Francis Bator found grounds for optimism based on a fundamental harmony of interest in the West on the issues of war and peace and on the mutual benefits which can result from cooperative solutions to economic problems.[7] Negotiations such as those leading to the Special Drawing Rights plan have succeeded in the past when a problem was properly identified, alternatives carefully investigated, and proposals fully discussed and vigorously pursued.

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[6] Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *The American Challenge* (New York: Atheneum, 1968).

What then are the alternatives to deal with the economic conflicts that are arising within the alliance? As implied from the foregoing discussion, there are two alternative approaches to the drift toward economic nationalism: we can alter existing economic mechanisms so economies can better adjust to divergencies among countries, or we can integrate political decision-making so that economic policies will be devised that will prevent national divergencies. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive and could be pursued simultaneously, which is just as well in view of the potential difficulties with either.

A number of independent measures could be taken to improve the functioning of the present international monetary system. First, the member countries of the International Monetary Fund could agree to begin issuing Special Drawing Rights and to do so in sufficient amounts to satisfy the need for a growing international monetary base. Second, cooperation between central banks could be institutionalized to a greater extent so that countries whose currencies are under speculative pressure would be assured that they could borrow sufficient resources to withstand the pressure, if that was their decision, or to support a change in policy, if that was required. Third, a fundamental change in the system could be initiated whereby exchange rates were permitted a limited degree of flexibility. This could be accomplished through widening the band within which spot exchange rates are permitted to fluctuate around fixed parities, or the parities themselves could be allowed to change slowly over time within specified limits. This would be a direct attempt to come to grips with the adjustment problem.

Other conflict areas might be handled within our present institutional system through greater international cooperation in identifying problems and in containing conflicts when they occur. The shadow hanging over the future of foreign direct investment might be dispelled if governments openly discussed the "dangers" they foresee rather than concealing their concerns. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) would be an appropriate forum for such discussions. If real problems exist, proposals for curing them can be made. The Secretariat of the OECD could make many of the background studies needed for productive discussions, or contract for independent scholars if that should prove necessary. Business firms would also be in a much better position if they knew exactly what governments expected of them, what governmental interferences are considered legitimate, and what redress they would have if treated unfairly.

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[7] Francis M. Bator, "The Politics of Alliance: The United States and Western Europe," in *Agenda for the Nation, op. cit.*

Commercial policy conflicts could be handled within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but only if GATT is substantially restructured. GATT is now the captive of lawyers and bureaucrats who would rather stick to some vaguely determined rules than solve problems. Its handling of conflicts tends to penalize responsible countries and to reward irresponsible ones. Because its investigations are conducted in a trial-like manner, attempts by a country to gain advance approval of a commercial measure are rebuffed with cries of outrage, accusations of undermining public morality, and threats of impending disaster. But let a country take a unilateral action, without consultation and without regard to its trading partners—then GATT bends over backward to find a rationale for accepting the action and congratulates the erring country for being so moderate. If another country should happen to object to this unilateral act and defend itself against it, condemnation is centered on the objecting country for not playing the game.

One could begin a review of the functioning of GATT by recognizing that GATT obligations will not prevent a sovereign nation from taking an action it thinks is necessary in its own interest. Countries take these measures either to protect inefficient industries or to affect the balance of payments. GATT investigations can only ensure that the former reason is not disguised as the latter. If the balance of payments is the target, GATT can insist that the measure be efficient. As they are currently interpreted, GATT rules work mainly in a perverse direction. Quotas that undermine the price system are favored over border tax adjustments; surcharges only on imports which discriminate against international trade are favored over adjustments on both imports and exports; and differentiated border charges that have some protective effects are sometimes favored over uniform charges. If countries find that they have to protect inefficient industries, they must be prepared to compensate other countries for the damage they cause them, and the onus of initiating the compensating action should not fall on the aggrieved country. Judgments can be made as to reasonable compensation which will leave all parties satisfied, if not happy, and thus keep a conflict from escalating. The knowledge that compensation must be paid may even temper some of the original demands for protection.

The more daring approach for meeting the problems of the alliance, however, would be a direct attempt to form larger, politically integrated units. This could involve a return to the original concept of partnership if Europe could somehow find the will to achieve political union. The European political climate should soon enter a state of heightened uncertainty. If sufficient despair over solving national problems within a narrow context should happen to be combined with the existence of a strong political figure bent on leading all of Western Europe toward political unity, then the pre-January 14, 1963 spirit might be recaptured. Alternatively, one could imagine a political union encompassing the entire Atlantic Alliance being successful, even if a European union were not negotiable. Many critics have suggested that such dreams are the equivalent of "tilting against windmills," and they may be right. What is surprising is that there are still some visionary thinkers who believe such a scheme is possible.[8] Unhappily a word of caution is required. A free trade area, even a North Atlantic Free Trade Area, is not a political entity. European experience has proven that economic integration does not automatically lead to political union. These require separate, although closely related, decisions.

CONCLUSION

In concentrating on the current state and future prospects of the alliance, little heed has been given to the actual record over the last twenty years. This inattention was not meant in any way to disparage the substantial record of achievements. Peace has been maintained in Europe. Political relations among alliance countries have been extremely close, and the economic gains of this period are unequaled in recorded history. Indeed, some of the present difficulties stem from these very successes rather than from failures as noted above. The successes should be a source of satisfaction for all alliance countries and also a source of comfort because they have resulted from a basic mutuality of interests.

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[8] See supplemental comments by Adolph W. Schmidt in the panel report, "NATO After Czechoslovakia," published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, April 1969.

But satisfaction with the past can lead to weakness if it prevents a realistic appraisal of the current situation, and to an unwillingness to recognize problems that exist. Even with the best of intentions, it often takes a great deal of searching to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems. Problems left unattended can lead to conflicts, and conflicts can result in sub-optimal or even destructive solutions. In the complicated arena of economics, it is foolhardy to expect a hastily called, ill-prepared meeting of Ministers to arrive at constructive solutions to difficulties among countries. The more likely outcome is a patchwork of expediencies of the kind we have recently witnessed.

Fruitful solutions of problems result from searching examinations of alternatives. The process is begun by some country taking the initiative and offering a particular solution. Where is the initiative to come from that will lead to solutions of the problems besetting the alliance? Some Americans believe that Europeans, having been critical of U.S. initiatives in the past, should offer initiatives and the United States should have the luxury of being the critic. The alliance would be greatly benefited if Europeans would take some initiative, but this is unlikely to happen. No European state feels powerful enough by itself to lead the alliance (although European-wide initiatives would be possible if European unity advanced). For most issues that affect the entire alliance, the United States must bear the responsibility for initiating ideas without foreclosing the opportunity to its allies. It must be self-confident enough to offer solutions, yet willing to accept superior alternatives suggested by others. This is not an easy role, but well worth the effort.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: AN INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE 1970'S

by Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

THE title of this article needs to be defined more narrowly. The 1970's, as such, will see international "institutional structures" of various kinds, beginning with the United Nations and its numerous offspring and including many regional groupings such as the Commonwealth, the Pan-American Union, the Organization of African States, NATO itself. What we have to consider in the context of the twentieth anniversary of NATO is the part the Atlantic Alliance might play in the structure of the Atlantic world, that is to say of the area covered by the Treaty of Washington. Clearly NATO can provide no institutional services—though it may offer institutional lessons—to countries which are not members, or likely to become members, of the Atlantic Alliance.

It is advisable to make this point straightaway because it underlines the fact that there are many important international tasks which NATO cannot undertake and for which it was not designed. It can hardly, for example, become a forum for East/West understanding and cooperation or for the creation of a "greater Europe" (including the East European countries now suffering under communism). During the somewhat euphoric months before the invasion of Czechoslovakia last year, NATO was busy on détente, and the role of the alliance as a factor in the reduction of East/West tension had become doctrinally almost the first preoccupation of the Council. (It was a more agreeable—and less costly—activity than providing and maintaining effective defense forces.) This was inevitably a disappointing experience, even at a time when hopes were high. The trouble was that the other side was absent from the table, and it became apparent that there is a logical difficulty in using, for purposes of improving relations with the Soviets, an instrument which was created for resisting them. I do not say that it is an insuperable difficulty, but it exists, and because of it NATO spokesmen made a rather self-conscious impression when trying to suggest that the principal aim of the alliance was détente. All too easily the argument was met, principally among the communists, but also unfortunately in certain allied circles, that the best contribution NATO could make to détente would be to dissolve itself, or to "abolish the two blocs," as the saying went.

Nor is NATO a suitable instrument for handling the relations between the industrial West and the developing countries, for the same reason—namely, that the interlocutor is not and cannot be present. In their search for a *raison d'être* more "respectable," or should I say more popular, than joint defense against aggression, the supporters and apologists of NATO thought that the organization of aid to developing countries might be a suitable activity for the alliance; but it was never a starter. Other institutions exist which are in a better position to do this. Even the more limited, and apparently more relevant, problem of economic assistance to the poorer members of the alliance has never received effective handling within NATO—as the Greeks and Turks have been disappointed to find. It has always been argued—and it is undeniable—that there are other international forums more suited for the purpose. I would say that one of the most necessary precautions in the creation of orderly international life is to prevent international organizations from invading one another's spheres of activity and duplicating one another's work.

So we return to the fact that NATO is an alliance of fifteen specific Atlantic countries with a defined geographical area and a distinct political objective: to ensure the protection of that area against aggression. Of course, protection against aggression is not the only ingredient in the maintenance of peace. As a deterrent to any Soviet attack in Europe NATO has been completely successful for twenty years. But in the long run peace demands more than mere deterrence against aggression; it requires the solution of differences and the settlement of unresolved problems. In this, our alliance has not been able to show such notable results—although the maintenance of the status quo in Europe for twenty years is not a negligible achievement in itself. But it is obvious that the main outstanding problems—the division of Germany and of Europe—can never be solved by individual European states acting alone. The only hope lies in a united front which can negotiate, when the time comes, on a basis of equality with the Soviet Union. This is now NATO's most important function.

NATO is a bloc of countries. Why do we accept the implication in communist (and Gaullist) parlance that a bloc is a bad thing and a threat to peace? "Bloc" is not an English word anyway. So far as I can see, it is merely a pejorative way of saying alliance, or group of states which have joined together for certain purposes. When you call them a bloc it must mean that you do not like them, or that you do not like their purposes; or perhaps that you think if they were not a bloc you could deal with them more easily one by one and get your own way. That seems, indeed, to be the origin of most of the objections to NATO as a bloc. The communists dislike it because it prevents Soviet Russia from dominating Europe, and the Gaullists dislike it, apparently, because it keeps Europe linked with the United States. I have never heard any Frenchman describe the Common Market as a bloc, although it is—or was meant to be—a much closer association than NATO. It is difficult to regard a policy of "dissolving the two blocs" as anything other than a policy of handing over Europe to domination by communist Russia. If NATO were abolished and the American guarantee abandoned, who would dominate our continent? Certainly not the French; hardly the Germans. It would be the Russians; and if anyone wants to belong to a communist community stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, then it is certain that the vast majority of Europeans disagree with that person.

Let us admit then that NATO is a bloc, but do not let us use the word again. Let us say that it is an alliance, but an "alliance plus," because in addition to the obligations the member countries undertook under the treaty there is the organization, the "O" in NATO, the institutional structure which they set up and which has now been operating for twenty years. My purpose is to try to see what functions this structure may perform in the 1970's.

II

What was the instrument originally meant to do? Primarily it was to ensure the creation and the coordination of a joint defense system. For this purpose there were established, under the authority of the Council, the Military Committee, the program of commonly financed Infrastructure (ports, airfields, fuel pipelines, early warning systems and so on) and the structure of Joint Command on land, sea and air throughout the NATO area. I do not suppose that the function of these institutions will change during the 1970's or that the need for them will grow less. Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia we might have thought differently, but today we can only suppose that the need to have a strong defense against the Red Army in Europe is as great as it ever was. (I do not say greater, because I am not convinced that the Soviet combat forces now indefinitely stationed in Czechoslovakia have necessarily increased the threat; they are evidently there to control the Czechs rather than to alter the balance of power between East and West.)

Similarly, we will have to take account of the ever-increasing Soviet naval forces which now operate in areas previously thought immune from direct Soviet pressure. These forces—conventional forces—will be used in peacetime for political purposes, to increase Soviet influence and frighten noncommunist nations, and it will be the task of NATO's military institutions and conventional forces to counterbalance them, to provide assurance and security to the Free World. Nor can we be at all sure that there will not be further, graver crises. The process of disengagement from her colonial positions in Eastern Europe, which is gradually being forced upon the Soviet Union, will be a painful one and may be dangerous for us all if the Russians cannot learn to adjust their policies successfully to the challenge of freedom in Eastern Europe. It could produce changes for the worse as well as for the better in the Soviet leadership itself.

Therefore the conventional military structure of the NATO alliance will remain an essential institution during the 1970's. The question is, will it be sufficiently robust and sufficiently flexible to perform the tasks assigned to it? There is no voting and no compulsion here. Everything in NATO has to be done by consent, and it is only by persuasion and mutual example that the member countries can keep one another up to the mark in providing the necessary forces and showing the necessary will-power. NATO institutions lack the power to acquire power. They possess no self-generating or self-nourishing authority like, for example, a central court of justice that may gradually extend its authority over local courts, or like an international commission entrusted by treaty with specific powers which it can then develop and extend. Nor is it to be expected that democratic nations like ours will ever agree, short of achieving some kind of federal system, to hand such powers to an international military organization in time of peace. The nuclear situation illustrates this clearly enough. Obviously the United States will not renounce the ultimate power of decision over the use of its nuclear force. Equally obviously her allies will not be content with a purely American nuclear authority for NATO.

The task of NATO as an institution is therefore to provide for continuous consultation, joint planning and preparation in peacetime, in both the nuclear and the conventional fields, so as to reconcile the interests of the nuclear and nonnuclear allies and to give the greatest possible degree of reality to the concept of an alliance of partners with equal rights. The Nuclear Planning Committee of NATO, which is the main instrument for this, will gain considerably in importance during the 1970's. When the Nonproliferation Treaty comes into force, making permanent the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear powers, the need for machinery of this kind will be increasingly felt as a means of maintaining mutual confidence between allies.

One might go further and suggest that to complete the effectiveness of mutual deterrence between East and West this mechanism might be made in some degree to operate across the Iron Curtain and become a piece of peacekeeping machinery on its own. In other words, to put it simply as an illustration, the "Nuclear Planning Committees" of the two sides might each have the duty of satisfying the other that its own side still possesses an effective, survivable deterrent capability.

To conclude my remarks about the military institutions of the alliance and their importance for the 1970's, I should like to quote what the British Defense Minister, Denis Healey, said recently to the British Atlantic Committee:

> . . . in the nuclear age, when in actual war some critical decisions would have to be taken literally in minutes rather than in days or weeks, the effectiveness of an alliance in deterring aggression depends critically on the readiness of its members to limit their freedom of action in advance of a crisis—to commit themselves in detail as to how they will behave and to reflect this commitment in the physical arrangements for the command and deployment of their forces in peacetime. It is only the certainty of this prior commitment which can reassure our friends and deter potential enemies. That is why the Atlantic Treaty differs from all previous treaties in history—it derives its value from its organisation of intimate military co-operation among its members in time of peace.

That is the essential purpose of NATO's institutional structure on the military side. The perfection of "crisis management" techniques, the evolution of an agreed strategy and the consolidation of a common will-to-resist will be its overriding responsibilities during the 1970's.

III

But the Atlantic Alliance had a secondary purpose when it was formed, and it has a secondary function now. They are not, as a matter of fact, identical. The authors of the North Atlantic Treaty, apart from their concern to save Europe from a communist takeover, believed in the future of the Atlantic Community, and hoped that the treaty they were drawing up might form the institutional basis on which such a Community could be founded. The vestiges of this hope are to be found in Article 2 of the treaty which speaks of the need to strengthen the free institutions of the parties and to "eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and . . . encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." As things have turned out, this aspect of the treaty never took fire and relatively little has been achieved by way of economic cooperation in NATO or in the other respects provided for in Article 2.

The fact is that the idea of an Atlantic Community in its political sense, looking toward some form of union between the United States, Canada and the European members, is no longer widely regarded as a practical, or even necessarily a desirable, objective on either side of the Atlantic. During the past twenty years the common interests between America and Europe and their need to stand together in a dangerous world have certainly not diminished; but I think it is true to say that their differences in character and the divergence of their ways of life have become more marked, or at any rate more widely recognized. There is no call in Europe for a merger with the United States, and no inclination in America to unite with Europe. It is fairly clear, therefore, that during the next ten years we shall not be looking to NATO as an institutional structure for the furtherance of Atlantic union. But this is by no means the same thing as saying that the alliance has no political services to offer to the member countries or to the Western world. Very much the contrary. The remainder of my article will be an attempt to forecast what these services may be.

IV

In the first place we shall need the NATO Council and its supporting structure as the outward manifestation and justification of the mutual defense commitment. This is a two-way requirement. European governments would be unable to justify the cost of their defense effort to parliament unless they could show that their forces were a contribution to a joint defense effort. There is not a single country in Europe which could put up an effective resistance to communist pressure except in conjunction with its allies. Without NATO, there would be little point in trying.

European parliaments are not stupid. They know that the forces for which they provide funds could not operate alone or stand up on their own. But when they are asked to approve defense budgets they want to know where their forces fit in and how they are to be used, and they want to know that their own governments have a proper share in formulating the policies on which the issues of peace and war depend. This is what the NATO Council provides. The reputation it has acquired over the last twenty years is such that "NATO requirements" and NATO strategic concepts are taken seriously by national parliaments and public opinion.

Even for the United States the position is much the same. America could not keep the Russians out of Europe without the cooperation of the Europeans. Nor would Congress take kindly to the idea of supplying military assistance and support to individual European countries. This would make no sense militarily or politically. NATO is the obvious and the only suitable institution through which the enterprise can be organized. It is the chosen instrument of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe, and as such its importance for Europe is vital. During the 1970's it will be necessary for the Council to continue perfecting its methods of work, nourishing and airing American-European relations, and keeping alive the mutual confidence which is the essential foundation of such an alliance. The Secretariat must grow in responsibility and experience, and governments must pay attention to the quality of the staff they supply to it, in addition to maintaining the level of their own representation on the Council. Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense must continue to find the necessary time to attend NATO meetings, if only to ensure that they all know one another and are constantly aware of each other's preoccupations and points of view. This structure, and its proper use, is vital to the cohesion of the alliance and consequently to the security of the Atlantic area.

The next important function of the NATO machine is to coordinate our political relations with the Soviet Union and its East European clients and to provide a forum for political consultation of a general character. I wrote at the beginning of this article that NATO could hardly become a forum for East/West dialogue because the other side is absent from the table. I am sure that this is true, but it does not mean that we can do without NATO in our relations with the Soviet Union. There is no aspect of East/West relations, whether it be the division of Germany and of Europe, the Nonproliferation Treaty, nuclear balance and the missile race or the movements and countermovements in Eastern Europe, that does not affect the vital interests of every one of NATO's members. It is essential that there should be the closest consultation among them.

Even supposing that the United States were to develop over the next few years the habit of discussing such matters with the Soviet Union direct, it will still be of the utmost importance to her that she retain the support and confidence of her European allies. To fail to do so might mean losing Europe to communism. Likewise for the Europeans, it will be a prime necessity to have access to American thinking and a means of presenting European views while policies are being formed and throughout the process of negotiation. That is precisely what the NATO Council has provided in the past, throughout the various Berlin crises, throughout the disarmament negotiations, throughout the many vicissitudes Europe has experienced on the two sides of the Iron Curtain over the last twenty years. It is certain that in the 1970's even fuller use will have to be made of this mechanism of consultation, which constitutes an essential prerequisite to the achievement of any settlements between East and West.

V

Is the instrument adequate and well adapted for the purpose? When I was working in NATO myself, first as Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and later as British representative on the Council, we always replied to this question by saying that the instrument was capable of anything; what could not be guaranteed was the will of governments to use it. In other words we believed that NATO could provide the location, the facilities, the know-how, the factual background and the right atmosphere for any form of political consultation and discussion between member governments, at any level they chose and at any time they chose.

We used to point out the flexibility of the Council's procedure. It met regularly, once a week, so that its meetings need attract no publicity. But it could also meet at any other time, at an hour's notice, either formally or informally, to discuss any critical situation that might arise. Ministers or high officials from the capitals could attend if they wished. The Permanent Representatives could meet one another in the NATO building, where they all had their offices, without anyone outside even being aware that they had done so. (This fact has particular importance in case of a dispute between member countries—as for instance over Cyprus.) The Secretary General can call meetings of two, five, ten or any other number of national representatives in his office any time he wishes, without formality and without publicity. The staffs serving the fifteen Ambassadors are in constant touch with one another on committees, in the corridors and in the lunch room. The international Secretariat has built up a body of expert chairmen or secretaries of committee, rapporteurs, interpreters, translators and so on and can provide documentation and statistics to aid the work of all. As a structure for multilateral diplomacy this is unique. It is by now highly experienced. It is a nearly perfect piece of machinery for permanent negotiation and consultation between governments. Its real value depends, however, upon how much and how seriously it is used.

One has to remember that NATO is an alliance of sovereign states. There is nothing supranational in the organization; there never was at the start, and I would say that there has been no movement whatever toward supranationality in the first twenty years. The trend in certain respects has been the other way. There is even a danger that infrastructure, which was intended to be a genuinely common undertaking, jointly financed on a pro rata basis in accordance with each country's capacity to pay, might degenerate into a system whereby countries would try to get out of it what they put in—or rather, would not put in more than they expected to get out. But this absence of any authority overriding the national state is not, in my opinion, a weakness in NATO, at least on the political side. On the contrary, it signifies recognition of the fact that in matters affecting their vital political existence, questions of peace and war, decisions of foreign policy, allocation of funds for defense and the like, our nations are not yet ready to sacrifice their sovereignty. To pretend that the situation is otherwise would be a weakness and the successive Secretaries General of NATO have been wise enough to see this.

I would say that the same would be true throughout the 1970's. I cannot believe that within that time scale there will be any readiness on the part of the major allies, the United States, Britain, Germany or France, for example, to allow a great deal more power to the Secretary General, to introduce majority voting, to accept any significant degree of control by the NATO "Parliament" (which is not, in fact, a parliament), or to do any of the other things members of a group might do if they wanted to work toward a political or economic union. The truth is that the member governments of NATO do *not* regard the alliance as an institution for promoting political or economic union. Some of them, the Europeans, have inclinations toward greater unity in other contexts and in other places, and this may begin to have an effect in NATO. Already there have been moves toward special meetings between European Defense Ministers, and there are areas of military cooperation open to the European members of NATO which may not always be open in the same degree for the United States with its worldwide responsibilities. The geographical unity of Europe creates common interests which can only be fully exploited in common policies. We may well see a "European point of view" emerging on nuclear policy, since this affects Western Europe in a special way; and we may see foundations laid for a more general European approach to the problems of arms production (the "Advanced Combat Aircraft" is a case in point). But everybody will take the utmost care to ensure that none of this endangers cooperation with the United States or the American commitment to collective defense through NATO.

VI

Are the governments then likely to make the best use they could of the instrument that is available to them in NATO? That is the real question. It is not easy to answer. International institutions, which, after all, are every one of them experimental and (except for the churches) hardly antedate this present century, tend to come and go, to have periods of importance and activity followed by periods of decline. Generally speaking, those which have practical functions, however pedestrian, and which dispose of money in however modest a degree, tend to enjoy a more stable existence than institutions dedicated to an idea and a hope. NATO is fortunate in having both types of purpose; it has the practical function of running a common defense system, and it carries the hope of political settlements, security and peace. Therefore, it should be assured of a stable future.

But there is another element by which these institutions live, another air they breathe and without which they die. This may be crudely and perhaps cynically described as "limelight," or perhaps I should say more generally "prestige." No organization like NATO could survive if the leading statesmen ceased to want to come to its meetings.

What makes busy and responsible statesmen go to international meetings? Obviously, you will say, the importance of the meeting itself and of the subject to be handled. But that begs the question to a certain extent, because a subject discussed between important people is less important when discussed between less important people. Statesmen go to meetings only partly to discuss subjects; they go at least as much in order to meet one another, and their decision to go, or not to go, will also be taken in the light of their internal political situation and the likely effect their journey will have on that. Most democratic leaders are thinking about their parliamentary position and their public relations at home for a considerable part of their working day, even when they are operating on the international scene. How does NATO stand in this respect?

Rather well on the whole. Ministers for Foreign Affairs hardly ever fail to turn up in person for the spring and autumn regular meetings of the Council, or Ministers of Defense for the autumn meeting. Finance Ministers often come too, once a year, usually for the purpose of checking expenditures. For all these three categories of minister, NATO meetings are an essential part of their job, because their business is transacted there and commitments are undertaken which affect their responsibilities to parliament. But a certain amount of this attendance is routine and not always politically rewarding for the individual (since defense and defense expenditures are not popular causes in any country). It is therefore most necessary that NATO governments should not weary in well-doing in this respect.

Heads of Government seldom meet under NATO auspices nowadays; perhaps there should be more "summit" meetings in the 1970's. Foreign Ministers might well come more often to the Council for special purposes, either to report or to consult on an international issue that happened to be of special current interest to them or their allies. The United States has frequently set an example in this respect, and the appearances of Secretaries Acheson, Dulles and Rusk at critical moments in the life of the alliance were always a stimulus to the NATO Council and an encouragement to all who worked at NATO headquarters. President Nixon's recent meeting with the Council is an excellent example. It is to be hoped that this practice will continue throughout the coming years.

VII

To sum up, I think NATO will be an essential institutional structure throughout the 1970's provided that we do not expect it—or allow it—to perform functions for which it is not adapted. It must keep its feet on the ground and avoid overlapping with the functions of other institutions. It is an Atlantic organization, in the sense that it binds America and Europe together for defense, but it is not, I suggest, the first stage toward an Atlantic union. It has enormous importance for Europe but is not in itself an instrument for European unification. The resolution passed by the Congress of European Parliamentarians at The Hague in November 1968 described the kind of European future to which the parliamentarians were trying to direct public attention. It included the following phrase, which had been proposed by Dr. Mansholt of the Netherlands and approved by a special vote: "... institutions with supranational powers and a democratic structure solidly based on direct elections." That is the ideal future for Europe. NATO will not be such an institution. It has neither supranational powers nor a democratic structure, nor do elections play any part in it. But the North Atlantic Alliance, by ensuring peace and security for Europe, will create the sole conditions in which such political progress can be made.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE 1970'S

by Livingston Hartley

IN our rapidly shrinking world of the twentieth century, the period since the end of World War II has seen unparalleled progress in Atlantic integration.[1] Although the process has been stalled in recent years by the policies of President de Gaulle, the American involvement in Viet Nam and other developments, the long-term trend toward integration appears likely to be resumed if and when such obstacles are reduced. The dominant factors today and tomorrow, such as advances in communications, transportation and technology, are pushing the West toward increasing interdependence.

I

The primary obstacle, the one which most affects the American people, is Viet Nam. What can we expect our prospects there to be in the 1970's? It seems probable that the negotiations in Paris will eventually lead to a settlement which would either terminate or drastically reduce the level of involvement of American forces. Such a settlement should be facilitated by the advent of the new U.S. Administration, which eases considerations of "face" on both sides. If it is achieved, it would likely be effective by the early 1970's. At that point Viet Nam would cease to be an overriding problem for the American people, no longer diverting their attention and interest from the central Atlantic relationship so vital to their future.

A second obstacle has been de Gaulle. Now that he has resigned, there could be a major change in Atlantic relations, even though it might develop gradually. Many of us forget today the role played by France in creating the European Communities before she was transformed into a barrier to integration. Freed from de Gaulle, she might return to this old role, seeking to build "Europe" and agreeing to British membership in the Common Market. She might also resume full participation in the Atlantic Alliance.

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[1] This subject was discussed by the author in "On the Political Integration of the Atlantic Community," ORBIS, Winter 1963, pp. 645-655, and at greater length in *Atlantic Challenge* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1965).

A third obstacle before last August was a widespread impression that détente with the Soviet Union was so certain that effective allied defense forces were not really necessary. It is sometimes said that when the shock to the West caused by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia wears off the NATO peoples will revert to feeling that they need not worry about Soviet aggression. But it seems unlikely that the lessons of Czechoslovakia will be completely forgotten. The ruthlessness and unpredictability of Soviet actions and the precision of Soviet conquest in bringing an errant ally to heel are likely to leave indelible marks on Atlantic memories. If so, it is safe to assume that effective Atlantic defense forces will continue to remain an accepted objective.

A final assumption relating to the next decade derives from the recent inauguration of a new President of the United States. President Johnson had evinced no particular personal interest in European or Atlantic affairs. Almost from the beginning of his administration he was immersed in the conflict in Viet Nam, devoting to it most of the attention he gave to foreign problems. Secretary of State Rusk was primarily oriented toward Asia, not only because of Viet Nam but because of his previous service in the Army and as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

President Nixon, in contrast, has long shown interest in European and Atlantic relations. As a Congressman, he supported the earliest Atlantic Union Resolution, and in 1960, when Vice President, he intervened effectively to bring about passage of a modified version of it by the Senate. His present view is evident from the following statement, excerpted from his radio address of October 13, 1968: "The Atlantic Alliance—formalized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—has been the cornerstone of our network of defensive alliances, and the world's strongest bulwark of peace." Again, in his press conference of February 6, 1969, he spoke of his trip to Europe as "a first step in achieving a purpose that I have long felt is vital to the future of peace for the United States and for the world. And that is the strengthening and revitalizing of the American-European community."

In light of the President's views, and his decision to meet with the North Atlantic Council and visit European capitals at the start of his term, it is reasonable to assume that his administration will seek to play a positive and leading role in the alliance.

This could bring about renewed progress in Atlantic relations and institutions and establish a new momentum for the 1970's.

These assumptions all point toward a new stage in the development of the Atlantic Alliance. Released from the burden and discord of the conflict in Viet Nam as well as from the paralyzing influence of de Gaulle, mindful of the continuing need for effective, collective defense, and led by an American Administration that appreciates the unique significance of the Atlantic relationship, the members of the alliance will have a new capability for integration.

II

Among the possible means of advance now visible, one is comprehensive in scope, as proposed in the Atlantic Union Delegation Resolution (H.Con.Res.48) approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on July 2, 1968. This resolution, not acted upon by either the House or the Senate during the remainder of that session, has been reintroduced into the present Congress. It was supported in 1968 by 29 Senators and 127 Representatives and was favored by all Presidential candidates of the two major parties. It provided that:

> The Congress create an Atlantic Union Delegation, composed of 18 eminent citizens, which is authorized to organize and participate in a Convention made up of similar delegations from such NATO allies as desire to join in this enterprise, to explore the possibility of agreement on:
>
> (a) a dclaration that the eventual goal of their states is to transform the Atlantic Alliance into a federal union;
>
> (b) a tentative timetable for the transition to this goal, and
>
> (c) the creation of interim democratic institutions to hasten the process of integration and provide a channel of continuing fruitful contact toward unity among the North Atlantic Treaty Organization states.

This resolution represents another effort to solve the interrelated political, military and economic problems of the NATO peoples by unification. The original proposal for a federal solution, made by Clarence Streit in "Union Now" in 1939, was adopted by the Atlantic Union Committee in 1949 and led eventually to the Atlantic Convention which met in Paris in 1962. It should be noted, however, that the legislation of 1960 which brought about the Paris Convention provided that it explore, not the possibility of agreement on federal union, but "means by which greater cooperation and unity of purpose may be developed." This was a much less all-embracing objective, as was shown in the discussions of the Paris Convention and the "Declaration of Paris" it produced. In a period of three decades, 1968 was the first year in which a Committee of Congress approved a resolution to explore the possibility of federal union.

Such a venture has an imposing amount of high-level support. The International Movement for Atlantic Union includes such leaders as Lester B. Pearson of Canada, the Earl of Avon and Paul-Henri Spaak. A special report of the National Planning Association on Atlantic integration, published in May 1966,[2] envisaged steps which would be federal in character. But as events have transpired, the most pertinent and potentially important support is that expressed by Richard Nixon on September 1, 1966; in a statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee he said:

> It is fitting that the United States, the world's first truly federal government, should be a main force behind the effort to find a basis for a broad federation of free Atlantic nations.
>
> Although the accomplishment of the ultimate goal of the Resolution may well be impossible to attain for many years, recent events of history and the numerous scientific and technological advances of the last twenty years point the way in this direction. It would be foolish for us to ignore the fact that science and history are even now fatefully combining to accomplish the same goal. . . .
>
> The Atlantic Union Resolution is a forward-looking proposal which acknowledges the depth and breadth of incredible change which is going on in the world around us. I urge its adoption.

What this overall move toward Atlantic unification will accomplish in the 1970's cannot be foreseen now. President Nixon's support and leadership could be decisive because of the weight his views on a question of this nature would carry in Congress. But it is one thing to support a resolution as a private citizen and another to secure its implementation as President of the United States amid all the pressures of that office and other considerations which must be taken into account.

If the resolution is adopted by Congress without any substantial watering down and leads to the proposed Convention, its consequences could be revolutionary. The first of its objectives alone, agreement that the eventual goal is to transform the Atlantic Alliance into a federal union, could change the course of history. To consider only the case of the United States, a solemn agreement with our allies to this effect would provide our people with a purpose which would mean hope to them and to all free men. Lacking such a long-range aim, we tend to improvise as problems and challenges arise and solve them without any clear sense of direction or of how the solution will affect our progress. Given this ultimate goal, our people as well as our government could see policies and plans in the proper perspective and decide whether or not they were moving toward Atlantic union. Were it likewise accepted by other NATO members as a common goal, this would give direction to our common policies.

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[2] Special Report No. 63 on "Strengthening the Free World Through Steps Towards Atlantic Unification," by the N.P.A. Board of Trustees and Standing Committees.

III

A second possibility for the 1970's is the creation of a European Union sufficiently integrated to allow development of the "equal" Atlantic Partnership envisaged by President Kennedy in his noted Fourth of July speech in 1962.

Hopes of progress in this direction have been thwarted since early 1963 when President de Gaulle barred Britain from membership in the Common Market, for to qualify in any sense as an "equal" partner of the United States, a European Union would have to include Britain. During this same period, de Gaulle also blocked further political integration of the Six. There is now little promise that a supranational European Union capable of conducting a single foreign policy could emerge by 1980, but as de Gaulle's influence wanes, the peoples of Western Europe may turn wholeheartedly toward the political integration so long urged by many of their leaders.

Yet even a fully developed European Union that included Britain could not actually be an equal partner of the United States. Examination of this concept has brought to light some of its difficulties.[3] In the economic field a roughly equal relationship might become possible, since the European Union would outrank the United States in foreign trade even though its gross national product would be much smaller. But militarily and strategically, the European Union would be far inferior and would continue to depend upon the American deterrent for its security. Another problem, for which no adequate solution has been offered, is how Canada could be fitted into a partnership between a United Europe and the United States. Finally, there can be

[3] See the author's "Atlantic Partnership—How?," ORBIS, Spring 1964, and *Atlantic Challenge, op. cit.,* pp. 39-51.

no assurance that such a bilateral partnership would function harmoniously. As far back as 1950, former Under Secretary of State Will Clayton wrote, "A Europe united without the United States can become a Europe united against the United States."[4]

How the institutions of the alliance would be transformed by such a partnership cannot be envisaged in any concrete terms because the shape of its relationships is so vague. Would the existing European governments continue to be represented individually on the North Atlantic Council, or would there be one representative of the European Union? How would Canada and any European nations that had not joined the Union be represented?

The answers to these questions depend, as does such a partnership, on the political unification of West European nations to the point where they would have a single overall government. As of today, the road forward is blocked and past momentum has been lost. Facing so hazy a prospect, it seems more fruitful to consider possible institutional developments in the alliance which would operate on an Atlantic basis, as do the North Atlantic Council, SACEUR, SACLANT and the North Atlantic Assembly. If the journey toward a European Union is resumed in the 1970's, the necessary institutional adjustments could be made.

While some form of European defense grouping may be established within the alliance before long, this could not fill the role of a full political union and it would not obviate the need for Atlantic defense machinery as long as European security depends on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and American as well as European conventional forces. Defense in Europe will remain subject to the control of the individual NATO governments until such time as an overall European government can be created.

IV

Since such "giant steps" as Atlantic Union or an Atlantic Partnership comprising a European Union would be regarded by most people as unlikely by the end of the 1970's, we need to consider lesser steps that might be taken more easily and quickly. Among these are improvements in the existing machinery or procedures of the alliance.

Before turning to them, however, it may be helpful to outline some of the main types of problems which have long confronted the NATO governments. How can they better work together toward common objectives? How can they consult in sufficient depth and detail to insure mutual understanding, if not agreement? How can they work out common policies or, when that is impossible, harmonize their individual policies for the common good? Achievement of these ends depends on the willingness of member governments to relinquish to whatever degree necessary their individual freedom of action.

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[4] "The Testament of Will Clayton," Declaration of Atlantic Unity, New York, 1968, p. 33.

The value of political consultation was stressed as far back as 1956, in the report of the "Three Wise Men." It is particularly necessary in relation to problems outside the treaty area, where the provisions of the treaty do not apply. But consultation will not produce effective results if the members involved in a problem insist on maintaining their full freedom of action and disregard the views of their allies. Speaking of European criticism and lack of comprehension of American policy in Viet Nam, Paul-Henri Spaak stated in Memphis on November 8, 1968:

> All this would probably not have happened if the United States had taken the precaution of informing her allies of the position in which she was in Southeast Asia, and had explained in time the policy she intended to pursue, and not faced them with an accomplished fact.
>
> Preliminary consultation would, once more, have avoided much trouble. It did not take place and it is deeply regrettable.[5]

Obviously agreement on common or harmonized policies requires even more willingness to give up full freedom of action. No one ally, not even the United States, can expect all the others to agree totally with its views. Some give and take is necessary, as it is in all dealings between democratic peoples.

Viewed from this angle, one purpose of improved institutions within the alliance would be to facilitate the merger of national freedom of action for the common benefit. While this is frequently accomplished negatively in treaties, in which the parties agree to abstain from certain acts, it could be accomplished positively within institutions especially designed for that purpose. The overriding need is effective means of reaching common policies in matters of common concern.

The development of NATO in the 1950's and 1960's suggests that one institutional improvement would be to upgrade the North Atlantic Council by appointing Permanent Representatives who would participate fully in the formulation of national policies relating to the alliance. This change could directly enhance the value of consultation within the Council as a means of harmonizing national policies. To make it practicable for these Representatives to spend enough time in their capitals to participate in policy formulation, each Representative of a distant country could have a Deputy to replace him in Brussels when he was at home and to take his place in the capital when he was in Brussels.

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[5] *The Atlantic Community Quarterly,* Winter 1968-1969, p. 491.

A second improvement could be the use of NATO intelligence facilities for joint evaluation of reports on situations that might affect any alliance member. This would be particularly useful to smaller members lacking adequate intelligence facilities of their own, and of value to all members. To harmonize national policies requires a common appreciation of facts.

A third improvement in existing practice could be more frequent meetings of senior officers of national governments who are responsible for specific aspects of foreign, defense or economic policies. A fourth could be strengthening the International Staff by provision of more adequate budgets and appointment of higher caliber officers, so that it could have a greater role in initiating suggestions and ideas from the viewpoint of the alliance as a whole.

A more organic means of bettering NATO's functioning through the designation of an executive or steering committee within the Council was suggested several years ago by leading authorities.[6] This proposal presents greater difficulty than the improvements just mentioned. It would depart from a basic concept of the alliance, namely, the juridical equality of all members, and could be expected to meet opposition from countries that would not be represented. If such a restricted body could not be established by a unanimous resolution of the Council as a "subsidiary body" under Article 9, it would presumably require a protocol to the treaty. No action has been taken to implement this idea for the last five years. Yet it could be taken up by member governments in the 1970's.

V

A different approach to Atlantic integration in the 1970's might be found in the application of methods developed in Europe. During the last decade, the outstanding example of international integration has been provided by the six NATO nations which form the European Communities—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The new institutions created by the Treaty of Rome achieved remarkable success until progress was slowed by de Gaulle. Their success suggests that they might profitably be adapted to serve all the NATO nations.

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[6] Henry A. Kissinger, "For an Atlantic Confederacy," *The Reporter,* February 2, 1961, pp. 16-20, and "Coalition Diplomacy in a Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1964, pp. 525-545; General Lauris Norstad, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in an address to the Atlantic Council of the United States on January 14, 1963; and Robert R. Bowie, *Shaping the Future* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

The first institution created by the Treaty of Rome is the Assembly, now known as the European Parliament. It is akin to the North Atlantic Assembly in that it deliberates and expresses its views, and its members are appointed by national parliaments on a sliding scale similar to the voting scale of the NATO Parliamentarians. But it has also some prerogatives and powers which the North Atlantic Assembly lacks. It can require the Commission of the Communities to reply to its questions or those of its members. And it exercises democratic control over the Commission through its power to force the Commission to resign in a body by a motion of censure.

The North Atlantic Assembly, although it is addressed by the Secretary General of NATO and by SACEUR, and although its recommendations are considered by the North Atlantic Council, has no treaty basis and has not yet achieved official status. Despite hopes in early 1968 that such a status would be conferred by a Council resolution, the Council took no action due to objections from some governments. Instead, the Secretary Generals of NATO and the Assembly secured approval for an "informal" relationship. It seems probable now that the Assembly will achieve a formal relationship with the Council, and thus an official status, by the early 1970's. But that would represent only a short step toward any kind of legislative functions or powers.

Since the North Atlantic Council is composed of representatives of the governments, it cannot be controlled by a parliamentary Assembly as is the European Commission. NATO has no executive organ composed of individuals, like the Commission, which could be made subject to parliamentary control. Only if and when such an Atlantic body is created can there be a question of providing for its control by the North Atlantic Assembly.

The second European institution is the Council of the European Communities. Under the Treaty of Rome some of its decisions may be made by a qualified majority based upon a weighted vote. This interesting new method of international decision-making[7] accords France, Germany and Italy four votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands two votes each, and Luxembourg one vote. Twelve votes are required for decisions on proposals of the European Commission and twelve votes, including those of four of the six members, in other cases. No one government can veto action where a qualified majority vote is required; such a veto would require the support of at least one large country and a country of medium size (Italy and Belgium, for example).

Proposals that the North Atlantic Council should adopt a qualified majority vote for certain decisions have been made by representative bodies of Atlantic citizens. The Political Committee of the Atlantic Congress of 1959 suggested that this question be considered by the Atlantic Convention which met in Paris in 1962. The Convention recommended that a Permanent High Council should prepare and concert policies "and, in defined cases, decide them by a weighted, qualified majority vote"; also that "where authority for decision is delegated to the North Atlantic Council by governments, it should proceed by a weighted majority."

Prospects that the Council will adopt a voting procedure of this type during the next decade now appear slim. It would depart sharply from the practice of arriving at decisions by a consensus of members desiring to participate. Nevertheless, it remains a possibility for the 1970's and one which would have extensive juridical implications, involving a merging by member governments of a portion of their national powers.

The mechanics of such a system are not complicated. As in the European precedent, it would be necessary to insure that no one nation or combination of a few small nations could block a decision. This might be done by providing, along the lines of the EEC model, that two-thirds of the member nations must vote favorably and must include in their number nations which together possess two-thirds of the total vote. To achieve this result, the vote of the United States would obviously have to be weighted at less than one-third of the total, on some sort of sliding scale such as is employed in the European Council and has long been utilized in the European assemblies.

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[7] For a more detailed discussion, see "On the Political Integration of the Atlantic Community," *op. cit.*, and *Atlantic Challenge*, pp. 80-85.

A weighting of NATO nation votes could be worked out,[8] although it would necessarily be more cumbersome than that in the European precedent because it would cover fifteen countries instead of six and the fifteen differ much more in size and importance. The obstacles to such a development are not mechanical but political, including its acceptance by governments and the delineation of areas in which it would be operative. Even if applied initially to questions of relatively minor importance, its adoption by the North Atlantic Council would have far-reaching political implications: it would represent a positive application of the principle of interdependence through a merging of national powers as well as a practical means of facilitating the adoption of common policies. Moreover, if such a system were adopted and found beneficial, its area of application could be expanded.

The third European institution is the Executive Commission of the European Communities, composed of individuals chosen for their professional competence by agreement between the governments. They serve the general interest of the Communities, not their governments, and can act by majority vote on matters entrusted to them by treaty or in exercising powers conferred on them by the Council. Primarily an executive body, the Commission insures the application of the treaties, proposes measures to the Council and carries out its decisions.

It is not apparent how an executive commission of this type

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[8] The following formula for a NATO weighted vote was included in *Atlantic Challenge* (p. 84). Its weighting is necessarily arbitrary as well as on a sliding scale, but some account is taken of such factors as population, strategic position and military and economic strength.

Country	*Weighted Vote*	*Country*	*Weighted Vote*
United States	22	Belgium	3
Canada	5	Greece	3
Britain	8	Netherlands	3
France	8	Denmark	2
Germany	8	Norway	2
Italy	8	Portugal	2
Turkey	4	Iceland	1
		Luxembourg	1

Total Votes	80
Required to block a two-thirds vote	27
United States and Canada	27
United States and either Britain, France, Germany or Italy	30
Britain, France, Germany and Italy	32

Any combination of six countries could also block a two-thirds vote, since a decision requires the concurrence of at least ten of the fifteen nations, regardless of their weighted voting power.

could be fitted into NATO at this stage of its evolution. But it does seem probable that a similarly constituted commission of "wise men" attached to the North Atlantic Council could play a valuable advisory role.[9]

An Atlantic Commission could be composed of outstanding individuals whose experience and prestige would insure respect for their judgment. Like the members of the European Commission, they could be selected for a fixed term, forbidden to seek or accept instructions from any government, and directed to serve the general interests of the alliance. Their number should be smaller than the membership of NATO, perhaps five or seven, both to promote operational efficiency and to avoid representation of each country and a consequent tendency to reflect governmental views. They could be provided with a small but competent Secretariat which included some officials with access to top levels in government.

The function of the Commission could be to make recommendations to the North Atlantic Council either on questions referred to it by the Council or on its own initiative. If it had the right to place on the Council agenda problems and contingencies which it believed needed consideration, this could insure timely consultation on problems arising outside the treaty area, such as developments in Southeast Asia or the Middle East.

An advisory Atlantic Commission was suggested to the Atlantic Congress and was advocated during the Atlantic Convention by M. Paul van Zeeland, former Prime Minister of Belgium. A body of this type was also advocated in 1962 by Lord Franks[10] and in 1964 by Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Center of International Affairs at Harvard University and former Assistant Secretary of State. In *Shaping the Future,* Professor Bowie wrote:

> The impartial Commissions of the [European] Community have shown the value of having a group which does not speak for member governments, but attempts to look at issues from the overall or general viewpoint. This same function could be performed for the Atlantic nations by four or five respected individuals of international standing who did not exercise any delegated authority. They would be chosen for their independence and should speak only for themselves.
>
> Their task would be to analyze the overall position of the Atlantic nations in relation to the wider world situation and especially to identify more precisely their common interests and to propose policies to promote

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[9] See the author's "An Atlantic Commission," ORBIS, Summer 1963, pp. 300-307, and *Atlantic Challenge,* pp. 85-91.

[10] Lord Franks, "Cooperation is Not Enough," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1962, pp. 24-35.

> them. Their reports could be put before the NATO Council of Ministers at their regular meetings. They would have only the status which the standing of their members might command. They would, however, be on the agenda for discussion as a matter of course.

Thus there is some authoritative support for the view that a purely advisory Atlantic Commission could make a constructive contribution to the Atlantic Alliance.

Might such a Commission, although constituted as an advisory body, in time develop a larger role? Once it had taken its place among Atlantic institutions, could it be entrusted with additional functions? This is a question that cannot be answered until such a Commission has been created and has shown it can effectively fulfill its advisory role. Possible means of adding further functions are apparent. One lies in the capacity of the North Atlantic Council, under Article 9 of the treaty, to set up subsidiary bodies to which powers possessed by the Council could be delegated. This could presumably be done by a resolution. Another means would be to confer additional functions on the Commission by treaty.[11]

VI

Of the various institutional changes in the alliance discussed here, the most improbable for the 1970's would seem to many to be the emergence of either an Atlantic or a European federal union. The most likely improvements are the most readily feasible. Among these are the appointment of Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council, the joint use of NATO intelligence facilities, more frequent meetings of senior national officers dealing with specific problems, and the strengthening of the NATO International Staff. It also seems probable that the North Atlantic Assembly will gain official recognition and further develop its importance and role. Among other feasible developments, an advisory Commission of "wise men" within the alliance appears particularly valuable as a means of promoting the harmonization of policies on problems of common concern.

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[11] See "An Atlantic Commission," *op cit.*, and *Atlantic Challenge*, pp. 88-91.

CANADA AND NATO

by Peter C. Dobell

WHERE is Canada going? This question has quite a different significance abroad than it has in Canada, which may be symptomatic of the different way Canada's international personality is regarded inside and outside the country.

Non-Canadians remember that Canada took a leading part in the founding of NATO and has over the years been a strong and consistent defender of the principle of collective defense. Why is this policy suddenly being challenged? What developments explain the uncertainty in Canada's NATO policy? Why is she acting so out of character?

For Canadians the issues are less dramatic, the uncertainty less surprising. The sense of purpose and direction that inspired Canadians during the 1950's has gradually evaporated in the 1960's. An increasing number of them who care about international politics have been looking beyond the North Atlantic world for an environment in which to find a new and meaningful international role. Others, disturbed by this trend, believe that it can only be arrested by a strong reaffirmation of Canada's commitment to NATO. For all Canadians, then, the present national debate is only part of a process, into which the government has at last belatedly injected itself. For them the question "Where is Canada going?" represents, not an expression of bewilderment, but a crucial issue to be resolved.

I

Canada's appearance on the world stage at the end of the Second World War can be compared to that of a stand-in who is unexpectedly called upon to play a leading role and proves to be an instant success. Such success affects people and nations differently: some grow giddy; others become lazy; others may be unaffected. Canadians perhaps became a little self-important; they certainly showed no signs of international laziness; in the main they remained naively unaffected and unaware of the special factors that made Canada's international debut a smashing success.

Canada's achievements in the postwar decade owed much to the quality of Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson, but more to accidents of history. She had during that period the position and relative power to play an exceptional international role and produced the leaders necessary to give effect to that potential. Circumstances even combined to produce a situation in which national interest and international responsibility and morality were in perfect harmony. As a result Canadians have hardly learned to calculate in terms of national objectives. Only recently have they had the bitter experience of discovering that the pursuit of international morality may actually be in conflict with material Canadian interests—which means that hard choices have to be made.

Canada's advocacy of NATO in the late 1940's is an illustration of the natural harmony which so fortunately prevailed during her international debut. The North Atlantic Alliance provided an ideal solution for Canadian policy. It linked the United States with Britain and Europe, for the first time bringing together in peacetime the two centers of Canada's primary interest. It offered a means of supporting democracy and freedom in Western Europe, where most Canadians retained strong personal connections. Most of all it provided an opportunity to take a constructive initiative internationally, to set out on a lead which the United States eventually was persuaded to follow. No scenario could be better calculated to satisfy Canada's emotional needs.

II

Contrast this situation with the one in which Canada now finds herself. Europe's recovery has been remarkable. From a situation in which Canada was militarily inferior only to the United States and Britain and economically surpassed only by the United States, her overall military and economic power within the alliance now ranks about sixth. The European members of NATO are in the main prosperous and powerful, and in terms of conventional forces potentially well able to look after themselves.

The Soviets at the same time no longer seem as aggressive and expansionist as they were two decades ago. Even the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia does not appear as an aggressive action from the perspective of Canada, but rather as a conservative move intended to maintain the status quo within Moscow's sphere of influence. For many Canadians there is an uncomfortable parallel between the Soviet intervention and U.S. action in the

Dominican Republic under the aegis of the Organization of American States.

Concurrent with the growth of Western Europe's military power has been a decline in the relative importance of the forces stationed by Canada in Europe for the direct defense of that continent. What was once a major military contribution has become marginal, increasingly viewed as a symbolic manifestation of Canada's NATO commitment.

Canada, like the United States, signed the North Atlantic Treaty in the belief that it would not be necessary to send forces to Europe. This calculation was upset the following year by the North Korean attack on South Korea. While both governments then joined in sending forces to Europe, the initiative had by this time passed from Canada to the United States. Both governments were emphatic in their assurances that troops would only be needed for a few short years until Europe's recovery had been achieved. In fact that undertaking has been stretched out for eighteen years, and since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia Europeans have become more sensitive than even before to suggestions that Europe is now prosperous enough to look after its own conventional defenses.

Voices have been raised in Canada and in the United States questioning the need for the continued presence of North American forces in their present numbers in Europe. But here the parallel ends, because the U.S. forces are the custodian of nuclear weapons in Europe and the guarantor of the commitment of U.S. strategic nuclear power to the defense of Europe. Almost any American can understand that Europe's defense depends on U.S. involvement, and that the United States has major interests in Europe which are directly affected by the degree of American power committed in that theater. It is hard to show Canadians how the presence of 10,000 men in Europe affects either the defense of that continent or Canada's voice in an eventual European settlement.

Nor is the task of those Canadians who for a variety of reasons favor maintaining Canada's forces in Europe—and there are many—made easier by the response of their NATO allies. In view of its present limited importance, few Europeans seem to be aware of Canada's military contribution, only showing appreciation when there is a danger of its withdrawal. Even then, the concern is mainly related to the effects such a withdrawal would have on the United States. In a word, many Canadians now feel they are taken for granted by their allies and, at the present juncture, this is a highly irritating reaction.

III

The development of Canada's relations with the United States in the postwar years helps to account for the intensity of this response. Canada's trade with the United States has steadily grown to the point where it now constitutes more than 68 per cent of all her exports and imports. The United States' direct equity investment has also grown enormously in the two postwar decades, with the result that about 60 per cent of the Canadian manufacturing, petroleum, natural gas, mining and smelting industries are now owned by Americans. More disturbing for Canadians is the fact that this investment is highly concentrated, so that in these sectors the percentage of industry controlled by Americans is even slightly higher than the percentage owned by Americans. Add to this the dominant position of U.S. interests in major fields of communications in Canada. In spite of the generally understanding and cooperative behavior of the U.S. authorities and the natural phlegm of Canadians, a certain uneasiness is clearly understandable.

During the postwar period there has been a major development in North American defense arrangements marked by the construction of an elaborate and costly integrated continental bomber defense system in which Canada and the United States have cooperated effectively. NORAD, while it is a command within the NATO area, is responsible directly to the President and Prime Minister and does not report to the North Atlantic Council. Over the years, Canada's relative contribution to NORAD has declined, to the point where it is now about as low as decency would permit. Yet NORAD is being suggested as the obvious instrument for commanding whatever ABM defense system the United States constructs, a proposal which in this controversial field has political as well as financial implications for Canada.

Canada's military cooperation with the United States also includes ground and maritime activity. In view of the growth of the Soviet submarine missile launching capacity, the latter activity has become significant in scale. For reasons that are hard to diagnose, this has become the area in which Canada's military contribution counts the most by contrast with that of the United States. Her maritime responsibilities in the major northwest segment of the Atlantic extending a thousand miles off her east coastline now cost roughly twice as much as all Canadian forces in Europe and 30 per cent more than the Canadian share of the NORAD arrangements. Not only is the size of this naval contribution—which is technically highly competent—little known outside naval circles in the United States, it is scarcely known in Canada.

What *is* known in Canada is that Canadian forces, alone with those of the United States, are in three NATO theaters—Europe, the Atlantic and North America. For some Canadians concerned about the maintenance of sovereignty against the spontaneous encroachment of the United States, this dilution of the limited Canadian forces is thought to be imprudent. They would like to see their forces concentrated in North America, resuming tasks that have fallen by default into American hands, and by this means serving to protect Canada's sovereignty—not militarily but politically. A new impetus to this approach has been given by the recent discovery of oil in Alaska. If, as expected, oil is found in the Canadian Arctic islands and under the seas off these islands, they want to be sure Canada's right to this oil is not questioned.

Considerations such as these militate in favor of concentrating Canada's defense efforts in North America and relieving the United States of certain defense responsibilities it now exercises on Canadian territory. There had until recently been some expectation that the declining bomber threat would remove the need for active defense arrangements and thus any possible threat this integrated activity might constitute to Canadian sovereignty. But with the development of a new concept of air defense based on airborne radar and control systems and long-range fighter aircraft, it seems probable that Canadian territory and air space may assume new importance in the next decade, posing in a more costly form the question whether Canada should establish the necessary new forces and buy the equipment needed, or instead authorize the United States to use Canadian territory. Since some of this activity would be taking place in the far north, the question of sovereignty over the northern islands and adjacent waters is inevitably linked.

Many Canadians who advocate a concentration on North American defense argue that this is a legitimate role for a North American member of the Atlantic Alliance: they compare Canada to Norway, Turkey and Greece, all of which concentrate on the defense of their regions. Some others advocate withdrawal from the alliance. Arguing that NATO is dominated by the United

States, they maintain that Canada can gain "independence" only by withdrawing and pursuing a distinctive, nonaligned policy. This group, both as a protest and out of fear of being drawn into a war arising out of the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, look on NATO as at best useless and at worst dangerous. While their number is small, their existence is symptomatic of the "malaise" over Canada's present situation.

IV

Canada's domestic difficulties are also having their effect on the defense debate. Inevitably when national energy is focused inward, a nation's external relations assume a lower priority; foreign policy tends to be seen more in terms of its domestic implications and impact.

In any discussion of defense, money plays a large part. Defense budgets are always hard to defend. But few can be harder to justify than Canada's—she is distant from Europe, necessarily protected by the United States, and her federal system multiplies and politicizes the competition for scarce revenues. At a time when the basic constitutional structure of the country is under re-examination, the pressure is stronger than ever. As the Prime Minister said in a recent speech in Calgary: "There is a tendency in the past few years . . . on the part of provincial governments, to say to the Federal government: spend less on defence and you'll have more for these other worthwhile projects."

Technical considerations add important implications for the debate. The Government White Paper in 1964 set out a program for the reorganization and re-equipment of the Canadian armed forces. This program is now in the final stages of its application, and ground forces are being organized in lightly-armed, air-portable combat groups. Canada's heavy mechanized brigade in Europe has therefore become a formation without a counterpart at home, which greatly complicates the problem of rotating units sent to Germany and of providing initial training in Canada. The same problem applies in the field of aircraft. Canada's Air Division in Europe is equipped with strike-attack aircraft of a type not used in Canada. It has been necessary to run a special training school in Canada solely to provide air crews for the Air Division in Europe.

Given the relatively small size of Canada's armed forces (98,000 in all), it is understandable why there have been suggestions that Canadian forces in Europe should be modified, reduced or withdrawn in order to permit the establishment of more homogeneous forces.

V

The style and age of the national leadership is another important factor. With the election of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau supported by a firm majority, a major change has taken place. Although John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson were very different men, they are of the same generation, each having a direct experience in two world wars. While Pearson privately and even in public in his last years in office questioned the need for the continuing presence of Canadian forces in Europe, he was not of a mind to take the determined steps necessary to give effect to his personal doubts.

Trudeau is a French Canadian and a generation younger than Pearson. He is not a veteran of the last war and has none of the emotional links with Europe which that experience has so frequently generated in Canadians who underwent it. Although he is leading a Liberal government that has succeeded Pearson's government, and even though there are a number of important holdovers from the Pearson Cabinet, the government as such is in no way committed by the decisions or policies of its predecessor. If anything, the guiding instinct is a determination to adopt new policies if serious study suggests that change is justified.

A practice of the Pearson government explains in part this clear break with the past. Pearson's Foreign Minister, Paul Martin, considered that foreign policy should in the main be worked out directly between himself and the Prime Minister, since they were the two members of Cabinet most directly concerned. Each had great experience in the field. Therefore the Cabinet was often not the debating forum it can be, with the result that several ministers who served in Pearson's Cabinet—and this includes Trudeau himself—lacked briefing on foreign policy choices and their views were not brought to bear on the decisions reached. In consequence the carry-over of several important ministers has not had the effect in this area of national activity that an analysis of present Cabinet appointments might indicate.

VI

It was suggested earlier that NATO originally provided Canada with an outlet for crusading zeal. The establishment of NATO was seen in part as a precursor to some kind of Atlantic entity.

Canadians have traditionally harped on Article II, and Prime Minister Pearson remained ready to the end of his administration to preach in philosophic terms the gospel of Atlantic unity.[1] Indeed the greatest form of abuse which can be directed at NATO in Canada is to suggest that it is only a military alliance.

Among a number of Canadians with an interest in international politics, membership in NATO is seen as an impediment to the effective expression of Canada's international personality. The aim as they see it is to find a role in the world which is unique, independent and visibly useful in a humanitarian sense. A few years ago the nostrum for people of this inclination was withdrawal from NATO, which they regarded as being out-of-date, in order to concentrate on United Nations peacekeeping, which seemed to offer a role tailored for the Canadian psyche. With the evolution of the Article 19 dispute in the world body over the financing of peacekeeping operations, the expulsion of UNEF from the Middle East and the increasingly obvious difficulties in securing UN endorsement for peacekeeping operations in places such as Biafra, where the need is clear, the number of Canadians still committed to this approach as the major focus of Canada's external defense activity has fallen drastically.

The area of widest current interest as a substitute for defense activity is foreign aid. It is argued for a variety of reasons that the risks of East-West conflict have diminished. While some insist that the Soviets are no longer aggressively inclined, more attribute the changed environment to NATO's success—which they expect to see continue with or without Canadian support. For these Canadians the risk in the next two decades lies in the growing division between the rich of the North and the poor of the South. They are fearful that the impoverished South will—if not assisted in a major way—turn in violence against its rich Northern (and white) neighbors on this planet. To avoid this catastrophe, aid to developing countries should be substantially increased. Yet the overall trend is toward reduction, particularly as a result of the major cuts made in the U.S. foreign aid program over the last few years. In this situation, they believe, Canada has the chance once again to come forward with a major reorientation of government expenditure, whereby the savings from a drastic cut in defense appropriations would be applied to her present modest foreign aid budget.

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[1] Article II is the nonmilitary part of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

It is characteristic of Canadian reaction that one of the most persistent advocates of this approach should be Escott Reid. Reid will be remembered by knowledgeable non-Canadians as the deputy under-secretary in the Department of External Affairs during the period of NATO's conception. He, more than any other Canadian official, developed the intellectual framework for NATO and argued the case for a basic reorientation of Canadian foreign policy. While Pearson and St. Laurent preached the idea in the country and in government circles in the United States, it was Escott Reid who worked out the arguments. Reid has in the meantime left public service and is free to advocate his views openly; he is doing so with the same vigor he earlier expended in behalf of creating NATO.

Reid has proposed that Canada's defense budget should be reduced almost 50 per cent, to one billion dollars, and the saving applied to augment the foreign aid budget which is in any event being slowly increased. This would produce a foreign aid program of close to two billion dollars, and make Canada "one of the two or three leading nations of the world in the struggle against world poverty." Not only would such a contribution be significant in its own right, giving Canada great influence in this whole field, but he believes it would also have a catalytic effect on more powerful nations, the United States among them.

VII

So far in this analysis no attempt has been made to outline the views of those who believe Canada should not only remain a member of NATO, but also continue to make a contribution of military force in Europe. This omission should not be interpreted to mean that there are no supporters of these positions in Canada. But these types of argument are already well known. There seems no need to do more than list the main contemporary reasons why many Canadians favor a continued military contribution to NATO in Europe. These are:

(1) On geographic grounds Canada would inevitably suffer from an intercontinental war in which missiles were used. The primary area where local war could speedily develop into a nuclear exchange is in Europe. Therefore Canada should continue

to make a military contribution in Europe so as to reduce the danger of war in that continent.

(2) Increasingly, NATO is becoming the focus for discussion of issues relating to European security and détente. If Canada wishes to continue to exert an influence on these discussions, she should maintain the present level of military forces in Europe.

(3) In the past Europeans needed Canada's support; now Canadians need links with Europe in order to balance the pervasive influence of the United States. However, the European countries are preoccupied with problems relating to European unity. This means that every instrument for developing the relationship is important. As long as the Europeans attach importance to NATO, a Canadian contribution to the alliance is a significant Canadian connection with Europe. Canada now needs contact with Europeans rather than vice versa, and NATO is an important element in this contact.

Before analyzing the position reached recently by the government, it might be useful to give some rough indications of the strength the supporters of NATO and of a continuing Canadian contribution in Europe can muster. At the conclusion of the first phase of a major review of foreign and defense policy undertaken by Trudeau's government, the decision has been to reject a policy of nonalignment and to remain a member of NATO. This undoubtedly reflects the views of the vast majority of Canadians. But the related questions are still undecided: How large will Canada's future defense budget be? Will Canada continue to station troops in Europe? On these issues the government has expressed some general principles, which will be examined in the final section of this article, but the decisions remain to be taken.

The views of the general public, as tested recently, show a three-to-one majority in favor of maintaining forces in Europe. In a survey conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, which was made public on December 11, 1968, 64 per cent of those questioned believed that Canadian forces should be left in Europe whereas only 23 per cent favored their withdrawal. These figures differed somewhat from region to region. In the west, where there is a high proportion of Canadians of East European origin, support for maintaining troops went as high as 70 per cent. Even in Quebec, which is the heart of traditional Canadian isolationist sentiment, only 32 per cent favored withdrawal as against 55 per cent who were prepared to see forces remain in Europe.

Within Parliament, the situation is less clear. The Conservative

Party appears committed to the advocacy of maintaining Canadian forces in Europe at this time, while the socialist New Democratic Party has advocated their replacement with an air-transportable, highly mobile force which might conceivably be stationed in Europe. The governing Liberal Party has no common view and appears to encompass the full range of opinions. A further indication of parliamentary opinion was the recent report of the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, a substantial majority of whom supported a recommendation to retain the present Canadian forces in Europe, at least until their major equipment becomes obsolete sometime in the mid-1970's.

But these rather mechanical recitations of opinion statistics are not overly illuminating because they will not be decisive when the time comes for decisions to be taken. Particularly under the parliamentary form of democracy, substantial power lies with the government to shape the way issues are presented, and this in turn makes it possible to influence public responses significantly. Therefore, assuming that no radical departures in policy are adopted, pressure from party, Parliament or the public is unlikely to sway the new government in its determination of the future orientation of Canadian foreign and defense policy.

VIII

At the time of writing there are only three documents that throw light on the future intentions of the government: a statement made to the press on defense policy on April 3, 1969, following a series of Cabinet meetings; a largely spontaneous speech given by the Prime Minister in Calgary on April 12; and a general statement by the Prime Minister made in the House of Commons on April 23.

The government—after its nine-months review—has reaffirmed that Canada will continue to be a member of NATO. In the same decision, it has announced that it "intends, in consultation with Canada's allies, to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of Canadian forces in Europe."

In commenting on this announcement, the Prime Minister has stated explicitly that beyond this general notice of intention no specific decisions have been taken. These questions are to be considered in a second phase of Cabinet study. In this process account will be taken of the views of Canada's allies and of international developments.

The Prime Minister has made no apologies to his critics for the length of time the process of review has taken and will take. He sees it as a once-in-a-generation re-examination of the fundamentals of Canadian foreign and defense policy, important both for itself and as a process in which he wishes to involve the interested public. If steps taken to achieve public participation prolong the time required for review, this approach is an essential part of Trudeau's style.

While it is possible to write authoritatively about Trudeau's manner of approaching problems, the substance of his thought is harder to diagnose and anticipate. He has retained in public life the habit of expressing his personal opinions freely, and he shows no fear of making statements which point in different directions. Thus, in his recent speech in Calgary he asserted that Canada faces onto three oceans and "that countries like Japan, like China, like Australia, and those on the Pacific coast of Latin America . . . are as important partners for Canadians as the nations across the Atlantic." Yet on other occasions, for example in his first major statement of policy on May 29, 1968, when the defense review was announced, he stated the government's interest in expanding Canada's contacts with the countries of Europe, implying that not enough attention had been paid to her relations with this region in the past. In contrast, his observations in Calgary suggested that Canadian policy during the past two decades has been overly Europe-oriented.

It is evident that for Canada at this time of change the question of how her forces should be organized in future is a complex one, with many international, domestic and technical ramifications. It should also be apparent that the Prime Minister is prepared even in public to admit the force of arguments on both sides of whatever problems he may be examining. All of this means that speculation about what decisions the government will take can only be guesses. For the Prime Minister himself the policy review is a process of discovery, in which he is constantly testing his evolving views against the views of his colleagues, his advisers and the informed public. But his practice of calling established policies into question has also brought powerful political forces into conflict, and this complicates the task of anticipation. If Trudeau himself does not know the final outcome of the review, it would surely be foolhardy for anyone else to try to second-guess him.

NATO AND ITS SMALLER MEMBERS

by Dirk U. Stikker

THE title of this article suggests that the position of the smaller members of an alliance is different from that of the larger or more powerful members. Is this true, and if so, is it right? Is there no sovereign equality of all states?

Speaking in 1944 of the projected Charter of the United Nations, the U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, declared: "As the Provisions of the Four-Nation Declaration (the Moscow Declaration calling for 'a general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states') are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."[1] After the Second World War it took two years for the West to give up this Utopian dream and return to reality with all of its bitter delusions fostered by nationalistic egoism and human frailty.

I

Soviet political aggression, backed up in every instance by the Red Army, brought all of Eastern Europe and much of Central Europe under Moscow's domination. As Paul-Henri Spaak pointed out in the United Nations in 1948, there was but one great power that emerged from the war having conquered other territories. Altogether about 600,000 square miles of territory, containing more than 100 million people who had shared European history for more than a thousand years, were incorporated into a Soviet-controlled area. Further Soviet expansion took place in northern Iran and in Manchuria. To consolidate these victories Moscow had, by 1949, signed twenty-three treaties in Eastern Europe laying a network of political, economic and military hegemony. All Western efforts for general disarmament had failed, and the last hopes that the United Nations could guarantee sovereign equality to all peace-loving states had been destroyed.

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[1] *New York Times,* March 22, 1944, p. 12. Also see the chapter, "NATO in the Beginning," in my memoirs, *Men of Responsibility* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); the quotation is on p. 279.

Faced in 1948 with the stark reality of the Berlin blockade, the West European nations had but one reaction: to submerge historic national differences and band together to solve economic difficulties and resist Soviet aggression, since it was plain that no one nation alone could achieve recovery or security. But this resistance would also be hopeless if the free nations of Europe were not to be joined by the United States and Canada.

At the time of the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, London informed Washington that there was an urgent need for some form of union in Western Europe. France asked for American support. While sharing the British and French concern, the United States insisted that Western Europe should first show what it was prepared to do on its own. But at that time West European countries had neither the manpower, the equipment, nor the economic resources to rebuild their military forces.

Nevertheless in March 1948, less than two weeks after the communist seizure of power in Prague, the United Kingdom and France began discussions with the smaller Benelux countries on a treaty of mutual assistance. The result was the Treaty of Brussels of March 17, 1948. On the day this treaty was signed President Truman told the American Congress: "I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them."[2] Three days later the Soviet representative walked out of the Allied Control Council for Germany, and this move was followed in ten days by the Moscow-instituted Berlin blockade.

The Truman Doctrine — whose declared objective was "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure," namely in Greece and Turkey — the Marshall Plan, the famous Vandenberg Resolution, the Rio Treaty, and the right of individual or collective self-defense provided by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, provided a rationale for the creation of a unified and effective trans-Atlantic Western defense organization. Negotiations on the North Atlantic Treaty began in July 1948; on April 4, 1949, now twenty years ago, the treaty was signed. The communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 helped to bring the West together. Again in 1968 the Soviet Union violated the sovereign rights of Czechoslovakia by its brutal armed invasion.

[2] *New York Times*, March 18, 1948, p. 4.

Will history repeat itself? Will the Soviet Union, which drove us together in 1948 by its desecration of the sovereign equal rights of smaller nations, keep us together by its renewed negation of the rights of a small and allied country? The answer must be yes.

The role of the smaller members of the Warsaw Pact has become quite clear since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. To quote only a few press statements on Czechoslovakia which came from Moscow in August and September 1968: "Marxism is irreconcilable with nationalism no matter how just, clean, fine or civilised the latter may be"; "the sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interest of the world of socialism" (i.e., the Soviet Union) ; and "law and legal norms are subordinate to the laws of the class struggle."

II

Compared to the humiliation suffered by small members of the Warsaw Pact, the position of the smaller members of NATO is fundamentally different, not only in the philosophy laid down in Articles 3, 5 and 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also in the handling of NATO's problems in the Council. Article 3 prescribes that "Parties separately and jointly will develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." This article means that members of NATO can undertake joint plans of action even if one or more members do not wish to join in such plans. Article 5 states that in case of an attack each member will assist the party attacked "by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force. . . ." Together, Articles 3 and 5, each worded in general terms and in no way as an exceptional arrangement, specify that on the crucial issue of the use of force, the parties will act "*separately* and jointly" to assure their "*individual* and collective" capacity to resist, while *each* of them will take "*individually* and in concert with the other Parties" such action "as *it* deems necessary."

The only time unanimity is mentioned in the treaty is in Article 10, dealing with the accession of new members. The operation of NATO in practice has confirmed the supposition of a rule of unanimity as pure myth. While no members of NATO, small or large, can be forced to accept a decision by the majority, no member can prevent others from taking actions they deem necessary for their security.

Practical wisdom and the spirit of an alliance require that every effort be made to reach unanimous agreement. In NATO this is especially important in questions of major policy, such as strategy, disarmament, colonial issues, or Soviet or Chinese expansionism in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean or Latin America. In the period just after its formation NATO was mainly concerned with maintaining, through joint defense efforts, the peace in Europe. In later years, when several members adopted policies of détente, attention turned to discussions on the possibilities of the peaceful settlement of East-West disputes.

Before examining the role of the smaller NATO members in keeping the peace by joint defense efforts in Europe and in working for peace in other explosive areas of the world, let us try to analyze first which members are covered by the expression "smaller countries."

There is only one giant in NATO, for compared to the power of the United States in the three decisive fields of finance, trade and armed forces, all other members of the alliance — however much this may displease France as it dreams about grandeur — are small. In this sense Orwell's dictum that all animals are equal, but that some are more equal than others, is applicable also to sovereign states. The really smaller members of NATO readily recognize that Britain and France, if only for their permanent membership in the UN Security Council, their atomic weapons, or their rights and duties in Berlin, are major allies. They also recognize that the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy have a special status in NATO because of their size, economic importance and geographically exposed situation.

Thus there are four different groups of NATO members: one superpower, two members with special duties, obligations and influence, two members of particular strategic importance, and ten smaller members — but they are all equal sovereign states. This is recognized by all except France, as was evidenced when President de Gaulle in 1958 proposed to the United States and Britain the creation of a three-nation directorate to run NATO. Rightly, President Eisenhower replied to this suggestion in his letter dated October 20, 1958: "We cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other allies, or other free-world countries, the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital interests are being made without their participation." I am convinced that a different reply would have destroyed NATO, because no alliance of free sovereign equal states can survive if the principle of equality is denied.

It is, however, questionable whether NATO has always adhered to this lofty principle. When the Netherlands in 1948 changed her constitution in order to make possible the relinquishment of sovereignty over Indonesia, her allies forced her to negotiate with Sukarno, who then came to power with disastrous consequences both for Indonesia and the Netherlands. When during the Korean conflict the Free World countries had made arrangements for the allocation of scarce raw materials, Britain's Prime Minister Attlee went to Washington and arrived at an agreement with U.S. officials specifying that the allocation system should be run by an American-British-French triumvirate. Also, for many years all major decisions on the future of Germany were taken, in practice, by the United States, Britain and France without real participation of the smaller members, whose vital interests were at stake.

To be sure, Secretary of State Dean Acheson always had an open ear for the opinions of the smaller members and succeeded in making adjustments acceptable to them. Moreover, the so-called special Anglo-American relationship has in NATO never been a cause of embarrassment to the smaller members. This fact furnishes proof that with tact and skill the principle of sovereign equality can be maintained in difficult circumstances, and that the smaller members have always recognized that some members are more equal than others. When there was a choice among different options, the smaller members never strove for the adoption of their own ideas but tried to amend the plans of the larger members in order to make them acceptable to all. On occasion the influence of smaller members has been quite important. The Lisbon decision to transfer the civil organization of NATO from London to Paris and to nominate Lord Ismay as NATO's first Secretary General was decided mainly by the smaller members.

For many years the larger members have preferred to have a national of one of the smaller countries serve as Secretary General. In the time of Lord Ismay, his deputy was a Dutchman. Ismay was succeeded by Spaak, and then it became my turn to hold office. At present the Chairman of OECD is a Dane and the President of the Executive Commission of the European Community is a Belgian. I do not believe these nominations happen by coincidence. There seems to exist among the larger members a subconscious feeling that under certain circumstances it is preferable for a national of a not so deeply involved and smaller member to be appointed to these difficult positions. Such men must have considerable political experience but should in their new function be broadly objective in outlook. By way of illustrating this point, President Johnson once sent me his photograph, on which he had written: "To a Patriot of the World."

III

For both peace-keeping and joint defense, all smaller members recognize the inadequacy of purely national efforts. To a certain extent the neutral nations — Sweden, Switzerland and Austria — also are aware that they benefit from NATO's joint efforts. Yet France now denies the importance of NATO, and the position of Canada under its new Prime Minister has for the time being become uncertain.

In order to coordinate joint efforts for defense NATO must have a political directive and a strategic concept. In the Eisenhower-Dulles period NATO strategy was based on the principle of immediate retaliation with nuclear weapons in case of an attack. There is a great deal of misunderstanding on the question of whether there was unanimous agreement on this principle by all members of NATO. The records of the NATO Council meeting which discussed the concept of massive retaliation show that two of the smaller members did not approve it. Thus the Kennedy-Johnson-McNamara regime was free to open the debate again and to propose under the changed circumstances the flexible response strategy. To implement such a strategy NATO military authorities must formulate their requirements, and in each member country financial and political experts must decide whether these requirements can be met by the available resources and what the effect would be on the economy if the level of taxation has to be raised. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, it is clear that the actual military strength of NATO forces and their state of readiness is not sufficient for a flexible response.[3]

The collective defense system must be strengthened; otherwise nuclear weapons will have to be used at an earlier and perhaps avoidable stage in a conflict. Several important measures to this end have already been instituted in Europe, but the impression remains that the gap between the feasible and the desirable has not yet been closed. According to Harlan Cleveland, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the United States spends about 10 per cent of its GNP for defense (including Viet Nam), while the "pure" U.S. contribution to NATO is less than 2 per cent. The other twelve NATO participants in the collective defense effort were expected to spend over the five-year period 1968-1972, $90 billion, or about 4.5 per cent of their GNP. The new pledges of men, material and money, announced at the November 14 NATO Ministerial meeting and, as it seems, now confirmed at the Ministerial Defense Planning Committee meeting of January 16, 1969, represented a major step toward raising the target of total expenditure for the allies – other than the United States – from $90 billion to $100 billion. As Cleveland points out, the principal share (80-90 per cent) of the new effort was for the first time contributed by the European members of NATO. Nevertheless, some of the smaller members might well increase their contributions. On the other hand, a percentage of GNP is not necessarily the appropriate yardstick for measuring the contributions of the respective members. When the per capita income is low, it is especially difficult to increase defense expenditures and levels of taxation. This raises a problem. Although NATO cannot publicize its deficiencies, Ministers of Defense must make clear to public opinion, members of governments, parliaments and trade union leaders why they must ask for greater contributions if NATO members are to strengthen their defenses in order to keep the peace and avoid early resort to nuclear weapons in the event of attack.

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[3] For an excellent examination of the impact of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia on NATO, see Harlan Cleveland, "NATO After the Invasion," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1969.

In the comparison of U.S. and European shares in the NATO defense burden it is interesting to note that for another joint effort – the capital flow to developing countries – the cost of which is always expressed in a percentage of GNP, the European percentage in coming years will probably be higher than that from the United States.

During the period when the dynamic Paul-Henri Spaak was Secretary General of NATO, the importance of political consultation within the alliance greatly increased. Since that time such consultations have continued to be important, and the smaller members have spoken as equal partners. On such questions as disarmament, observation posts, détente and East-West relations, full information was always available to all members. It is only to be expected that most of this information came from the larger countries, but the contributions of the smaller members, several of which are keenly interested in disarmament and peaceful coexistence, were in my time often quite valuable. Recently the well-known Harmel Report found that this was still the case.

During crisis situations and in crisis management, for the most part, all members have been given the opportunity to express their opinion in time. At the end of all discussions it has been the duty of the Secretary General to present a summing up, to set forth areas of agreement and to make clear whether the Council has or has not given its blessing to a line of action one or more members deemed it necessary to take.

Here the difficulty arose that sometimes several ambassadors remained silent. What is the meaning of ambassadorial silence? Does it mean approval, disagreement, lack of interest, no instructions? Silence could mean anything, and even careful prodding did not always break it. When, for example, there was silence on a question like Viet Nam, I understood this to mean that several of the members had serious reservations but felt that even if they spoke frankly the policy of the United States would not be changed. On other problems, such as Cyprus, discussions could be frank and sometimes even overheated, making it necessary for the Chairman to regulate the temperature. I have always believed that political consultations between allies should be frank. An attitude of silence or no comment helps neither the larger nor the smaller members. It is not only silence in the Council, but also silence outside the Council (with respect to the press and public opinion) that can be harmful. Member countries consider that it is the prerogative of each member to inform its people about what is going on in NATO, and that the Secretariat should not interpret to the press what has been discussed in a Council meeting.

Looking back on the last twenty years, most of which I spent in NATO, I feel justified in saying that the Atlantic Alliance has been of greater importance to both its larger and smaller members than some critics believe. NATO is gathering strength. But we, the older people who took the initiative in founding the organization and worked together to strengthen its cohesion, should be well aware that a younger generation must now take over. We wish them luck and hope they will defend the principles of peace, justice, prosperity, freedom, democracy and equal sovereignty that we tried to develop and preserve.

THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK MILITARY COUP, APRIL 1967*

by D. George Kousoulas

THE military coup of April 21, 1967 in Greece, and the ensuing collapse of the democratic system in that country, inevitably caused a crisis of conscience in NATO countries. NATO was, after all, the product of an avowed desire to preserve and protect the democratic institutions in the member countries against possible encroachment and subversion by communist totalitarian forces. To have these same democratic institutions destroyed by noncommunist forces was regarded by many as an equally unacceptable blow to NATO's cherished objectives. The internal weakening of the democratic fabric in a member-state, opening the way to civil conflict and a possible takeover by procommunist forces, was no more acceptable from a NATO standpoint.

The question before NATO was not whether the collapse of the democratic institutions in Greece was to be condoned as desirable or shrugged off as immaterial. The real issue was whether the military coup[1] was the only type of action that could have averted a civil conflict and a possible takeover by pro-communist or communist-dominated political forces. With regard to the future there were two other relevant questions for the NATO partners. One was strategic-political: whether the nondemocratic regime in Greece was buying present stability at the expense of future upheavals and whether by remaining in power too long it might alienate the population to the point of weakening the defense posture of the alliance. The second question was ideological-moral, centering around the timing for the restoration of democratic institutions in accord with the basic principles of the North Atlantic organization.

This article will be limited to an examination of the main issue, whether the military coup was the only type of action that could have saved Greece from the throes of civil conflict and the possibility of a takeover by communist-dominated forces. While the focus is on events in Greece, discerning students of political processes may find some kernels of insight into the causes that can lead to the collapse of a democratic system. The Greek lesson may deepen our understanding of what is needed for the preservation and effective functioning of democratic institutions, and warn of the symptoms of disarray and impending collapse, so that the process of decay may be arrested in time.

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[1] In the main, the leaders of the coup followed a NATO-prepared contingency plan under the code name Prometheus II, designed to strengthen internal security in the event of a serious threat to Greece and NATO's southeastern flank.

THE LEFT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR

Limited Popular Support

To appraise realistically the role of the Communist Left in the pre-coup days, one must first view it within the broader context of Greek politics. The electoral records of the last fifty years indicate that the overwhelming majority of Greek voters, in successive generations, have consistently rejected communism as an ideology or as a political program. Prior to World War II, the Communist Party (KKE) remained a marginal political party; at its interwar apogee in the elections of June 9, 1935 the candidates of the communist-led "Popular Front" received only 98,699 votes (9 per cent) in a total of 1,030,362 ballots cast. In the first postwar election (March 1946), KKE chose to abstain and urged its followers and sympathizers to stay away from the polls in a reverse show of political strength. According to the Allied Mission for Observing the Greek Elections, the politically-motivated abstention did not exceed 9.4 per cent.

The Communist Party was outlawed in 1947 in the midst of the guerrilla war it had instigated and led (1946-1949). With the defeat of the guerrilla forces in August 1949, it found itself a refugee in Eastern Europe, the remnants of its leadership and many of its followers wandering from one country to another, meanwhile quarreling over the reasons and the responsibility for their failure. The area in the political spectrum previously occupied by KKE was taken up in 1951 by a substitute organization known as the United Democratic Left (EDA). In the following years, the record of EDA may legitimately be used as the record of the Communist Left in Greece.[2]

[2] In the words of a leading member—a former leader of the communist-led wartime ELAS—the policy of EDA "was made by little-known persons speaking for the exiled KKE leadership." See also three articles by Lefteris Apostolou published under the title "Elections-Democracy-Center and the Left," in *Eleutheria*, October 17, 18, 19, 1961.

In six out of seven elections since 1951, the support received at the polls by EDA ranged from a low of 9.15 per cent (November 16, 1952) to a high of 15.1 per cent (October 29, 1961). It went down to 12 per cent at the last (pre-coup) election of February 16, 1964. Only once did support for EDA far exceed the normal average, when, in the elections of May 11, 1958, it received 24.42 per cent of the total vote. This unusual upsurge of communist influence was primarily due to popular dissatisfaction with Western policies on the question of Cyprus and was not sustained in the following years. Thus, the record shows that support for the pro-communist Left in Greece figured at a more or less constant 12-14 per cent during the last fifteen years before the coup.

Several factors peculiar to the Greek political environment and to the history of the Communist Left in Greece have kept its political influence from growing. First, the KKE leadership was drawn, as a rule, from disenchanted and ambitious pseudo-intellectuals and semi-literate workers whose bitterness and frustration stimulated their participation in the political process. Few, if any, could command the respect and the loyalty of the average Greek with his petty-bourgeois and rather conservative mentality. EDA fared much better in terms of leadership composition but its close association with KKE and a widespread feeling that respectable EDA leaders were merely a facade for the actual movers of party policy prevented it, too, from significantly expanding its political influence.

Second, the association of the Communist Left with the Soviet Union and the other Slavic nations to the north (especially Bulgaria) roused the ever-present fear that Greece, perched as it is on the southernmost promontory of a land mass dominated by millions of Slavic nationals, could be absorbed and culturally, if not physically, destroyed; the communists, in the eyes of most Greeks, appeared to have little regard for the Greek national heritage. While during the Axis occupation and the postwar years, the Communist Left made a play for Greek nationalistic sensibilities, it proved unable to overcome altogether the long-established belief that it is a foreign-dominated political force.

Third, the politico-economic ideology of the Communist Left, emphasizing a command economy and single-party rule, has no particular appeal to the ordinary Greek with his penchant for private ownership and freewheeling political activity.

Fourth, the well-publicized excesses of brutality committed by individuals associated with the Communist Left during the occupation and the guerrilla campaign have left a negative legacy that continues to bedevil the Greek communists even though a new generation of Greeks with no personal memories of that period has entered the political stage.

Fifth, the deliberate use of a peculiar language style set apart the Communist Left not only from the educated elite but also from the average Greek whose linguistic sensitivities were offended by the communist argot.

Finally, the intraparty quarrels which have broken out after every serious failure, and the airing of the party's intrigues and designs have done little to improve the image of the Communist Left or that of its leaders, who have accused each other of being "scoundrels," "life-long agents of the class enemy," or "incompetent *arrivistes*."[3]

Two Basic Tactics

Hard-core communist leaders have been acutely aware that their party, as a political force operating in competition with "bourgeois" parties and within the context of a pluralist political system, has limited potentialities. This awareness is reflected in the tactics they have adopted to further their quest for power. Through the years—and through a veritable maze of twists and turns in party policy—the Greek Communist Left has employed two basic techniques. One involves the use of violence, subversion and force and may be called the "revolutionary" tactic. The other concentrates on cooperation with noncommunist political groups or personalities and on using such coalitions as the primary (or auxiliary) vehicle for moving toward a power position from which the party can influence state policies with an effectiveness denied it by actual popular support; this may be called the "political" tactic.[4] In either case the maximum objective is the seizure of power and the revolutionary transformation of the socioeconomic and political system along the lines of a socialist command economy and Communist Party hegemony; the minimum objectives have varied with the times.

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[3] Nikos Zachariades, *Deka Khronia Palis* (*Ten Years of Struggle*) (Central Committee of KKE, 1950), p. 197; *Pros tin III Synthiaskepsi tou KKE* (*Toward the III Conference of KKE*), p. 137; *Neos Kosmos*, No. 11-12, November-December 1950, pp. 828-831. See also the records of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of KKE (February 1956) and the records of the Eighth Congress of KKE (October 1961).

[4] In communist parlance the two tactics are usually identified as "United Front from below only" and "United Front from below *and from above*." (Emphasis added.)

The two tactics have been used interchangeably, and on occasion simultaneously. Up to the present both have failed to bring the party's maximum objective closer to realization and have been only marginally effective with regard to more limited aims. The revolutionary tactic, in particular, has been excessively costly to the Greek Communist Left—and to the country.[5]

Meager Gains

While some writers have argued that the political forces in Greece during the late 1950's and early 1960's were polarized around the conservative ERE (National Radical Union) and the pro-communist EDA, the record shows that such an assessment would be overdrawn. Around 75 per cent of the electorate were more or less evenly divided between the "conservative" and "liberal" camps, with another 10 per cent fluctuating between the two. From the remaining 15 per cent, approximately 12 per cent were attached to the pro-communist Left represented by EDA, and 3 per cent moved in and out of the pro-communist ranks.[6] Leaving out the unrepresentative and short-lived upsurge of EDA's political support in the elections of 1958, EDA's regular following throughout the period hovered around 12-14 per cent. None of its stated political aims was accomplished: KKE was not legalized, Greece did not leave NATO, the laws requiring police clearance for employment in a variety of occupations (Loyalty Certificates) were not essentially modified, the agreements concerning foreign (American or NATO) military bases in Greece were not abrogated. For almost fifteen years, following its establishment in 1951, EDA remained on the periphery of the Greek political scene, unable to penetrate the country's political structures effectively. The political processes continued to be shaped by the "bourgeois" parties and the other centers of political power in Greece.

Only once in the elections of February 19, 1956, when EDA joined forces with noncommunist leaders in a coalition labeled the Democratic Union, did it succeed in promoting a "United Front from below and from above." But the coalition proved to be a short-lived marriage of convenience, inspired primarily by virulent opposition to Constantine Karamanlis and his newly created party of the National Radical Union (ERE). The Democratic Union forged for the election by EDA, the Liberal Party and a host of other noncommunist personalities won 48.15 per cent of the total vote, to ERE's 47.38 per cent. Due to the intricacies of the electoral system and the distribution of votes, however, ERE gained 165 seats in the 300-seat Parliament while 132 seats went to the Democratic Union. Of these, 18 seats were won by EDA candidates. The coalition broke up after the election; still, it gave EDA a chance to emerge from the political wilderness with the aura of legitimacy it sorely needed.

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[5] The detailed and fully documented record is presented in D. George Kousoulas, *Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 145-156, 164-168, 170-173, 176-182, 188-196, 271-288.

[6] See Table A and accompanying analysis in D. George Kousoulas, "Greek Politics," *Balkan Studies,* Vol. VIII, No. 2 (1967), pp. 407-420.

When EDA's leadership made a similar effort prior to the elections of May 1958 the effort foundered on the unwillingness of the bourgeois politicians to accept the "minimum program" (including withdrawal from NATO) demanded.[7] Yet this apparent failure turned into a temporary blessing. EDA, running virtually on its own, garnered 24.42 per cent of the total vote and (due to the provisions of a new electoral law which was expected to benefit the liberal parties) 79 of Parliament's seats, thus becoming for the first time in the history of the Communist Left in Greece the major opposition party in the legislature. ERE remained firmly in power with 171 seats.

Significantly, at this moment of EDA's political triumph, there was not a whisper for a military coup or for any form of unconstitutional or violent action to remove EDA from its newly won position. There was no reason for such action: EDA, thrust as it was into the unaccustomed role of the leading opposition party in Parliament, failed to measure up to the expectations of its supporters or the fears of its detractors. Because actual power within the party remained in the hands of little-known activists closely tied to the KKE leadership abroad, its deputies in Parliament could not engage in a constructive dialogue with the government. To avoid charges that they were becoming tools of the "class enemy," the deputies found it necessary to reject all proposed legislation as inadequate or deceptive. In the end, EDA's work in Parliament degenerated into sterile obstructionism.

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[7] Interestingly, Apostolos Grozos, KKE's Chairman, suggested in a broadcast from Eastern Europe that EDA should not pose "at this time as a condition for cooperation Greece's withdrawal from NATO." *Avgi* (Athens), April 11, 1958. EDA's leaders decided to take advantage of the resentment generated by the Cyprus dispute and insisted on a strongly anti-Western platform.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Throughout the postwar period, the influential centers of political power in Greece (the palace, army, industrialists, church, high-level bureaucrats, major newspaper publishers, anti-communist labor leaders, "bourgeois" politicians, and up to a point the Americans) and the "nationally-minded" Greek masses, have been united in their opposition to "communism." Perhaps for some of the more sophisticated, anti-communism was less a hardened conviction than a useful political instrument serving to generate consensus among the broad masses in support of what may be conveniently termed Free World policies and objectives; for many others, however, fear and suspicion of communism was the product of a deep-seated belief born of postwar experiences with the Greek communists.

There is no doubt that after the crushing of the guerrilla rebellion in 1949, a communist seizure of power by military means was no longer a practical possibility; besides, the Soviet camp had been moderating its revolutionary objectives and Greece was now safe from external threats under the NATO umbrella. Still, many Greeks were impressed with the persistent revolutionary pronouncements of the Greek communists, especially of those who had grown old and embittered abroad and who continued to shape the policies of the Communist Left. Even people who discounted the danger of a violent takeover feared the possibility of communist infiltration into the various political and social structures and the reorientation of the political-economic-social underpinnings of the nation along pro-communist, anti-Western lines.

As long as EDA's efforts to ride to power on the shoulders of "bourgeois" political organizations failed to bear fruit because most political leaders were unwilling to play its game, no one questioned seriously the sanctity of the democratic institutions, however imperfectly they might have been operating. Ironically, the disintegration of the system began at a time when EDA's fortunes appeared to have reached a low point and a democratic political party had come to power with the largest popular vote in recent Greek history. The record indicates that the unsettling of the political system was not initiated by the Communist Left or directly provoked by anything the communists did or attempted to do. EDA's policies continued along the same lines established in 1956, and there had been no significant change when the first clouds of serious political trouble appeared on the horizon. But once the process of disintegration had begun, the leaders of the Communist Left saw and proceeded to exploit the opportunities opening for penetrating the "bourgeois" fabric. Inevitably, the Communist Left became a participant and a major disruptive element. It is quite possible that the danger posed by its machinations was overblown in the minds of many Greeks, including the military who eventually engineered the April 1967 coup. Be that as it may, it is a fact of life that widely-held political assumptions, however ill-founded, often shape political reality.

A Professor Turned Politician

Many observers greeted with genuine satisfaction the victory of the Center Union Party in the elections of February 16, 1964. This party, organized in 1961, had brought together under one banner the various groups of liberal persuasion which for many years had been half-competing, half-cooperating, beset by the personal antagonisms of their leaders, constantly undergoing kaleidoscopic mutations. Under the leadership of George Papandreou, veteran liberal politician, the Center Union won 34.3 per cent of the total vote in the elections of October 29, 1961 when it faced Karamanlis' ERE for the first time. The somewhat poor showing of the newly organized party was mostly due to lack of adequate time to prepare for the election, yet Papandreou charged fraud and coercion and for the following two years kept pressing for a new election. Karamanlis had authorized no fraudulent excesses during the election; in fact, he had encouraged the emergence of the Center Union as a strong, competitive democratic party. While some lesser officials especially in outlying areas may have pressured villagers to vote for the ERE candidates, it is doubtful whether their excessive zeal could have accounted for the electoral result.

The bitterness caused by Papandreou's "relentless struggle"[8] against ERE and the electoral result of 1961 injected the first disruptive element into the system. This was most unfortunate as it came at a hopeful time when a second, truly competitive democratic party had come into being and a viable two-party system was a distinct possibility. The "relentless struggle" eventually brought results. King Paul came to accept a Center Union government as a desirable alternative to the growing power of Karamanlis, and the man who had been Prime Minister for almost eight years was maneuvered out of office in the summer of 1963. In November a general election gave the Center Union 42.18 per cent of the total vote to ERE's 42.85 per cent. In terms of parliamentary seats the Center Union received 138 and ERE 134. EDA, with 14.34 per cent of the vote, gained 28 seats.

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[8] "I denounce the election results to the Greek people and the King. The outcome was the product of violence and fraud. . . . I call the Greek people to a relentless struggle. . . ." Statement of George Papandreou, *Vema* (Athens), October 31, 1961.

As in 1936, the upshot was that the Communist Left held the balance in Parliament.[9] Neither major party could form a government without EDA's support or tacit acceptance. The situation seemed to justify the worst fears of those who had made a career of predicting a communist takeover. Yet there was no talk of a military coup, possibly because neither of the democratic parties contemplated cooperation with EDA. Papandreou, given the mandate to form a government, refused to accept EDA's support in Parliament and a new election was called for February 16, 1964. Papandreou's refusal to assign to EDA the role of kingmaker deprived the Communist Left of a real chance to become a decisive factor in Greek politics.

The election of 1964 was a triumph for the unified liberal camp. With an unprecedented 52.78 per cent of the total vote, the Center Union gained 173 seats in the 300-seat Parliament. There was reason to expect that, with such a commanding majority, it would provide the country with strong and efficient government. Yet within fifteen months Papandreou was out of office, and eighteen months later a military coup ended the parliamentary system. Even more surprising, when the coup took place no one moved to defend the political institutions; many Greeks greeted the end of the democratic system with a sigh of relief. What had transpired between the Center Union's triumph and the ignominious end of the parliamentary system?

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[9] In 1936, the almost equal distribution of parliamentary seats between the two major "bourgeois" political camps gave the fifteen deputies of the communist-led "Popular Front" the opportunity to apply the political tactic and emerge in the role of "kingmakers." An agreement of cooperation between the Liberals and the Popular Front deputies (the so-called Sofoulis-Sklavainas Agreement) appeared to open the way to inordinate influence for the communists; in the end it failed to advance their objectives because many Liberal deputies balked at the idea of working with the Communist Left. When their "political" efforts were frustrated, the communists shifted emphasis to the revolutionary tactic and intensified the agitation for strikes and demonstrations. The process culminated in the bloody riots of Salonika (May 1936) and in violent demonstrations in other parts of the country. Then the party moved to a higher level of revolutionary activity and called for a general strike set for August 5, 1936. At that crucial moment, Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas moved, with King George II's permission, to suspend certain articles of the Constitution and with a stroke of the pen established the dictatorial regime of the Fourth of August. The Communist Party crumbled and for the next four years ceased to be an effective political force. It re-emerged in 1941 when the occupation of the country by the Axis caused the complete breakdown of the Greek political fabric and opportunities opened for new political arrangements.

In Greece, where parties have traditionally been the vehicles of personalities rather than ideas, the activities of one forceful leader have the potential of exerting inordinate influence on the entire political process. This is precisely what happened with the arrival of Andreas Papandreou on the Greek political scene. A son of Prime Minister George Papandreou, Andreas had lived for more than twenty years in the United States, where he had acquired American citizenship and was well known as a distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley. He was originally induced to return to Greece by Premier Karamanlis, and as long as he confined himself to the role of technocrat (as head of the Center of Planning and Economic Research) he enjoyed considerable and largely nonpartisan respect. But with his election to Parliament in February 1964 and his emergence as his father's most trusted aide in the Cabinet, as Minister to the Prime Minister, his attitude changed. Andreas Papandreou saw himself as his aging father's successor to the leadership of the Center Union—i.e., to the liberal and left-of-center forces in the country—not merely on account of kinship but primarily because of his personal abilities as a leader with a clear program for political, social and economic modernization. Inevitably, his not-too-secret ambition caused a serious rift within the Center Union leadership. Other aspirants with credentials of longer service in the liberal camp resented Andreas' swift rise. In less than a year after the Center Union's electoral victory, the party was rent by internal strife.

Since his major rivals controlled a majority of the party's deputies in Parliament, Andreas of necessity began to cultivate the left-of-center groupings and personalities within the Center Union. He also made an effort to attract the less doctrinaire among the EDA followers. His aim, as he told this writer in the summer of 1966, was to take away from the communist fold those Greeks who were dissatisfied with social and economic conditions in their country but were not yet irrevocably committed to the communist ideology. EDA and KKE leaders who were apprised of this aim seemed undisturbed by the prospect. When I mentioned it in a talk with a leading personality in

EDA,[10] the topic was shrugged off as having no real bearing on the political situation. "What matters most at this point is co-operation," the EDA spokesman intoned and went on to other matters.[11]

The Greek communists may be accused of many weaknesses and foibles, but never of being unable to identify accurately their friends as well as their opponents. For this reason, the attitude of the Communist Left in and out of Greece toward Andreas Papandreou is relevant to this analysis. It is a matter of record that in party decisions, public statements and broadcasts over the "Voice of Truth" KKE station in Rumania, the communist leadership expressed no real opposition to Andreas Papandreou,[12] although his father was never accepted as a friend of the Left. While Andreas should not be held responsible for this kid-glove treatment from the Communist Left, the communist attitude had a serious effect on the deepening political controversy.

In a broader sense, Andreas wanted to become the spokesman of the emerging social forces (intellectuals, technocrats, industrial workers, youth) that consciously or instinctively favored radical systemic changes to speed up modernization. To realize this objective, he tried to dissociate himself from those held responsible by the Left for all the real or imagined weaknesses of the Greek political, economic and social fabric: the "Establishment" and the Americans, or, to use Koliyannis' terminology, the forces of "the plutocratic oligarchy" and the "American imperialists." As a former U.S. citizen, Andreas Papandreou was sensitive to the inevitable charges of being pro-American (or even a CIA agent!). To counter such suspicions, he went to great lengths to display his independence. One of his earliest moves as a member of the Cabinet was to stop the relay of Voice of America broadcasts in Greek by the national radio network, after which he dramatized his disregard for American sensitivities by practically throwing out of his office the U.S. representative who came to protest the decision. His action had broad public support because the VOA broadcasts and the pro-Turkish attitude of the American press had been irritating to most Greeks since the outbreak of hostilities on Cyprus in December 1963.

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[10] Betty Ambatielou; interview at EDA's headquarters in Athens, July 1966.

[11] In the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of KKE's Central Committee (March 6, 1965), it was clearly stated: "In the struggle [to promote essential democratization], the Greek Communist Party regards as imperative the policy of broad alliances which, as shown by the municipal elections and the decision of Parliament to bring Karamanlis and his collaborators to investigation, are possible. In that struggle our party will convince the masses that firm democratic progress can be assured by a government which, relying on the support of all democratic forces inside and outside of Parliament, will apply a truly democratic program. The materialization of such a solution which demands the *broadest possible democratic cooperation and unity* can be achieved through tenacious work to overcome the *psychoses* and *prejudices* which have been insistently cultivated and continue to be cultivated by the Reaction and to eliminate the disastrous effects of anticommunism in its varied forms." (Emphasis added.)

In the same resolution, the Central Committee spelled out how broadly it envisaged "cooperation and unity" and what forces it considered "democratic." It called for the "isolation of the rightwing elements of the Center Union government." These elements included, in the opinion of the Communist Left, most Center Union leaders with the exception of Andreas Papandreou and his followers.

[12] The KKE resolution of March 6, 1965 declared: "Putting forward its program of democratization, the Greek Communist Party organizes the popular struggle for the realization of the pledges of the Center Union, for meeting the national and popular demands, and for real democratization in all sectors of public life." According to KKE records, this process of "democratization" was interrupted by the ouster of the Papandreous in July 1965. Referring to the July crisis, Kostas Koliyannis, the First Secretary of KKE's Central Committee, said in his speech to the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU (March 1966): "The forces of plutocratic oligarchy along with the American imperialists in their desire to break the process of democratization—begun by our people's struggle—and turn back the political life of the country, overthrew the country's legal government through this coup." (Text broadcast by the Voice of Truth, April 3, 1966.)

The dispute with Turkey over Cyprus brought into question Greece's association with NATO and strained relations with the United States. Many Greeks thought Washington was siding with the Turks. When Andreas advocated independence in foreign policy, his words were correctly interpreted to mean independence from U.S. influence. It was no secret that the American representatives in Greece had been influential since the early days of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In the past only the Communist Left had openly attacked the Americans and the "policy of servitude" practiced in KKE's eyes by all noncommunist political leaders. When Andreas took up the chant—albeit in milder wording—many eyebrows were raised in the U.S. Embassy and at the State Department.

Ironically, twenty years in the United States had left their mark on his way of thinking. He could not understand why political pronouncements which could have caused hardly a ripple in the United States, were taken at face value in Greece and provoked a storm of protest and editorial abuse. In time, he came to appreciate the political advantages of being a controversial figure and began to provoke his opponents with calculated deliberation. In the last two years before the coup hardly a day passed without Andreas' name appearing prominently in both friendly and hostile newspapers. Even though his power base was still limited, he openly voiced views that were bound to provoke almost all the important centers of power in Greece. Before long, many began to suspect that he was trying to broaden his base by cooperating with the Communist Left, or at least by appealing to the most radical elements in the noncommunist leftist forces. The suspicion became grist in the mill of his opponents.

The Aspida Affair

In the spring of 1965, only one year after the Center Union's electoral triumph, the brewing conflict came to a head. A secret organization of left-wing army officers, known as Aspida, had been uncovered by General George Grivas, the fiery chief of the Cypriot guerrillas against the British colonial administration, and the commander of the Cypriot forces since 1964. Grivas was irritated by Andreas' increasing involvement in Cypriot affairs. He regarded the younger Papandreou as a leftist and a partisan of Makarios in the disagreements he had with the Cypriot president over strategy. When Grivas found some indications that Andreas was associated with Aspida he hastened to report his findings to King Constantine. The information which came to light later at the trial of the principal military members of Aspida failed to prove conclusively that Andreas was the initiator of the organization as alleged.[13] More likely Andreas had accepted the role of spiritual mentor because he was flattered by the loyalty voiced by its leaders. The officers needed a "grey eminence," prestigious enough to convince prospective members that Aspida was an organization to be taken seriously and that it had backing in high places.

Andreas probably saw in Aspida a means to mobilize friendly elements in the army so that he could checkmate any reaction on the part of military personnel to the reforms he advocated. Judging from his remarks to me in the summer of 1966, he regarded the army as an instrument of the palace and the "Establishment" and believed that any effort toward genuine modernization would face the hostility of the traditional centers of power. While there is no hard evidence that Andreas was the leader of a dark conspiracy, there are many indications that he had imprudently allowed himself to become entangled in the petty intrigues and ambitions of some minor officers.

[13] See Section 7, Report No. 1/66 of the Council of the Permanent Court Martial of Athens to the Royal Prosecuting Commissioner of the same Court. The investigator flatly states that "it has been concluded that the head of the above mentioned illegal organization is Andreas Papandreou." (Official translation, p. 329.) The evidence presented in the report does not, in the opinion of this writer, justify such a "conclusion."

An observer taking a rational, "evidence-oriented" look into the Aspida affair would have concluded that it could have been settled without reaching the proportions of a major scandal. But one could have searched in vain for rationality and empathy in the spring of 1965. For four crucial months there was no face-to-face consultation between King Constantine and Prime Minister George Papandreou. Wrapped in the mantle of self-righteousness, all the parties to the controversy considered themselves to be on the side of the angels while casting their opponents in the role of the devil's apprentices.

When the King learned of the Aspida affair, he saw it as his patriotic duty to protect the armed forces from the miasma of conspiratorial organizations. He believed that in the interest of the nation the affair should be thoroughly investigated, even though the Prime Minister's son might be implicated. The elder Papandreou, on his part, was convinced that the Aspida affair was a sinister plot concocted by his opponents. To foil their designs he felt he should have effective control over the investigation.

In a row with Defense Minister Petros Garoufalias, the Prime Minister asked for his resignation, which Garoufalias refused to submit without the King's approval. Thereupon, Papandreou dismissed Garoufalias and decided to assume the Defense Ministry himself. But King Constantine did not sign the necessary decree authorizing such a change, on the grounds that the Ministry of Defense was in charge of the Aspida investigation, and it would be improper for the Prime Minister to assume the post; since his son was implicated, the Prime Minister would be exposed to charges of favoritism and the investigation could be discredited as a whitewash.[14] The King proposed instead that a personality of the Prime Minister's choice be appointed to the Ministry of Defense. By "selective inattention," George Papandreou declined to see that the King's suggestion offered a realistic and face-saving alternative. Social psychologists would probably say that Papandreou was guided in this by his own "moral self-image"; the King's suggestion that another man be appointed to the post appeared to cast doubt on Papandreou's integrity and moral courage. His retort was, "If I am not trusted as the Minister of Defense how can I be trusted as the Prime Minister?"

In retrospect, it appears that each of the principals to the dispute ascribed to the other sinister and devious designs. Conversely, each saw himself as a paragon of patriotism and nobility. The King felt that he had a duty to safeguard the integrity of the armed forces and prevent their politicization; the Prime Minister considered himself to be the guardian of the constitutional order and the defender of the integrity and independence of the parliamentary system against the encroachments and machinations of the palace. One may suspect that belief in the righteousness of their respective positions was reinforced by more practical arguments based on mundane interests. Such a combination of practical interests and noble intentions is not unique in the world of politics.

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[14] See letters exchanged between King Constantine and Prime Minister George Papandreou, *Ethnikos Kyrix* (New York), August 10-14, 1965.

The Conflict Deepens

It was in this frame of mind that the King and the Prime Minister came to a showdown in the evening of July 15, 1965. The King stood firm on his one condition for settling the dispute, that the Prime Minister appoint to the Ministry of Defense anyone he would like. The Prime Minister replied in essence that if he could not be trusted as Minister of Defense he had no place as Prime Minister.

> "Then, are you resigning, Mr. President?" the King asked.
>
> "Yes, Your Majesty; I shall submit my resignation in writing tomorrow."
>
> "No; I consider this oral statement sufficient. I accept the resignation."[15]

In explaining his action to me in the summer of 1966, the King said candidly that he became "suspicious" when the Prime Minister offered to submit the resignation of his government the following day. Guided by what psychologists would call the "diabolical enemy-image" he had of his Prime Minister—implanted in his mind by some of his closest and most trusted advisers—he thought the Prime Minister was planning to use the authority of his office during the night to engineer a coup, establish a dictatorship with the assistance of the Communist Left, and, with Andreas as the prime mover, proceed to change the country into a Republic. Eventually, so the supposition went, the communists would push the Papandreous out and take over entirely as they had done in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. While the realities of 1965 were admittedly different from those prevailing in Eastern Europe at the end of the war, several Greek politicians and newspaper publishers told this writer that the King's suspicions were valid.[16]

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[15] The King's personal account of the incident as told to this writer on August 18, 1966.

It may be argued that Constantine's image of his Prime Minister was grossly distorted, but so were the perceptions of pride and duty on the part of the aging Papandreou. Both had mishandled a minor disagreement and had allowed themselves to become entangled in the intrigues and machinations of self-seeking politicians, newspaper publishers, and ambitious state officials. At the crucial moment of showdown, neither side possessed a shred of "empathy," neither side was "evidence-oriented," to borrow again from the lexicon of the psychologist. The King had been convinced by his advisers that the Papandreous (especially Andreas) were not to be trusted and that their victory in any form would amount in effect to his own defeat. Conversely, to the Papandreous the King's actions were merely another sorry page in the history of political interference by reactionary forces lurking in the dark corners of the palace. Thus an election, which would have been the only proper solution to the impasse, was seen by both the principals and the public as a whole as a contest between the King and the Papandreous. A parliamentary election would have been distorted into a constitutional referendum.[17]

Even before July 15, the King had apparently been convinced by his advisers that an early election would only benefit the Papandreous and bring humiliation to the Throne. He was relieved when the outgoing Prime Minister failed to recommend elections before leaving the palace that evening. Had Papandreou done so, the King (as he told this writer) would have found it difficult to refuse.[18]

Papandreou's opponents later offered a rather ingenious explanation for the apparent blunder of the experienced Prime Minister. Facing serious difficulties within the Center Union, they said, he provoked a clash with the King, hoping to generate wide popular support not for the Center Union conglomerate of dissonant personalities but for the Papandreous themselves as the only true champions of progress and democracy. He failed to suggest elections, they added, because he needed time to build up his personal following and eliminate in the process any Center Unionists unwilling to accept the Papandreous' leadership.

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[16] Among them, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Prime Minister in the summer of 1966.

[17] See the minutes of the Crown Council which met in September 1965, *Ethnikos Kyrix,* September 22-29, 1965.

[18] Under the Constitution of 1952 (Article 37) the King had no definite obligation to accept the advice of the Prime Minister as to the timing of the elections. In the summer of 1963, King Paul had not accepted the advice of outgoing Prime Minister Karamanlis to hold elections immediately.

Whatever the merit of this reasoning, the fact remains that Papandreou began to press for a general election the day following his resignation. His "relentless struggle" against the "palace coup" found warm support from the Communist Left, which mobilized mass demonstrations and strikes in his behalf. In a statement of the KKE Central Committee, entitled "With a Nationwide, All-Democratic Call to Arms, the Plans of the Palace, the Junta, and the Foreigners Can be Thwarted," and broadcast over Voice of Truth radio from Eastern Europe, the party called

> on all democrats, everyone who wants democratic order and normality, to mass mobilizations, meetings, and strikes—to a nation-wide, all-democratic rally. We call on the sons of the people serving in the armed forces, all patriotic officers to stand by the people, to be faithful to the constitutional democracy. . . . Democratic unity, which in the face of common dangers has already started to materialize in life itself, must be increased even more. May it embrace all the people, all the country.[19]

This first statement set the tone for the policies of the Communist Left in the following months.

Regardless of the motives or the objectives of the principals to the dispute, a normal parliamentary election had now become a political impossibility. By allowing his disagreement with the King to degenerate into a personal feud, Papandreou had turned his campaign into a constitutional contest. On the other hand, by accepting such an interpretation and refusing to hold an election, the King had reduced himself from his position of above-politics "constitutional arbiter" to that of a partisan in a political dispute. Those who advised the King against the election, whatever their motives or reasoning, had given him the worst possible advice. Once the "safety valve" of a parliamentary election was bypassed, the dispute was bound to take an even uglier turn.

There is no question that in appointing Athanasiades-Novas to the premiership the King was acting properly under the Constitution; Novas was the President of the Parliament and a leading member of the Center Union. Politically, however, the King's action was inevitably interpreted as a trick designed to break up the Center Union. If that indeed was the King's intention, he was committing another serious error which could only deepen the conflict and polarize the opposing forces. His efforts to form another Center Union government with Parliament's support failed at first, but eventually he found enough allies among CU deputies who for personal or other reasons agreed to desert the Papandreou camp.

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[19] Statement dated July 16, 1965, signed by the Central Committee of KKE. See also Central Committee Statement, "The Government of Blood Must Go," dated July 21, 1965, and that of July 24, 1965 calling for a "nationwide strike" and general elections.

While the personal ambitions and questionable motives of some of the "apostates" should not be discounted, the most prominent among them, including Prime Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos, sincerely believed that in aligning with the Crown they were serving their country in a time of need, at great political cost to themselves. Several, in statements to this writer in the summer of 1966, insisted that their objective was to restore stability, de-fuse political passions, and prepare the country for a parliamentary election with no constitutional overtones. They could not play the role of disinterested broker for the simple reason that they were not neutral to the dispute, nor were they unrelated to the principals. Instead, they had become one of the major issues in the quarrel. Besides, whatever the efforts of the "apostates," an election would still be regarded as a contest between the King and the Papandreous as long as the latter continued their campaign against the palace.

The December Agreement

Logic suggested a compromise: that the Papandreous cease their attacks on the Crown, and the King accept an early date for a general election.[20] Inevitably, the Stephanopoulos government would have to be replaced by a nonpolitical cabinet composed of personalities acceptable to all concerned and charged specifically with the preparation of the parliamentary election. The King appeared receptive to this idea as early as August 1966.[21] At about the same time, Andreas Papandreou intimated to this writer that he would have no objection to such an arrangement if he were convinced of the King's sincerity. In December

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[20] In an article published in *The Sunday Star*, October 16, 1966, this writer said: "It stands to reason that to have an election without constitutional overtones there must be a reconciliation between the King and the Papandreou forces. . . . [Otherwise] pro-royalist elements in the armed forces might take it upon themselves to cast aside the verdict of the polls and impose some kind of unconstitutional, dictatorial regime upon Greece."

[21] As this writer can testify.

1966 such an understanding was actually worked out, reportedly by the King's political adviser, Ambassador Dimitrios Bitsios, and newspaper publisher Christos Lambrakis, a Center Union supporter. The Stephanopoulos government was replaced by a service cabinet, elections were to follow within six months, and the country appeared to be on the way to a saner political climate.

Optimism proved premature. The more extreme elements in both major political camps attacked the agreement either as a blunder or as an unholy compromise. KKE, of course, rejected it as a "dirty deal." In obvious violation of the understanding approved by his father, Andreas Papandreou continued his attacks on the palace. He was convinced that any compromise with the "Establishment" would tarnish his image as the champion of the new "progressive" forces, alienate his friends within EDA, and disillusion all those vocal elements that had incited the street demonstrations which had been partly responsible for building him up as the most controversial, and to some the most significant, political personality in Greece. While the older Papandreou stood scrupulously by the agreement (being an experienced politician, he realized that only through an election could he transform his popular support into a certification for assuming the reins of government again), his son deliberately removed the one essential requirement in holding an election, namely, assurance that the result would not be interpreted as a repudiation of the King. Andreas may have seriously doubted that an election would take place—or, if it did and the Center Union emerged victorious, that the palace would allow the Papandreous to form a government. Yet the King, with all his distrust of Andreas, could see the advantages of extricating himself from the political arena and regaining his constitutional position as the nonpolitical head of state. The December agreement was evidence of this.

By sabotaging the arrangement, Andreas gave one more argument to the proponents of a dictatorship. His intransigence raised second thoughts among the most doctrinaire elements of the "Establishment." The agreement, the latter argued, was a clever ploy by wily George Papandreou, who had tricked the King and the ERE leader, Panayiotis Kanelopoulos. The apparent disagreement between father and son, they went on, was a convenient distribution of roles, with the father behaving as a "good boy" to get his elections and the son keeping the pressure on in order to hold the more radical elements in their following. They had misinterpreted the intentions of the older Papandreou, who genuinely wanted to go to the polls and remove the causes of the political conflict.

But miscalculations and misinterpretations, due to prejudice, wishful thinking or faulty reasoning, were the order of the day in the early months of 1967 in Greece. Andreas, impressed by the street demonstrations, usually engineered by the Communist Left, came to the conclusion that the will of the people was a factor that made a military coup impossible. He even charged that those who raised the possibility of a coup sought "to prepare the ground psychologically for reconciliation; to create an atmosphere to justify a democratic retreat. . . ."[22] Interestingly, he regarded a reconciliation as a "democratic retreat." An outsider might have said that moderation, conciliation and compromise are essential to a democratic system.

Miscalculations and Maneuvers

As the time for the dissolution of Parliament and a general election neared, both Andreas Papandreou and the extremists in the opposite camp intensified their efforts to subvert the arrangement. Andreas' statements became more and more provocative. Almost daily he spoke out boldly and alluded to actions he had no practical means of carrying out. His rhetorical statement that the Prime Minister would be sworn in on election night in Constitution Square by a triumphant multitude, with or without the sanction of the King, meant that he was either bluffing or had naively interpreted the noise made by organized demonstrators as the irresistible "voice of the people" which would sweep away any attempt of "reactionary forces" to snatch from the Papandreous the fruits of their victory.[23]

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[22] A. Papandreou, writing in the Athens periodical *Neoi Dhromoi* (*New Roads*), December 1966, as quoted in Stephen Rousseas, *The Death of a Democracy: Greece and the American Conscience* (New York: Grove Press, 1967), p. 53.

[23] In the spring of 1967, Andreas claimed that in the elections projected for May 28, the Center Union would register an even greater triumph than that of February 16, 1964, when it had received 52.78 per cent of the total vote. In an article published July 21, 1968 in the *New York Times Magazine* (p. 29), he refers to an alleged CIA poll taken in March 1967, which "indicated that if elections were held as scheduled on May 28, the Center Union and the left would receive 63 per cent of the votes. Is it far-fetched to assume that the reason for the 1967 coup was a determination to forestall such a political outcome?" The statement is interesting on two points. Curiously, A. Papandreou gingerly combines the support for the Center Union and the Left into one grand total, thus providing unexpected support to those who claimed that he was working together with the Communist Left. Second, the total of 63 per cent is lower than the total received by the Center Union and EDA in the elections of February 16, 1964. At that time the mathematical total for the two was 64.78 per cent (52.78 per cent for the Center Union and 12 per cent for EDA). Yet, no coup was attempted in February 1964.

On the other side of the fence, the more extremist elements saw with dismay that the country was moving toward a general election with Andreas the *de facto* leader of a Center-Left coalition in which EDA was a clandestine but no less energetic and influential partner. This assessment was largely correct. For the first time since the war a political alliance (as against a mere electoral coalition) was being formed without written agreements or protocols (but with the more solid foundation of a community of interests) between one segment of the "bourgeois" democratic leadership and the partisans of the Communist Left. To EDA a Papandreou victory (and by March 1967 this meant an Andreas victory) promised an "opening to the Left" with open-ended possibilities. To Andreas, EDA's benevolence and support meant not only a few additional votes but the mobilization of well-organized and disciplined groups that could spearhead any popular action needed at a crucial moment.[24]

In this psychological climate, aggravated constantly by an outrageously partisan press, few political figures seriously expected the elections in May to serve their purpose by restoring sanity and allowing the democratic processes to function again. Instead, many hoped, and as many feared, that the army would step in with the King's blessing and prevent the advent of Andreas to power. A more rational approach on both sides might have granted that the army had indeed a role to play by keeping order and assuring a free expression of the public will and proper application of the constitutional rules. But in the frantic days of that spring, rationality had little place in Greek politics.

Those who considered Andreas a modern Ephialtes opening a path to the enemy made one last effort to remove him from the political stage. In March, the Prosecuting Attorney of the Athens Criminal Court charged Andreas Papandreou with high treason for his alleged role in the Aspida organization and asked Parliament to remove his parliamentary immunity so he could be tried by the court. The request was voted down by a majority of deputies from the Center Union, the "apostates" and EDA.

Under Article 63 of the Constitution, a deputy was protected by parliamentary immunity not only during the life of Parliament but also for four weeks after its dissolution. Since, under the Constitution, elections should take place forty-five days after dissolution, Andreas could have been subject to arrest for a period of fifteen days prior to the election. Center Union leaders were afraid that his enemies might take advantage of this technicality and put him behind bars at the critical moment. They pressed for an amendment to the electoral bill pending before Parliament, whereby former deputies would not be subject to arrest during the entire pre-electoral period. The amendment had been originally approved by a parliamentary committee in 1966, but in March 1967 the ERE leadership decided against it and threatened to withdraw support from the nonpolitical government unless the amendment was declared unconstitutional.[25] The government complied, but Papandreou rejected the government's ruling and insisted that the matter be discussed by Parliament and decided by vote.

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[24] On June 20, 1968, the Greek government gave the press photocopies of a document prepared by retired Lieutenant General Archimides Argyropoulos for Andreas Papandreou and discovered in the archives of EDA, which were seized following the military coup. The document contained a "plan of operations" for armed defense against the "forces of the Right." General Argyropoulos admitted authorship in a letter published in the Greek press on June 27, 1968.

With the underpinnings of the December agreement shattered by these developments, the nonpolitical government of Paraskevopoulos ceased to be relevant and on March 30, following a meeting with the King, Paraskevopoulos submitted its resignation. On the next day King Constantine had a two-hour conference with George Papandreou as the leader of the largest party in Parliament. The veteran politician advised the King to form another nonpolitical government which would then act immediately to have the electoral law of simple proportional representation passed, dissolve Parliament and proclaim a general election. At the same time, Papandreou suggested, the King should proclaim a general amnesty for all those implicated in political crimes such as that of the Aspida, so that a climate of mutual confidence could be restored. In retrospect one may say that this was a reasonable course of action—if mutual confidence already existed. As it was, the fears associated with a Papandreou victory could not be eliminated by the course the elder Papandreou proposed.

Because the political situation was now back to the point where it had been before the December agreement, the King sought to postpone the election and restore a degree of cooperation by appointing a government of "national unity" with the participation of both ERE and the Center Union. He invited all political leaders to a meeting set for April 3 to discuss the impasse. It is said that George Papandreou was misinformed by the King's emissary on the actual purpose of the meeting and refused to attend. Be that as it may, it is highly unlikely that he would have agreed to a government of "national unity" which had already been rejected by Andreas. Such a government would have meant a further postponement of the election and a virtual moratorium on the partisan conflict. The suggestion was as rational as that advanced by George Papandreou in his two-hour meeting with the King—and equally impractical. "Conciliation" had been rejected by Andreas as a "democratic retreat."

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[25] From a strictly constitutional point of view the amendment was inadmissible. The 1952 Constitution provided clearly in Article 63 for the parliamentary immunity of deputies. Any amendment of this article should have followed the amendment procedure of Article 108.

When Constantine asked ERE leader Panayiotis Kanelopoulos to form a cabinet and (since he could not expect majority support) dissolve Parliament and set the election date, Papandreou predictably charged that the King had now openly become a partisan leader. His argument was that an ERE government would make every effort to falsify the result of the elections and deprive the Center Union of victory. Kanelopoulos proceeded to dissolve Parliament and set the election date for May 28, 1967.

The King, faced with an election that could well produce a Center Union victory, apparently saw in an ERE government a needed safeguard against revolutionary action on election night by the more extreme elements of the Center Union assisted by EDA. Whatever his hopes or intentions, the election had now become clearly identified as a bitter contest between himself and the Papandreous. Already political fever was getting out of control. The Athenian newspapers fanned political passions in banner headlines and flaming editorials. Strikes and demonstrations added to the atmosphere of tension and disarray. The possibility of a military coup was freely discussed in the cafes. Yet it appears that no political party, not even EDA, had made any serious preparations to meet such an eventuality. The operational plan of General Argyropoulos had little practical significance. In fact, Andreas and EDA had grossly misinterpreted the role of the army in the resolution of the conflict. It is true that the political leadership and the forces "hostile to the Left had been sufficiently entangled, sufficiently at loggerheads with each other," to paraphrase Lenin's descriptive dictum. But the army remained one crucial factor unaffected by the breakdown of the political fabric.

Andreas Papandreou and the Communist Left committed three basic errors in assessing the possible reaction of the army to the crisis. First, they thought that the partisan conflict had spread into the military establishment, and that in a showdown the army, reflecting the "will of the people," would split, with its majority supporting the "forces of democracy" (i.e., Andreas and EDA). Second, they saw the army as an *organization* controlled neatly and effectively by those at the top of the pyramid; if the intentions and moves of the top military officials could be ascertained, they could be counteracted in time. As it happened, Andreas and EDA were well informed about the thinking of the higher echelons but knew practically nothing of those who actually engineered the coup. Third, they viewed the army as an organ of the palace, the Americans and the "Establishment." They refused to accept that it could act as an independent factor in the political equation. All three assumptions proved to be fallacious.

THE MILITARY COUP

There are indications that the King and some senior generals in command positions discussed measures to be taken in the event Andreas and the Communist Left tried to take advantage of an electoral victory and press for drastic changes by mobilizing massive demonstrations. But from what this writer has been able to ascertain from sources close to the principals, the King was as much against installing a dictatorship in the spring of 1967 as he had been in the summer of 1966. He was thinking in terms of emergency measures of relatively short duration, designed primarily to avert a "communist takeover."

Others, however, interpreted the escalation of the political conflict differently. These were younger officers, mostly colonels and majors, who had been cadets during the Metaxas dictatorship, had served in the war against the Italians in Albania and later had fought on the side of the British in the Middle East or in the Greek mountains with the national resistance forces. In the early postwar years they had fought against the communist-led guerrillas, and the experience had left an indelible imprint on their political thinking. More recently, many of them had studied in NATO and other Western military schools, and some had served in various capacities abroad. They had thus acquired a broader understanding of political and social issues than that usually associated with military officers.

With a predilection for order and efficiency, they were enraged by the failings of the parliamentary process in Greece, the abuses of the press lords, and above all the quarrels, deals and intrigues of the politicians, some of whom, in their view, were opening the gates to the Communist Left. To them the situation in April 1967 was reminiscent of the spring and summer of 1936, when the disintegration of the parliamentary system had raised the specter of a "communist takeover." They recalled that when the communists had called for a general political strike set for August 5, 1936, Metaxas had interrupted the revolutionary process by proclaiming martial law and establishing his dictatorial regime on August 4. Some of the officers decided to move in analogous fashion. A leak in their plans forced them to take action on the night of April 20-21, but their original intention had been to strike before the excitement of the electoral campaign made the undertaking almost impossible without bloodshed and violence.

When the tanks rolled through the night and orders under the "Prometheus II" Plan reached the crucial military units, these officers had done what Metaxas did in 1936: they had outpaced the buildup of the revolutionary process—and they succeeded as he had done without bloodshed. Their swift action took by surprise the King, the generals, the politicians (including Andreas and EDA) and even the allegedly ubiquitous and omniscient Americans. The few officers who took the initiative accomplished their purpose with unbelievable ease, mainly because a great number of other officers in command positions, not initially party to the coup, shared their views and responded automatically to the signals emanating from the center.

CONCLUSIONS

Was there danger of a "communist takeover?" The answer can only be gleaned through a speculative look into a future that might have been. Granting that speculations have limited probative value, there are a few ascertainable elements in this case to give them substance.

(1) The principal participants in the political process had failed to work out arrangements capable of restoring the conditions needed to settle the political dispute through a normal electoral contest. A democratic system cannot function unless there is consensus on its fundamental premises, willingness to compromise and smooth out differences, mutual tolerance, and tacit acceptance of the patriotism and integrity of those who participate in the democratic system and aspire to play the role

of decision-makers alternating on the seat of power. These elements were conspicuously absent in the critical weeks prior to the military coup.

(2) The election scheduled for May 28, 1967 could not have restored the democratic processes because it was no longer considered by the participants as a contest between political parties competing within the democratic framework but as a constitutional showdown with open-ended consequences.

(3) Such a distortion of the electoral process was aggravated by the suspected alliance forged between the nondemocratic Communist Left and a vital segment of the democratic Center Union. This was a highly unsettling element because it raised the possibility of a radical increase in the potential of the Communist Left to exercise power in Greece.

(4) In light of the above, the election of May 28 could have produced three possible results: a victory for the Center Union, an ERE victory, or an inconclusive situation with no clear winner. An electoral victory for the Center Union, with Andreas Papandreou emerging as the dominant figure, would have been interpreted by the victors as a repudiation of the King and the "Establishment," and as a popular mandate for radical changes. In the new political context, the influence exerted by the Communist Left could not have decreased—the opposite would be more likely. Already during the first year under the Center Union government (February 1964-July 1965), EDA and the other overt organizations of the Communist Left had found it easier to operate, especially in the countryside. In the months since the July crisis, Andreas had discovered political advantage in placating the Communist Left by avoiding criticism of its activities and embracing practically all of its political demands. It had reciprocated by supplying the militant element needed for street demonstrations and strikes. The record provides no assurance that Andreas would have taken a strong stand against it once he was in power. To carry out the radical changes advocated in his speeches, he would have had to rely on the support of the Communist Left, the one political force that favored the same changes and could furnish the thrust to overcome any opposition to them.

But it is doubtful that a Center Union victory would have propelled Andreas to power. Faced with the prospect of a government veering sharply to the Left, the King, the army, the Americans, not to mention the masses of anti-communist Greeks, would have acted to prevent such a development; most likely, the night of the election would not have been filled with the jubilant cheers of Center Union demonstrators but with the rattling of machine guns and the anguished cries of the wounded and dying.

An electoral victory for ERE—not entirely impossible as a result of an anti-communist backlash[26]—would have been denounced by Andreas as the product of fraud and intimidation, and such charges would have appeared plausible because an ERE government was in office at election time. The "unrelenting struggle" that George Papandreou had waged after the 1961 elections would have been dusted off and given an even more stringent and menacing tone. As the political strife continued unabated, popular disillusionment with the viability and effectiveness of the democratic system would have deepened, thus strengthening the anti-democratic forces of Right and Left.

An inconclusive election with no clear winner could have diffused political passions but it would have led to a succession of weak coalition governments, continuing agitation by Andreas Papandreou and the Communist Left for a new election, very likely a wave of politically-motivated strikes and demonstrations in order to bring this about, and a further weakening of the democratic system—and all this at a time when the country needed strong and efficient government to carry out the necessary tasks for political modernization and economic development in view of the approaching deadlines for closer ties with the European Common Market.

(5) The inescapable conclusion is that the military coup was rendered inevitable by the breakdown of the democratic process. To an impartial observer, the truly relevant question now is not whether the coup was justified but whether the period of stability purchased at the cost of liberty will be used wisely by the military rulers to carry out needed reforms and prepare the stage for the return to a genuinely democratic system founded on a happy blending of freedom with stability. The answer to this question will determine the ultimate verdict of history.

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[26] The then Prime Minister, P. Kanelopoulos, told this writer on June 5, 1969 that he was convinced that such an ERE victory was quite possible, and that, in any event, he expected to form a coalition government with moderate Center Union elements after the election. He ruled out an Andreas landslide. Kanelopoulos was prevented by the coup from testing his political instinct.

THE PROBLEMS OF NATO: A RESEARCH NOTE

by Werner Feld and Gary J. Borne

PRIOR to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, a considerable number of NATO officials were busily engaged in trying to find new roles for the alliance which in the eyes of many in Western Europe appeared to have lost much of its *raison d'être.* After the Soviet action had again dramatically demonstrated the need for a strong alliance, the task orientation of these officials shifted radically. Instead of worrying about new roles for NATO, highest priority had to be given to shoring up its military potential through strengthening manpower and armaments. But since success in such tasks inevitably requires the commitment of new funds that are apt to impose fresh tax burdens on the shoulders of citizens in the alliance countries, and since the quest for détente seems to be strongly espoused on both sides of the Atlantic, it is not inconceivable that in a few months or a year the new spirit in NATO may give way again to frustration and uncertainty about the future of the alliance. A growing concern in the United States with solving domestic problems and a consequent increase in American neo-isolationism may contribute to such a development. On the European side, there prevails the understandable desire for continuous enjoyment of the fruits of economic prosperity and the notion that détente is the only rational course to follow, although few ever bother to define precisely what détente means. For these reasons most of the national governments are likely to give mainly lip service, rather than cold cash in the form of additional troops and weapons, toward the restoration of NATO's vigor. Thus, it may not be too long before NATO officials again begin to ponder new roles for their organization in order to avoid a creeping paralysis that in due time might lead to full disintegration.

Undoubtedly many NATO officials, both international civil servants and the staff of the permanent national representatives, have lived with changing NATO problems for many years and have spent much thought and energy on providing solutions. But it is not unusual for one who lives too closely with a problem not to be able to see the "forest for the trees" at times, so that his efforts toward solving problems may become sterile. This is the reason why private industry and governmental agencies often call in outside consultants to seek new approaches for the solution of difficult management and administrative problems. This was also one of the motivations for holding a NATO simulation exercise at Louisiana State University in New Orleans (LSUNO) on April 26 and 27, 1968. The objective of this exercise was to give seventy-five undergraduate and graduate students an opportunity to examine and possibly find solutions for such NATO problems as the desirability and feasibility of new roles for the alliance, joint decision-making in the nuclear field, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, movements toward détente and disarmament, and the elaboration of common economic policies.

The students came from thirteen universities,[1] all members of the Gulf States Center for Atlantic Studies. The authors of this article were the directors of the exercise, and several faculty members from different universities served as advisers.[2] The Council for International Relations and United Nations Affairs (CIRUNA) at Louisiana State University in New Orleans provided logistical support and furnished personnel for various activities in the exercise.

Few, if any, NATO simulation exercises have been held in a university setting with students as participants. Moreover, this kind of an exercise was somewhat unusual inasmuch as most exercises in international relations involve adversary situations whereas the primary emphasis here was on cooperation. However, since decision-makers in the alliance member countries usually act in accordance with what they perceive to be their own national interest, competition and conflict also came into play on many occasions.

Fully convinced that simulation exercises similar to this one are valuable for pedagogic, analytical and policy purposes, we would like to share our experiences with other simulation-oriented institutions and agencies. We will give an account in summary form of the structure of the exercise, the techniques used, the actual operations performed, and the lessons learned. In our conclusions, we will suggest the changes we plan to make in future simulation exercises, particularly as far as student preparation and the use of computers are concerned.

STRUCTURE AND TECHNIQUES

By definition, a simulation is an operating model of a process, designed for learning or research. It gives the participants an opportunity to experience the complexity of the international situation by confronting them with internal and external considerations based on the actual economic and political capabilities of the nation-states they represent.

Delegation Make-Up

In our NATO simulation, five participants for each country formed the delegations for the exercise. The delegates functioned as decision-makers in the following roles: (1) Foreign Affairs Minister, (2) Permanent Representative to NATO (Ambassador rank), (3) three Deputy

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[1] They were Dillard University, Florida State University, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University in New Orleans, Loyola University, Southern University, Tulane University, the University of Alabama, the University of South Alabama, the University of Southern Mississippi, the University of Southwestern Louisiana, and Xavier University.

[2] They were Dr. Alan T. Leonhard, LSUNO; Dr. Victor H. Gibean, University of Alabama; and Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, University of Pennsylvania. Financial support was provided by grants from NATO and the Hugh Moore Fund, which are gratefully acknowledged.

Foreign Affairs Diplomats for the following committees: Political, Military, and Nuclear Defense Affairs.

The Foreign Affairs Minister embodied the tasks of the administration of his particular country, and in this role was to make decisions on both internal and external affairs based on his country's economic and political factors during any given time period.

The Permanent Representative to NATO was head of the national delegation accredited to NATO. It was his responsibility to coordinate the activities of the delegation within NATO and assist the Foreign Affairs Minister in formulating the nation's foreign policy. In the simulation he could also play a double role by acting as an administrator assisting with the planning of domestic policy.

The Deputy Foreign Affairs Diplomats served as delegation representatives to the three committees mentioned above. Their task was to discuss, investigate and attempt to resolve the strategic, political and economic problems of NATO referred to earlier. These individuals also played dual roles by assisting in the formulation of foreign and domestic policy.

Task Requirements

In order to ensure realism of the exercise, the first task of the participants was to review the economic, military and political characteristics of the nation-state they represented. They had to determine the wealth of their nations in terms of Basic Capabilities (gross national product being represented in a ratio of 100 BC's equals 1 billion U.S. dollars), their military strength (Force Capability), Units of Capital (the value of factories, tools or machines), Capital Investment (investments in factories, tools or machines), Basic Resources (national resources, raw materials), Population (work force, skills), and Research and Development (research to raise the level of technology).

The next task was to determine the internal needs of their states based on certain indicators such as Domestic Satisfaction and Satisfaction with Foreign Affairs.[3] A number of formulas were used to calculate these factors which enabled the participants to determine the saliency of their system.

Once the level of Domestic Satisfaction and Satisfaction with Foreign Affairs was established, the delegations had to prepare a Statement of Goals and Strategies based on the needs of their nation-states and the demands of the international environment. Next, they had to fashion a budget based on the following categories: (1) Consumption Satisfaction, (2) Capital Investment, (3) Research and Development, (4) Force Capability, and (5) Decision Latitudes. An example of this appears in Table I.

The critical mission of each delegation was to guide its country through two simulated time periods (April 1966-1967 and April 1967-1968) without losing office or creating an unstable system. Their actions and decisions would be evaluated throughout these time periods and calculated according to prescribed formulas. At the end of each period the delegations were to be given the results of their performance based upon their internal planning and their participation in the NATO system. (See Table II for example.)

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[3] For definition of these terms, see Harold Guetzkow and Cleo H. Cherryholmes, *Inter-Nation Simulation* (Instructor's Guide) (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1966).

Computer Program

Since a large amount of statistics had to be handled effectively and speedily, the computer was a valuable asset. The computer program included checking arithmetic of all calculations made by the decision-makers, a print-out to show collectively all trade agreements (amounts and countries involved), and a final print-out that gave the characteristics to be used in the next simulated run. (See Table III.) Perhaps the most important phase of the computer program was a check on the probability of continued officeholding, which was based on the current

TABLE I

BUDGET ALLOCATIONS

Fund	*Per Cent Allocated Last Session*	*Range of Allowable Change*	*Per Cent Allocated This Session*
Capital Investment (maximum of 20 per cent)	15.0	2.0	
Consumption Satisfaction	78.0	2.0	
Force Capability	5.0	3.0	
Research and Development (maximum of 5 per cent)	2.0	1.0	
Decision Latitude (maximum of 10 per cent)	0.0	10.0	
Total (must equal 100 per cent)	100.0		

The above budget allocation represents the allocations in a previous simulated run. That below represents a hypothetical change in budget allocations for a future simulated run, dependent upon the overall Validator Satisfaction of the previous run.

BUDGET ALLOCATIONS

Fund	*Per Cent Allocated Last Session*	*Range of Allowable Change*	*Per Cent Allocated This Session*
Capital Investment (maximum of 20 per cent)	13.0	2.0	
Consumption Satisfaction	80.0	2.0	
Force Capability	5.0	3.0	
Research and Development (maximum of 5 per cent)	2.0	1.0	
Decision Latitude (maximum of 10 per cent)	0.0	10.0	
Total (must equal 100 per cent)	100.0		

budget allocations of the decision-makers and the Satisfaction with Foreign Affairs, a variable determined by the exercise controllers. (See Table IV.) In this way, the delegations were able to have a preview of the outcome of their allocations.

In short, in a relatively brief time each delegation could devise a budget for a particular run or session, check the economic and political effects of its budget on its government's chances for holding office, and make adjustments if necessary by changing the budget or by trade or aid agreements in order to give the country a stable system at the end of the run.

Physical Arrangement of the Exercise

To carry out the exercise, physical arrangements had to be made for a NATO Council of Ministers session, the meetings of the three committees, a control center, and the world newspaper.

TABLE II

PERFORMANCE RESULTS
BELGIUM*

Office Determination: Office Retained	*Session Number 2*
Overall Validator Satisfaction	6 VS
Domestic Satisfaction	14.0 DS
Decision Latitude	5 DL
Force Capability, Conventional	84 FCC's
Force Capability, Nuclear	0 FCN's
Accumulated BCS Defending BCS	0 BCS DEF-BC's
Accumulated BCS Defending FCN's	0 BCS DEF-N's
Basic Resources	.35 BR
Population (in millions)	9.5 P
Population Growth Rate Per Period (per cent)	.6 PGR
Units of Capital	54.0 UC
Capital Depreciation Rate (per cent)	5.0 DR
Research and Development Payoff in BCS	168 BCS
Basic Capability Available for Allocation in Present Period	1806.2

Fund	*Per Cent Allocated Last Session*	*Range of Allowable Change*	*Per Cent Allocated This Session*
Capital Investment (maximum of 20 per cent)	12.0	2.0	
Consumption Satisfaction	80.0	3.0	
Force Capability	3.0	4.0	
Research and Development (maximum of 5 per cent)	5.0	1.0	
Decision Latitude (maximum of 10 per cent)	0.0	10.0	
Total (must equal 100 per cent)	100.0		

*The data in this table on Belgium is representative of that developed for the other fourteen NATO countries during the course of the simulation exercise.

For the Council of Ministers session, the University Center Ballroom was utilized and the fifteen delegations were placed alphabetically in a U-shaped formation. The NATO Secretary-General was in charge of the session, assisted by the Assistant Secretaries-General and administrative personnel.

For the three committee meetings, special rooms were set up with places for all members of all delegations. A NATO Assistant Secretary-General was chairman for each committee.

The control center was designed to act as the nerve center of the exercise. It was sufficiently staffed to cover the areas that would probably have the greatest need for coordination. Both directors functioned in the control center, one as adviser for general NATO affairs, and the other as adviser for computer data. In addition, three faculty advisers for general international affairs and the "world newspaper" were available.

TABLE III

FINAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONS AT END OF SESSION

Country	*DS*	*DL*	*FCC*	*FCN*	*BCDBC*	*BCDN*
Belgium	14.	5.	84.	0.	0.	0.
Netherlands	12.	5.	136.	0.	0.	0.
England	14.	4.	1794.	25.	0.	0.
France	15.	7.	1370.	31.	0.	0.
USA	25.	4.	14020.	328.	48.	285.
Italy	8.	5.	442.	0.	0.	0.
Norway	15.	5.	45.	0.	0.	0.
Greece	5.	7.	32.	0.	0.	0.
Canada	19.	4.	335.	0.	0.	0.
Germany	15.	5.	1074.	0.	0.	0.
Portugal	3.	6.	17.	0.	0.	0.
Luxembourg	26.	5.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Turkey	2.	5.	44.	0.	0.	0.
Iceland	18.	5.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Denmark	17.	5.	49.	0.	0.	0.

Country	*BR*	*POP*	*PGR*	*UC*	*CDR*	*BCS*
Belgium	.35	9.5	.006	54.	.05	1806.
Netherlands	.62	12.5	.014	26.	.08	2026.
England	.62	55.2	.007	318.	.08	10899.
France	.74	49.6	.013	261.	.08	9586.
USA	.84	199.7	.015	427.	.10	71647.
Italy	.46	52.2	.007	258.	.03	6202.
Norway	.81	3.7	.008	25.	.02	755.
Greece	.29	8.6	.006	21.	.01	526.
Canada	.79	20.2	.020	330.	.09	5291.
Germany	.78	59.7	.013	254.	.08	11841.
Portugal	.30	9.2	.008	15.	0.00	417.
Luxembourg	.33	.3	.009	11.	.05	109.
Turkey	.60	33.7	.026	45.	0.00	911.
Iceland	.24	.2	.005	14.	0.00	6.
Denmark	.30	4.8	.008	72.	.03	1045.

TABLE III (continued)

RECORD OF TRADE AGREEMENTS

Type of Trade	*From*	*To*	*Amount*
Capital	Portugal	Iceland	2.
Conventional Force	Canada	Norway	4.
Capital	France	Canada	8.
Basic Resources	Norway	Canada	.
Conventional Force	Canada	France	8.
Basic Resources	Denmark	England	.
Consumer Sat.	England	Denmark	10.
Conventional Force	Greece	France	6.
Capital	France	Portugal	1.

SUMMARY OF TRADE

Country	*BR*	*Capital*	*CS*	*Con For*	*Nuc For*
Belgium	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.0
Netherlands	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.0
England	.02	0.00	—10.00	0.00	0.0
France	0.00	—9.00	0.00	14.00	0.0
USA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.0
Italy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.0
Norway	—.01	0.00	0.00	4.00	0.0
Greece	0.00	0.00	0.00	—6.00	0.0
Canada	.01	8.00	0.00	—12.00	0.0
Germany	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.0
Portugal	0.00	—1.00	0.00	0.00	0.0
Luxembourg	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.0
Turkey	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.0
Iceland	0.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.0

Assisting these advisers were a computer programmer, five control center secretarial staff members and the world newspaper staff.

The world newspaper was crucial in the development of interaction between the domestic politics of the member states and their external policies with regard to NATO. This component was used by control center personnel, the NATO Secretariat, the nation-states, and the newspaper staff representing editorial opinion, to stimulate the international environment. Its staff consisted of an editor, an assistant editor, several reporters and typists.

The delegations were to hold frequent caucuses in order to acquaint themselves with economic, military and political data as they developed and to devise strategies and proposals for the committee and Council sessions. Communications channels between control center and delegations and between delegations were simulated by individuals who served as messengers. A similar arrangement was set up for the world newspaper communications.

OPERATIONS

Preparations

Prior to the exercise, the delegates were furnished with a variety of information deemed necessary for their effective participation. Two packets were mailed. The first provided general information on NATO and included materials furnished by NATO: differences between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, a NATO handbook, and a paper on the future tasks of the alliance. Other information, prepared by the LSUNO Department of Government, included a synopsis of the McMahon Act, rules for parliamentary procedure, and a general introduction to NATO, its background and organization. The second mailing focused on the exercise itself. This packet contained a discussion of simulation, the simulation techniques to be applied to the NATO exercise, specific information on the country to be represented, and a simulation handbook for the use of the delegation.

Exercise Activities

The exercise began officially at 9:00 a.m., April 26, with an orientation session for all participants. In this orientation, a general outline of the procedures and ground rules which the delegations were to follow was given, the scope of the program was reiterated, and questions from participants were answered.

After the orientation, each delegation caucused for thirty minutes to prepare their Main Decision Forms (Budget Allocations, etc.) and their Statements of Goals and Strategies which were to be turned in to control center.

Following this caucus, the committee meetings went into session to discuss the issues selected for the exercise. The control center had given each committee sample resolutions regarding these issues to initiate action.

TABLE IV

SAMPLES OF OUTPUT OF TRIAL BUDGET TEST PROGRAM SHOWING PROBABILITY OF CONTINUED OFFICEHOLDING

Test Number	*Country*	*Chances of Retaining Office*
1	Norway	7 out of 10
1	Netherlands	8 out of 10
1	Turkey	Revolution Possible Chances of Revolution: 9 out of 10 Successful Revolution: 75 out of 100
1	England	9 out of 10
1	Luxembourg	9 out of 10
1	USA	9 out of 10
1	Portugal	6 out of 10
2	Portugal	8 out of 10

At the same time, the Foreign Affairs Ministers were being briefed in more detail as to what the overall operations entailed, for it would be their responsibility, as senior officers, to guide their delegations in the exercise.

With the simulation now moving along, each Permanent Representative to NATO had to keep his Foreign Affairs Minister informed as to the proceedings in the committee meetings and aid him in making decisions regarding trade agreements, treaty negotiations, financial questions, aid given or received, military questions, as well as any other demands made on his nation-state. Members of delegations of different countries entered into negotiations in response to domestic needs and events and the international environment as these were developed by the control center.

Interspersed with these activities were further caucuses held in accordance with the simulated time schedule and designed to allow the delegations to discuss privately the issues at hand and their possible resolution. To aid the participants in reaching rational decisions, faculty advisers provided needed information on difficult aspects of NATO. Their advice allowed deliberations to proceed along useful lines.

In the afternoon of April 26, three scholarly papers on technological cooperation were presented. They assisted the participants in making their decisions, for they were addressed to some of the questions discussed in the committees. After a dinner that evening which featured Philip Farley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, as the main speaker, the committee meetings continued for several hours. A number of resolutions were approved for later introduction in the NATO Council. At this time the last edition of the world newspaper for the day was distributed with information planned to stimulate the next day's deliberation.

The remaining papers of the academicians were presented during the morning of the next day, and the Council of Ministers met in the afternoon. By that time, all participants were fully oriented and had gained valuable experience in the committee sessions. During the Council sessions, four resolutions were introduced. The first advocated that the Secretary-General of NATO make direct contact with his counterpart in the Warsaw Pact or individual members in order to explore the possibility of establishing an atom-free zone in Western Europe in conjunction with an atom-free zone in Eastern Europe. The second resolution opposed the notion that NATO should become a center of political and economic "bridge-building" with East European nations and advocated that only individual countries should work toward this end. The third advocated that a NATO Mediterranean fleet be created with missile detection systems integrated with existing detection systems in NATO Europe, and that the command structure for this fleet be unified and basic strategies and operations be determined by the Military Committee. The fourth resolution advocated that the NATO countries in a unanimous resolution ask that the Vietnamese question be placed in the hands of the United Nations for solution.

After forceful discussion in the Council, none of the resolutions which had already been debated in the committee sessions was able to obtain sufficient support for adoption. Only one resolution was adopted: It advocated that the traditional restrictions existing in trade between NATO countries and European nations be relaxed, but that the execution of this plan be carried out by the individual nations themselves. The difficulty of adopting resolutions in the Council highlights the complex problems existing in NATO and the difficulty of obtaining agreement among the alliance members.[4]

During all proceedings, the world newspaper played an important role.[5] Its materials consisted of two major types: (1) factual news originating during the simulated time period, and (2) hard-core real time news originating from exercise activities. The simulated time news was taken from two different sources: news summaries and news as published during the simulated time period. News summaries taken from *Facts on File* were used for the earlier periods of simulation. They provided overall news trends during the period.

The real time news, which provided input into the simulation derived from the simulation exercise output, consisted of delegation press releases and information gathered by the reporters—factual and otherwise, including resolutions and rumors initiated by delegates. This material provided a real sense of participation among the delegates. The names of delegates were printed whenever possible. The real time news served an integrating function, unifying the whole simulation within a total system of simulated and actual events.

LESSONS LEARNED

One of the most important follow-up techniques of any conference is the collection of participants' critiques to help determine the lessons learned from the program. The NATO exercise was no exception.

The Views of the Students

It is evident from the critiques of the students that one of the most important benefits of the exercise was the remarkable insight it gave participants into the decision-making process of an international organization. It illustrated dramatically the challenges, demands and frustrations to which foreign policy decision-makers are exposed and the importance of their being able to adapt to the international environment and domestic pressures. The following four critiques indicate the way these participants perceived their individual roles in the system.

> Initially, I perceived my role as that of a representative of one member nation in a partnership, aimed at mutual cooperation in a common effort. After the

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[4] The Council sessions were taped and transcripts can be furnished to anyone interested in reading them.

[5] We would like to thank Wilhelm E. A. Wulf for assisting us in preparing the materials on the world newspaper.

exercise began, my role seemed to shift to that of a representative defending his nation's foreign policy, particularly policies which had conflicting effects on the alliance, i.e. needed for security and prosperity and, concomitantly, leading to greater U.S. hegemony. By the end of the first day, my role seemed to shift again to that of an arbitrator, attempting to obtain consensus on overall goals and direction of efforts.

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My role as Permanent Representative to NATO was to (1) help the diplomats in their committee sessions as much as possible, (2) negotiate trades, (3) assist the Foreign Affairs Ministers in making treaties and forming political blocs, and (4) represent my country's views as truly as my knowledge and preparations permitted.

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As Military Affairs diplomat, my role was to carry out the military policies of the country I represented, to keep the rest of the delegation aware of the military situation, both internal and external, and to communicate and discuss jointly with other military delegates, and to cooperate with the other military delegates to work toward both real and theoretical solutions.

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In general, I viewed myself as a member of a committee which had as its goal the reduction of world tensions which result from the existence of polarized nuclear powers. My role was to seek specific proposals to accomplish such a relaxation. These proposals were to be the product of discussion and compromise on the part of myself and my fourteen counterparts.

A second important benefit of the exercise was the newfound appreciation of the participants for the complexity of international negotiations. It clearly dispelled the notion in the minds of many that "simple, forthright" solutions are the answer to international problems. This and the general pedagogic value of the exercise are reflected in the following four critiques:

By participating, I have in some small way experienced the joys, frustrations, and disappointments of "running a nation." I now appreciate more deeply the slow, painful work that is required of our diplomats. It also gave me deep insight into the compromise, give and take, that is so necessary in order to obtain workable and enforceable agreements.

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I have taken several political science courses and even in the courses taken for completion of my major in history, none have had such a great effect upon me as this symposium. It was an excellent practical application of international negotiation. It was set up so that I was able to learn from my mistakes. I really played the part of a representative from Turkey, without realizing the change. It seemed natural to me to resent the U.S.A. when they would not aid in our sought-after goals. The symposium transformed me in spirit into a Turk.

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The exercise turned out to be the greatest course I could ever imagine in the study of NATO. Instead of merely knowing the operational aspects of NATO, actual participation has given me an understanding of NATO which I definitely lacked before the exercise. Also, I would like to mention that even though I represented only France, I feel that I gained considerable knowledge of the views of the other countries represented.

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In participating in the simulation, I was made to read material and digest ideas which, otherwise, I probably would never have read. I was also faced with the problem of defending my stand on certain issues against some very "stubborn opposition". This forced me to face some facts and make some decisions which might have floated around in my mind for years. Besides all this, I learned much new material on NATO, Germany, and other countries which will help me greatly later. The simulation also placed into perspective the main elements which must be considered in making decisions which would influence more people than just me.

The simulation exercise gave rise also to occasional feelings of disillusionment regarding the decision-making process in the international arena. One may agree or disagree with the perception of this individual, but it does represent a valid viewpoint.

> Because of the dehumanization of the exercise via the methods employed, I am afraid I did not gain as much from this exercise as I would have liked, aside from the rather dubious opportunity to witness "inaction in action." If this, as it was in the exercise, is actually what decision-making is really like, I can only pity those who must engage in it and I can only suggest that it is time for a change, not mimicry.

Evaluation of the Directors

In general, we considered the NATO simulation exercise a success inasmuch as it demonstrated that a coalition situation such as the NATO alliance is susceptible to the same simulation techniques used for adversary situations in the international arena. Moreover, from a substantive standpoint, the exercise proved to be a useful tool to examine some of the issues facing NATO and their implications, discuss solutions, and advance proposals for NATO's future role.

The simulation exercise is a man-machine game. This one presented particular problems in the relationship between computer information and deliberations in the committees and Council of Ministers. Part of the difficulty was the limited time given to proper orientation of the participants and their consequent delay in grasping the functions they had to perform. Many had participated in Model United Nations sessions, but none had ever been in an exercise where their actions would be evaluated not only on the basis of their substantive knowledge of NATO and its environment, but also on how they could apply and integrate the data into rational decisions. If the exercise had lasted three to five days, this knowledge gap would have been reduced and the full expertise of participating in a man-machine game would have been acquired.

We also recognize that some delegations lacked the necessary preparation for this exercise. Most of them had some information about the countries they were to represent, but few were prepared at a desirable depth. The information most lacking pertained to the foreign policy objectives and general goals and strategies of the individual nation-states. Information on NATO was generally good, as both the LSUNO Department of Government and NATO itself had provided much of it. In the future a bibliography on each country and on the NATO questions to be discussed should be furnished to each participant. Since simulation was a new experience to most delegates, it became clear that more careful advance instruction about the use of computers to evaluate decisions must be made available to participants in future exercises.

Simulation and Computers

The computer program must be broadened, for the criteria used to measure the effectiveness of the delegations, i.e., the stability of their simulated governments, do not fully reflect the decision-making proficiency of the participants in an alliance situation. Other criteria such as improvements in military security, economic position and political influence in the international arena may be better indicators of successful foreign policy decisions, provided the proper variables for inputs into the computer can be operationalized.

The method of quantifying the efforts of the participants must take into consideration the foreign policy objectives of the NATO partners in order to obtain an optimum objective evaluation of their performance. This would also contribute to a badly needed refinement in the calculation of the Satisfaction with Foreign Affairs (SFA). Subjective calculations regarding this factor were made by control center personnel after reviewing the role of the participants in the NATO meeting deliberations and their relationships with other nation-states recorded on their Main Decision Forms (MDF). This is a difficult and cumbersome task for the small control center group and slows down its operations. Perhaps a combination of subjective and objective techniques may be utilized. In any event, the method must be improved in order to obtain better simulation results.

The computer program may also have to be broadened in the sense that nation-state functions in the international environment need to be expressed in more concrete terms. The simulation apparatus deals in units. For example, 50 FC's may equal the total force capacity available to a country. The participants, however, preferred to talk of actual numbers of troops, weapons cost, and the like. Although these figures are not available in precise costs, an effort must be made to simulate costs in terms of concrete factors and then calculate them in units for computation. The same applies for trade and other agreements among the alliance partners.

The World Newspaper

The world newspaper was virgin territory for its staff. A number of insights have been gained through this simulation with respect to the framework and functions of a world newspaper and its relationship to the total simulation concept.

The major error was the failure of the editors to complete the simulated time news prior to the simulation exercise. Prior preparation is vital so as to release the staff to collect real time news which can be critical to the success or failure of the total exercise. The importance of some kind of world newspaper cannot be overrated. Its main functions, namely, providing chronological simulation continuity and delegation stimulation, are vital elements in the overall design of a simulated international relations system.

FUTURE NATO SIMULATION EXERCISES

The success of the NATO simulation exercise suggests that future programs should be scheduled. Several factors have led us to this conclusion: (1) the obvious benefits to the participants for their education and training; (2) their high interest in such a program and their willingness and desire to participate; (3) the systematic introduction of students to the functions, problems and value of the NATO organization; (4) the potential development of the program as a research technique to study the roles and tasks of NATO; and (5) the development of Atlantic Community concepts in potential leaders.

With these factors in mind, and strengthened by the suggestions of several of the delegation advisers, we recommend additional simulation exercises in American, Canadian and European universities. Since in 1969 we observe the twentieth birthday of NATO it is a propitious year for such exercises.

As far as our future NATO simulations are concerned, we propose to make three changes which have been indicated in this report. First, we favor the enlargement of each delegation from five to ten members. The reason is twofold: to enable the delegates simulating the decision-makers of the nation-states to divide the labor necessary in the decision-making process, and to increase the committees from three to six in number in order to cover the full range of deliberations in NATO. Perhaps one committee can function on an *ad hoc* basis to serve for immediate consultation on pressing problems in response to the Secretary-General's wishes.

This ties in with the second proposal for increasing the length of the exercise from two to five days. In most of the participants' critiques, the factor of time was brought up. As pointed out earlier, they were just getting a feel for the proper functioning of the simulation and the use of the computer when the program ended. Three days would have been more productive, but the limitation of funds prevented an extension for even several hours. On a five-day schedule, we could include one full day of orientation in simulation techniques, especially the computer process, and a briefing on NATO problems by experts.

The third proposal is to increase the function of the computer—not by eliminating or decreasing the function of the participant, but rather by developing the program so that the participant can utilize the computer better in making his decisions. For example, participants may be able to inquire from the computer what impact military aid agreements and trade agreements may have on their countries before the transactions are actually carried out. Furthermore, additional criteria must be developed to measure by computer the effectiveness of the decision-making of the delegates within the context of the foreign policy objectives of their countries.

We are convinced that the suggested changes will add materially to the realism of the exercise, increase its pedagogic value, and result in a more effective tool to examine the functions and problems of NATO.

Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes. By Amitai Etzioni. New York: The Free Press, 1968. 698 pp. $10.95. Developing a model for the analysis of societal and political processes, Professor Etzioni examines the instruments of societal control and the processes of consensus formation, especially in post-industrial social systems. He views an active society as one responsive to changes in the composition of its membership and engaged in continual self-transformation.

The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society. By Peter F. Drucker. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 394 pp. $7.95. The author intends this book as an " 'early-warning system,' reporting discontinuities which, while still below the visible horizon, are already changing [the] structure and meaning of economy, polity and society." He believes these discontinuities exist in such areas as new technologies, the growth of a world economy, new socio-political realities in pluralistic institutions, and the new knowledge based on mass education, and are likely to mold and shape our future.

Behavioralism in Political Science. Edited by Heinz Eulau. New York: Atherton Press, 1969. 158 pp. $6.95 ($2.95, paper). Essays by David Easton, David B. Truman, Robert A. Dahl, Leo Strauss, Christian Bay and Peter H. Merkl combine to present arguments in support, and in criticism, of behavioral approaches to the study of political science. In an introductory essay, the editor attempts to reconcile contending approaches and to re-establish a dialogue between tradition and innovation in the discipline.

Computers and the Policy-Making Community: Applications to International Relations. Edited by Davis B. Bobrow and Judah L. Schwartz. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 374 pp. $12.50. In a collection of essays on the application of digital computers to the conduct of research and analysis in International Relations, the contributors examine the logic of computing machinery, computer languages, information retrieval, content analysis in political research, simulations and war games, the study of international interaction, the Monte Carlo method, and artificial intelligence and international relations.

The Democratic Experience: Past and Prospects. By Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul E. Sigmund. New York: Praeger, 1969. 192 pp. $5.95. In the first half of this book, Niebuhr examines the rise of representative government in the West and those elements that contributed to the success of this form of government—e.g., national unity, individualism, the internal balance of forces that encouraged government by compromise. Sigmund then applies Niebuhr's framework to the developing areas to show where these elements are or are not present and where free government may or may not develop. "Both authors have been guided by the belief that democracy is neither a universal panacea nor, at the other extreme, merely a cultural monopoly of the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian world."

The Ecumenical Movement in World Affairs. By Darril Hudson. Washington: The National Press, 1969. 286 pp. $6.95. Dr. Hudson, Assistant Professor at California State College at Hayward and Honorary Archivist of the Life and Work Archives of the World Council of Churches library, traces the activities of the Christian churches' ecumenical organizations (i.e., international, interdenominational) as they have attempted to influence world affairs through pressure on international conferences and organizations and national governments. The study begins with the Hague Peace Conference in 1907; describes the great ecumenical conferences at Edinburgh (1910), Stockholm (1925), and Oxford (1937); and treats of the formation of the Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches in 1938. A final chapter discusses postwar developments and the central role of the WCC, formally established in 1948.

Experiences. By Arnold Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 417 pp. $8.75. This sequel to *Acquaintances* (1967) is as close to an autobiography as Arnold Toynbee expects to write. In the first part he traces the major events of his life and writes of his personal beliefs, attitudes toward old age, bereavement and death, the nature of the universe, sin, conscience, love, self-centeredness, efficacy of prayer, and ultimate reality. In the second part he surveys and comments on human affairs in his lifetime: the world revolution, war and militarism, race relations, genocide, science and technology, education, and the welfare state. In a brief final section, he provides a checklist of current problems facing mankind.

International Law: Current and Classic. By Richard N. Swift. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969. 558 pp. n.p. Designed as an introductory text, this volume covers such topics as the nature, bases and sources of international law, membership in the international community, continuity of states and state succession, the individual and international law, the law of the sea, relations among states, and force and international law.

International Relations: The World Community in Transition. By Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins. (Third edition.) Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969. 799 pp. $8.95. The latest edition of this basic text attempts to take account of revolutionary developments in the world as well as in the study of International Relations. The first part treats the principles, instruments, institions and techniques of international relations while the second deals with contemporary world problems.

The Law of Nations. By J. E. S. Fawcett. New York: Basic Books, 1969. 195 pp. $4.95. A nontechnical account of what international law is, how it works, and why it sometimes does not work. The author examines how far the writ of international law extends, the needs that brought it into being, the forces that have molded it, the instruments through which it is expressed, and the use that has been and can be made of it in resolving conflicts and seeking just settlements. Mr. Fawcett, a Fellow of All Souls College at Oxford, also discusses the problems of sovereignty, recognition, self-determination, human rights, peace-keeping, and international organizations.

Major Legal Systems in the World Today. By René David and John E. C. Brierly. New York: The Free Press, 1969. 528 pp. $10.95. This is the English translation and adaptation of Professor David's *Les Grands systèmes de droit contemporains* (1966, 2nd edition), prepared by Professor Brierly of the Faculty of Law, McGill University. It provides an analysis of the general characteristics, spirit and philosophy that lie behind the development of four principal series of legal systems: the common law (English and American), the civil law (Romano-Germanic), socialist law (Soviet), and religious and traditional law (Muslim, Hindu, Chinese, Japanese and African).

Men Who Play God: The Story of the H-Bomb and How the World Came to Live with It. By Norman Moss. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 352 pp. $6.95. A British journalist considers "how the hydrogen bomb got here, how and why it was created, the way people learned to use it and not to use it, and how a place was found for it in the world." More than the scientific-military-political history of the bomb's development, his is a story of the problems it has given rise to and the personalities involved with them. His portraits-in-depth of physicist Edward Teller, strategic analyst Herman Kahn and British conscientious protester Mrs. Pat O'Connell synthesize three aspects of the thermonuclear age.

Of Powers and Their Politics: A Critique of Theoretical Approaches. By Arthur Lee Burns. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 299 pp. $7.50. The author reviews and criticizes major theories about systemic change, the nature of power, and the dynamics of power relations among nations. Included are materials on game theory and the concept of probability.

On Escalation. By Herman Kahn. (Revised edition.) Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968. 308 pp. $1.65 (paper). A revised and updated version of the original work, published in 1965, in which the author analyzes the dynamics of escalation and illustrates the intensification of conflict by means of an escalation ladder, culminating in all-out war. He also shows how the potential tactics of two opponents might be influenced by the existence of thresholds.

Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association Second Conference. (Two volumes.) New York: Humanities Press, 1969. 415 pp.; 388 pp. $24.00. A compilation of papers delivered at the Second General Conference of the International Peace Research Association held in Sweden in 1967. The first volume covers such topics as Peace Theory and Peace Research, Studies in Conflicts and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. The second includes essays on the general subject of Poverty, Development and Peace.

Systems, States, Diplomacy, and Rules. By J. W. Burton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968. 251 pp. $7.00. In addition to an examination of general systems theory as it relates to the study of International Relations, this volume contains chapters on power relationships, intervention, decision-making, diplomacy and international conflict.

Technocracy. By Jean Meynaud. New York: The Free Press, 1968. 315 pp. $12.95. Believing that the politician in modern societies has been dispossessed of his power by technocrats who attempt to apply specialized technologies in government for the management of human affairs, the author assesses the advantages and disadvantages for society in being ruled by the "experts." In addition to tracing the ascendancy of technocrats from the fields of economics and military strategy, the study analyzes the nature and implications of their tools for decision-making.

Treaties and Alliances of the World: An International Survey Covering Treaties in Force and Communities of States. By Keesing's Publications Ltd. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968. 214 pp. $10.00. This reference work furnishes essential information on international agreements presently in force: time and place of signing; participating nations and their representatives; the general purpose of the agreement; principal provisions; and a concise history of how it originated. Numerous maps and charts facilitate reading and understanding of the various agreements and their operations.

The Treaty Trap. By Laurence W. Beilenson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 344 pp. $7.00. An impartial analysis of the history of treaty-making and treaty-breaking over the past 300 years in Europe and North America. Mr. Beilenson, a prominent Los Angeles attorney, has painstakingly examined every important political treaty since 1648 to determine whether it was broken by one or more of the signatories, why it was broken or honored, and what the result was in relation to its objectives. He seeks to determine whether there has been any consistent pattern of performance and breach, warns of the perils of excessive reliance on treaty-observance, and draws up a set of suggested guides for when to rely on existing treaties and when to make future ones. The book contains a complete set of citations to the texts of political treaties mentioned, and lengthy notes, references and bibliography.

World War II and Its Origins: International Relations, 1929-1945. By Pierre Renouvin. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 402 pp. $8.50. The first half of this study is devoted to a review of international diplomacy, economic crises, the growth of German, Italian and Japanese expansionism, the Spanish Civil War, the arms race, and the ultimate failure of collective security in the decade before World War II. In the second half, the author, a renowned French historian, examines wartime strategy and diplomacy, belligerence and neutrality, the fall of France, the heroic resistance of England, the vicissitudes of Allied diplomacy, and the defeat of the Axis powers.

II. UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The American Empire. By Amaury de Riencourt. New York: The Dial Press, 1968. 366 pp. $7.50. A stimulating and provocative interpretation of America's "imperial destiny as the Rome of the modern world. . . . The growth of an American empire is not a temporary aberration due to the nefarious activities of the last power-grabbing Presidents of the United States, as asserted in the 1967 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report; it becomes the logical outcome of centuries of historical development, and not merely of American historical developments but of worldwide trends." In Europe, de Riencourt argues, the best hope is no longer for a united Europe but for an Atlantic Confederation under American hegemony. He believes that eventually the world will be controlled by a U.S.-Russian condominium, with Russia clearly the junior partner.

America's Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy. By Gottfried Dietze. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 298 pp. $7.95. A pessimistic evaluation of the "progress" of American democracy. Professor Dietze believes the march of democracy has made government less reasonable, eliminated constitutional checks upon the majority, restricted essential human rights, and resulted in a foreign policy that jeopardizes national security. He "does not share the general opinion that the United States has a long way to go toward egalitarian democracy, but asserts that on the road in that direction America has moved too much away from libertarian values."

Canada and Three Crises. By Robert W. Reford. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. 246 pp. $5.00. A journalist who is presently United Nations correspondent for the *Montreal Star* examines Canada's reaction to three world crises—the offshore islands of China, Suez in 1956, and the Cuban missile crisis—and finds her foreign policy consistent with national considerations, Western commitments and the thesis of middle power influence. Although the reaction was different in each crisis, "in turn [the] rebellious, resourceful and reluctant [ally]," the underlying motives of the government were essentially the same: the control of pressure points under UN supervision and the prevention of a world conflagration.

The Discipline of Power. By George W. Ball. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968. 363 pp. $7.50. George Ball argues that America's priority of interests lies in the Northern Zone, which includes Western Europe, Canada, the Soviet Union and Japan—and, for special reasons of geography and history, Latin America. U.S. foreign policy must therefore seek a better allocation of power among the industrialized countries and an improved East-West balance. Although a united Europe will shed American influence, the unification of Europe is in the U.S. interest, for a third power is needed to alter the inherently dangerous bipolar system and to share international responsibilities. The Middle East, Asia and Africa—the peripheral Southern areas—are of secondary interest only; there is no need to fear them falling into a closed system, because internal diversification renders these regions' problems unsolvable. The discipline of power calls for America's realization of her priority of interests. Accordingly, Ball advises the United States to recognize Red China and to get out of the war in Viet Nam.

George Washington. By Woodrow Wilson. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. 333 pp. $8.50 ($2.45, paper). In his introduction to this edition of a biography first published in 1896, Professor Marcus Cunliffe concedes that "Woodrow Wilson's biography of George Washington is no masterpiece. Rather, read in the context of Wilson's own life, this biography tells us at least as much about the twenty-eighth President of the United States as about the first." Its main value "lies . . . in the clues it offers to his [Wilson's] temperament during the pre-political stage of his development."

The Legislative Process in the U.S. Senate. Edited by Lawrence K. Pettit and Edward Keynes. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. 309 pp. n.p. A collection of articles treating such topics as the recruitment, style and norms of Senators, institutional constraints imposed by committee characteristics and Senate roles, and characteristics of leadership and influence in the U.S. Senate. Authors include Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lawrence K. Pettit, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., and Donald R. Mathews. The volume might prove especially useful in courses on American Government.

Never Again: A President Runs for a Third Term. By Herbert S. Parmet and Marie B. Hecht. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 306 pp. $6.95. A thorough coverage of the personalities, conventions, campaigns and issues of the Presidential election of 1940 in which Roosevelt defeated Willkie and won a third term in office.

The Professional Diplomat. By John Ensor Harr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 404 pp. $11.50. In this valuable study of the U.S. Foreign Service as an organization and as a relatively small group of professional diplomats, the author describes the postwar forces of change that have challenged the organization and its personnel and the latter's response to them. He describes the composition, social origins, characteristics, norms and attitudes of the corps and its coordination and leadership, and sets forth a managerial strategy for the future. Harr served as a staff member of the Commission on Foreign Affairs Personnel in 1962 and as Director of the Office of Management Planning in the State Department for four years.

Tangle of Hopes: American Commitments and World Order. By Ernst B. Haas. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 306 pp. $7.95. Professor Haas examines the impact of U.S. policies on international organizations since World

War II, as well as the implications of American activities in such organizations for subsequent U.S. policy and attitudes. Included is an assessment of the manner in which the American government and people have adjusted to disappointments in the operation of postwar international organizations.

Washington. By Douglas Southall Freeman; an abridgment by Richard Harwell. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968. 780 pp. $14.95. An abridgment in one volume of the seven-volume life of George Washington, originally published between 1948 and 1957. For this biography, Dr. Freeman, who died in 1953, was awarded posthumously his second Pulitzer Prize.

III. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

Anatomy of Europe. By Anthony Sampson. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 462 pp. $7.95. The author examines the principal forces making for greater unity in Western Europe, including the role of advanced technology, the spread of mass consumption, increased communication and movement of persons, and the institutions of such "European" organizations as the EEC.

The Arms of Krupp, 1587-1968. By William Manchester. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968. 976 pp. $12.50. Based upon numerous interviews and other documentation, including letters and transcripts from the Nuremberg trials, this lengthy study describes the development of the Krupp dynasty and assesses its impact on German military capabilities, with especial attention to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and the two world wars. The author also evaluates the contribution of Krupp to postwar German economic recovery and West European economic integration.

Decision for Europe: The Necessity of Britain's Engagement. By J. L. Zaring. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. 221 pp. $6.95. Besides describing the achievements, problems and failures of the Common Market and examining British policy toward European integration, this book contains the author's proposals for British initiatives to gain admission to the EEC. Britain's participation, it is argued, is essential to the revitalization of the European integration movement.

Experiment in Internationalism: A Study in International Politics. By John H. MacCallum Scott. New York: Hillary House, 1967. 223 pp. $7.50. This report on the international activities of the European Liberal parties in the postwar period describes how the Liberal International came to be established, its ideas and personalities, the difficulties of securing cooperation between liberals of widely differing national backgrounds, and the process by which a general body of liberal thought was formed with special emphasis on European integration, Atlantic cooperation, and the Free World-communist bloc conflict. The author was instrumental in the creation of the Liberal International and served as its secretary general until 1957.

John F. Kennedy and a Uniting Europe. By George M. Taber. Bruges, Belgium: College of Europe, 1969. 188 pp. n.p. The author traces the course of U.S. support for European integration and an Atlantic partnership and expresses the hope that a continuation of the partnership concept will ensure the future viability of U.S.-European cooperation. He maintains that cooperation now depends upon the activities of Europeans: if they can break the present deadlock and begin a new drive toward greater economic and political unity, Atlantic ties will be strengthened. At the same time, he believes it would be harmful to trans-Atlantic cooperation if the impetus toward European integration were provided primarily by the fear of U.S. hegemony over European affairs.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Ordeal of Total War: 1939-1945. By Gordon Wright. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 315 pp. $7.95. This volume, the final in the series "The Rise of Modern Europe," examines Europe's efforts to cope with the demands of a protracted and total conflict such as World War II. The author assesses both the impact of economic, psychological and scientific factors on the war's outcome and the effect the war had on European political and social institutions, attitudes and forms of intellectual and cultural expression.

Waterloo: Day of Battle. By David Howarth. New York: Atheneum, 1968. 239 pp. $7.95. Based on 18 principal eyewitness accounts, as well as biographies, memoirs and letters, this study recreates the Battle of Waterloo as observed by participants in this great military encounter. Many maps and pictures supplement the text.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Agricultural Workers in the U.S.S.R. 1969. 139 pp. $5.00.
Justice and the Legal System in the U.S.S.R. 1968. 152 pp. $5.00.
The Soviet Police System. 1968. 103 pp. $5.00.
The Soviet Political System. 1968. 144 pp. $5.00.

Edited by Robert Conquest. New York: Praeger. Four additional studies in the Contemporary Soviet Union Series: Institutions and Policies. Previous volumes have dealt with industrial workers, politics of ideas, nationalities policy, and religion. The first of these books focuses on the vicissitudes and condition of the peasant—the results of collectivization, the extent and role of the private plot, his wages, working hours, trade-union dealings, housing, community life, price-and-quota system, and cultural amenities. The second, based almost entirely on Soviet sources, provides a clear theoretical and practical account of the machinery and principles of Soviet law, examines official attitudes toward the law, shows how the emphasis of the law varies in relation to the immediate needs of the political system and party, and treats of communal forms of justice, such as comrades' courts and collective probation. In the third volume, Conquest examines the development of the police apparatus from the Cheka to the KGB, the size, organization and personnel of the police forces, methods and examples of repression and purges, the relationship of police to judiciary, police penal and economic functions, and operations abroad. The final volume treats of the development of the constitution, the territorial-administrative and electoral systems, the supreme soviets, the Council of Ministers, the local soviets, the organization and principles of the party, and its relation to the state administration.

Communist International Economics. By P. J. D. Wiles. New York: Praeger, 1969. 566 pp. $12.50. Professor Wiles of London University, one of the West's leading scholars on the Soviet economic system, starts with a general discussion of the Marxist economic tradition with regard to foreign trade and proceeds to cover every aspect of the international economics of communist countries, including inflation, balance of payments, trade structure, Comecon, bilateralism and multilateralism, economic warfare, exchange rates, terms of trade, capital transactions, and autarky.

The Czech Black Book. Edited by Robert Littell. New York: Praeger, 1969. 303 pp. $6.95. An on-the-scene account of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia prepared by members of the Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. In recording the events of August 21 to 27, 1968 these intellectuals have compiled eyewitness testimony, official government and party announcements and documents, union bulletins, speeches, leaflets, radio broadcasts, and newspaper articles.

Czechoslovakia's Blueprint for "Freedom." Introduction and analysis by Paul Ello. Washington: Acropolis Books, 1968. 304 pp. $2.95 (paper). A compilation of the most important documents relating to developments in Czechoslovakia in 1968, each accompanied by analysis provided by Dr. Ello of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967. By Adam B. Ulam. New York: Praeger, 1968. 775 pp. $12.95. A comprehensive chronological and analytical history of Soviet foreign relations since 1917. Professor Ulam emerges with many startling and important conclusions, for example: The USSR's troubles with the satellites have forced her "to question the whole premise of Communist expansion: is the game still worth playing? It is no longer creating satellites; it is even doubtful whether it is producing allies. Communist countries, even small ones, loom as future liabilities rather than assets." "From the Soviet point of view nuclear proliferation is no longer as important as it was when China was still without nuclear weapons. Now that the most dangerous proliferation of all has taken place, much of the original Soviet urgency in barring the spread of nuclear weapons is gone."

"June 22, 1941": Soviet Historians and the German Invasion. By Vladimir Petrov. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968. 322 pp. $5.95. In the summer of 1965, Aleksandr M. Nekrich's book about the origins of World War II, *June 22, 1941,* was published in Moscow. It was at first praised but later came under a barrage of criticism which led in July 1967 to his expulsion from the ranks of the Soviet Communist Party and presumably finished his career as a prominent Soviet historian. Professor Petrov of George Washington University provides an analysis of l'Affaire Nekrich, a translation of the book and reviews and other documents pertaining to the case.

Prague's 200 Days: The Struggle for Democracy in Czechoslovakia. By Harry Schwartz. New York: Praeger, 1969. 274 pp. $5.95. An account of "the spontaneous and courageous attempt at self-liberation Czechoslovakia made in the incredible '200 days' from January 5 to August 20, 1968." The *New York Times*' specialist on communist affairs sketches in the background covering the period 1948 to 1967, presents a month-by-month account of the events of 1968, and concludes with chapters on the invasion and its aftermath.

The Russian Empire: 1801-1917. By Hugh Seton-Watson. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. 813 pp. $10.00. In this third volume in The Oxford History of Modern Europe series, the well-known Professor of Russian History at the University of London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies has centered his attention on political and social history—the history of institutions, classes, political movements and individuals. Foreign policy is discussed from the Russian rather than the general European aspect.

The Soviet Union: The Fifty Years. Edited by Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, A New York Times Book, 1967. 484 pp. $10.00. A collection of essays on Soviet society, economy, education, housing, arts and letters, science and technology, military capabilities, religion, and diplomacy by such specialists as Harrison E. Salisbury, Fred M. Hechinger, Harold C. Schonberg, Clive Barnes, Theodore Shabad, Walter Sullivan and Hanson Baldwin.

Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II. Edited by Seweryn Bialer. New York: Pegasus, 1969. 644 pp. $10.00. This account of the Soviet war effort by Stalin's associates casts light on the decision-making process in the Soviet High Command and the relationships that existed within the Command between Stalin and his generals and among the Soviet military leaders. It also rounds out as an assessment of Stalin's contributions to and mistakes in the strategic and tactical planning of Soviet war operations.

V. Middle East and Africa

Eastern African History (Boston University Papers on Africa, Volume III). 245 pp. $17.50.

Western African History (Boston University Papers on Africa, Volume IV). 258 pp. $15.00.

Edited by Daniel F. McCall, Norman R. Bennett and Jeffrey Butler. New York: Praeger, 1969. These companion volumes, published as Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs, continue the series on African history resulting from quarterly seminars conducted by the African Studies Center of Boston University. *Eastern African History* spans the prehistoric to the colonial eras with more than half the volume devoted to the pre-19th century, its eight papers drawing on linguistics, archaeology and anthropology to elucidate the geography, religion, economy and politics of the area. *Western African History* has a somewhat more recent focus: four chapters deal with Islam, Christianity and traditional or tribal religions; three with indigenous, colonial and settler politics; and the remaining two with trade.

Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension. By J. C. Hurewitz. New York: Praeger, 1969. 550 pp. $3.95 (paper). A thorough examination of civil-military relations in each country of the Middle East, defined as stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan and Pakistan and from the Sudan to Turkey. The author also treats of the Cold War tactics of the Great Powers, the legacies of the Islamic tradition and European imperial styles, armies as agencies of social change, and U.S. policy options.

Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World. By Hisham B. Sharabi. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1969. 176 pp. $1.95 (paper). In this paperback edition of his informative study analyzing the forces that have shaped the Middle Eastern world, Dr. Sharabi classifies the area's post-independence governmental systems as falling into three basic types: monarchical, republican multiparty, and revolutionary single-party systems. He assesses current revolutionary forces, devoting special consideration to the movements in Algeria, Egypt and Syria. Useful documents pertaining to the Middle East are included.

Persian Kingship in Transition. By E. A. Bayne. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1968. 288 pp. $7.50. Based on a series of revealing conversations the author has had with the Shah of Iran since 1948, this book attempts to show how the Persian ruler has guided his nation through a critical and dynamic transitional era that has witnessed profound changes in Iran's internal power structure, economy and world outlook.

The Search for Peace in the Middle East. By Samuel Merlin. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1968. 490 pp. $8.50. The story of the campaign to find a Middle East settlement which President Bourguiba of Tunisia launched in Jerusalem in March 1965 and continued in a sustained manner until September of that year, and of his frequent efforts since then, especially after the Six-Day War of June 1967, to devise an acceptable solution. The author, an Israeli citizen and Director of Political Studies for the Institute for Mediterranean Affairs in New York, asserts that Bourguiba "acted out of self-interest in trying to stem the aggressive and expansionist drive of President Nasser's pan-Arabism, which he considers the ultimate danger to the independence of each and all of the Arab states."

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta and the PKI. By Sheldon W. Simon. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. 210 pp. $6.95. An examination of the policies and common objectives of Communist China and Sukarno's Indonesia toward Southeast Asia; the movement by the two countries from tacit cooperation to explicit alliance; their efforts to create spheres of influence in, and expel the West from, the area; the attempts by Peking to manipulate leftist elites in Indonesia and bring the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to power by peaceful means; and the revolutionary effects of the abortive communist coup which resulted in a sharp shift to the right in Indonesian politics, the near-destruction of the PKI, and the end of the Peking-Djakarta arrangement.

Chinese Communist Politics in Action. Edited with an introduction by A. Doak Barnett. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969. 620 pp. $12.50 ($3.95, paper). These papers were commissioned by the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council for a conference on the Microsocietal Study of the Chinese Political System. Written by a new generation of young scholars, they focus on particular aspects of the Chinese communist political system at the subnational level and include such topics as: "Mass Mobilization Policies and Techniques Developed in the Period of the Chinese Soviet Republic," "The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949-65," "The Centralized Control of the Communes in the Post-'Great Leap' Period," and "Social Welfare and China's Industrial Workers."

A Cultural History of Tibet. By David Snellgrove and Hugh Richardson. New York: Praeger, 1968. 291 pp. $10.00. In this comprehensive survey of a rapidly vanishing civilization, the authors trace the evolution of Tibetan culture from its 6th century pre-Buddhist origins through the introduction of Buddhism, the emergence of the great monastic houses, the rise of the "Yellow Hats," and the establishment of the Dalai Lama, to the fall of Tibet to the Chinese communists in 1959.

Great Britain and the Taipings. By J. S. Gregory. New York: Praeger, 1969. 271 pp. $8.50. Dr. Gregory, Lecturer in Modern East Asian History at La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia, traces the movement of British policy from a position of neutrality during the Taiping rebellion in the early 1850's to one of limited intervention on the side of the Manchu government in the early 1860's.

Mao. Edited by Jerome Ch'en. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 176 pp. $4.95 ($1.95, paper). This volume, like others in the Great Lives Observed series, examines the character and achievements of an important world figure through his own words, opinions of his contemporaries, and retrospective judgments. Dr. Ch'en, Senior Lecturer at the School of History, University of Leeds, England, quotes Mao on the role of China, war and revolution, the mass line, ideology and culture, imperialism, and the Soviet Union; cites the writings on Mao of contemporaries such as Edgar Snow, Andre Malraux, Lin Piao, A. Doak Barnett, and various Soviet leaders; and presents excerpts evaluating Mao's role in history from his own writings and those of Maurice Meisner and Stuart Schram.

The Modern History of Mongolia. By C. R. Bawden. New York: Praeger, 1968. 460 pp. $11.50. A comprehensive account of modern Mongolia, from its loss of independence and incorporation into the Manchu state at the end of the 17th century to the transformation of a society of nomadic herdsmen into a centrallycontrolled, USSR-oriented, socialist state in which industry and agriculture compete with animal-herding.

Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail. By M. D. Morris, New York: Hawthorn Books, 1968. 238 pp. $6.95. A personalized, journalistic survey of Okinawan events since World War II. Morris expresses the hope that the Ryukyus will not become the battleground for a power struggle between Japan and the United States as the 1970's approach. He believes the average Okinawan is more interested in his own affairs and stability than in the controversial "status" or "reversion" issue.

The Panay Incident: Prelude to Pearl Harbor. By Hamilton Darby Perry. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 295 pp. $6.95. The publisher of *American Heritage* recreates the events surrounding the Japanese bombing and sinking of the U.S.S. *Panay* in December 1937, when the gunboat was evacuating American businessmen, State Department personnel and newsmen from the Nanking area in the midst of the Japanese aggression against China.

People's War: Conditions and Consequences in China and South East Asia. By J. L. S. Girling. New York: Praeger, 1969. 244 pp. $6.50. An explanation of insurgency, the circumstances that create it, the conditions necessary for its success, and the ways in which it can be prevented or suppressed. The author argues that insurgency, or people's war, is not just a matter of military tactics, organizational skill, and a calculated program of force and fraud; it cannot begin until the populace becomes involved, for Asian insurgencies are essentially peasants' wars against the existing system of government. He analyzes the successful "people's wars" in China and Viet Nam, criticizes U.S. policy in Viet Nam and Laos, and shows why counterinsurgencies were successful in Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Mr. Girling, now a Senior Research Fellow at the Australian National University, spent nine years on the research staff of the British Foreign Office and five years in the secretariat of SEATO.

Vietnam: A Political History. By Joseph Buttinger. New York: Praeger, 1968. 565 pp. $10.00. This is a condensation of the author's previous books, *The Smaller Dragon* and *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled* (two volumes). The new book deletes several hundred pages of scholarly apparatus, shortens the narrative, and adds a concluding chapter on "The Americanization of the War," which amounts to a scathing indictment of the U.S. role.

VII. Latin America

Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966. By Andrés Suárez. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967. 266 pp. $7.50 ($2.45, paper). This book does not pretend to be a complete history of Castro's Cuba, but an investigation into some of the most important developments, from the origins of Castroism to the three-way relationship among Cuba, the USSR and Communist China in the mid-1960's. The author examines Castro's decision to affiliate with Moscow, his strategy in managing his regime and his differences with the Soviet Union, the October 1962 missile crisis, and the First Tricontinental Conference.

The Jamaican Economy. By Ransford W. Palmer. New York: Praeger, 1968. 186 pp. $15.00. One of the Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development, this is the work of a Jamaican economist who is currently teaching at the Catholic University of America in Washington. Not since the World Bank report in 1952 has the Jamaican economy been examined so comprehensively. With a systematic, sector-by-sector approach and a wealth of data, Palmer discusses in detail the factors that contributed to Jamaica's phenomenal rate of growth since 1950. He concludes that the government's creation of an institutional environment attractive to private business was a primary stimulant of the dramatic expansion of industry, and that expansion of internal trade is a key requirement for future economic growth.

Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity. By Charles C. Cumberland. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 394 pp. $7.50. A survey of Mexican history since the beginning of the 16th century, with emphasis on the social and economic issues and subjugation of the indigenous peoples that led finally to the explosive violence of the Mexican Revolution.

Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey. By E. Bradford Burns. New York: Praeger, 1968. 158 pp. $5.50. Dr. Burns, author of several other books on Brazil and Associate Professor of History at Columbia University, traces the growth of nationalism in Brazil over four and a half centuries and through three fairly well-defined stages: colonial nativism, 19th-century defensive nationalism, and 20th-century offensive nationalism.

Monographs and Reports Received

ABM: Yes or No? By Donald Brennan, William O. Douglas, Leon Johnson, George S. McGovern and Jerome B. Wiesner. Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, An Occasional Paper, February 1969. 48 pp. $1.00.

American Foreign Policy and Moral Rhetoric: The Example of Vietnam. By David Little. New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1969. 117 pp. $1.75.

Britain and the Developing Countries: South and South-east Asia. Prepared by the Central Office of Information for British Information Services. New York: British Information Services, 1968. 36 pp. $1.30.

Castro, the Kremlin, and Communism in Latin America. By D. Bruce Jackson. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Studies in International Affairs, No. 9, 1969. 163 pp. $2.45 (paper).

Friedrich List, the Zollverein, and the Uniting of Europe. By Emmanuel B. Roussakis. Bruges: College of Europe, 1969. 159 pp. n.p.

The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's. By George Rathjens. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969. 53 pp. 60 cents.

Germany: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 1969. 69 pp. 80 cents.

Greece: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, February 1969. 55 pp. 80 cents.

The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal. Washington: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Special Report Series, No. 8, February 1969. 107 pp. $2.95.

MONOGRAPHS AND REPORTS RECEIVED

Die Interamerikanische Entwicklungsbank. By Albrecht Kruse-Rodenacker. Hamburg: Übersee-Verlag, 1969. 114 pp. DM 13,80.

Ireland: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 1969. 37 pp. 80 cents.

Mexico: Revolution und Verfassung. By Hans-Rudolf Horn. Hamburg: Übersee-Verlag, 1969. 164 pp. DM 15,60.

The NATO Story (2nd edition). By James Robert Huntley. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1969. 119 pp. $1.75.

New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy—a Symposium. By Robert Strausz-Hupé, Ronald Steel, Paul Seabury and Richard A. Falk. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 193, February 1969. 83 pp. 85 cents.

Southeast Asia: A Survey. By Richard Butwell. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 192, December 1968. 63 pp. 85 cents.

Soviet Works on Southeast Asia: A Bibliography of Non-Periodical Literature, 1946-1965. By Peter Berton and Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, School of Politics and International Relations, Far Eastern and Russian Research Series, No. 3, 1967. 201 pp. $4.50.

Spain: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, January 1969. 64 pp. 80 cents.

Sweden: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 1969. 51 pp. 80 cents.

Switzerland: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, January 1969. 46 pp. 80 cents.

United States: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, December 1968. 54 pp. 80 cents.

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